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
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
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SOCIOLOGY
ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND APPLICATIONS



SOCIOLOGY

ITS DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS

BY

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BOOK OF SOCIOLOGY."



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PREFACE

This work is an enlargement and revision of the author's *Sociology* issued in 1909. In it no attempt has been made to work out a system, a sufficient number of which already exist, or to set forth novel and untried hypotheses in social theory. The author has sought rather to give a sort of survey of sociological development, so that the reader interested in social problems, or the student desirous of a comprehensible statement of the main aspects of sociology, may have in fairly brief compass a general view of its rise and its relations to other sciences, a sketch of the development of social institutions, and a short discussion of social problems and of the factors to be considered in social progress.

The volume, as a textbook for college purposes, may be supplemented by more detailed studies and by personal investigations of social conditions on the part of the students. Its reading references, purposely abbreviated, may aid the general reader to follow more closely such aspects as may arouse interest. If both student and reader find the presentation of the subject matter fairly clear and helpful to an understanding of social questions, the purpose of the author will have been fulfilled.

At the present time the whole social world is in ferment as the result of the World War, and the economic and political aspects of European society are in transition, working towards readjustments. No one can foretell what the outcome will be in western civilization, but

Reclaw. 2-15-30 T.E.N

sociology can blaze at least a trail and indicate in a general way the direction that should be taken. Admittedly the science is not an infallible guide in the "no man's land" of social reconstruction. The field it aims to cover is exceedingly complex, and its conclusions must be tentative for many years to come. Yet it is obvious that sociological teachings have already powerfully affected the world's point of view and are rapidly socializing its policies. This task of socializing public opinion is, in the author's opinion, of vital importance to national progress. Sociology, rightly interpreted, voices the safe and sane attitude towards social problems; it avoids, on the one hand, the crude individualism of the Nineteenth Century, and, on the other, that rampant radicalism which favors empty panaceas and short cuts to social perfection. Sociology realizes that evolution is better than revolution, that haste must be made slowly, and that it is no easy task to quicken the leaden feet of Nature.

J. Q. DEALEY.

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PART I
SOCIOLOGY AND ITS KINDRED SCIENCES

SOCIOLOGY

ITS DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATIONS

CHAPTER I

SOCIETY

The Field of Social Science.—Society, social, association, sociology, socialism—these and numerous other kindred words in common use show their relationship to the Latin word *socius*, the root meaning of which involves the notion of companionship or fellowship. This may be interpreted strictly, as to imply a real intimacy of relationship, or loosely, as to suggest merely contiguity or casual intercourse. In the same manner the word “society” may denote a union of persons closely knit together in sympathy and interests, or, on the other hand, a conventional grouping of human beings considered as a unit because of some assumed generic connection. In this latter sense all mankind may be considered as a society, since presumably all races have a common ancestry, a common type of physical body, and, in general, the same physical needs and the same fundamental psychic activities. In other words, they have a common human nature.

From this assumption it would be natural to argue that under similar conditions human beings would act in much the same way and would develop the same sort of social institutions. Of course, conditions rarely, if ever, are quite the same, and consequently there must be real variations in human experience; yet notwithstanding these variations, there are approximations to similarity of conditions sufficiently close to enable the observation of resemblances and differences. This being the case, it is possible to consider society comprehensively, and to speak in a somewhat loose and general fashion of the stages of social evolution, the development of social institutions, and the laws of social progress, applying these notions to all mankind, past or present, irrespective of race or degree of civilization. Such studies, when made, are naturally grouped together under a common heading as *Social Science* or *Sociology*.

Early Theories of Social Development.—It was common enough in the social science of the older, more idealistic sort, like that of Condorcet, for example, to assume the unity of all mankind and to generalize rather loosely in respect to humanity as a whole. Hence there came histories of civilization, philosophies of world history, and sweeping generalizations which were thought to apply indiscriminately to all races at all times and under widely varying conditions of environment. This attitude was largely due to the emphasis placed by the Eighteenth Century on environment and the consequent lack of an appreciation of the importance of heredity. In the Nineteenth Century, however, theories of social development became much more scientific through closer observation and the rise of newer sciences, so that charming generalizations about Humanity in general are not

avored except in utopian literature. Still it must be admitted that some of the many attempts to set forth a comprehensive survey of human development are historically important, and a brief statement of these may prove helpful.

Hesiod's Four Ages.—Ancient social philosophizing had teachings in respect to social evolution and usually assumed a gradual descent from a perfect age to the degenerate days in which the philosopher lived. This is most familiar to us in the tradition of the "fall of man" contained in the book of *Genesis* and elaborated in Milton's *Paradise Lost*. Hesiod (about the Eighth Century B.C.) in his *Works and Days* gives us the familiar classic description of the four ages of man:

First was a golden race of men, that with language are
gifted,
Made by the gods immortal, who hold the Olympian dwell-
ings.
They were in Kronos' time, when he was the ruler of
Heaven.
Like to the gods they lived, and possessed their spirit un-
troubled,
Wholly exempt from toil and misery.¹

Then followed in order descriptions of the ages of silver, bronze, and iron, though between the third and the fourth he inserted the Age of Heroes, the heroes of Thebes and Troy, in recognition of Hellenic greatness as narrated in Homeric epic and story. These four ages typified by the metals are most familiar to us through Ovid, who lived in the time of the Emperor Augustus, and who in his *Metamorphoses* (Book I) described them

¹ See W. C. Lawton, *The Successors of Homer*, p. 57.

along with the story of the flood sent by the gods because of human wickedness.

The Cycle Theory.—The familiar "cycle" theory of development is best given by Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius in discussing the various forms of government. Plato in his *Republic*, when seeking to find Justice "writ large," finds it best in a society organized under the control of an aristocracy, the rule of the wisest and best; society then in descending order degenerates into types hospitable to timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and despotism, and characterized, respectively, by ambition, greed, demagogism, and tyranny. This is the natural *cycle* of human evolution, for in the last stage there comes a revulsion against the tyranny of despotism and a return to an aristocracy, from which again degeneration takes place, and men descend once more through the cycle.

The four stages of Ovid, the cycle theory, and the Hebraic "fall of man" remained as the dominant theories of human development down to modern times, though there were other theories, like that, for example, in which society is compared to a human body having stages of infancy, maturity, and senility, or like the teaching in St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei* that God is in human history, guiding it from immaturity to the perfection of a heavenly State. In the philosophizing of France in the Eighteenth and in the first half of the Nineteenth Centuries, however, historical stages of a social sort began to be emphasized, culminating in the ten epochs of Condorcet and the three stages of Comte.

The Ten Epochs of Condorcet.—Condorcet² in his *Historical View of the Human Mind*, sought to

² He committed suicide 1794 to avoid execution at the guillotine. This work, written shortly before his death, was printed posthumously.

show that man in his history had gone through nine well defined epochs of civilization and was about to enter the tenth and final epoch. He depicts the early stage as made up of wandering hordes grouped into families and having a rude form of government, subsisting by hunting and fishing and having the beginnings of language, arts and morals. From this early stage he represents man as passing into pastoral and agricultural stages, followed by industries and commerce. He then traces the rise of philosophy and science, the decline of the latter in medievalism, its revival and rapid growth after the discovery of the art of printing and the broadening of men's ideas in the Eighteenth Century, culminating in the French Revolution. In his tenth epoch he sought to show, in anticipation, the glorious future lying before men, basing his argument on his belief that man was capable of unlimited perfectibility (within cosmic limitation) and asserting that society should seek to become free, equal, and happy, through modification of environment and education. It is interesting to note in this chapter his suggestion that progress would become much more rapid in the future because of the inheritance of qualities acquired by parents through education, the later Lamarckian theory of acquired characters.

Comte's Three Stages.—Comte, in his *Positive Philosophy*, following a suggestion of Turgot and to some extent the teachings of Condorcet and Saint Simon, worked out a theory of social development in his famous discussion of the three stages of the development of the human intellect, which, he argued, in satisfying its inherent need for the explanation of phenomena, passes historically through (1) the "theological" or anthropomorphical stage, in which the human mind assumes that

supernatural beings, like man himself but more powerful, are the causes of phenomena; (2) the transitional "metaphysical" stage, which assumes the existence of universal abstract principles, like the abstract justice or universal reason of the Stoics, or the cosmic ether of scientific hypothesis, for example, as explanatory of phenomena; and (3) the "positive" or scientific stage, in which explanations are sought by the methods of science only, namely, observation, comparison, experimentation. These three stages are then worked out with a wealth of detail in his *Social Dynamics*, devoted to the laws of human progress, and occupying about one-third of *Positive Philosophy*. Of this discussion John Stuart Mill^{*} said: "There is scarcely a sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable . . . to give even a faint conception of the extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be appreciated."

Five Other Theories of Development.—The rise of the Darwinian theory of natural selection and Spencer's evolutionary teaching, including his study of the development of social institutions, gave a new trend to discussions of human evolution. Five of these will be briefly mentioned in the following paragraphs as typical of the tendencies of modern thought.

(1) Spencer himself stressed the point that society, starting from the loose groupings of primitive savagery, evolved into a militaristic form of social organization, then into a transitional militaristic-industrial type, and finally will pass into an industrial stage. Each of these two fundamental types molds social institutions into its own pat-

^{*} *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, p. 106 (Routledge edition.)

tern; the one stern, hierarchical, autocratic; the other, sympathetic, democratic, coöperative in spirit, becoming humanitarian and cosmopolitan.

(2) Gumplowicz in his *Outlines of Sociology*⁴ (Part V) is agnostic in respect to the theory of a continuous human evolution and teaches a sort of cycle theory of progress and an evolution, not for humanity as a whole, but of selected groups or races. These, when conditions are favorable, make progress, attain a maximum, and then die of dry rot through loss of energy, or are overpowered by more vigorous barbarian races or by anarchical elements within their own body. He does not, therefore, look for a human evolution so much as for the "rise and fall of nations."

(3) An excellent illustration of how social development may be traced from an economic viewpoint may be found in Karl Bücher's *Industrial Evolution*. In his first four chapters he explains in a most interesting fashion the prominent aspects of economic conditions in primitive tropical life, and then shows the development of economic stages based, respectively, on the differentiating labors of the household, the village or city, and on the nation. In the later chapters he shows the effects of these various systems of labor in the formation of social classes and the distribution of population. The work as a whole indicates the methods of study that should be employed in respect to social institutions, so as to formulate data for later sociological study.

(4) Professor Patten in his *Theory of Social Forces* struck out on a different line of evolutionary discussion by taking as his basis the ancient discussion of the influence of pain and pleasure on human activities and ar-

⁴*Grundriss der Sociologie, Annals* translation (see Bibliography).

guing that human evolution is characterized first by a *pain* and then by a *pleasure* economy. A pain economy is a society whose "institutions have as their basis the fear of enemies and pain." The gist of his idea is continued in the following quotation:

The causes of a pain economy lie in the environment. Vigorous enemies deal out death and destruction so freely that the thought of isolated individuals is concentrated on the causes and remedies for pain. The development of human society has gradually eliminated from the environment the sources of pain. The civilized world has been freed from dangerous beasts and reptiles, and the growth of large nations has cut off the danger of invasion by barbarous and warlike human foes. . . . These changes make a pleasure economy possible and destroy the conditions which made the subjective environment of the old pain economy a necessity.

It is not, however, to be assumed that the transition to a pleasure economy is an easy one. On the contrary, it is a most difficult process and one fraught with many evils and dangers. So many of the fundamental ideas, ideals, and impulses of the race lose their efficiency through the change that mankind seems almost without a rudder to guide it through its new difficulties. Historical evidence would seem to prove that a pure pleasure economy is an impossibility. Nation after nation has gone down when utilities instead of pains have become the supreme object of individuals as well as nations show the deteriorating of pleasure as soon as they are freed from the restraints of a pain economy. This tendency to deterioration, however, is an evil that belongs only to the period of transition. . . .

In those regions where a pleasure economy is possible nation after nation has risen and fallen, without ever developing sufficient strength to resist the encroachments of enemies disciplined by a pain economy. A pleasure economy cannot be formed by any kind of a revolutionary process. There must be a long period of transition in which the lead-

ing elements of the old economy are gradually lost and in their places the ideas, ideals, and impulses of a pleasure economy are substituted. The development of modern nations has been along this path. Without a conscious departure from the old ideals of state, morality, and religion, there has been a gradual substitution of certain ideals and impulses of a pleasure economy, until now all of our leading concepts are held in a dual form. One group of ideals and impulses is the conservator of past conditions, while blended with them is another group of ideals and impulses which is the outcome of the new conditions. Such a state of affairs cannot but be the cause of much confusion and distress. The only hope of progress lies in separating the present aggregate of forces into their elements and in finding to which group each ideal and impulse really belongs.

(5) As a final illustration, Professor Giddings in his *Principles of Sociology* gives in Book III, under the title "The Historical Evolution of Society," an anthropological series of stages in which human association is traced as zoögenic, anthropogenic, ethnogenic and demogenic. This last stage, the stage of civilization, he subdivides into three other stages, namely, the military-religious, the liberal-legal, and the economic-ethical, terms obviously descriptive of the ages to which they apply.

Other Classifications of Development.—These stages of association as presented by Professor Giddings show definitely the influence of the rise of the many sciences loosely grouped under the title of "anthropology" and devoted to the study of primitive man and earlier civilizations. These newer sciences have furnished many bases for classifications of evolutionary stages, each characterized by some particular social attainment, either material or intellectual. Attention may, for instance, be directed to the substance used in the making of tools. The

earliest human beings who became "tool-using animals" presumably used sticks and roots or branches of trees as primitive hammers and weapons. At a later period pieces of heavy stone were fastened to wood, either by thongs or by insertion. Still later these stones were polished so as to give a better cutting edge and a more ornamental appearance. Then came the age of bronze or copper, in which were used soft metals that could be beaten into shape while in their natural state. In the last stages of early civilization, when the use of fire was understood, hard metals, such as iron, came into use through smelting, and civilization was then ready for the massive machinery of modern times, whose introduction depended on scientific knowledge as to the utilization of the powers of steam and electricity.

Other writers prefer to trace civilization by noting the chief sources of food supplies for human beings. At first natural foods which could be obtained by man without tools or weapons were consumed. Then came, in addition, food supplies from hunting and fishing. Still later, through the domestication of animals, came permanent supplies of flesh foods, and then agriculture made its important contribution toward the sustentation of the human race.

Some prefer to emphasize the development of the chief forms of occupation, such as the wild and precarious life of the hunter, the care of flocks and herds, the pursuit of agriculture, and finally, the occupations involved in the trades, in commerce, manufacturing, and professional pursuits. Others fix their attention on the evolution of the notion of property in land and personal possessions and discuss three stages: (1) that in which the notion of the ownership of land and other forms of property was un-

known; (2) that in which land and other property⁵ were considered as held or owned by the community as a whole; and (3) that in which land and other property are considered to be the personal possessions of individuals.

Still other writers prefer to trace civilization through the varying forms of the family and indicate a threefold development: (1) a matriarchal⁶ stage, characterized fundamentally by kinship traced through the mother, and the absence of permanency in family life; (2) a patriarchal stage in which kinship is traced through the male, and the power of the paternal head of the family tends to become absolute; (3) the modern stage in which kinship is traced through both parents and emphasis is placed on a permanent marriage relationship between one man and one woman.

Finally, some writers would trace civilization by a study of the development of religion through its historic stages, such as animism, ancestor and nature worship, polytheism, pantheism, and monotheism. Others, again, may trace it in the several stages of morality, starting from primitive notions of utility and its opposite, as shown in the customs of savages, and leading on to theories of abstract morality such as those taught by philosophers and theologians.

It is hardly necessary to enumerate other explanations of development set forth by sociological writers. The very fact that the progress of civilization can be indicated under so many aspects shows that these are but specialized phases of one great movement of a unified social life, manifesting itself under many different forms, but all

⁵ Except such personal possessions as weapons, tools, ornaments, and clothing.

⁶ Metronymic is the better term, but the other is more familiar by usage.

alike teaching that mankind is rising from primitive savagery to higher and more ethical, more intellectual stages of development. Evidently, therefore, even the most advanced peoples have not yet attained the highest possible development. Even the best of them are low and savage when compared with the ideals of social perfection taught by the noblest representatives of humanity in ages past and present. Further development is still possible, and every wise utilization of the materials and forces of nature and every upward step in intellectual and moral attainment will aid in the furtherance of social progress.

Society and the Social Group.—In these illustrations of discussions respecting society, it is clear that the term is vague and has no definite, precise meaning, varying from a notion of humanity as a whole to particular aspects of social life. It is usual, therefore, in these days, to use the word in a very conventional sense and to substitute for it, whenever possible, more exact terms, such as the "social group" or "human association," emphasizing as the gist of the whole matter a grouping of individuals or a compounding of groups in mental contact one with another. The members of such groupings are not necessarily in bodily contact. The stress is on the interaction of mind and mind, whether this contact is through the spoken word or the printed page or even in mental intercourse through the comprehension of emotional gesture or facial expression. Social groupings, therefore, are transient or permanent, they may in theory include all mankind past, present, and future, or by contrast the fleeting contact of desultory conversation, a passing glance, or the chance reading of some pregnant thought. Whenever human mind associates with mind, there is society

and an opportunity for the study of the processes of human association.

If, therefore, an attempt should be made to formulate a science of society, evidently the science itself will oscillate from vague generalizations and diffused sentimentality on the one hand to more exact and precise discussions on the other, according as attention is given to the general term society or the more definite notion of the associating group. This wide divergence will be noted in the explanations of the following chapters. A general survey of social science naturally should take into account all aspects of such studies, but should emphasize the more modern trend. From all such studies are slowly forming the social sciences, a "sociology," and specialized social studies of many varied aspects.

CHAPTER II

WHAT IS SOCIAL SCIENCE?

Social Terminology.—There is in popular usage often a real confusion as to the proper meaning to be given such terms as “socialism,” “sociology,” “social economics,” “social science,” and the many other words that name the various forms of social *isms*. As a matter of fact, these terms in origin had quite different meanings although they are at times used as if they were synonyms. The word “socialism” came into use about eighty years ago to connote a scheme of social reforms advocated by the followers of Robert Owen. Auguste Comte coined the word “sociologie” about the same time (1838), using it to denote the study of the fundamental laws underlying social phenomena. John Stuart Mill, an economist, but deeply imbued with the views of social reform set forth by Bentham, Owen, and Comte, sought to humanize the “dismal science” of his day by stressing the social aspects of it as “social economy” or “social economics.” The term “social science” came into use as a generic term, like the adjective “social,” covering all aspects of social study, including, therefore, the many kinds of social reforms, social philosophizing, and sociology.

At present the word “socialism,” though often loosely used as a generic term for any rather radical aspect of social reform, is usually employed in a Marxian sense, implying the “class struggle” and the national ownership

of wealth and means of production. The science of economics has become so "social" that the terms "social economy" and "social economics" are now seldom employed. The word "sociology" is still properly used in the Comtean sense, though often incorrectly employed as synonymous with social reforms, and the term "social science," although less frequently used than formerly, still retains its generic meaning.

There are kindred terms of changing meaning often employed in discussion, such as anarchism, individualism, communism, syndicalism, guild socialism, and bolshevism. *Anarchism* assumes the inherent goodness of man, who voluntarily associates himself with his fellows, forming coöperative organizations from which all compulsory forms of control are eliminated. If an anarchist favors violent methods for the removal of governments using compulsion, he becomes a terrorist or an anarchist of the deed. *Individualism*, like that of England in the Nineteenth Century, assumes that that government is best which governs least, since men should be free to enjoy liberty without much interference from government, which is considered to be a necessary evil. *Communism* emphasizes the voluntary coöperation of self-sufficing groups, organized so as to carry out some ideal of social perfection. Communism, therefore, tends to stress a careful regulation of the detail of social life such as dress, foods, housing, marriage, and vocations, and thus may tend to repress individuality. Such groupings, therefore, are not necessarily democratic but may be strongly hierarchical in their methods of control.

Syndicalism, like anarchism, aims to abolish the State, which, in its opinion, is the agent of capitalism, and would reorganize society on the basis of occupations. Each

vocation in a given country would be organized, would control its own means of production, and would manage its business without interference. The attainment of such a system may be brought about peaceably, but violent methods, if necessary, are permissible. In the United States of America syndicalism goes by the name of the Industrial Workers of the World.

In Great Britain *guild socialism* is the substitute for syndicalism, which is French in origin. The State is retained as the final owner of the means of production, but these in fact are held in trust by each guild or combination of workers in any given vocation. The guild thus controls its own means of production; is its own employer; fixes wages, hours, and conditions of labor; and furnishes its own vocational and technical training. The guilds combined make a sort of federation controlling economic life and would pay rent to the State in lieu of taxes. The function of the State would be to serve as a sort of umpiring, regulative organization, and it would also be authorized to carry on the functions of culture, such as justice, education, art, and also international relations. Conceivably other vocations, such as farming or the professions, might organize as guilds, each regulating the conditions of its own vocation. All guilds combined make a sort of federation, an *e pluribus unum*.

Syndicalism and guild socialism, it will be noted, voice a new sort of individualism, the individualism of corporate groups, each claiming for itself "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," regulated only by such government as they would themselves expressly ordain and establish.

Bolshevism, by contrast, is Marxian socialism of a rather radical sort, emphasizing the class struggle, the

overthrow of capitalism by revolution and the supremacy of the proletariat. In Russia by force of circumstances it created a form of government compounded of autocratic¹ and communal² elements, and established it by the usual terroristic methods of violent revolution.

Although these numerous terms are comparatively recent in origin it would be a mistake to assume that the studies they represent were unknown before the Nineteenth Century. The rise of a new vocabulary in any branch of knowledge merely indicates that more attention is being given to its problems and that new terms are employed so as to give more exact shades of meaning. Previous to 1820 social discussions would usually be classified under such headings as "humanitarian," "moral," "political" or "religious," or they would be included in some comprehensive study, corresponding somewhat to what later was called the "philosophy of history." The well-known saying of Aristotle, for example, "man is by nature political,"³ would to-day be more correctly translated "man is by nature social," for Aristotle in his *Politics* discusses family relationship, economics, education, and sanitation, as well as politics proper. In the same manner Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, plainly political by title, are really sociological discussions covering the whole field of social life. Similar illustrations may be found in the works, for example, of such writers as Hobbes, Descartes, or Montesquieu and the French Encyclopædists.

Social Thinking in the Earlier Ages.—Doubtless when primitive man first began to think at all outside of

¹The Council of People's Commissioners.

²The soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers.

³"Politics," 1, 2.

the daily routine of food-getting his thoughts must have turned periodically to the social problems of life in respect to mating, warring, hunting, and recreation, and to vague philosophizing about his relations to the many supernatural beings that seemed to environ him throughout his life.

Naturally no record has come down to us of the thoughts of primitive man, except as we find these embodied in his stereotyped institutions, his customs, and his traditions. These, however, furnish abundant opportunity for social studies of all sorts and splendid work in these fields has been done during the last sixty years.⁴ At present much attention is being given to the study of the ancient developed civilizations of Asia and Africa, and in these also it is obvious that social problems and social theorizing formed an important part of the intellectual life of those times. Indeed, their conclusions are usually strikingly modern in tone, but this is not at all surprising when we remember that the human intellect was probably fully as capable then as now, and reasoned just as logically from the facts before it. There was not, however, in those ages the abundance of facts from which to reason, or well developed positive sciences to be used as bases for further study. They reasoned well from the imperfect data in their possession but, since their information was defective, their conclusions also were imperfect. Yet the conclusions of ancient peoples based on the homely daily experience common to all ages of civilization were as full of common sense and empirical wisdom as those of the average modern man, perhaps more so, and these, as wise sayings or proverbs,⁵ were handed

⁴ In the anthropological sciences, for example.

⁵ Benjamin Franklin's *Poor Richard's Almanac* is a good modern illustration of such sayings.

on by tradition as the mature concensus of opinion of many generations respecting their social problems. In later centuries these were written into holy books and considered as ancient oracles and revelations from the gods, so that they became fundamental for future philosophizing, since they were passed on through instruction to succeeding generations and civilizations.

In the Later Ages.—In any complete study of the development of social science, therefore, emphasis would naturally be placed first on the results obtained from social studies of the contributions to social information made by earlier civilizations, as testified by their institutions and traditions and by their "wisdom literature" in its many forms. A great advance was made in social philosophizing when, after centuries of slow development, there came into use an alphabet like that of the Greeks in which each symbol represented a definite sound. This most important "tool of the mind" * powerfully aided men in their attempts to transmit to later generations the results of human philosophizing, so that real civilization of a progressive sort began with the Greeks, who were able to write out their complete thought and to transmit it, without the necessity of condensing it into pithy sentences or axiomatic statements made in a rigid and narrow vocabulary. This contribution of the classical period, the Greek written language, and its later rivals, the Latin and the Arabic, standardized philosophical, juristic, and religious thought for some two thousand years, since relatively few contributions were made to intellectual achievement after the passing of the Greek age. In the Fifteenth Century the invention of the printing press

* The generic "tools of the mind" are spoken and written language, logic, and mathematics.

enormously multiplied the diffusion of knowledge, and gave opportunity for the development of national languages. Then came the discovery of the Americas and the ocean voyage to the Indies, thus broadening the human horizon so as to include in its sweep the whole of mankind and the uttermost parts of the earth. The newer knowledge gained after the Fifteenth Century through these enlargements of human knowledge gave a basis for the modern era, characterized by the rise of science, using the inductive methods of observation, comparison, and experimentation. This scientific point of view slowly began to manifest itself in the field of social phenomena and was definitely adopted in the Nineteenth Century, when applications of its methods to social problems were made by such sociological forerunners as Comte and Quételet of France. From that time forth the scientific study of social phenomena has been well to the front and tends to become more exact and precise as the years pass on. Our own generation is predominantly a social age, and social and sociological interpretations are in demand, since they throw light on the complex problems of human progress and, in process of time, may be expected to assist greatly in the formulation of right social and civic policies.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF EARLIER CENTURIES

Instruction of Ptah-Hotep.—Some illustrations will now be given showing the kinds of social philosophizing that may be obtained from former writings. No attempt will be made to illustrate from that part of wisdom literature which consists of proverbs and wise sayings given as guides to human conduct. These are common in all literatures, ancient and modern, and in the Old Testament find exemplification in such books as "Proverbs" and "Ecclesiastes."¹ There is, however, a variation of this type of literature, more unified in kind, in which usually a nobleman, or a wise man, or a father, embodies in the form of a discourse or lecture instruction and advice for the younger generation. One of the most interesting of these is known as *The Instruction of Ptah-Hotep*.² This little work, said to be the oldest complete book in the world, is a summary of the principles of conduct and social standards current at that time, given in the form of advice from a father to his son and was used in Egyptian schools as a textbook of manners. In this little sketch the son is advised to show proper respect and reverence to his superiors, to be careful in speech, yet when he has worthy thoughts to express he is urged not to hesitate to de-

¹ Illustrations also may be found in the "Wisdom of the East" series of monographs.

² Written in Egypt about 3530 B. C.; tr. by B. G. Gunn, see "Wisdom of the East" series.

clare his views, so that those who listen may declare, "How excellent is that which cometh out of his mouth." He is advised to be modest of his attainments and to seek to discourse even with the unlearned man who yet "has some knowledge worth knowing." As a leader he should be courteous to his inferiors, just in his dealings, and truthful always. He should not be avaricious and should appreciate the advantage of leisure, for he is told, "Lengthen not the daytime more than is needful to maintain thine house. When riches are gained, follow the heart, for riches are of no avail if one be weary."

Again, he is advised, "If thou wouldst be wise, provide for thine house and love thy wife—Gladden her heart,—be not harsh, for gentleness mastereth her more than strength." The domestic servant problem was felt, for the son was urged to "satisfy thine hired servants out of such things as thou hast; it is the duty of one that hath been favored of the God. In sooth, it is hard to satisfy hired servants,—and even when favors have been shown unto them they say, We go!" Again, he is urged, "Plunder not the houses of tenants," and "Let thy face be bright what time thou livest" for "It is a man's kindly acts that are remembered of him in the years after his life."

Teaching of Confucius.—Another important illustration of this older sort of literature is found in the teachings of Confucius in his doctrine in regard to the Superior Man.³ In these teachings, which make up the essence of the Confucian system, self-development and the practice of right living are represented as the highest art. Therefore, he argues, it is the business of every

³ "The Ethics of Confucius," arranged according to the plan of Confucius, with running commentaries, by Miles Menander Dawson (1915).

thoughtful man to develop himself intellectually into a superior type of man. This is accomplished chiefly through study, specially through the investigation of matters concerning men, animals, and things; that is, the investigation of environment or phenomena, because through this sort of study the mind becomes open and free from prejudice, and develops through facility in investigation a fondness for the study of causes. This kind of study, he asserts, is far better than speculation about immaterial matters.

Again, he emphasizes the thought that a superior man through his knowledge of himself will obtain a complete control over his appetites, subduing these by the power of his intelligence. In this way he builds up a character for rectitude and virtue. This conquest over appetite can be obtained only by thoroughness, continuity of purpose, and a keen insight into the end desired, with constant introspection so as to see his weaknesses in order the better to control them. When the superior man becomes through study open-minded and intelligent and by conquest of passion becomes well poised and just, it will be comparatively easy for him to direct his will toward right ends so as to achieve his purposes. The superior man will find relaxation not in bodily passions but in the enjoyment of the fine arts, especially in music and in the comprehension and practice of ceremony or etiquette. Friendship also, and free conversation with intelligent men will furnish relaxation and enjoyment.

There are three famous sayings of his that illustrate fairly well his teachings.

(1) Those who are born in the possession of knowledge are the highest class of men. Those who learn and so acquire knowledge are next. The dull and stupid who yet

achieve knowledge are in a class next to these. Those who are dull and stupid and yet do not learn are the lowest of the people.

(2) There are three universally recognized qualities in man, namely, intelligence, moral character, and courage.

Some men are born with the knowledge of these moral qualities; some acquire it as the result of education; some acquire it as the result of hard experience. But when the knowledge is acquired, it comes to one and the same thing.

(3) He only can exist under Heaven who is possessed of all sagely qualities, who shows himself quick in apprehension, clear in discernment, of far-reaching intelligence and all-embracing knowledge, fitted to exercise rule; magnanimous, generous, benign, and mild, fitted to exercise forbearance; impulsive, energetic, firm, and enduring, fitted to maintain a firm grasp; self-adjusted, grave, never swerving from the [golden] mean and the correct, fitted to command reverence; accomplished, distinctive, concentrative, and searching, fitted to exercise discrimination. All embracing is he, and vast, deep, and active as a fountain, sending forth in their due seasons his virtues.

Confucius in his teachings also discusses social relationships among men, paying especial attention to the family and the State.⁴ These teachings represent the best standards of patriarchal civilization, emphasizing of course, in the case of the family, honorable marriage, filial piety, and mutual duties in conjugal and parental relationships. In the case of the State, he shows the necessity of providing for the welfare of the people so that they may be free from extreme poverty by proper economic arrangement ordained through government. Respect for law, order, and the necessity for a broad general

⁴ See Dawson, Chaps. IV and V.

education are emphasized and the importance of careful policies in questions of taxation and war.

Confucius also had clearly in mind a sort of perfect humanity, although it is uncertain whether he thought of this as a golden age in the past or more probably as a future social organization yet to be attained. The following extract from Doctor Chang's work on *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*⁵ gives a translation from Confucius' teaching of a perfect state and perfect society.

When the Great Principle⁶ prevails, the whole world becomes a republic; they elect men of talents, virtue, and ability; they talk about sincere agreement, and cultivate universal peace. . . . Thus, men do not regard as their parents only their own parents, or treat as their children only their own children. A competent provision is secured for the aged till their death, employment for the middle-aged, and the means of growing up for the young. The widowers, widows, orphans, childless men, and those who are disabled by disease, are all sufficiently maintained. Each man has his rights, and each woman her individuality safeguarded. They produce wealth, disliking that it should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep it for their own gratification. Disliking idleness, they labor, but not alone with a view to their own advantage. In this way selfish schemings are repressed and find no way to arise. Robbers, filchers, and rebellious traitors do not exist. Hence the outer doors remain open, and are not shut. This is the state of what I call the Great Similarity.

This ideal, which is not unlike in many respects Plato's *Republic*, depicts a perfection toward which men in this life can merely approach. Confucius, through the teach-

⁵ Columbia College Series, Vols. xlv and xlv.

⁶ Of the "Great Similarity," practically equivalent to equality of opportunity.

ings he advanced in regard to the conduct of life, hoped to enable men to attain in some degree at least this social ideal.

Other Eastern Teachings.—The Code of Hammurabi, king of Babylon about 2250 B.C., the oldest code extant, which was discovered in 1901, furnishes another type of information illustrative of ancient social standards. Its provisions treat of business contracts and agriculture; the relations of social classes, including slaves one to the other; the system of inheritance then prevailing; the rights and obligations of women whose status in those days was fairly high among the better classes; family and religious life; and systems of punishment for various crime, based usually on the *lex talionis* or on fines, but including many capital offenses.

Another form of ancient teaching of social significance comes from a study of the more ancient religious teachings such as may be found in the Rig-Veda and the other Vedantic literature of India or in the teachings of religious leaders like Zoroaster, as found in the Zend Avesta.⁷ Zoroaster, who is supposed to have lived about the Sixteenth Century B. C., sought to restore the primitive teachings of the ancient Aryan faith with its nature worship, its spiritual explanations, and its social regulation in respect to the manners and customs of the people. He represents God as creating the heavens and the earth, ushering in thereby a golden age. No evil exists among men who busy themselves in agriculture and in the care of domesticated animals. Then came the fall and because of the introduction of evil into the world men came in

⁷ The Parsees of modern India are his followers. See interesting article on "The Parsees" by William Thomas Fee, *National Geographic Magazine*, December, 1905.

need of instruction and this instruction Zoroaster sought to impart. In social matters he emphasized sanitation, personal hygiene, and many precautions in case of sickness. Burials in the earth were prohibited, bodies being exposed to the action of the elements. He especially enjoined kindly treatment of animals, humane methods of slaughter, and forbade hunting for amusement. Men were to exercise charity towards all and to be kindly in their relations one to another. Stress was placed on industry and honorable marriage was enjoined upon all, every man being urged to have home, wife, children, and vocation. Chastity was strongly taught, but in case of illegitimacy the father was required to care for mother and child. In social status the wife was to be equal to the husband. He gave much attention to questions of education and required toleration in religious matters, and exact honesty in all business contracts.

In the same manner, the *Laws of Manu*,⁸ a compilation dating back some two thousand years, gives similar information regarding the cosmogony, education, morals, and religious and social life of the ancient Hindus.

Studies of Social Institutions.—Based on sources similar to these there are now several modern studies giving what may be called a social interpretation to the institutions and developments of ancient peoples. Among these as typical may be mentioned Professor Gummere on *Germanic Origins*, in which he traces from Germanic legend and epic the institutions of our ancestors some two thousand years ago. Another along somewhat similar lines is Professor Keller's study of *Homeric Society*, in which he carefully traces from the Homeric poems the social standards and institutions of that famous period of Greek

⁸ See "Sacred Books of the East" series.

history. A third illustration of this sort of literature is contained in the excellent study by Louis Wallis entitled *Sociological Study of the Bible*.⁹ In this work of Mr. Wallis' he seeks to interpret in the light of Biblical criticism the economic and social development of the Hebraic people, using as his thesis the thought that this history on the whole is a struggle between two conflicting ideas; one based on urban civilization dominated by aristocratic standards, with consequent oppression of the masses; the other, a rural, more democratic demand for justice and freedom, a demand voiced by the prophets and carried to its theoretical consummation in the teachings of Jesus and the early Fathers. In this work and in his previous work, *An Examination of Society*, Mr. Wallis furnishes excellent studies showing the importance of re-interpreting Hebraic history from economic and social standpoints.

Summary of Ancient Teachings.—From the teachings of Ptah-Hotep and from social studies of ancient civilizations it can be readily seen that a fairly high type of social philosophizing had developed even as far back as six thousand years ago. There must have been much reflection on social questions in those days and many attempts to solve interrogations respecting social origins and destiny, but the type of written language in use was not suited to philosophic expression and hence exact knowledge of their thoughts is lacking.

Those stages of civilization that produce wise sayings and types of "superior men," seem to emphasize a sort of static notion of social philosophizing. The best minds of the age musing on social experiences, come to decisions

⁹In Appendix of this work see his bibliographical note on the "History of Sociological Bible-Study," p. 299.

as to what is ultimately best and announce "the conclusion of the whole matter" (Ecc. 12, 13.). On the other hand, dramas like those of the *Book of Job* and *Prometheus Bound*¹⁰ represent a stage of indecision; the one raising the question, why in human experience should the good suffer and the wicked prosper, and the other charging injustice against the gods who punish vindictively the benefactor of man.

In the Greek "Age of Discussion,"¹¹ when East and West were mingling their civilizations and ancient standards had become unsettled, ancient customs and beliefs lost their hold on the more thoughtful part of Greek public opinion so that new points of view and social reforms of all sorts came to the front. Political innovators like Solon, Cleisthenes, and Pericles are well known, but there were numerous social reforms and panaceas projected, references to which are common in the comedies of the conservative Aristophanes. The Sophists against whom he railed were those seeking to justify the proposition that ancient customs and beliefs were largely outgrown and that each new generation, or every man, should make its or his own decisions as to what is right and good. Aristotle also in his *Politics* (Book II) calls attention to the communistic teachings of certain social reformers of that time, and he especially denounced in quite modern argument some of the communistic reforms advocated by Plato.

Plato's Teachings.—Plato, by general consent, however, is taken as the best type of the social theorist of his age, not merely because of his wisdom, but because he

¹⁰ See John Owen's *The Five Great Skeptical Dramas of History*. 1896.

¹¹ See Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*, Chap. V.

saw the need of change and tried to work out the proper bases for reform and to suggest a rightly organized society. These teachings of his are chiefly contained in the *Republic* and the *Laws* and in so far as they advocate models for social reorganization they proved to be a complete failure. Dreading the spread of democracy, as he did, and admiring the theoretical simplicity and stability of Spartan civilization, he set up as the social ideal, petty, agricultural communes, aristocratic in organization and static in type. His greatness, however, consisted in his capacity to see clearly the great underlying principles of an idealized human association and to present these so cogently in his arguments, that they have proved to be a constant stimulus in later generations to others who have struggled with similar problems. He, for example, taught that justice is the real aim of social organization; that every person, male or female, noble or ignoble by birth, should be given equal opportunities for advancement; that a well balanced system of education, open to all, is the fundamental for this purpose, and that the State is safest when government is in the hands of men (or women) of wide experience and wisdom, selected on the basis of proven capacity. In the *Laws*, a work full of the *detail* of social reform, he emphasizes temperance in drinking, chastity for both sexes, the reform of criminals, the elimination of those seen to be inherently unfit, and the wisdom of encouraging capable men to travel abroad for the purpose of observation and study, so as to bring back suggestions for social improvement. Hellenic leadership and equal opportunities for all Greeks were basal in Plato's scheme of reorganization, but the conquests of Greece by Macedonia and by Rome put an end to thoughts of social betterment under Greek initia-

tive. Speculative philosophy in respect to the gods and the cosmos was safer, and attracted the attention of later generations.

Roman Influence.—Such reforms as the Romans developed or speculated about were governmental, administrative, and legal in kind, due partly to Greek influences and partly to a somewhat steady trend towards democracy, so far as that was possible on the basis of a restricted suffrage and a mass of proletariat population composed largely of freedmen, slaves, and aliens. There were noble teachings of right living, human brotherhood, and world justice in the Epicurean and Stoic philosophy favored by Roman writers; there were agrarian movements, proletarian revolts, and crude systems of state charity, but the civilization of Rome was neither social nor philosophic in type, being built on a basis of war and exploitation, so that there was little demand for anything savoring of social philosophy. It was a civilization based on the "will to power," and it was assumed that Roman *Kultur* should dominate the earth. When the dream of world supremacy began to wane under the threats of barbarian invasions Tacitus gave us in his *Germania* an idealized picture of Germanic barbarism, depicting it as a sort of utopia of the simple life so beloved by ancient theorists. Some three hundred years later, when Rome seemed near its end, in St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei* we find a definite teaching of the emptiness of human and imperialistic ambitions, and an insistence on the unity of mankind, and the continuity of human history, which under God's guidance, moves steadily forward, towards a celestial goal foreseen in the divine mind. The chief defect of this work, from the social standpoint,

is that it seeks to concentrate human effort on other world aspirations rather than on human progress.

Saracenic Social Teachings.—The next really important contribution to sociological speculation developed among the Saracens with the rise of Mohammedism.¹² It is an illustration of the dynamic effect of the mingling of civilizations at a time of intense activity. The stationary civilization of Arabia with its wisdom sayings and symbolic parables suddenly came in contact through war and conquest with the wisdom of Persia, India, and Greek Asia Minor. Plato and other Greek philosophers and scientists, especially Aristotle, became known through translations and the fascination of a higher civilization also made its suggestions to a highly suggestible race. In consequence of these influences, there sprung up Saracenic theologies, philosophies, sciences, and literature, and, as these came into fruition, along with the decline of enthusiasm and loss of political prestige, there came a sort of encyclopædic and social movement like that of France in the Eighteenth Century. In the latter half of the Tenth Century, *e.g.*, there arose the Brethren of Basra, an ascetic body, who prepared (in fifty-one treatises) an encyclopædia of the sciences of that time, mingled however with theology and religion. A century or so earlier had flourished Masudi (died about 956) who devoted himself to what would be called the social history of his civilization. This study found its culmination in the writings of Ibn Khaldun,¹³ the most distinctly sociological of all Saracenic writers. He was positivistic in his method, emphasizing observation and comparison, and argued for the continuity of social history, asserting that there are

¹² The basis for this paragraph is chiefly taken from De Boer's *History of Philosophy in Islam*.

¹³ Born at Tunis, 1332; died at Cairo, 1406.

principles of causation underlying social phenomena, so that from a knowledge of the past light would be thrown on the future. History, he argued, should study human associations, racial elements, climatic influences, the struggle for foods, the stages of civilization (nomadic, militaristic, urban), and the social attainment of intelligence, science, and culture. Social evolution he taught is cyclic, or rather spiral, revolving through the stages above mentioned, but on somewhat higher planes, through the social assimilation by nomadic tribes of conquered urban civilization. Like Plato he lived at the end of an age, when Islamism had passed its climax, so that none of his race followed him, as he had hoped, in carrying on his investigations towards a sounder science of social history.

Early Modern Writers.—The Renaissance of Western Europe, under the stimulus of classic learning and contact with Saracenic civilization, East and West, and the inventions and discoveries of the Fifteenth Century largely destroyed interest in theologic and philosophic discussions and turned men towards a social, scientific interpretation of life. In action the new movement at first took the classic form of plebeian uprisings and peasant revolts arising from a sense of injustice and inequality, like the peasants' insurrections of Luther's time, so mercilessly repressed by the Junkers of that day with Luther's approbation. These unsuccessful rebellions were followed by more successful revolutions such as those of Switzerland, the Netherlands, England under Cromwell and William of Orange, and the American and French revolutions of the following centuries. In theorizing, philosophers like Marsiglio and Bodin at first imitated Plato and Aristotle by writing studies of politics and speculating on the *Republic*. Then came tangible suggestions of improvement

in utopian form, based on Platonic notions of a simple, intellectual life in city-state communities, but also infused with ideas from the immediate environment. These studies find their best illustrations in Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, Campanella's *City of the Sun*, Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis*, and Harrington's *Oceana*; four utopias wonderfully rich in social suggestion and distinctly modern in their emphasis on the necessity of economic readjustment, broad education, and scientific information.

Another type of philosophic study developed through such writers as Thomas Hobbes, who in his writings emphasized the social contract and argued for a science of "civiology," in thought very like a premature sociology; Grotius, who in his theory of a law among nations emphasized the enlarging of the term "society" so as to include all Christendom; and John Locke, who had a great influence on the social studies of the Eighteenth Century by his teachings of social compact, religious toleration, and his psychological theory of the sensations, involving as it did an emphasis on environment rather than on heredity. Vico in his *Scienza Nuova* (1725-1730) had in mind a sort of social philosophy of history and a theory of the evolution of law, emphasizing points of view derived from classic teachings and St. Augustine, and not unlike in essence the teachings presented by Ibn Khaldun.

French Writers of the Eighteenth Century.—The Eighteenth Century represents the culmination of the pre-modern period of social theorizing and presents a remarkable series of great names and teachings. France was easily dominant in this development, as always in idealistic philosophizing. Voltaire emphasized rationalism and fought the vices of the Church, Montesquieu in his *Persian Letters*, criticized the evils of western civilization and in

his *Spirit of Laws*, in many respects the most famous book of his century, sought to show the fundamental laws underlying civilization, stressing the influence of climatic and geographic conditions, the necessity of reorganizing social and political structure so as to secure justice among men, and ardently advocating reforms in the treatment of criminals and the abolition of slavery. The Encyclopædists under the leadership of Diderot sought to formulate and to classify all knowledge, along lines suggested by Sir Francis Bacon, and laid down, as they supposed, the fundamentals to all social reorganization in their advocacy of general education in encyclopædic information and of modifications in social environment. Turgot, when chief minister of France, in addition to economic reforms, suggested the later Comtean law of the three stages, and Condorcet, at the end of the century, sought to show the historic social stages of human development. Rousseau in the second third of the century popularized the Lockean theory of the social contract, with continental variations, revived the Epicurean emphasis on the feelings and emotions, and brought Stoic enthusiasm for nature, natural rights, and natural methods, into politics and education, stimulating at the same time romanticism in love and literature. Finally the French Revolution, fecund in social reformers and utopians, actualized for a time many of these suggestions for social reorganization; exalted before men's eyes from that time forth the social trinity of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; and stimulated in the Nineteenth Century reformers after the type of Fourier and Louis Blanc and social philosophers, of whom Auguste Comte was the chief.

English Social Writers.—Beccaria in Italy became the father of modern penology by his teachings in respect

to the treatment of criminals, and this was taken up in England by John Howard, Patrick Colquhoun, Elizabeth Fry, and by Jeremy Bentham in his advocacy of improved penal laws and prison architecture. Adam Smith by his *Wealth of Nations* became the apostle of *laissez-faire* and individualism; Bentham, who lived well into the Nineteenth Century, taught utilitarianism, showing how a state should legislate so as to secure the "greatest happiness to the greatest number," and stimulated as his successors John Austin, who so deeply influenced the development of English law, and John Stuart Mill, the famous writer in behalf of social-economic reforms. In Bentham's time also came Malthus with his theory of population,¹⁴ which suggested to Darwin the principle of natural selection, and Robert Owen, who, stressing the French emphasis on education and environment and developing his own version of industrial coöperation, started English social and coöperative movements that developed increasing momentum and reached their culmination in the great social legislation of Parliament enacted between 1904-14.

The Beginnings of Modern Science.—Meanwhile, after centuries of mental incubation, the modern sciences had come into existence, forming as they do the much needed basis for social science. In 1543 Copernicus launched his great work setting forth the heliocentric theory of the solar system, and in due time was followed by a host of others who established the science of astronomy on a firm mathematical basis. The Seventeenth Century, greatly aided by the invention of numerous scientific instruments, gave not only Newton's discoveries in mathematics and gravitation, but also many scientific hypotheses

¹⁴ Written in opposition to the cheerful optimism of such books as Godwin's *Political Justice*.

respecting light, heat, electricity, and ether which unitedly became the basis for the rapidly developing science of physics. In that century also Harvey set forth his demonstration of the circulation of the blood, thereby stimulating studies in anatomy and medicine. In 1662 the Royal Society of London for the advancement of science was granted its first charter, an organization suggested probably by the "House of Salomon" in Bacon's *New Atlantis*.

The Eighteenth Century definitely established on an inductive basis the science of chemistry, the alchemy of former centuries, and also gave those basal studies in botany and zoölogy that found their culmination in the biological sciences of the Darwinian era. Psychology long remained in the "metaphysical" stage, but Comte thought he saw signs of change in the abortive science of phrenology, a sort of physiological psychology. Evolution supplied a genetic psychology, as voiced, for example, by Spencer, and within the last twenty-five years Freudian psychology and behavioristic methods have given "tone" to the newer psychology, the latter emphasizing the physiological basis of mind in the nervous system.

Lacking a scientific basis in biology and psychology, sociology, as already indicated, long remained a series of visionary speculations, but in the second quarter of the Nineteenth Century Comte was able to find in the scientific knowledge of his day a sufficient foundation on which to establish his famous system of positivistic philosophy and polity.

CHAPTER IV

THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Common Sense Philosophizing.—Every person who thinks at all is likely to generalize his experiences and to develop rules of conduct suitable to the usual happenings of his daily life. Occasionally he philosophizes a little by comparing somewhat his own conclusions with those of his fellows, seeking thereby to reach wiser conclusions based on a wider common experience. He may even seek to classify his generalizations by grouping his experiences under headings such as business and politics, family affairs, and religion. In all this he is unconsciously working out a sort of social science based on his study of the round of his daily experiences. In so doing his familiarity with the field of his observations may enable him with reasonable intelligence to arrive at quite accurate conclusions as a foundation for his plans for the future.

Yet his ability to do this successfully within his own daily routine would not necessarily fit him to make easily correct decisions within larger fields, such as, for example, in the formulation of suggestions in respect to a municipal or national policy. For such tasks one needs large and wide experience and much more thoughtful consideration in respect to the conclusions that properly might be based on this. Equally important, perhaps, is the need of a definite point of view, a well defined method of approach to the problem under consideration, and the

ability to survey clearly and dispassionately the whole field of phenomena to be covered. Lacking this there is likely to be a sort of vagueness or indefiniteness about the whole study. Things do not fit into their places. Stress is placed on unimportant matters to the neglect of fundamentals, so that onesided conclusions are developed resulting in the unbalanced radicalism and wild panaceas, so characteristic of untrained and unregulated thinking. Even if the thought processes are carried out logically and carefully, as often prove to be the case, yet if one's experiences be unduly limited or if interpretations start from incorrect suppositions, the very logic of the argument may result in teachings all the more dangerous, because they seem to be valid deductions properly drawn from the facts under consideration.

Need for a Science of Society.—Now it is against such dangers in social theories that a science of sociology is needed. From time immemorial, during thousands of years of past human history, men have coned over in their minds their daily experiences and have reflected on the larger fields of social phenomena about them and the many mysteries of nature pressing for solution, and as best they could they reasoned out conclusions, which slowly became maxims for conduct, theories of right and justice, religious and philosophical teachings, and incipient truths of future sciences. Yet to a quite large extent, especially in the wider rounds of human experience, they reached conclusions filled with error, for the reason that civilization had not developed sufficient knowledge and methods of reasoning, so as to enable thinkers in their research to attain the truth.

In the surviving literature of ancient peoples, in the classical learning of Greece and Rome, the keen dia-

lectics of early mediævalism, the humanistic studies of the Renaissance, and the social movements of the religious reformations and political revolutions, there are wonderfully fine studies of social phenomena, rich in wise teaching and stimulating to the social imagination. But somehow they seem to lack perspective; they get nowhere and they seem to have no practical application to conditions outside of their own times, if even then. Yet when the modern centuries came with their emphasis upon science and scientific methods, and the great mind of Auguste Comte in the Nineteenth Century saw that even social phenomena might be studied from a scientific point of view and by the inductive method, then there came, as it were, a sort of crystallization of hitherto disjointed and incoherent social teaching that permitted henceforth the formulation of a definite science of sociology.

Comte's Sociology.—It is not that Comte in his great treatises on the *Positive Philosophy* and the *Positive Polity* said the last word in sociology. On the contrary, much that he said and thought has long been rendered obsolete by the rapid changes of human civilization since his day. It is simply and solely the fact that he gave students a real viewpoint, a proper method of study, and indicated the broad lines along which future studies should be made. Interesting, for example, as are his summaries of the sciences and his lengthy chapters on the "dynamic" development of human society, they are rarely read in these days since the broadening of human knowledge during the last sixty years permit of better discussions than his. On the other hand he gave a decidedly useful hypothesis in his three-stage theory of intellectual development, already mentioned. Again, in his remarkable discussion of the classification of sciences

he showed the unity of all scientific knowledge and the relationship, or filiation, of the several sciences. These philosophical contributions are unquestionably of great value. In his series of sciences¹ sociology is included as a definite scientific study to be pursued and developed by the use of scientific methods. This new science, furthermore, is shown to be based directly on biology and psychology (transcendental biology), although of course it has its own peculiar field of study. His psychological emphasis was placed on the affections, the human feelings, and emotions, as the energizing aspect of the mind, guided and directed by the intellect reasoning out conclusions in respect to social policy, an idea more fully developed later by Lester F. Ward. The whole process becomes what he called "prevision," or the ability to foresee on the basis of the known, like the prophecies of an astronomer, for example, who predicts eclipses from his mathematical knowledge of the movements of the heavenly bodies. Comte further stressed the point that social phenomena, in addition to the usual methods of scientific study, demanded an additional method, namely, the historical, since, he argued, no field of social phenomena can properly be known unless it be studied as a development from its beginnings to its consummation in the present time. This he called the dynamic aspect of sociology in contrast to the static. Again, he sought to show how Humanity, past, present, and future, might be considered collectively as a great organism, made up not necessarily of all human beings, but of those only who made achievements that added to the sum total of human knowledge and happiness. This human society in its activity he then analyzed in the *Polity* as economic, ethical

¹ See Chapter V.

and political, educational, æsthetic, intellectual, and religious, and devoted also a chapter to the place of woman in a rightly socialized society. Such a conception of society as that indicated in his theory of perfected humanity he thought might even be considered as worthy of worship, since it would embody in itself the worthiest thought and action of human kind and the highest aspirations of the human heart.

In Comte's discussion of these matters he often dogmatizes overmuch and reaches many rash conclusions owing to his static notion of civilization, since the Darwinian-Spencerian evolutionary point of view had not then been proclaimed, nor was there in his day that wide knowledge of human development and of complex social institutions which has come to light through later studies. The value of his works, therefore, is not, as was said before, in his actual studies of social conditions, but rather in his scientific point of view, his synthetic survey of the entire field of scientific and sociological knowledge, his insight into the really important fields of social phenomena, and his belief in the possibility of a progress based on an accurate comprehension of social conditions as they really are, and without dogmatic assumptions based on supernaturalism or metaphysics.

After Comte had thus blazed the way for a real science of social phenomena, others since his time have made improvements in the general plan he set forth and newer teachings of the basal science of sociology have been emphasized. Moreover, many studies of widely varying sorts have been made so that sociological knowledge has made rapid strides forward since the publication of his works. Yet because of what he did he has rightly been called the Father of Sociology, a title that likely will

permanently remain his by general consent, even of those who are not Comtean in their conclusions.

Social Points of View.—There is, finally, another point of view that may need to be emphasized. Attention has been called to the fact that social studies of all sorts have been made for thousands of years, but that these in themselves had no scientific value for want of a proper method and point of view, yet that, when once such a point of view and method are supplied through the rise of scientific sociology, at once ancient and mediæval studies become illuminated and acquire their true meaning. Just as the atomical and evolutionary teachings of Democritus and Epicurus, so nobly voiced in the *De Natura Rerum* of Lucretius, acquired meaning only in the Nineteenth Century with the rise of the sciences, so the wealth of former social speculation, so far as it has come down to us, now furnishes rich and abundant fields for social inquiry. Thus, the sociologist is not compelled to devote himself merely to the social investigations of the last fifty or sixty years, but has at his disposal the wealth of social theorizing hidden away in ancient religions and philosophies and in the institutions of former civilizations. Sociology, therefore, is not to be considered merely as an upstart science in the process of formation, since the material it uses is as old as human records of thought and can now be more intelligently comprehended than ever before. By the use of its methods and teaching it furnishes to the other sciences and disciplines, like that of history for example, a method, a viewpoint, and an interpretation that already are throwing into the discard studies based on old-fashioned points of view. Practically every study of any tangible human importance in these days is approached by modern stu-

dents with some attempt at least to satisfy a demand for sociological interpretations, so as to show the bearing of each study on human welfare and social progress. For, admittedly, by common agreement the problem of social betterment is to-day the most important problem facing civilization and it demands a scientific solution in which all the factors of social life are to be taken into account.

Social Causation.—This modern emphasis on human progress is primarily due to the evolutionary theory and to the stress on the causes and processes underlying social laws. Now a social law is a general statement of the sequence of uniform social phenomena, but a principle, by contrast, is the scientific explanation of a given law, so that the search for principles is fundamental. The real task of sociology is to explain. Right explanations are basal in any system of sociological teachings. If one knows quite fully by observation and comparison a field of social phenomena, and is familiar with the law of its development or evolution, and in addition, comprehends the principles underlying such phenomena, he would then be prepared to go one step further and to show how such principles may be applied in studies of social conditions, so as to produce modifications in these in any desired direction. Like the formulæ of chemistry, certain combinations under certain conditions should produce certain results. Changed combinations under changed conditions would produce other results. When in any science desired results can invariably be attained at the will of the scientist he has reached the acme of scientific accuracy. Now it is entirely possible that a limited field of comparatively simple social phenomena can be comprehended in its completeness. On the other hand, obviously if one attempted to cover in one study the entire field of social

phenomena in all lands and times his task would prove impossible, owing to the complexity and the mass of material to be studied. To-day, therefore, the whole field of social phenomena is highly differentiated and each segment is studied by itself, often from many points of view, so that in process of time there should be secured sufficient material in the form of conclusions to form the basis of study for a synthetic student who can think things together and see the higher generalizations and principles of social phenomena.

Sociology a Synthetic Science.—In one sense such a synthetic student will be a social philosopher in that he would unite into a harmonious whole parts apparently unconnected. But there is still a higher sense in which this term can be used. There are other fields of phenomena not primarily social, each of which is the realm of a distinct science. Yet such sciences, as astronomy, physics, or chemistry, for instance, really contain in their teachings information of great importance for sociological purposes. The astronomical explanation of comets and of the movements of other heavenly bodies freed human beings from a heavy load of superstition, since they no longer dread comets as portents of disaster nor believe that the sun, moon, or stars are supernatural beings influencing human destiny. Physics and chemistry also now explain scientifically many phenomena formerly attributed to satanic agencies and at the same time they powerfully aid man in his conquest of the forces of nature. In consequence, material civilization with its inventions and scientific discoveries is progressing by leaps and bounds. The basal sciences of sociology also, biology and psychology, are naturally permeated with teachings that illuminate the meaning of social phenomena. For

these reasons also there is need of synthetic students who by their comprehension of the laws and principles of these great sciences may be able to show applications of them, so as to eliminate, to some extent at least, the evils of life and to strengthen whatever is worth while in human experience.

Finally also, if one can synthesize into a common teaching the generalizations of these sciences with the laws and principles of the social sciences, he again may lay claim to the title of synthetic philosopher, even though one might rightly argue that such syntheses represent simply the highest possible stage of sociological study, and therefore are preferably scientific rather than philosophical. Obviously, the study is scientific if done by means of scientific methods, but in its reach after higher and finally the highest generalizations there is a sort of philosophic aspect to the study needed, so as to see that each part finds its proper place in the scheme of things and that the sciences are welded together into the science of sciences.

Vagueness of the Term "Sociology."—Now the general recognition of the growing importance of the sociological viewpoint is one reason why the term "sociology" has not yet won in popular vocabulary any definite meaning. Comte, who first used the word "sociology," meant by it the study of the laws underlying social phenomena. Causation to him was a matter of small importance, since real causes, he thought, could not be ascertained. Obviously the study of laws implies a study of concrete phenomena, yet this was to be merely the means of getting at the really important sociological law or laws underlying phenomena. But the field of study suggested and partly covered by Comte was so broad

and comprehensive, requiring a synthetic mind capable at the same time of close analysis, that few have ventured rashly to attempt to master so wide a field of study, especially since it is continually broadening through later investigations. Succeeding writers, consequently, have tended to stress some particular aspect or division of the whole sociological field, and each naturally called his study "sociology." For this reason sociology has almost as many definitions as there are writers, and since some of these are of necessity superficial or ill balanced, sociology is occasionally ridiculed by mock definitions, such as "sociology is the science that seeks to elaborate the obvious," "the rendering of familiar things into unfamiliar words . . . the translation of the obvious by the incomprehensible." Some writers, again, argue that any study at all, treated from a sociological standpoint, may properly be called sociology, a definition that will surely leave little to be desired from the standpoint of inclusiveness.

Others would prefer to consider sociology proper as the statical study of social phenomena properly classified, or of social institutions, great and small. Others again prefer to call sociology the study and investigation of what may be considered as the degenerate or backward aspects of social life. Yet others prefer to define sociology as an attempt to trace historically the growth or development of society and its institutions, or, as a variation, the study of the rise and fall of social groups, such as for example economic classes, nations, or civilizations. Again socialism and similar *isms* are often confused one with the other or with sociology, as for instance when a newspaper editorial once denounced Governor Altgeld of Illinois as "not only a socialist but also an anarchist and

a communist," or a similar newspaper comment to the effect that all sociologists are either socialists or anarchists.

Moreover in social studies the point of view may be sociological and the methods used be those demanded by Comte, namely, observation, comparison, the study of social experimentation and the history or development of the field under discussion, but they are not sociological in the sense that Comte intended, since they confine themselves to the study of concrete phenomena ignoring the notion of law. Others, more nearly in Comtean fashion, seek to show the relation of sociology to other sciences, especially to its basal sciences biology and psychology, and built up elaborate systems of teaching, biological or psychological in kind, with applications of these to social phenomena. Indeed, the possibilities of variation in sociology seem almost infinite, so that, like a chameleon, the word seems to undergo a modification of definition whenever a new emphasis arises in society.

The Tasks of Sociology.—Under such circumstances it is hardly worth while to give a formal and set definition of sociology, with the implication that all sociological studies not included under this are barred from consideration. Preferably the term "social science" is the one that should be used to cover the entire field of social investigation, including the many aspects of social reforms when these are approached by sociological methods. In that case, by contrast, the term sociology should be used to designate a general science coördinate with biology and psychology, its nearest kin, aiming to synthesize into law and principle the many teachings derived from concrete social studies. The accomplishment, however, of such a task lies far in the future, since many years

must elapse before even a close approximation to such an abstract science can be made. For this reason one must cheerfully admit that the preliminary task of sociology must be much more precise and concrete. The science must seek to make a complete survey of social conditions and problems and to work out empirically improvements in the situation. It must study as completely as possible the processes in the development of social groups and institutions. But, in order to do so intelligently, there is necessarily involved an analysis of the social order, structure, or organization of society, as well as a study of the social forces or psychic factors at work and their resultant social functioning or activities under varying conditions of environment. Finally, it must work out applications of these teachings to present situations, thereby developing the applied science of sociology.

CHAPTER V

THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology and Social Progress.—The study of sociology is becoming increasingly important because of the hope that this new science, one of the “newer humanities,” may prove useful as a guide in the furtherance of individual and social welfare. For many ages prophets of civilization dreamed of a coming utopia, but they died without sight of the promised land. In times of revolution it almost seemed as though the millennium were near at hand, but the anticipated paradise proved to be a mirage and faded away as darkness returned. At the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, under the influence of scientific optimism, men’s pulses once again began to quicken; reforms, utopias, and panaceas for all social evils came in quick succession from the pens of ardent reformers, the usual heralds of a forward movement in civilization. In the midst of this century Comte launched the new science of sociology and sought to show how it might work out the laws of social order and progress and become a guide in the movement for social betterment. Paraphrasing a famous sentence from Rousseau,¹ sociology would assert that men have too long been in bondage to custom and tradition, but that henceforth they may learn how to become free and through “pre-

¹ *Social Contract*, Chap. I.

vision" to enjoy the fruits of freedom. Whether this science can ever satisfy the expectations it arouses is still an open question, but at any rate it should remain *open* until its students have had a suitable opportunity to show the possibilities inherent in the study. Already, if one reads aright the trend of the times, the point of view of sociology has struck deep into the thought of the age, and the results of its teachings, imperfect though they are, have become manifest in the constructive policies so rapidly developing in social reform.

Relativity of Knowledge.—Comte, in his exposition of the field of sociology, emphasized as a fundamental condition for progress the importance of knowledge, and sought to show that, since the mind of man is finite and the earth is a mere atom in the universe, human knowledge must always remain defective or relative, so that complete or absolute knowledge, humanly speaking, is impossible. Comparatively little, for instance, can ever be known of the universe as a whole. Knowledge of it, in the main, will be bounded by the solar system, since little information of anything beyond this can be obtained owing to the natural limitations of human mentality. Yet, Comte argued, by careful observation and reflection there may be collected a mass of information, from which can be obtained broad generalizations. These when tested by experience form the basis on which is slowly built up a series of great sciences, coördinated in their fundamental laws, but differentiated in their details through emphasis on different fields of phenomena. Following this argument he then advanced his famous classification of sciences, a classification rejected by many critics, but which Professor Lester F. Ward characterized as "the

most sublime, interesting, and important idea of the last century." ²

Classification of the Sciences.—Much of the objection arises because Comte's critics fail to grasp his point of view. He would, in the first place, ignore all knowledge not susceptible of verification, *i.e.*, not positive or scientifically demonstrable, and would, in the second place, have the great basal sciences composed of the generalizations and laws underlying the phenomenal and the concrete.

In settling on the order of the sciences, he used mathematics, our most positive and exact knowledge, as a norm or standard to determine the relative positivity of the several sciences. Grouped in the order of their mathematical exactness there follow in the series the great classes of abstract laws which Comte would designate as the sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. Psychology, which Comte treated as part of biology, Herbert Spencer and Lester F. Ward both place as a separate science between biology and sociology. Comte, in his later teachings, and Spencer, in his scheme of scientific classification, added ethics as a final science in the series, but Ward shows that this is practically identical with what he calls "applied" sociology.³ Each abstract science, he argues, may be considered under the aspect of a pure and of an applied science. The abstract science of sociology, therefore, may be divided into pure and applied sociology, the latter of which is for all purposes the science of ethics as given by Comte and Spencer. Accepting as correct this explanation of Ward's, all the numerous concrete sciences of human knowledge

² Brown [Univ.] *Daily Herald*, April 20, 1909.

³ See Ward's *Applied Sociology*, p. 317.

may be grouped under these six heads, and if logically arranged would thus show the fundamental unity of knowledge:⁴

	Astronomy
	Physics
Mathematics,	Chemistry
used as standard	Biology
of positivity	Psychology
	Sociology

This order also shows the filiation, or relationship, of the sciences, for the broad generalizations of each science in the series become the basis for the next following science, which adds the laws deduced from the study of a specialized, yet kindred, branch of knowledge. Thus, each of the later sciences springs from and is differentiated from its predecessor, is dependent on all those that precede it, and is, necessarily, more complex, and less mathematically exact. As each of the later sciences has its own special field, it is not a mere subdivision of its basal science or sciences, but is independent within its own proper sphere. Under such an arrangement, sciences may be said to be "coördinated," and to be grouped (1) in the order of their mathematical exactness, or (2) in the order of their relationship, or "filiation,"⁵ or (3) in the order of their complexity.

Relative Utility of the Sciences.—This series em-

⁴For discussions of the classification of the sciences, see Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive*, vol. i, Chaps. I and II; H. Spencer, *The Classification of the Sciences*; L. F. Ward, *Outlines of Sociology*, Part I, and *Pure Sociology*, Chap. V, pp. 65-71; Karl Pearson, *A Grammar of Science*, Chap. XII; F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. II, pp. 45-51; *English Sociological Papers*, numerous articles in series, 1905-1907; Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Comte*, Chap. III, *et seq.*

⁵See Ward's *Pure Sociology*, Chap. V.

phasizes also from a sociological standpoint the relative utility of the sciences to man; the first science, astronomy, being the least, and sociology the most useful. For it is clearly fundamentally important that men should thoroughly understand the laws of human association so as to comprehend the meaning of civilization and wisely to guide the activities and ambitions of society. For practical purposes this is, by far, the most useful knowledge mankind can possess. Yet in order to attain this knowledge, the psychological group of sciences must, of course, be prepared to explain the phenomena of mind, and must be in harmony with the teaching of biology about life, which in its turn must ultimately harmonize with the conclusion of the preceding sciences that furnish data respecting the physical basis for organic life.

Utility, of course, implies not merely material utility but includes also spiritual and intellectual enlightenment through the increase of truth and the displacement of error. In this sense each of the basal sciences may be looked on as a reservoir of information to be utilized in due time for human uplift. From this same viewpoint sociology may be considered as a science of sciences, since it incorporates into itself all information of human interest gathered by the other sciences. Comte stressed this point of view, even arguing that the other sciences should consider themselves subordinate to sociology as the science inclusive of all information in them worthy of human study. One may, however, grant that sociology is anthropocentric, absorbing into itself all knowledge useful to man, and yet prefer to think of a larger science of sciences broadly inclusive of all the sciences in the series, combining into itself not merely a certain sort of knowledge, the social, but rather, as already men-

tioned, the laws and principles fundamental to all knowledge.

From the standpoint of a philosophy of the universe, however, cosmic laws are logically vastly more important than the activities of human beings on this relatively insignificant planet, so that to such a philosopher the entire mass of sociological study might properly be relegated to a footnote at the end of a chapter. But from the human standpoint the emphasis is reversed, since the cosmic is beyond our control, while the human and the social are susceptible of profound modification. Man cannot change the solar system, but he can modify, in fundamental ways, the social organization and its activities, and for that reason he must understand the laws of human association, so as to be able gradually to banish social handicaps and to expedite progress.

This simple arrangement of the sciences does not imply that they became known historically in this order, for vague theorizing about all of them can be found far back in the history of human thought. The assertion is rather that the simplest science with the broadest cosmic or universal generalizations comes first in natural order, and that each subsequent science is more complex, its principles are less definitely known, and the possibility of its becoming mathematically exact is more and more remote as the end of the series is approached. Yet the aim of all scientific study is to add to our knowledge year by year, and to discover new principles, new laws, new generalizations, so that, as the far distant goal of scientific attainment, this series of basal abstract sciences will be made exact, as far as that is possible to the human mind with its limitations, and all knowledge will ultimately be seen to be unified into a sort of "synthetic philosophy."

This movement from the unknown to the known, is well illustrated in traditions of such early studies as astronomy and chemistry. These were once astrology and alchemy, and were popularly identified with magic and supernatural agencies, for what was uncomprehended and mysterious used to be thought to be due to supernatural power. Similarly, many aspects of biological and psychological phenomena are among the ignorant supposed to be caused by ghostly agencies beyond scientific comprehension. Sometimes the very complexity of social studies develops in the student a sort of religious attitude, for, dealing as sociology does with profound moral problems, it arouses an idealism that easily passes into religious fervor. Socialism to the socialist is a sort of religion, and Comte, in the last of his great works, actually advocated the establishment of a religion in which the achievers of mankind would unitedly be considered as worthy of worship.⁶

Three Aspects of Science.—If the word “science” is to be used to cover all the branches of knowledge contained in the series, obviously the meaning of that term is vague. Generally speaking, the word is used in three senses: (1) as a mass of systematized or methodized information; (2) as a collection of laws, principles, and generalizations with their proper explanations, logically reasonable, but not susceptible of mathematical proof; (3) as an interrelated system of generalizations which can be mathematically demonstrated. Obviously no science, not even mathematics, has become exact in all of its aspects. There is regularly a border land and a *terra incognita*, where the van or advance line of a science may

⁶In his *Système de politique positive*. For an interesting account of the English Positivist or Comtean Church, see Frederic Harrison, *The Confessions of a Layman*.

be found. Explorers and patrols are tentatively mapping out the new land by formulating hypotheses, speculations, half truths, and visionary imaginations. As knowledge increases, however, system and order appear, the false fades away before truer information and broad paths become known, needing only the surveyor's chain to make them exact. Naturally in the last science of the series, sociology, exact generalizations are least possible. There are many so-called laws, some of which will undoubtedly stand the test of time, being partly built up from statistics, the chief mathematical tool of sociology, but for the most part the army of sociological students is busily engaged in amassing facts, assorting knowledge, and formulating hypotheses to be verified or rejected in the light of later knowledge.

Need of Generalized Knowledge.—From the standpoint of sociology it is desirable that every intelligent person of liberal education should understand the broad generalizations of all the sciences in the series. In other words, he should, as a prerequisite for the study of sociology, understand the chief teachings of astronomy, physics, chemistry, and especially of biology and psychology. This does not imply that he must know all the concrete sciences dependent on the abstract sciences. Such knowledge would be too vast for any one mind. But the principles and laws of the abstract sciences are comparatively few and simple of comprehension. They are related, filiated, and grow naturally one from another. Such knowledge in the mind would approximate to the unity of knowledge and would enable the person to "see things in their relations," and thus to avoid the tendency to over-emphasize one aspect of knowledge to the neglect of others. A specialist in any one branch, ignorant of

the others, tends to become narrow and often fails to understand his own specialty, because of his inability to comprehend its proper place in the larger scheme of knowledge. This understanding of the generalizations of science must in time become part of common knowledge as a necessary basis for an intelligent comprehension of the larger questions of social importance.

In any case, a person who desires to become proficient in some one science of the series, should at all events become familiar with the fundamental teachings of the science or sciences immediately preceding his preference. Thus, a knowledge of the principles of psychology, and to some extent, of biology, becomes well-nigh essential to a proper knowledge of sociology, just as the psychologist should comprehend the teachings of biology, as far as it concerns the nervous system at least, and the biologist should comprehend the essential teachings of organic chemistry. Sociology being the last science in the series and obliged to rely on the other sciences for its bases, is still in a formative stage since its chief basal sciences, biology and psychology, are themselves comparatively new and are just becoming scientific. They, however, already supply teachings that tentatively, at least, may be applied in the sociological field as the basis for investigation and speculation. In consequence of this fact, many concrete sociological sciences are forming, each collecting facts, systematizing them, working out laws, and accumulating information that the general sociologist will try to coördinate and to harmonize with the principles supplied by the basal sciences. These subordinate social sciences, coupled with anthropocentric information obtained from the other sciences of the series, furnish the data needed for sociological study.

Social Importance of the Basal Sciences.—The relation of sociology to these other sciences may be better understood by calling attention to their bearing on human existence and development. *Mathematics*, for example, is fundamental to each of the sciences, and through discoveries in that field the science of astronomy in particular became possible and has been made exact. *Astronomical* teaching has freed the human mind from many a superstitious fear, such as the dread of comets, eclipses, and shooting stars; has shown man his real "place in the universe" on an insignificant planet in a petty solar system; has taught him through its knowledge of the solar system the probable duration of human life on the earth; and has given to him among others the practical sciences of surveying and navigation. Through its subsience, *geology*, he learns the history of his own planet and the true story of human origins and how the world was made habitable for man. From it he also acquires knowledge of soils and of hidden forms of wealth, such as metals, coals, oils; and waters, and through studies of climate past and present he attains a deeper insight into human history and a basis for weather forecasts, so useful to commerce and agriculture. Through *physics* we become familiar with the many forms of cosmic energy such as light, heat, and electricity and with the laws of mass, weight, and motion, thereby allowing the possibility of innumerable inventions and the development of all forms of engineering, so useful in higher civilization. *Chemistry* likewise, through its ability to analyze compounds and to synthesize elements, makes enormous contributions to manufacturers and to agriculture, and furnishes a scientific basis for biological investigations and for the pathology of plant, animal, and man.

Biology through its three great branches, botany, zoölogy, and anthropology, shows the order of the evolution of life, and starting with the protoplasmic cell studies the nature, function, and structure of vegetative and animal organisms, including man. Among the concrete sciences dependent on biology some are sociologically important. Human physiology, for example, studies man's physical functions and structure; and the numerous anthropological sciences throw light on the differentiation from the animal world of the *genus homo* and on human origins and early social development.

Psychology, being the basis of all social activity, naturally has before it innumerable possibilities of usefulness, for example, in education and social psychology, but these various fields of utility will be discussed more fully in later chapters.

As one may speak of a social psychology, so likewise it would be theoretically possible to work out a social biology, a social chemistry, a social physics, and a social astronomy. Such studies would show how man through association has consciously or unconsciously modified the structure and function of vegetable, animal, and human life; how he has introduced into the universe the series of human chemical creations; how he has utilized cosmic energy by using it as power, heat, or light at will; and how he has changed to some extent terrestrial conditions through engineering and invention. These researches would be interesting and important, and they indicate the wide field opening up to the sociologist, as scientific knowledge of all sorts becomes systematized and available.

Lacking the scientific discoveries and inventions achieved in these great fields of study mankind would

still be groping in primitive savagery. On the other hand, the potential achievements of the future are so enormous that present generations can form but a faint conception of the possibilities of later development when the human brain is at its maximum of efficiency and attainment, and through social inheritance has at its command the scientific and spiritual achievements of past generations.

Special Social Sciences.—In addition to knowledge supplied by the other sciences in the series, sociology has to rely on the special social sciences for the larger part of its data. This relationship is often confused and needs to be clearly understood. If sociology belongs in the series with the other sciences it must be an abstract science, differentiated so as to emphasize the laws and principles underlying social phenomena, both in their pure and in their applied form. These laws and principles, as already indicated, are partly supplied from the sciences preceding it in the series, and partly from the study of the various forms of group association. The laws and principles obtained from these specialized studies of separate departments of social phenomena, when brought into relationship with the generalizations of the preceding abstract sciences, form the science of sociology. Some of these departments are in themselves so broad in the extent of their social interests that their students have been tempted to identify them with sociology proper. Politics, as presented by Greek philosophers, was practically an ancient theory of sociology; ethics and economics, in their broader aspects, both threaten at times to usurp the province of sociology. The mere name of the science, however, is immaterial; no matter by what name it may be called, that study is sociology

which works out scientifically the laws and principles of human association.

On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the above explanation all that calls itself sociology is not, necessarily, sociology. Thus, such familiar terms as "descriptive sociology," "practical sociology," "Christian sociology," "criminal sociology," are incorrectly used. They merely designate descriptions of social conditions and explanations of social reforms. Even though such studies are sociological in aim, they are properly concrete social sciences or practical applications of these to social conditions, and each covers only a very small part of the entire field covered by sociology. These special concrete social sciences with their applications to social conditions work out their conclusions separately, basing them on a study of the specialized phenomena within their respective spheres. Relating these conclusions to one another and to the great generalizations of the serial sciences is the work of the sociologist proper, and can only be completely done after social phenomena have been studied by the subsiences of sociology. If one looks, therefore, at the world of social phenomena, the picture presented to the mind is of many persons each working out his specialty and each elaborating conclusions from his studies in the subsiences of anthropology, in social psychology, in economics, jurisprudence, ethics, education, religion, and domestic relations, in crime, vice, pauperism, and a thousand other specialized branches of societal knowledge.

Sociology Synthetic.—This sort of thing might be done for centuries and there would still be no great abstract science of sociology. But when scientific philosophers arise, as Comte, Spencer, and Ward, who try to re-

late these disconnected researches so as to show that underlying all human association there are common principles in harmony with cosmic laws, from that time sociology proper is in process of formation. The beginnings of the science may be weak and often illogical, even viciously defective from lack of proper basal knowledge and prone to backslide into metaphysics, but the same statement would be true of any other science in its beginnings, only more true, doubtless, of sociology, because it is the most complex science of the series. Since, however, a knowledge of the science of sociology is fundamental to any adequate comprehension of social life or to any wise policy of social progress, one must hope that the errors will be shed as soon as possible, that gaps in knowledge may be bridged over by study, and that a fairly accurate body of principles may be worked out, so as to enable mankind to accelerate its upward march toward the far-distant goal of social evolution. From this standpoint one may admit that sociology hardly deserves yet to be called an exact science, that its theorists make many blunders and enunciate occasional absurdities, and yet at the same time he may argue that it is the science *par excellence* and will some day furnish the key to the door which bars our way to the full comprehension of human destiny.

Sociology's Relations to Philosophy and Religion.

—With this explanation in mind it becomes possible to see more clearly the relation of sociology to certain other studies closely allied through common interests. Philosophy, for example, is a term that in its numerous and conflicting meanings covers a whole series of studies. (1) Spencer preferred to think of it as a study which should use the scientific method of induction and base itself en-

tirely upon verifiable generalizations, and which should aim to synthesize scientific knowledge by becoming a science of sciences. (2) If philosophy be considered as concerned chiefly with the general contents and forms of knowledge, it would properly be included within the general science of psychology, as the study of abstract laws and principles underlying thought and the acquisition of knowledge. Psychology, in its behavioristic form, is, of course, a concrete science dependent upon the abstract psychological group. (3) If philosophy be considered as dealing with volitions and conduct, either between man and man or between men and a personified divinity or divinities, it may be defined as ethics. Social ethics to-day is rapidly becoming a subsience that should properly be ranked under the sociological group. Now sociology, as the last science in the Comtean series, may, well philosophize to some extent in the first sense of that word as defined above, but would have no direct concern with philosophy in the second sense, whereas in respect to social ethics it may rightly assert a deep interest, since that study deals with human conduct and its standards.⁷

In a similar manner the relation existing between sociology and religion may be indicated. Religion as a study, emphasizing certain teachings in respect to divinity and human immortality, is plainly a philosophy which, according to sociological theory, should harmonize with scientific knowledge, or at least should not be antagonistic to it. So far as religion is a philosophy, sociology is concerned with its teachings only as they affect human relations. In so far, however, as religion establishes social institutions, such as the church or the priesthood, for the

⁷ Compare on this topic J. S. Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, especially Chap. I.

perpetuation and the enlargement of religious influence, and in so far as it teaches through these a code of morals, sociology has a direct concern and may well study religious institutions and religious ethics by the same methods it employs in the study of other institutions, such as the family or the state.⁸

Social Prevision.—It has already been shown that from a scientific point of view human knowledge is only relatively ascertainable, and hence can be only relatively true. If each science depends on others for much of its data and on an imperfect mental mechanism for its elucidation, no knowledge is absolutely true. The aim of science is to ascertain the exact truth as far as this is humanly possible, but the consummation of this lies far in the future. The best approximation to this is seen when the scientist, through his knowledge, becomes able to forecast the future. In many directions at the present time scientists can foretell results as, *e.g.*, in the fields of astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology, and the hope of science is that in ages to come knowledge will become so exact that man, by his understanding of the laws of nature, can with a fair degree of accuracy intelligently direct his activities so as to attain a desired goal.

The question arises whether in sociology, the newest of the great sciences, this same power of "prevision,"⁹ as Comte called it, is possible. The answer is decidedly becoming affirmative. Sociologists now assert with increasing emphasis that the time is not far distant when some of the fundamental laws and principles underlying

⁸For further statements on this topic, see Chapter XVII.

⁹"All science has prevision for its aim," *i.e.*, the capacity to form right conclusions through an insight based on scientific deductions. For a brief discussion of this term, see Lévy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Comte*, pp. 66-70.

social activity will be so well understood that civilization can begin to exterminate the great handicaps to progress, such as crime, pauperism, intemperance, and sexual vice, and to build up with scientific precision a social order that will bring vigor and happiness to mankind. It is essential, however, to remember that this consummation will probably not be effected by adopting *in toto* any of the utopias or social panaceas now so numerous, but by slow and methodical study of the facts of social life, a scientific elaboration of the truths contained in these, and the harmonization of sociological teaching with the great generalizations that underlie all science. "United we stand, divided we fall" is as true of the sciences as of the commonwealths of a federation. The true scientist must coöperate with his fellows, be modest in his conclusions, refrain from dogmatism, and must hold as his article of faith the belief that the unknown may yet become known to the patient student who sits at the feet of nature and seeks to understand her mysteries.

At the same time it should be said that the best of our utopias have an important place in sociological theorizing. They voice the intuitive anticipations of thinkers who may not be able to explain the steps leading to their conclusion, but yet see with a sort of prophetic vision the trend of civilization. They should be taken at their face value, their details ignored, and their general ideas considered as hypotheses setting forth a theory of human progress. Some utopias, like those of Plato, Sir Thomas More, and Edward Bellamy, have been decidedly stimulating to the social imagination.

Sociology is Anthropocentric.—Sociology, it may be said in conclusion of this chapter, tends to be anthropocentric. That is, it seeks to interpret all scientific knowl-

edge, as already explained earlier in this chapter, into terms of utility to man. Theoretically knowledge may be acquired for its own sake, out of the desire merely to add to the world's store and without thought of any practical application. It is probable, however, that even in the mind of such a student there is the unconscious hope that at some time the results of his researches may prove beneficial to mankind. Sociology, with its keen desire to accelerate the progress of humanity, favors, in the best sense of the word, a utilitarianism that seeks always for a practical application of any new scientific discovery. In consequence, it favors stimuli in the form of honors and rewards in invention and science, it approves the scientific experimental activities of governmental and private enterprise, and encourages in every possible way the development of concrete sciences and arts involving activities of social importance. Its trend is away from the simple life of village communism, or monastic retirement, or a selfish individualism. It emphasizes coöperative activity, social altruism, a complex yet unified social organization, and the necessity of constant achievement for the sake of human welfare. In so doing it is deeply interested in the application of astronomical truths, for instance, to navigation, or in the teachings of physicists in respect to the utilization of natural power; of chemical knowledge in respect to foods, metals, and the industries generally; of biological principles of utility in developing the quantity and quality of vegetable and animal foods; and of psychological information that may throw light on the potential capacities of the mind when rightly trained. From its subsiences sociology hopes to understand the true principles of economic effort, the proper organization and functions of government, the wisest

methods in regulation of domestic relationships, the scientific principles underlying law, mortality, and public opinion, and the relative social importance of the religious, the æsthetic, and the intellectual.

Sociology, therefore, has a distinctly practical aim. It seeks to base itself firmly on science and scientific methods, abjuring unverifiable teachings; it aims to bring order into the chaos of social activities, and through the unification of sociological knowledge to guide mankind towards the ideal of an increasingly progressive civilization. In this newer era of coming social progress the evils of social life will slowly give place to a more just system of social organization, in which men will deliberately and methodically work towards an ethical goal, in which the inherent capacities of the human race will have full opportunity for higher development.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIOLOGY AND BIOLOGY

Social Utility of Biology.—Reference has several times been made to biology and its subdivisions as basal for sociological studies. In saying this one does not imply that biology is sociology or that the latter is merely a subdivision of the former. Each science has its own field, distinct and apart from the other. By broad definition sociology is devoted to the study of human associations and human associations are not biological organisms. Yet human associations are psychic by nature and psychic phenomena depend primarily on the existence of a physical nervous system as part of a physical body. Human bodies are biological organisms and, therefore, whatever biology and its various subsiences may teach about the body and nervous system is of profound human interest. Then, too, biological knowledge is basal for hygiene and sanitation, and for the practice of medicine in its aim to keep the human body free from sickness and disease, or for physical culture in its attempts to develop a perfect physique.

Biology also in its botanical aspect has before it immense possibilities of social usefulness in seeking to enlarge through forestry the supply of timbers for building and wooded areas to serve as reservoirs for streams. Botany, furthermore, in its applications, aims to develop edible plants and fruits of all sorts so as to multiply the vegetal

supplies of human foods, varying them by selective processes so as to furnish the many different varieties, for example, of the grains, the potato, the apple, pear, or grape, or flowers cultivated for their æsthetic value.

In the same manner zoölogy through studies of animal life is becoming increasingly able to supply to hungry mouths innumerable varieties of animal foods, whether flesh, fish, or fowl, as well as to supply for the yoke and the bit animals as substitutes for human labor. In later years the tropics and the seas will undoubtedly be utilized far more than at present for the purpose of producing foods and other organic necessities of life, but only when biology through its scientific investigations has ascertained the best methods of food multiplication and at the same time has discovered the art of freeing organic life from the natural diseases of plant and animal.

But, omitting for the present these scientific contributions from biology to human welfare, there are other aspects of the science that must be taken into account by the student of sociology. From among these three will be selected as illustrations, namely, (1) the field of anthropology, (2) the organic theory as applied to society, and (3) the biological teaching in respect to heredity.

The Field of Anthropology.—Anthropology is a descriptive science devoted to the study of man. Obviously, therefore, sociology and anthropology conceivably might easily overlap. In one sense anthropology is a subsience of sociology; in another, sociology is merely a subdivision of anthropology. Anthropology historically arose as a subdivision of zoölogy and described the animal man, contrasting his physiology with those of other animals and comparing human racial physical differences of body and skull. This naturally led to a statement of the

mental and social characteristics that distinguished man from other animals or that differentiated one race from another, thus leading on to the development of other sciences. Man, for example, has developed language to a remarkable extent, as compared with the language of animals, and, therefore, the subsience of *philology* devoted itself to this study. He is an animal making use of tools of his own creation, and hence arose the study of human *technology*, and of the survivals of earlier achievements under the study of *archæology*. Again man is characterized by his mentality, expressing itself in art, religion, and mythological philosophizing and through this development primitive man multiplied his social relationships or group contacts. This is developing into the science of *social origins*. All of these properly form part of anthropology, although the study may be somewhat narrowed by considering the same subject matter from a racial viewpoint, thus developing into the sciences of *ethnography* and *ethnology* with their subdivisions. Under such conditions the term anthropology becomes merely a sort of connecting link between kindred descriptive sciences, devoted mostly to studies of primitive man and early civilizations, so that the real science of man is not anthropology but sociology, since this goes far beyond mere description of primitive peoples and seeks by wider studies to work out the laws and principles underlying this vast mass of descriptive material, contained not merely in anthropology but in the special social sciences also, like economics, politics, and morals.

Yet emphasizing, as sociology does through the influence of Comte and Spencer, the study of social develop-

ment¹ or evolution, the information contained in anthropology and its subsiences is fundamental to any true comprehension of human history, so that evolutionary social studies are dependent on and profoundly interested in the progress of these numerous sciences devoted to human and social beginnings, and must follow their conclusions closely, so as to have a scientific basis for its teachings in respect to social evolution. For these reasons sociology regularly assumes the truth of such teachings from these sciences as the geologic age of man, his descent, from an animal ancestry, and his slow ascent from animality to a crude and savage civilization, out of which by infinitely slow processes mankind, under the stimulus of an expanding mentality, is emerging into the quasi-civilization of this century. Since millions of years probably yet lie ahead of the human race before the earth will cease to be fit for human habitation, sociology is not in the habit of talking pessimistically about the senescence of mankind, but rather views humanity as a robust, sprawling infant, not yet able to act and think in a mature way. Yet, learning by sad experience, it is slowly strengthening its foresight and intelligence and gaining imperceptibly such an insight into the laws of its future that, in due time, one may hope it will shun the blunders of its immaturity and direct its activities purposively towards the attainment of a higher social life.

Organic Theory of Society.—The older organic theory of society, which had vogue for thousands of years down to the time of Darwinism, assumed that society might well be compared to a human body. In Greek teaching both Pythagoras and Plato used this analogy, comparing, for example, the head to the noblest

¹ Comte's *Social Dynamics*.

part of mankind, the upper trunk to the less noble, and the lower trunk to the plebeian element. This analogy was common among the Romans also as when, for example, the secession of the plebs from the patricians was compared to the revolt of the stomach against the head. National personification is common in the Old Testament as in the dream of Nebuchadnezzar, (Daniel 2). Paul, in the New Testament, compares the church to a body having Christ as its head, or again the Church and Christ as a bride and bridegroom. In the Seventeenth Century this older organic notion still remained common, for Hobbes in his *Leviathan* pictures the State as a magnified man, the parts of which are made up of miniature men,² and Pascal in the same century, following St. Augustine's *Civitas Dei* represents mankind, past and present, as though it were a single person living a continuous life and constantly adding to his knowledge.

The danger of holding an analogy too closely is seen in this older organic theory, since it was assumed that mankind, or a nation, being an organism, had its birth, childhood, maturity, and an old age followed by inevitable death. Since also from this standpoint mankind was thought of as hoary with age and that high civilization was a mark of senescence, advanced nations were destined to "decline and fall" and would be succeeded by more youthful barbarians who in their turn would grow decrepid through the curse of civilization. It developed also a pessimistic belief in the nearness of the "end of the world," a notion that prevailed down to the middle Nineteenth Century, and that is still held in some religious circles.

Another aspect of this organic theory is best seen in

² See pictures in old folio edition of this work.

the development of the idea of the corporation, a community of persons so unified in their collective character that they are assumed to have a corporate personality. Thus, the law assumes that corporations are artificial persons, even though a corporation has "neither a body to be kicked, nor a soul to be damned." In the same manner, the State as a corporate entity is a person and has a personality, and its character may be portrayed in cartoons, as in the case of Uncle Sam, John Bull, or *la belle France*.

The latest form of the organic theory was best voiced by Herbert Spencer, under the influence of the biological era of his mature life. In his *Principles of Sociology* he made great use of biological analogies in his discussion of society, so that one gets the impression that society is an organism or a superorganism very like a man, or, if not so high in the scale, then perhaps more like a brainless jelly-fish, or perhaps a cross between both. Schäffle of Austria, Paul von Lilienfeld of Germany, and the earlier French sociologists generally made large use of the organic analogy, but in later years, with the rise of the newer psychology, the organic analogy is losing its hold, or survives in a modified form, stressing a psychic organism, the "social mind," instead of the social body.

Problem of Parenthood.—The third aspect of biology in which sociology is interested is its teaching in regard to human parenthood, life, and heredity. These questions are unquestionably among the most ancient problems with which the mind of man has struggled. Animals, of course, never trouble their heads about questions of parenthood or heredity, but when man began to think at all the problem of birth must have early presented itself to his mind. Unquestionably a child is born from its mother, but was she alone responsible for its birth (par-

thenogenesis), or were supernatural agencies concerned, imparting to the female divine life from the heavens,³ or might conception take place through the influence of natural objects or animal life other than human (totemism)? When the office of the male in generation was understood male egotism soon evolved the theory that the offspring really "sprung from the loins of" the male, and was merely nourished and carried by the female until its birth. Not until the Nineteenth Century (1827) when Von Baer discovered by microscopic investigation the mammalian ovum, was the joint function of both parents in procreation scientifically known. The widely varying ancient theories of parenthood seem strange to us, but each conclusion was doubtless attained only after centuries of meditation and reflection on human experiences, and each conclusion, when adopted, deeply affected family organization and kinship, according as the interpretation was metronymic, totemistic, or patronymic.

Ancient Beliefs Respecting Heredity.—The other related problem, that of life, was not susceptible of solution by observation, and hence had its religious and philosophical reply. At first it was assumed that life came directly from the gods as, for example, in the narration of Genesis (II, 7).⁴ But in later generations, as men mused on the vicissitudes of life and the extremes of fortune that came to the lot of man, they concluded, as in the Indian theory of the transmigration of souls, that life is eternal in the universe and is similar in all living organisms, including man, but that it mani-

³ Compare, for example, the many traditions of the divine parentage of founders of religions, or of heroes and kings.

⁴ "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."

festes itself according to law in different forms of varying grade. For example, as in Indian philosophy, the kind of life a man lives, determines his character (karma) and this at death determines the kind of organic body the life will inhabit when reborn. Thus, a noble life might progressively advance through numerous bodies towards saintliness and absorption into divinity (Nirvana), or by contrast a vile life would descend through varying grades until it inhabited the body of a beast or a serpent. Plato taught quite the same idea in his *Republic*, in the "Fable of Er" (Book X) but represents the souls of the dead in the other world as making choice by lot of the destiny they desired to experience when reborn in earthly bodies, a teaching reproduced with variations by Virgil in his *Æneid*.

These several notions of the determination of one's life as fixed by the gods, or by an eternal fate, or by some decision made before birth represent the supernatural and metaphysical stages of explanation of heredity. On the other hand a teaching based on human experience is found in such notions as the hereditary curse resting on the house of Œdipus, or the blessings inherited from Abraham by a chosen people, or such expressions as "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge," or, "Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" Plato, in his myth of the metals, went one step further by emphasizing a gradation in heredity. In the *Republic* he says:

The God who created you mixed gold in the composition of such of you as are qualified to rule, which gives them the highest value; while in the auxiliaries he made silver an ingredient, assigning iron and copper to the cultivators of the soil and the other workmen. Therefore, inasmuch as

you are all related to one another, although your children will generally resemble their parents, yet sometimes a golden parent will produce a silver child, and a silver parent a golden child, and so on, each producing any. The rulers, therefore, have received this in charge first and above all from the gods, to observe nothing more closely, in their character of vigilant guardians, than the children that are born, to see which of these metals enters into the composition of their souls; and if a child be born in their class with an alloy of copper or iron, they are to have no manner of pity upon it, but giving it the value that belongs to its nature, they are to thrust it away into the class of artisans or agriculturists; and if again among these a child be born with any admixture of gold or silver, when they have assayed it, they are to raise it either to the class of guardians, or to that of auxiliaries. (Book III, Section 415. *Translation by Davies and Vaughan.*)

Also in discussing the question of woman's supposed inferiority to man he argued:

I conclude then that none of the occupations which comprehend the ordering of a state belong to woman as woman, nor yet to man as man; but natural gifts are to be found here and there, in both sexes alike; and, so far as her nature is concerned, the woman is admissible to all pursuits as well as the man; though in all of them the woman is weaker than the man.

Precisely so.

Shall we then appropriate all duties to men, and none to women?

How can we?

On the contrary, we shall hold, I imagine, that one woman may have talents for medicine, and another be without them; and that one may be musical, and another unmusical.

Undoubtedly.

And shall we not also say, that one woman may have qualifications for gymnastic exercises, and for war, and

another be unwarlike, and without a taste for gymnastics?

I think we shall.

Again, may there not be a love of knowledge in one, and a distaste for it in another? and may not one be spirited, and another spiritless?

True again.

If that be so, there are some women who are fit, and others who are unfit, for the office of guardians. For were not those the qualities that we selected, in the case of the men, as marking their fitness for that office?

Yes, they were.

Then as far as the guardianship of a state is concerned, there is no difference between the natures of the man and of the woman, but only various degrees of weakness and strength.

Apparently there is none.

Then we shall have to select duly qualified women also, to share in the life and official labours of the duly qualified men; since we find that they are competent to the work, and of kindred nature with the men. (Book V, Section 455.)

But in a century earlier than Plato's, Confucius had hit on a theory of the "survival of the fit" when he remarked:

For God, in giving life to all created things, is surely bountiful to them according to their qualities. Hence the tree which is full of life He fosters and sustains, while that which is ready to fall He cuts off and destroys.⁵

Teachings of this sort are exceedingly common in ancient and mediæval literature, for beliefs in regard to heredity had become standardized through the influence of Oriental and Greek classics and Jewish teaching. Newer instruction needed the methods of science and these, in biology, were practically unknown before the Nineteenth Century. Throughout the Eighteenth Cen-

⁵ *Conduct of Life*, tr. by Ku Hung Wing, p. 39. "Wisdom of the East" series.

tury, owing to the influence of the psychological sensationalism of the school represented by John Locke and David Hume, heredity as a factor in civilization was minimized and environment made important. Social perfection, it was taught, must come through modifications in and improvement of social environment.

Recent Teachings.—It was early in the Nineteenth Century (1809) when Lamarck definitely raised the issue between heredity and environment by advancing as a scientific teaching the inheritance of acquired characters through use or disuse. This, of course, implies an hereditary inheritance, but one built up generation by generation through human environmental experiences. Nearly twenty years later came the discoveries of Von Baer respecting the mammalian ovum. Another thirty years ushered in the Darwinian era (1859) with its theory of the origin of species, human descent from animal ancestry, and progress through continuous variation, adaptation, selection, survival, and elimination, as the result of the struggle for food and mates. Towards the end of the century came Weismann, who argued (1885-1893), that the germ plasm is continuous, in the sense that there are definite cells handed down from generation to generation, and that these include the total inheritance with which a new generation starts. Then was revived the theory of Mendel (announced in 1865) proclaiming that there are in plant and animal certain unit characters which do not blend with other unit characters, when these are brought together in breeding, but remain constant and finally appear in the offspring in definite proportions. In 1901 came the mutation theory of De Vries, claiming that Darwin's principle of continuous selection by slow variations is not the only, and perhaps not even

the chief, method for the origin of species but arguing that variation takes place at times by leaps (the "sports" and "freaks" of Darwinism) and that these may result in the origin of new species. Finally, Francis Galton developed his earlier teaching respecting "stirpiculture" into the new science of eugenics,⁶ which was launched into existence by his presentation of papers before the English Sociological Society (1904-1905). His theory, in brief, was that statistical and other studies of heredity should be made, so as to ascertain the conditions that would best aid in the production of a good racial stock. This information, in respect to both heredity and environment, should then be taught as widely as possible, so as to establish scientific standards of mating, which should be enforced by a powerful public opinion.

Social Importance of Biological Teachings.—From this brief survey of the development of teachings in respect to parenthood, life, and heredity, it may be possible to see why sociology is to some extent dependent on biology. If men should believe, as in primitive times, that the female is the sole parent of the child, or that if there be any other agency it is supernatural in character, obviously her place in social life and in familial relations would be quite different from her place if, by contrast, the male believed, as in patronymic society, that he was the really important factor in parenthood. Again, history plainly teaches how important an influence in political and religious leadership has been the belief that gods might become parents of human beings. Certainly profound social consequences have resulted from the belief that human *destiny* was determined absolutely at birth by pre-natal conditions fixed by fate, or by the will

⁶ A word he coined and employed in 1883.

of the gods, or because of acts performed in previous existences, or of some impiety committed by an ancestor. Fairly modern illustrations of the influence exerted by such beliefs may be seen by considering the psychological effects of such dismal teaching in respect to heredity as may be found in the former religious dogmas of predestination and innate depravity, with their implications of ultimate damnation to infant and adult alike, unless that by God's grace some few had been elected to salvation from the beginning of time.

It was against the ecclesiastical consequences of such teachings that the Eighteenth Century revolted in declaring with Methodism that grace and salvation were free, or with French philosophers in asserting that men were born good and kindly, and that evil in the world came not from divine fiat or from anything inherent in nature or man but from unnatural ambitions of men and adverse environmental conditions. These, therefore, argued that peace and good will can come only when men clearly understand the social situation through scientific knowledge and restore natural conditions by overthrowing artificial institutions, devised by cunning and selfish men. This delightful generalization, empirical though it was, was, as already indicated, a reaction against the pessimistic views of heredity taught by religion, since it was held with Locke that every child born started life with a clean slate (*tabula rasa*), as it were, and by right instruction, training, and environment, might become a paragon of goodness and intelligence. The teaching of Lamarck was in line with this school of thought, for if use and disuse tended to determine inherited characters, then right instruction and environment would tend to determine the survival of characters making for jus-

tice and virtue. This general attitude of mind, so far as it affected the status of women, received a powerful support from the scientific discovery of Von Baer, which gave the female an equal, if not superior, place to the male in parenthood, thus depriving him of his age-long prestige as the really important parent in procreation, with its implication that the male must necessarily be the superior sex.

This antagonism between a pessimistic religious teaching in respect to heredity and the optimistic, agnostic humanitarianism of the Eighteenth Century arguing for the all importance of environment in social development, is in many respects, the key to the modern discussions of the relationship between sociology and biology; for Darwinism,⁷ in a sense, took the place of religion in arguing pessimistically for heredity and against environment. It taught, for example, that man began as an evolution from animal forms and, consequently, has inherited brutish instincts. After a few hundred thousand years of struggle and a weary round of endless bloodshed and pain economy, he has attained a condition of semi-respectability, which in the course of other myriads of years may become so ingrained by eugenic selection as to amount to inherited *Kultur*. The dull mediocre masses meanwhile should rest content with the station to which nature assigns them with its bare subsistence wage, and its misery of disease and iniquity. Indeed, they should be thankful that they live at all since extermination is naturally their portion. For success belongs rightly to the superior "fit," who by physical prowess and mental cunning have might on their side and in their hearts a "will to power." Qualities such as these are handed on in the

⁷ Including in this term his successors and modifiers also, . . .

eternal germ plasm of superior stocks. These stocks furnish genius mutations in great number, and, if they can be discovered by Mendelian investigations, it may become eugenically possible slowly to eliminate inferior stocks of humanity and substitute in their stead a race of supermen, the predestined elect.

It is not necessary at this time, to discuss these matters more minutely. Obviously teachings such as these, if scientifically correct, would profoundly modify sociological teaching, which at present stresses vigorously the importance, though not the all-importance, of a right social environment, as a necessity for social progress. Such an emphasis is broadly humanitarian and democratic in aim but if the Darwinian teaching of endless struggle, extermination, and survival are to be emphasized to the exclusion of social environment, sociology must change its tone and favor the chosen elect as against the gentile masses. There is a probability, however, that the emphasis on social environment may yet find its justification in biological, as well as in sociological, teaching, so that one need not yet become a pessimist in respect to the ultimate survival of modern beliefs in democracy.

CHAPTER VII

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

Sociology and Its Basal Sciences.—Since sociology is based chiefly on the biological and psychological sciences, sociological discussions naturally emphasize analogies and vocabularies derived from one or the other of these sciences. At first, under the impulse given by Darwinism, students for many years devoted themselves to what may be called a biological interpretation of society. Under this impulse the notion that society was fundamentally an organism was vigorously emphasized, as for instance by Herbert Spencer and especially Schäffle.¹ Then, as attention passed in part to psychology under the new light thrown on mental phenomena by physiological researches, there came a newer interpretation of society which tended to make sociology a sort of supplementary chapter in psychology. But as the field of sociology enlarges through the influence and the knowledge gained from special social studies of all sorts, there is a growing conviction that although there may be much valuable information and suggestion from the two basal sciences, yet such knowledge will grow relatively less important as sociology secures possession of its own peculiar field. At present, however, sociological terms present a curious mixture of words taken from the exact sciences and from

¹ Schäffle, *Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers*. For a brief discussion of the organic nature of society, see J. S. Mackenzie, *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, Chap. III.

biology and psychology, often used in a slightly different sense from that employed by writers in these sciences. This confusion will gradually disappear as agreement is slowly reached in respect to the terminology to be employed.

Psychology and Sociology.—Of the two basal sciences, psychology is naturally more important for sociology, since the latter's trend toward "prevision" demands a mastery of such psychological principles as would be advantageous in the guidance of human activity toward desired ends. This is obvious if we realize the importance of mind as a factor in civilization. Knowledge is the basis for power, and a social group is intelligent only when composed of persons who have well-trained intellects, stored with a large fund of useful information. An intelligent group can understand the conditions and possibilities of its own existence, and may accelerate its progress by telic forethought. Biological analogies, therefore, relatively lose their importance; society ceases to be thought of as strictly organic, and is instead looked on as a psychic unity, a super-organism, with emphasis on the social aspect of psychic relationships, or on the process whereby men become and remain associated. In this transition the vocabulary changed from biological terms, such as "function," "structure," "heredity" and "variation," and began to make use of the terms "social mind," "desires," "volitions," "intellect," "consciousness" and "will";² and now tends to use terms derived from behavioristic psychology.

In seeking to show the relationship between psychology and sociology it is natural, first, to call attention to the

² For examples, see Giddings' *Principles of Sociology*, Book IV, Chap. IV, and his *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Part II.

teachings of Comte, Spencer, and Lester F. Ward in this matter, since these have largely influenced later writers, and then to explain other points of view.

Comte's Psychology.—Comte in his *Polity* placed great stress on the feelings, especially sympathy and altruism, and argued that the affectional aspect of the mind was fundamental and reason secondary. In his *Philosophy*, on the other hand, as already explained,³ he stressed his three-stage theory of the evolution of human intelligence, a teaching which finds many illustrations in earlier centuries. A brief comment, therefore, on each of these stages may prove of interest.

Stage I.—It is obvious that in any comparison between man and animals the one difference of overshadowing importance lies in his enormous superiority in psychic capacity. This superiority is more evident to men of civilized races, for among peoples of primitive or low civilization the distinction is not so obvious. To them there seems no sharp dividing line between man and animal and in their traditions and religious teachings human beings and animals are so related that bodies and souls might be interchanged, as in mythological legend or in numerous fairy tales, like that of *Beauty and the Beast*. Indeed, there are many totemistic traditions of the animal parentage of racial stocks, as among the Australian blacks, or in the English tradition that a bear was in the ancestral line of the noble family of Warwick.

In more thoughtful ages, however, when men began to reflect on the wide disparity of mentality between themselves and animals, it seemed obvious to them that so great a gift must have come directly from the gods, be-

³ See Chapter I.

cause of their interest in man. Æschylus, for example, in *Prometheus Bound* represents the Titan as explaining how he, pitying cave-dwelling men in their wretchedness, brought the divine fire of reason from the heavens and taught them civilization, ending his narration with the statement: "And, in short, learn my tale in brief. All arts came to men through Prometheus." Milton also in his *Paradise Lost* (Book IV), making use of the story of creation in Genesis, represents Satan as discovering in Eden

Two of far nobler shape, erect and tall,
Godlike erect, with native honor clad,
In naked majesty seem'd lords of all;
And worthy seem'd, for in their looks divine
The image of their glorious Maker shone,
Truth, wisdom, sanctitude severe and pure,—
Whence the true authority in men,

In the same manner the appearance on earth of heroes and the greatness of kings were readily explained on the theory of divine parenthood, just as the power and inspiration of genius or prophet were ascribed to the influence of an indwelling god or as a mark of favor, as in the account of God's bestowal of wisdom and riches on Solomon (II Chronicles, Chap. I). By contrast insanity was supposed to be sent by the gods as a punishment for impiety or some great wickedness. In later Christian centuries the Devil also was supposed to have power to bestow wisdom on men in exchange for their souls, or to make men insane by taking possession of their minds. Beliefs such as these, strongly held as they were, obviously had important consequences in religious practices and social policy.

Stage II.—In more metaphysical ages the human mind was studied apart from theological presuppositions and was analyzed into its three aspects, each considered as a sort of entity and conventionalized under the terms, "intellect," "will," "feelings." Of these the intellect with its ability to reason and to speculate seemed so preëminent that it was conceived of as related to or as a part of a cosmic mind, the eternal reason, from which it emanated and to which it would ultimately return. In consequence, the supreme attainment possible to a philosopher was to free his reason from the blindness natural to humanity, so as to will its return to the ultimate reason of the universe. The feelings, thought of as physical in type, were classed as inferior; they were a sort of dross, a defilement to the pure light of reason, and hence, as in Buddhism or asceticism, they should generally be ignored and suppressed as much as possible. If this be done, then the will, freed from the domination of the feelings and enlightened through the intellect, would become free and would consciously select in conduct the right and the good.

Again, there was among Eastern peoples generally a belief in a sort of ancient golden age when men were naturally kindly, sympathetic, just, and reasonable.⁴ From this delightful estate men had fallen through ambition or covetousness, so that these original qualities of the mind were obscured through the artificialities of civilization, which were thought of as evil. By a return to simplicity in thought and life, however, these original qualities might be regained in their original vigor and thus evil would be banished from human society.

⁴The "state of nature" of the early modern advocates of the "social contract."

Intermediate between these first and second stages was the tendency to deify these three aspects of the mind, as in Greek mythology, so that there was a god or goddess of reason, or of creative energy or will, or again of fundamental desires, such as the gods and goddesses of food and drink, or of sex passion, eagerness for wealth, or joy in warring.

Such teachings and opinions affected social activities so that social history even down to the present century might be considered as the rise into prominence and fall into obscurity of theories of ascetic renunciation and the simple life; or the glorification of reason as the supreme achievement of creation; or stress on the necessity of controlling the feelings and guiding the will through intelligence, so as to attain some desired goal. Occasionally, as in late Epicureanism, or in the "return to nature" school of the Eighteenth Century, typified by Rousseau, the feelings are considered as more fundamental and important than reason, so that indulgence in natural desires, in emotionalism, and in ecstatic aspirations is strongly favored as tending to happiness.

Stage III.—In these older theories the mind is looked on as a thing apart from the body, unfortunately connected with it to be sure, but longing always to be free, that it may most fully realize itself. Again, it was not thought of as evolved, but rather as having come to existence complete, as is shown in the legend of Adam, and of the birth of Athene, the goddess of wisdom, who was born from the head of Zeus in full perfection. The Nineteenth Century overthrew both of these conceptions. Through the rise of physiological psychology psychic phenomena have come to be considered as definitely associated with the physiological nervous system centering

in the brain, so that in the extreme mechanistic interpretation of animal and human behaviorism mentality is merely "a secretion of matter" or the by-product of physiological processes, which, when fully understood, may be expressed mathematically. Through Spencerian and Darwinian hypotheses also, the mind is no longer thought of as a creation by divine fiat, or as an emanation or spark from a cosmic mind. Rather the attempt is made to trace it as the resultant of an highly organized chemical compound, evolving into primordial life forms, from which slowly, after millions of years, evolve higher organisms with complex nervous systems, at the head of which stands man, since he has the relatively largest and most complex nervous mechanism, with a resultant greater capacity to feel, to think, and to resolve on lines of action.

When sociology began as a science under Comte, he naturally ignored religious and metaphysical teachings in respect to psychology and sought a positivistic basis for psychological teachings. Phrenology, as taught by Gall at that time, seemed to supply the need, since it seemed to identify psychic processes with the physical brain, so that Comte with intuitive vision saw, as he thought, that psychology was merely an aspect of biology; he therefore refused a place for it in his series of sciences, referring to it as a sort of transcendental biology. Phrenology soon passed into the hands of charlatans and fell into disrepute, but its underlying idea, that there is a definite connection between the physiological system and mentality, has been taken up scientifically by biological experts in histology and in the anatomy of the nervous system, as well as by behaviorists in psychology.

The behavioristic interpretation of psychic phenomena

is still comparatively modern and is by no means accepted by all as the final solution of psychic problems. Hence, in the world of social theorizing, there are many divergent points of view basing themselves chiefly on the older philosophic teachings. In general, communists and anarchists in their interpretations of human nature are inclined to emphasize the naïve notion of a natural golden age of human goodness and virtue, to which men may return by a simple life, freeing themselves from the artificial conventions of religion, government, and economic striving, and getting back to the soil, to the village organization, and to a homely environment untroubled by contacts with the turmoil and degeneracy of civilization. In such theories reason plays no important part, the supposedly natural feelings of sympathy, sociability, and social justice are stressed, and the intellect finds its chief function in repressing evil ambitions and in maintaining a static paradise.⁵

Other theorists, utopian in spirit, but emphasizing evolutionary teaching, think of anything primitive or ancient in man or society as necessarily evil, so that, exalting their own conclusions and ideals as standard, they would place tabus on elemental passions, eliminate ancient customs, traditions, and teachings as belittling to an "enlightened civilization," and would substitute brand *new* systems made to order, so that henceforth progress would walk a straight line towards the social goal instead of pursuing a wobbling path like that made by the steps of a drunken man.

Others again, following Spencer, comprehending the

⁵ Plato's *Republic*, Pastor Wagner's *Simple Life*, Carpenter's *Civilisation, Its Cause and Cure*, and Tolstoi's teachings are all good illustrations of this point of view.

eternal slowness of psychic development deprecate the intrusion into natural processes of the human intellect as a factor in progress, arguing that human intelligence is so low in attainment that any attempt to expedite natural processes by human reason would likely result in thwarting natural progress by the "interference" of blundering panaceas, thus retarding the slow upward march of civilization. The intellect, to be sure, has an important function in seeking to develop scientific knowledge and to make applications of this to material inventions and achievements, but social phenomena, it is argued, are entirely too complex for scientific comprehension, at the present state of mental development at least, so that a policy of *laissez-faire* in social reform should be vigorously maintained, in order that social progress may be made through nature's processes.

Spencer's Psychology.—Spencer, in his *Principles of Psychology* thinks of the mind as made up of two aspects, feelings and the relations between these, the percepts of the mind. As in Comte's *Polity*, sympathy plays an important role in social activities. Mind is considered entirely from the physiological standpoint, and the human mind as an evolution from animal mind. In this genetic study he shows the relation between sensations and emotions (originating from within), between instincts (compound reflex actions) and habits, and between perception (the initial process of mental operation) and reason, all from a study of the nervous system and brain mechanism. Such studies, coupled with his teachings respecting the evolution of social institutions, readily formed the basis for behaviorism and for the numerous genetic and specialized studies of the mind

such as child, adolescent, sex, race, and group psychology and all sorts of mental abnormalities.

Ward's Psychology.—Lester F. Ward, in his *Dynamic Sociology*, was the first American sociologist to turn away definitely from the biological bias of Spencer and to suggest a psychological basis for his system of sociology. In substance his conclusions are as follows: The historically fundamental part of the mind is the feelings, which supply to the individual and to society dynamic energy. These feelings, evolved from the simple fundamental hunger-feeling of undifferentiated biological organisms, in evolutionary process became the mass of physical, emotional, and intellectual desires and aspirations now recognized in human nature. As an aid to the organism in the struggle for survival, intellect slowly evolved as a guide to the feelings; first, in its unconscious intuition forms, then, in its capacity for semi-conscious or fully conscious reasoning, and finally into a grasp on broad generalization and a deep insight into truth. Applying this teaching to sociology, he then argues that the social mind, which is merely the generalization of the individual minds that compose the group, may be considered as made up of social feelings and a social intellect. The social feelings are the social forces or desires, and ever seek by activity to satisfy the cravings of society. Such feelings may be physical or cultural in aim. Through the physical feelings society craves race survival through food, and race continuance through sexual reproduction. Hence, the primary social activities are food-getting and mating, and from these arise, in due process, secondary physical desires and also cultural or spiritual desires for what is good, beautiful, and true.

If, however, feelings fundamentally dictated activity, society would be involved in a constant struggle of conflicting human desires, without harmony except through force, and ultimately self-destruction would ensue through emphasis on pleasure to the neglect of safety. Hence arises by slow evolution the intellect, which perceives ways and means of attaining ends and shows the advantage of individual self-restraint and social coöperation. Slowly the social intellect works out restraints and regulations, laws and customs, ideals and principles, and guides the energy of physical feelings into higher emotions and ambitions. From that time forth society strives not merely to satisfy physical feelings, but to gratify also its desire for moral standards, æsthetic ideals, and intellectual truths, thus passing from a physical to a cultural basis. As the intellect gains a larger place in the mind, it becomes able to formulate ideals not simply for individual guidance, but for social guidance also, and hence society passes into the stage of "collective telesis"⁶ and deliberately plans out its future. This it accomplishes by formulating for itself a goal for social energy; it then ascertains the best methods of attaining this and guides the activity of the social feelings or forces in the desired direction.⁷

Behaviorism.—Studies in respect to the human mind such as those of Comte, Spencer, and Ward are empirical and philosophic in kind and seek to formulate a psychic philosophy on the basis of which sociology may be erected. Such a basis is certainly necessary unless behaviorism, which in method is positive and objective, can supply a better. Behaviorism is still comparatively new; its en-

⁶ Ward's *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XII.

⁷ See especially Ward's *Psychic Factors*.

ergy so far, rightly, has chiefly been expended on animal behavior, and it is not likely that for years much result will be attained from the study of human behavior, that would prove especially helpful to sociology. Its methods of study, of course, are not peculiar to itself, since they are the usual methods of science, and they have long been used by social scientists in the study of what is generally called "social psychology."

Behaviorism is an attempt to supply a mechanical, physiological explanation of animal and human movements or actions by noting under controlled conditions what action on the part of the organism results under varying stimuli. Its methods are the usual scientific methods of observation, comparison, and experimentation so that the study is objective in character. The study implies a knowledge of anatomical structure and physiological processes, at least so far as these relate to the nervous system and its functioning, and also a knowledge of the external stimuli that may affect the organism. In the study of animal behavior a knowledge of trophism and reflex activity is fundamental, supplemented in the case of higher organisms by a knowledge of complex reflexes or instincts.⁸ Instincts, it should be noted, are inherited, never acquired, and presumably increase in number with growth in the complexity of the nervous system, since the more complex the nervous system becomes, the greater is the possibility of multiplying systems of coördinated

⁸ If an organism is moved to act directly by the environment, not through the intermediary of a nervous system, these direct reactions are tropistic. If the environment acts on the organism indirectly through a nervous system this indirect action is a reflex. A system of coördinated reflexes is properly an instinct. Direct reactions and indirect actions in process of time become by selection automatic and are inherited, so that reflex actions and instincts are inherent in the organism, ready to respond automatically under proper environment.

reflexes. An instinctive act, since instincts are inherited, is performed without previous experience or training when the appropriate stimulus affects the organism, therefore, no knowledge or foresight is involved. When, in the case of higher organisms, experience enters as a factor, or in the case of man, experience, memory, and ideation, instinctive acts may be inhibited, or on the other hand reënforced, owing to the associational centers in the brain connected with the several instincts. Human activity, therefore, is rarely purely instinctive after experiences have become coördinated in the brain. For, owing to these associational centers, painful or pleasurable feelings or emotions accompany instinctive actions so that human behavior may be determined in part by the anticipation of immediate pain or pleasure, or in part by the reasoning processes, which through the frequency or intensity of memory associations, determine the line of activity to be followed from the basis of ultimate or future utility in terms of happiness or misery. The more coördinated experiences a person has, therefore, the less he is governed by his instincts. In higher civilization a person systematically places checks on his instincts for reasons based on personal or social experience. The sexual instinct, for example, is held in check by feelings of modesty and chastity, by standards of virtue, by respect for conventional morals, or by prudential considerations based on physical or economic well-being. On the other hand, the sexual instinct reënforced by moral, religious, or æsthetic emotions (sublimation) may express itself in the higher aspects of conjugal or parental life or in spiritual activities of a religious or philanthropic sort. In the behaviorism of social groups, therefore, it may be possible to study the social activities of

groups acting largely through instincts, but such activities would be low in kind and manifested chiefly in somewhat primitive communities or by groups in higher civilization when, under the stimulus of some wild excitement, the barriers erected by experience and reason against instinctive actions are swept away and such instincts as pugnacity or sexual passion come to the front. Illustrations of such are common as in mob riots, lynchings, sadism, or in the fury of war and massacre.

There are in addition to instincts, certain general in-born *tendencies* in associational centers, from which ready responses are obtained when the appropriate stimuli suggest specialized lines of activity. These are often referred to as instincts and may be thought of as instincts in the making, but they are by no means so deeply rooted, so automatic in their action, nor presumably are they common to all normal men, as instincts are considered to be. Then, too, there are individual differences in inherited general mental capacities such as the capacity to observe, to retain in mind, to imagine, and the varying capacities involving the processes of sensation.

These instinctive and mental inheritances combined, form the basis for mental suggestibility, so that a highly suggestible person readily acts when suggestions enter the mind and arouse related activities from associational centers.

Thus, the tendency, for example, to play or to imitate, readily responds in activities appropriate to the kind of suggestion that presents itself to the mind through some sensation. These activities are usually performed spontaneously and almost or altogether unconsciously. A quite large part of our usual experience is of this sort, since we perform our daily routine at the suggestion of

a clock or uttered sound or at the sight of some familiar scene. But, reasoning may enter into the matter when one having a well understood purpose deliberately submits himself to a series of suggestions, so that through conscious imitation he may attain the definite end in mind. Training, for example, in athletics or in military tactics, may be so thoroughly done that in process of time the deliberate imitation of models through a series of suggestions results in the practically automatic movements characteristic of a well-trained team or a regiment. In such cases, however, suggestibility and suggestion are utilized as means to an end, so that the really important factor is the human intellect in its capacity to form ideas, purposes, and judgments.⁹ Obviously, therefore, in the study of the social process the various factors of instinct, inherited mental tendency and capacity, and intellect must be clearly differentiated and comprehended, so as to see the connection between them and social activities.

Freudianism.—The above explanation is also at the basis of the Freudian "psychology of the unconscious." Deep-rooted, vigorous instincts, inhibited and suppressed under the decree of social conventions, customs, and beliefs, may unconsciously be struggling for expression and produce in consequence a somewhat abnormal psychic behavior. The suppression of sex passion, for example, produces much abnormality in conduct, and the blood-lust inherent in human nature, but suppressed in a pacifistic civilization, asserts itself in riots, murder, and lynchings, or in the joy of economic cut-throat competition.

⁹ The term "intellect" itself needs explanation but that properly belongs to the psychologists. For behavioristic purposes it may be thought of as that which results from the integration of instinctive and associational centers.

In times of war it finds itself at home in battle when men "see red" and become atavistic in the slaughter of the enemy. The energy of a suppressed wish such as sex passion may, on the other hand, by the process of sublimation be transferred to some other field, such as the religious, the æsthetic, or the intellectual.

The Freudian method of psychoanalysis, which is based on the utilization of our knowledge respecting the association of ideas, aims to form an estimate of the mental situation, so as to suggest a remedy in the case of abnormal behavior, either by making suitable explanations or by suggesting the proper line of activity, in accordance with the process of sublimation. Freudian psychology, however, should not be restricted to the study in individuals of suppressed instincts only. The higher desires and emotions, likewise, may be inhibited by adverse environment and defective or deficient education. Such inhibitions result often in the bitterness of a rabid fanaticism and the morbid attitude towards life so frequently displayed by intellectually gifted persons, compelled for economic reasons to forego educational advantages and to engage in poorly paid manual toil. In the same manner vigorously felt group desires may be suppressed, as in the case of a down-trodden proletariat or an enslaved nation, full of memories of former greatness. But in group suppressions Freudianism passes into social behavior and forms an important aspect of that study, hardly as yet investigated from the standpoint of psychology.

CHAPTER VIII

SOCIAL BEHAVIORISM

In the explanation of behaviorism already given may be noted the general character of the phenomena that logically should be taken into consideration in the study of social behaviorism. These are of three classes and involve a comprehension of (1) structure, (2) the functioning process, and (3) action under stimulus.

Social Structure.—The subject of social structure properly is not a part of social behaviorism. Structure is merely a mechanism, a means through which functioning takes place. Functioning and resultant action are properly social behaviorism, but one needs a knowledge of the skeleton and body before he can fully comprehend the functioning of the structure. Now the study of social structure would involve a comprehension of society or the social group as a whole, and an analysis of this into its interrelated parts. The unity and its parts would be assumed to be at rest or static, although, of course, society as a whole is never at rest but is always in movement. This structural unity of society is often termed in sociology the "social organization" or the "social order," and its interrelated parts are the "social institutions," both permanent and temporary in kind. A study of social structure, therefore, would involve a comprehension of the social organization in its several genetic stages, and of the several fundamental social in-

stitutions, each with its hierarchy of subordinate institutions, traced in their development.

In the study of social structure, the evolutionary teaching of Spencer set the fashion of starting with the primitive horde as the germ of social organization, and then tracing that historically through its various differentiations and integrations. Growth in structure involves a corresponding growth in function under the stimulus of a growing complexity of environment, so that the study of structure, process, and stimulus cannot, except logically, be kept separate. The study of any one involves a corresponding study of the others, though the one under special observation may be considered for the time as dominant and the others recessive.

Primitive Social Structure.—In the light of present knowledge little can be said about the structure of the primitive group. Some hold that man may have appeared on the earth a million years ago, others maintain that perhaps a quarter of that time would be nearer the mark. At any rate, any definite knowledge of a really tangible sort for *social* purposes would hardly extend back more than about twenty-five thousand years, the latter part of the paleolithic age. Ten thousand years ago would place us in the European neolithic age, about which we have a fair degree of knowledge. From a study of our nearest animal kindred, the gorilla, the chimpanzee, and the orang-outang, some notion of the primitive group may be had. This can be supplemented by studies of primitive types of existing races, as supplied by ethnological studies, and the two then compared with what is known of European paleolithic and neolithic civilization and similar information obtainable from other parts of the world.

As the conclusions of such studies, it is usual to assume the existence in late primitive times of a sort of undifferentiated group, the horde, with a membership varying from a score or so, up to one or two hundred. The horde was not a family, though its members were doubtless akin by blood and lived in family relationship; it was not a war band, though its males were presumably organized for attack or defense; it was not organized for religious purposes, though superstitious beliefs had surely developed and also rude rites of propitiation; but it was fundamentally a band for food-getting purposes and remained united because of propinquity and for reasons based on utility. Simple groups such as this, starting possibly in the forests and grassy plains of Asia, multiplied for thousands of years, migrated slowly into the many parts of the earth, differentiating their social structure into specialized organs for government, war, religion, family, and industry, and varying these as conditions and necessity demanded, until with the passing of centuries there developed the exceedingly complex social organization of modern civilization, widely variant as it is in different climates and races.

The Functioning Process.—The term “function” is naturally coupled with the term “structure,” but function involves the notion of process so that one may study the functioning or work performed by the social structure, or preferably may go behind that and endeavor to explain the social processes at work that result in functioning. In the study of the social process or processes, one should seek to comprehend the psychic desires that energize the social organism; the ways in which these interact and form “structures” through which they work; and the ways whereby stimuli from the environment

arouse "interests" in the social mind, culminating in actions of widely varying character. It is essential, therefore, that there be a brief explanation in respect to familiar sociological theories of social desires and interests.

Rise of Social Interests.—Society has already been explained as a human group held in association because of common interests. Each individual in the group has, of course, his own special interests, but most of his interests, as a *socius*, are common also to his fellows, so that there are general interests or a general welfare to be considered. General interests of this sort must have developed quite early in civilization. We know through anthropological studies that primitive man living in horde groups, subsisted either on natural foods or on such as he obtained by hunting or fishing. Weapons and skulls or bones showing fractures demonstrate that he was used to battle with fierce beasts and fiercer men. Fires were used for warmth and cooking purposes, and in cave or grave have been found drawings and ornamentation showing an appreciation of the æsthetic. The group held together as a hunting band, a war band, and as a body of loosely related families. Their ties were the felt needs for food and mates and for joint action, so as to secure their safety against enemies. Unitedly they may be considered as a group interested in self-preservation, in organizing, as Aristotle worded it, for the sake of life. Animals also, it may be objected, form groups for similar purposes, and that is true. The distinction that must be emphasized is that the group, however dimly, *perceived* from past experience, the necessity of group life and made thoughtful provision for its preservation. Until there was a mental recognition of this unity, the hordes

of the primitive period might better be considered as aggregations of animals herded together through instincts. The very essence of the distinction between man and animal lies in psychic development, and until ancestral man, by means of memory associations built up through experience, became able *to see* and in consequence *to foresee* (*voir pour prévoir*), it is useless to ascribe to him a social life. In other words, the word "social," properly used, should imply always psychic relationship, not merely the contiguity of body and the "feel" of the herd. It is, of course, not necessary to assume a capacity for philosophic reasoning on the part of the early groups. They were mentally capable, to be sure, as is indicated by the size of their fossil skulls, but their mental inferiority was due to their lack of a *social* heritage; for the strength and power of modern social life depends on the inheritance of the tradition, achievement, and wisdom of many thousands of years, and lacking this any modern nation would probably be as crude and as savage as any known primitive group existing to-day. Social life is psychic through and through and no bond in group life has any real social meaning unless its utility is perceived and appreciated by some, at least.

Perception of Social Utility.—Now this perception of utility is an essential point in sociological teaching respecting *social forces*. In passing, it may be said that there are no inherent social forces driving groups onward irresistibly towards progress, but when groups perceive the permanent desires common to men and grasp the idea that men unitedly are in need of social recognition, regulation, and expression, then the conventional term "social force" may properly be used. An individual may see the utility of securing for himself the prime necessities of



life but that does not make his activities social. There may be and are many indirect benefits to society at large through such purposive acts of individuals, but after all, as Lester F. Ward has so fully shown, so far as society is concerned, such growth is unconscious in kind. It is individual not social teleosis, and should be sharply distinguished in thought, at least, from the conscious, purposive telic action of social groups. A group as a group should see the utility of its action; it is not necessary that all the members of the group see this, or all as clearly as some, but the "mind" of the group, the agreement of the group, should be present, however far apart the individuals of the group may be in the clearness of their insight. This emphasis is possible only when the smaller *group*, not *society*, is emphasized. Society in the sense of all mankind, and to some extent this is true even of nations, is a very loose unity, largely a mere name, and the loose bonds that hold together great combinations of human beings are seldom vigorous. Conventionally we can speak of the social forces existent in Africa or China or Latin America, but the really important social forces in these geographic areas are to be sought for in the many varieties of racial, economic, religious and other groupings, rather than in the unity itself. *Society* is really a sort of loose confederation, a social league; each member of the confederation may comprehend fairly well the significance of his own unified life, but there is only a vague comprehension of the larger ties that hold all unitedly, so that such unities readily fly apart, whenever the real interests of individual members seem to be threatened by the supposed interests of the whole.

If now we turn once more to the primitive horde, it becomes obvious that that group which perceives most

clearly the necessity of preserving group life is most likely to survive in competition with other groups less *social*. In other words, in the struggle for group survival a premium is put on a capacity to perceive social advantage by forming combinations for the necessities of group existence, so that those that could organize efficiently for common purposes and maintain a somewhat permanent cohesion had a distinct advantage over groups that easily disintegrated. From this standpoint, therefore, the student desirous of tracing the development of social behavior should study the primitive group with its desire for group safety, and note how its leaders utilized this desire by regulating the activities of its members, so as to adapt its institutions to the influences arising from a changing set of conditions in the environment, physical, psychical, and social.

Social Unity.—We may feel quite sure that even in the earliest groups the members had become vaguely conscious of the necessity of working together for the securing of food supplies. This would necessitate the banding together under leadership in the search for food, and the slow differentiation of vocation, such as the duties assigned to the members of the group according to their respective capacities. Thus, there came quite early a sort of specialization by sexes, in that the males hunted game, and women sought for vegetable foods, thereby developing incidental knowledge of the properties of herbs, edible and medicinal, and preparing the way for future attempts in the cultivation of the soil. If cannibalism prevailed, the hunting of other savages as game, or with the conscious purpose of exterminating dangerous neighbors, would result in the further specialization of a war band, a more highly organized hunting band, since

the "game" sought after was both cunning and dangerous. In the hunting band and in the war band we have the beginnings of government, so undifferentiated in those early times, that the term "social control" might better be applied to it. Such social control would involve a concentration of authority into the hands of the more capable members of the group, whether more capable through the experience of age, or through larger insight and a stronger personality, or because of skill in the vocations of hunting and warring. Social control also implies the growth of custom and tradition, slowly supplanting the arbitrary decisions of personal authority, whenever group experience reached definite conclusions as to what was safe for the group as a whole. Social control also would imply, on the part of the group, a general attitude of mind that might be called receptive or suggestible. In other words, the individuals of the group, becoming conscious of their identity of interests, became sympathetic one with the other and appreciative of the benefits of leadership, and hence were willing to follow custom or to obey orders or to imitate the actions of their leaders. At the same time through group experience they distinguished between the useful and the harmful in social practice, *i.e.*, the good from the bad, and incidentally learned their customary rights and obligations as members of the group, as well as the tabus and prohibitions placed on them by their leaders. In all this may be noted the joint development of function and action since there was an emphasis on toil for daily food, obedience to authority, a respect for rights and obligations, and a recognition of the necessity of customary law, all combined into a rude sort of social control or government, so as to ensure

safety and a better existence by joint activity for the general welfare in respect to foods and protection.

Social Control Over the Sex Instinct.—A similar development doubtless took place in respect to the sex instinct. Presumably at first this instinct was subject merely to the principles of sexual selection among animals. When foods became abundant with the return of spring the exuberance of physical life manifested itself in sex passion and mating in animal fashion, since the conventions of modern courtship and marriage were unknown. But little by little dim notions of the danger to group tranquillity of incest, and vague notions of ownership by *usus* or possession arose in the group consciousness, so that by slow degrees, requiring probably thousands of years, there grew up systems of exogamy and systems of kinship, prohibiting marriage between those near of kin. Custom also settled on sanctioned methods of courtship, marriage relations, and the respective place in the home of male, female, and child. Such systems also are forms of social control representing purposive social attempts to add to the internal safety of the group by enforcing, through social opinion, customs that experience had taught to be worth while in the preservation of the group from internal strife.

Supernatural Fear.—In the same manner the instinctive fear of the unusual, common to all animals, had become broadened in sphere by crude attempts on the part of the wiser members of the group to explain unusual phenomena. All animals dread the crash of thunder, the flash of lightning, and the roar of the tempest, but primitive man went farther than this by reflecting on his fears and trying to answer the question why he was afraid. Imagination and erroneous reasoning, handed



on by tradition and enlarged by later generations, in time peopled the entire environment of man with supposed supernatural agencies, for the most part supposedly hostile to him. Hence a new form of control had to be developed, for there were needed methods of controlling not human but supernatural beings, so that with the passing of years came systems of propitiation, prayer, and sacrifice, in charge of a specialized vocational class, the primitive priests, who from training and insight knew how to ward off supernatural dangers from the group, because of the knowledge that they had acquired respecting these mysterious agencies.

Social Beliefs.—In this simple explanation of the beginnings of these four fundamental fields of social functioning—the economic, the political, the familial, and the religious—the essential aspects of social behaviorism may be noted. The instinctive feelings of hunger, sex, pugnacity, and fear are common to all animals; but in the human group, by reflection on the part of the wiser members, by group memory or social traditions, they became recognized as group feelings in need of regulation and guidance, through the inculcation of social beliefs and customs. Also may be noted the rise of a common sympathy or “consciousness of kind,” a common kinship, and common opinions voicing themselves in the sanctions of group opinion, giving approval to what seemed safe, useful, and, therefore, good, and sternly condemning as *tabu* or *forbidden* what from experience had proved to be unsafe, harmful, and, therefore, bad. Primitive groups, cut off from other human beings, as were the Australian blacks by geologic land subsidal, might slowly build up systems of social control and activities, under conditions somewhat uniform, and thus settle down into a sort of

static paradise, in which practically every experience has been tabulated, catalogued, assigned its place in the scheme of things, and settled for all eternity, according to set customs derived from their ancestors and handed on from generation to generation by social tradition. Such static elysiums have in fact never really existed except in utopia, for even among the Australian blacks there were differences due to geographic variation with consequent differences in experiences and customs, but in civilization there have been many approximations to static social conditions, and wherever these exist there may be studied the determining influences of social sympathy and a recognition of group unity, along with imitation, custom, and belief; and a control, emphasizing the authority of social hereditary tradition, and a recognition of social standards of morals, rights, and obligations.

Now there is obviously a sort of danger when groups become approximately static. Customs and beliefs may become so *set*, that variations in the form of innovations or heresies would be frowned on and suppressed, since whatever is new seems evil. Yet social suppression of variations means stagnation, social inertia, misoneism, and ultimately extermination, for in the long run social inbreeding brings degeneration and death. Excess, whether of conservatism or radicalism, is always dangerous, but the ignoble many prefer by nature to die of dry rot rather than be blown heavenwards by experimentation with explosives. As always, the golden mean of social progress can be attained only by forethought and intelligence, accompanied by freedom of discussion; but these are rarely continuous in civilization, so that there is a natural ebb and flow in social progress, although in

the case of static groups relative retrogression and degeneration are more possible than progress.

Group Antagonism.—There is another aspect of social behavior worthy of special attention. The members of a primitive group, as already explained, by contiguity and custom become *used* one to the other and consequently develop a unity of feeling or social sympathy. But outsiders, strangers to the group, are *different*. It would be preposterous to assume that in primitive civilization all human beings were kindly and sympathetic one to the other. If there ever was a time like the classical "golden age" when nature spontaneously and bounteously supplied foods to human beings, without special exertion on their part, possibly at that time there was natural sympathy among men. But idyllic peace did not prevail in primitive civilization as we know it from anthropological studies. Strangers were presumably suspicious persons, hostile in intention, and safer dead than living. Fear and pugnacity combined developed an attitude of opposition to the stranger, so that there was a tendency to social seclusion and a strong desire to keep external influences at a distance. Group antagonism, on the other hand, was accentuated, because of the rise of property in things other than weapons and ornamentation. The intellect, for example, perceived in time the social advantage of stability in respect to food supplies through the possession of domesticated flocks and herds as *property*. An increase in the amount of such property seemed a guaranty against the danger of famine, so that the group became eager to acquire by natural increase and by plunder still larger supplies of "food on the hoof." But these supplies attracted the attention of lean and hungry neighbors, who were willing to take their chances in a fight

rather than starve. From this time forth the encounters of groups were no longer sporadic and haphazard, but became systematic and continuous. War became prominent with the rise of property, "the age of iron" of the ancients, and the struggle of competing groups for existence played a leading part thenceforth in the drama of social conflict.

Social Action.—In a close study of social behavior, from the standpoint of stimuli, in an objective environment, there are certain kinds of stimuli that involve activities corresponding to the actions or movements arising from tropism, reflexes, and the instincts in organisms. These are such external stimuli as light, heat, moisture, electricity, gravitation, as well as the kind and relative amount of food supplies. In other words, one may study the effects of climate and geographic environment on racial and social groups, and also the flora and fauna of the habitat as determining the food supplies of the group. Much study of this sort has been made and properly so, for if social activity is largely determined by climatic and food conditions, such knowledge would afford a definite basis for any theory that involves a materialistic or an economic interpretation of social development. If such conditions really determine social development, then wide differences in these conditions would imply corresponding physical and perhaps mental racial differences, so that there would be a psychology of particular races, as well as a psychology of the human race.

Influence of Physical Environment.—Thus, if it be assumed that society or a social group is definitely an organism, like a biological organism, and subject to the same laws, we should in that case think of social tropisms, reflexes, and instincts, and should assume that the social

body responds automatically, mechanically, and without manifest purpose or intelligence to the stimuli that come to it from its external environment. This aspect of social behavior would be exemplified by actions determined, for example, by climate, whether hot or cold, moist or dry; by altitude above sea-level or proximity to the sea; by the relative abundance or scarcity of fresh water, potable or navigable; or by the mineral wealth of the land or the nature of the soil, determining by its flora and fauna the amount and variety of food the land could furnish. On the other hand, just as the number and the intensity of animal instincts depend on the relative development of a nervous system, so on the structure of the social body would depend the possibility of reaction to external stimuli. If, for example, the members of a particular group had by inheritance an inferior yet static social order and a weak system of control, would not such social structure clearly *condition* the kind of reaction such social bodies would give to external stimuli?

It seems rather obvious that, in theory at least, studies of social behavior as influenced by climatic conditions are possible, and that, so far as they could be made, such studies would find their best illustrations in non-migratory primitive races adapted by selective processes to their physical environment, or in higher races transplanted through migration to a widely different natural environment, before the proper adjustments to the new environment had been learned.

As a matter of fact, human instincts even in the lowest existing civilization are so dominated by social beliefs, traditions, and customs, and are under so great a control through the inhibitions and modifications developed through experience, that the study of social behavior of

this lowest sort is hardly possible, though some approximations to it have been attempted. In illustration of such studies may be cited the long line of writers from Aristotle to Buckle and Ratzel, through Bodin and Montesquieu, who have emphasized the determining influence of geographic and climatic conditions on human association and civilization. A late stimulating book of this sort (1915) is Ellsworth Huntington's *Civilization and Climate*, which argues the thesis that high civilization naturally develops wherever a certain special type of temperature and humidity prevails.¹ A similar type of argument is that which would divide man into those with brachycephalic or dolichocephalic skulls (broad or narrow), with the implication that each type of skull determines to some extent the kind of mentality, and, therefore, the kind of civilization possible to those having that particular form of skull.² Obviously such studies as these, confined as they must be to the study of lower races for the most part, belong especially to the anthropological group of studies, rather than to sociology proper.

Food as a Social Factor.—There is another sort of social activity, kindred to the foregoing but higher in degree, namely, that based on the necessity for foods. In the long run the hunger instinct is the most fundamental, determining other forms of activity. May there not, therefore, be a study of social behavior approached from the standpoint of food, showing how social activity is determined by the kind of food, whether animal or vegetable, or again by the scarcity or abundance of foods?

¹ Like that, for instance, of most of western Europe and the northern United States.

² For statement and discussion of this theory with negative conclusion see Ripley's *Races of Europe*, and the argument of Professor Boas to the effect that skull shapes are modified by migration.

There are already studies showing the physiological or psychological effects, respectively, of a flesh or of a vegetarian diet, or of wheat as against rice, for example, with the implication that there are social consequences, according as national diet is chiefly the one or the other. Then, too, Malthusianism is an excellent illustration of what important social consequences are involved in the question as to the relative scarcity of foods in proportion to the number of stomachs needing to be filled. The Marxian materialistic interpretation of history is a study of the same sort, for if the average man of civilization, as things are, must labor unremittingly for a wage barely sufficient for the plainest necessities of life, obviously social behavior is determined by a world economic system which gives to the average man mere food and shelter in return for daily toil.

It seems plain that important studies are possible showing how social behavior may be influenced by the struggle for food or wage, or by the kinds and amount of food consumed, and yet again sociology would not claim this field as peculiarly its province, even though information and theories of this sort—food supplies, Malthusianism, economic determinism—are so necessary for social theorizing. These studies properly are biologic and economic, and belong to these sciences. Sociology needs the *conclusions* formulated by economists respecting such matters, but should not make it its task to pursue the studies themselves.

Contact of Mind with Mind.—Again, though as previously stated, man, with his highly complex nervous system, doubtless has a strongly instinctive nature, his instincts are usually held in check or inhibited through social control and through reasoning from experiences, or,

on the other hand, are strengthened by the concurrent rise of emotions that tend to intensify and give persistence to actions instinctive in basis. For this reason social behaviorism must not be studied merely from a physical and physiological standpoint, since this is not sufficient of itself to give a complete interpretation of social behavior or activity. Human beings live in social groups, so that the mind of each person in the group is a stimulus to, and is stimulated by, other minds in the group. Consequently, the individual mind may, first, be considered as made up of varying inherited mental potentialities, many of which are latent and will remain so through lack of appropriate stimuli, but others of which are stimulated and developed through varying contacts with other minds.

In the second place, the individual mind of high potential may be considered as modifying other minds through the energizing of his potential capacities by contact with a highly stimulating mental environment. Such individuals are the men of forceful personality, the men of talent and genius who lead in human achievement. In the same manner the social mind of the group as a whole, when brought into contact with other group minds, may be studied in its behavior from either standpoint, namely, its inherent potentialities and reactions to stimuli or the suppression of these through the absence of the appropriate stimuli.

The achievements of talented men or of talented groups are, after all, the most important class of actions possible for group safety or progress. It is the innovation, the invention, the scientific discovery, the new achievement in art, morals, or philosophizing that in the long run builds up civilization and gives to men the possibility of a life larger than mere existence. The study of the

processes that may lead to the development of talent and genius, the rise of a leisure class and of an élite, their actions called out through the stimulation of a favoring environment—all these are essential to national survival in times of race struggle, whether peaceful or warlike, and are fundamental to social progress. This contact of mind with mind, in its several aspects, is the subject matter of what is called "social psychology."

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In a study of social behavior one should seek to comprehend the various aspects of the environment, from which come the many stimuli that impress themselves on the social mind, thus arousing social action. It is plain that to the group the really important aspect of environment is the social, involving the contact of mind and mind. This includes the reciprocal influence of the group on the individual and the individual on the group, or again the influence of one group of collective individuals on other social groups. The study of such mental contacts is what is usually referred to as "social psychology."

Social Suggestibility and Suggestion.—The starting point for a study in social psychology, as already explained, lies in psychological teaching in respect to inherited instincts, mental capacities, tendencies, propensities, dispositions, or whatever other term may be used to imply the psychic inheritance of individuals. These unitedly furnish the basis that makes the individual suggestible. Now the social suggestibility of a group is not the same as the sum total of individual psychic inheritances. Social suggestibility though based on individual psychic inheritance is built up through social experiences. Individuals, of course, vary widely in their psychic inheritances, so that even those who pass through approximately the same social experiences may differ

in susceptibility. On the other hand, those with approximately the same inheritance may have had widely different experiences and for that reason may differ in their reactions to suggestions. An Oriental may be susceptible to social contagion, but if, ignorant of baseball, he by chance attend a close deciding game of a great series, he would be unable to respond to the tense excitement of the contest, since he would not react to the suggestions associated with the various plays. In the same manner a person untrained in classical music might easily become bored at the performance of some great symphony, preferring in his heart the street band or the drum. Likewise a nation, whose traditions and customs are fraternal and peaceful, cannot readily respond to the call of war until after definite and persistent attempts have been made to develop a public opinion based on a vigorous belief in the necessity and rightness of that particular war.

Assuming, therefore, the existence of a social group, there are two factors that enter into its suggestibility, namely, the common psychic inheritance and experience of the individuals composing the group, and its social environment. If the heredity of the group is, on the whole, rather low in grade, instinctive in type, and the social environment is narrow, being petty or one-sided in character, the *balance* developed between these may be readily overthrown by sudden changes in environment, and this overturn would throw the people back on their primitive instincts such as fear, sex passion, rapacity, and vindictive pugnacity, at which time they become highly suggestible to suggestions of those who are recognized as, or assert themselves as, leaders. Thus, if the inhabitants of a village aroused by a violent earthquake or storm, or by some horrible crime committed in the

community, or an impending attack by an invading enemy, do not know from experience what is the proper course of conduct under the circumstances they become instinctive and impulsive in action; display violent emotion, ranging from extreme fear to the rashness of madness; adopt suggestions readily, reject them as easily; and finally become apathetic from excess of emotion and from the weariness of unusual bodily activity. In war, also, homeloving, domesticated men, kindly to children, and respectful to women, under the excitement of battle and the incitement of their officers often become cruel and merciless to the enemy, slaughter the wounded, mutilate or kill innocent children, rape and murder women, and burn and destroy whatever comes in their way. To them the situation is unusual, primitive passions are well to the front, the moral law of every day life is in abeyance; and so, when in this highly suggestible state in which rapid decisions have to be made, a slight suggestion of rapine and license from those in command finds a ready response in an orgy of lust and bestialty. In higher civilizations, with stronger hereditary mentality and with training under a broad and intellectual environment, it becomes easier to arouse psychic associations that would perceive the claims of the weak and helpless to mercy, so that soldiers of such civilizations and endowments, even in the midst of wild excitement, can inhibit the dormant brutality inherent in human nature and give help and protection to both woman and child.

Again, ordinary minds yield easily to a sort of social hypnotism and when they come in contact with a genius, or vigorous class interests, or an emotion-moved mass of individuals their passive minds become open to impressive suggestions, and they readily adopt the beliefs of those

who dominate their personalities. Hence we may have such studies as the psychology of the mob, the crowd, the religious revival, the cure of sickness through relics or suggestion, the orator's power, and the prestige of a dominant class. This is one of the most important branches of social psychology, for the average mind is, as a rule, automatic and unreasoning in most of its activities, and hence is prone to yield easily to the domination of superior minds. It takes its tone from the great man, the orator, or the revivalist; it readily falls a victim to the persuasive salesman or the seductive advertisement; it is easily induced to laugh with the humorist, to weep with the suffering, to yell at a ball game, or to join in a lynching. It is moral with the virtuous, low with the vicious, acquires bodily illness by social contagion in times of epidemic, and is hypnotically cured by suggestion from a trusted or a powerful personality. Every public speaker, teacher, minister, physician, salesman, or writer of advertisements acquires empirically some knowledge of these principles in social psychology, but through a careful study of them would gain more effectiveness.

Sometimes lines of action suited to times of special emergency are anticipated and special instruction given to suit the new conditions. For example, the danger of the loss of life in case of sudden fire is very much lessened if a school has been well trained in fire drill, or if a theater audience is instructed in advance what to do and is reminded of it by signs and by directions from the stage. Nor are persons trained in the methods of group psychology so liable to be stampeded by the hot enthusiasm of the revivalist or by the wild excitement of a mob. By long tradition English sailors have been trained, in case of shipwreck, to maintain discipline and to save

first the women and children. Sailors of certain other nations not trained in such standards follow the natural law of "*sauve qui peut*" with disastrous results, so far as women and children are concerned. Even in the exercise of lynch law set standards often develop, so that, for example, in the South rape on a white woman by a negro usually results in his being burnt at the stake, or in the Far West, in the days of vigilance committees, a formal trial for offenders became customary, even though at times it followed rather than preceded the execution.

Social Plasticity.—From the foregoing the importance of the study of suggestibility and suggestion may be seen. Social suggestibility is social plasticity and is obviously an essential to survival. A group socially suggestible is in the line of progress, since it has a basis in inherited capacities, if, at the same time, it is surrounded by a generous environment and has its mentality under the control of its intelligence. A group lacking suggestibility becomes socially rigid, set, ossified and is in the line of extinction. A low suggestibility, implying as it does a low psychic heredity or a narrow social environment, is subject to attacks of fear and superstitious dread, to the wild emotionalism of riots, lynchings, murders, and brutality, and to irrational decisions based on instinctive promptings, atavistic intuitions, and haphazard suggestions. A group, on the other, hand, having a high development in social suggestibility derives stimuli from its environment and this results in social psychic associations which coördinate its activities, place reasonable inhibitions on tendencies to instinctive savagery, and suggest lines of conduct socially approved by long experience and reflection, and suited to almost any conceivable emergency that may arise in social life. As already intimated, a

social group having slight suggestibility is purblind, seeing, as it were, that only which is immediately in evidence and it is not capable of receiving suggestions higher in grade than those appropriate to its own conditions. A high social suggestibility, on the other hand, is capable of receiving suggestions from widely differing groups, since some association can readily be made between its own needs and experiences and the needs and experiences of others. In this way a progressive group, plastic, open-minded, intellectually inquisitive may add to the quality of its own environment by absorbing or adapting the best suggestions that come from neighboring civilizations.

In Paul's time it was said of the ancient Greeks that: "All the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing" (Acts, XVII, 21). Cæsar also, though without any intention to praise, said of the Gauls: "For, among the Gauls, it is customary for villagers to compel travelers to stop, even against their will, and to demand from them the news of the day. Incited by what they hear they frequently start great undertakings, of which they soon repent, since the travelers often tell them imaginary happenings so as to pander to their taste for excitement" (*Commentaries on the Gallic War*, IV, 5). Such traits of themselves might result merely in unintelligent curiosity and the vacuity of gossip, but the desire to find out and to comprehend, rightly stimulated, is the very basis of all science and philosophy, without which men would be mere animals, lacking civilization.

Social Pressure.—A familiar type of phenomena in social psychology consists in what may be called social pressure. Suppose, for illustration, we assume the existence of a society developed into a static civilization.

As each new generation is born it comes into contact with the mind of the group. Customs and beliefs are fixed, standards are unchanging, and social activities of all sorts are performed according to an unvarying routine. The individuals of each generation have at birth their special variations and potentialities, but the social mind, through its numerous institutions such as family and religion, is steadily molding into the social type the varying individualities subject to its influences. By the time maturity is attained, the generation conforms to the standards, variations either lie dormant or have been suppressed, and the psychological process has been completed. This is a simple and natural illustration of social imitation and social pressure. In the course of centuries slight modifications in social standards may creep in, a genetic development thus taking place; but these changes are unintended, accidental, and are determined by the insensible modifications in physical and economic conditions. There is, therefore, a static, genetic form of social psychology, in which the emphasis throughout is placed on the silent pressure exerted by practically fixed social institutions, and the coöperating effect of natural physical and economic conditions. Preëminently it is the influence of the social mind, as a unit, acting on the individual, and crushing out his variable personality by the sheer weight of a dominant public opinion. It is the best illustration of the familiar saying, "The voice of the people is as the voice of God." When the voice speaks and the will is expressed, opposition vanishes like a flash, unable to draw breath against omnipotence.

Social Imitation.—The preceding illustration of social pressure is a simple form of social imitation, in

which each new generation in a static civilization automatically adopts the customs and beliefs of its ancestors. A less stable form is developed when through suggestion from recognized leaders or prestige of a powerful class, whole populations or masses of human beings tend to imitate the fads, fashions, and standards of the leaders or class patterned after. As these change periodically, the imitation is not unconscious but yet is based on an unreflecting form of imitation. It is semi-conscious and is determined in the main by social suggestion and mass response. Fashions in dress for both sexes vary at regular intervals; the bicycle fad is followed by the automobile, which in its turn may be followed by aerial or submarine navigation; reforms appear in waves, and new sports come and go, lending variety to the national game. The prevalence of these imitative fads in the United States is probably due to the influence of the newspaper and the skill of advertisers; the newspaper and advertising are more fully developed as social agencies in this country than anywhere else on the face of the earth.

Rational Imitation.—There is, however, a higher type—conscious or rational imitation—which may be observed when an intelligent man, or a class, or a society, studies the differing systems and standards round about and consciously, after reflection, chooses to imitate something better than what he or it has already attained. This represents the highest order of imitation and is found at its best in highly civilized groups who realize the importance of having at their command the newer knowledge of the times. Illustrations of conscious imitation are becoming increasingly familiar first, through the custom of employing commissions, local,

national, or international, to study out by comparison and reflection the most suitable policy for a proposed activity; secondly, in the rapid adoption of material and cultural achievements made by nations other than the imitator; and thirdly, through the growing use of great national conventions convened for the purpose of exchanging ideas and agreeing on a proper policy in respect to the subject under discussion. Such policies when formulated receive the support and assent of many thoughtful persons, who accept the decision made by the whole body even though it may differ in detail from their own conclusions.

In the preceding illustrations though conditions were dynamic, development was still genetic, not telic. For the mental changes effected were brought about by persons in the pursuit of their own interests, or through unconscious social imitation, or through the suggestibility of the weak when dominated by the powerful. There is another possibility also, namely, that development under dynamic conditions would become socially telic, not genetic.

Social Conflict.—Social life is not always static or imitative. Conflicts arise, creating social friction as the result of powerful dynamic movements either through war, migration, or fundamental economic changes. From the midst of the turmoil there would arise out of heretofore dormant personalities new ideals and standards that would compete with the old. This is social conflict; it is mind against mind, and the result of it may be the suppression of one or the other, or the modification of each by compromise and differentiation.

Mental changes accomplished by genetic growth are slow in development and are often variable and weak,

because ordinary minds respond too easily to temporary influences and blow hot or cold by turns. Really permanent mental changes must be deliberately hammered into the heads of mentally capable persons, the natural leaders of society, whose beliefs and standards will be followed by the mass in any case through suggestion and imitation. This result may be accomplished by either one of two methods, discussion or education. In static civilization discussion is unnecessary for there is nothing of moment to discuss. All are of the same opinion in respect to important matters, and discussion can arise only about trivialities. These, of course, may be debated eagerly and even with rancor, but no important effect follows from a decision either way. Static religions furnish historically many illustrations of the ease with which learned men who have no other field for their ingenuity may write ponderous volumes on the distinction between tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee. But suppose that there arises a dominating personality, who has thought out new and truer intellectual standards and with the eye of genius sees the trend of the times. By his psychic energy he may easily rally to his support many of the thoughtless, as already explained, but for permanent success he realizes that he must convince the intelligent.

"Age of Discussion."—Then arises the "age of discussion." He advances his views and seeks to propagate them throughout the community. A chorus of dissent follows; he reiterates with increasing emphasis; his opponents grow excited in their replies, but a few begin to hesitate; discussion rages in all directions and spreads by social contagion to the masses, who in sage debate at street corners or other social centers solemnly

reach the same conclusions attained by their leaders. When the ardor of discussion has passed, the new leader has an intellectual following, who with the zeal of converts propagate his views as translated by their own mentalities. Slowly the leaven leavens the whole lump, the opposition yields point after point, or is silenced, and finally the newer view has become the accepted standard. Often this process is hastened by a sudden discovery that the new was really old, having been taught centuries ago by great teachers or implied in their doctrines. This soothes the sting of defeat; the new is really old, there is "no new thing under the sun," all repeat, and are happy.

Or again, in place of open warfare by discussion, which is often dangerous and leads to martyrdom, a would-be reformer quietly gathers about him eager youth who show intellectual capacity and teaches them his doctrines; these in their turn teach others, avoiding open debate and perhaps even conforming outwardly to accepted teachings. More slowly, but as surely, if the newer teaching is truer and wiser for the age, it sinks into social consciousness, and in due process of time is part of the accepted teaching of society, having supplanted its rival under the law of the survival of the fit.

In the same way might be cited many other illustrations of social friction, which develops whenever differences in standards arise in a community; class may be arrayed against class, factions and sects in politics and religion against one another, powerful personalities are arrayed in opposition through differing interests, or nations in their careers of conquest may endeavor to compel conquered peoples to conform in their civiliza-

tion to the demands of the conqueror, as is the case to-day in India and Korea. The phenomena in such struggles are practically uniform, if varying conditions are taken into account, and laws and principles are fairly well understood, so that it has now become possible to work out a telic policy which may reduce social friction to a minimum. The newer age will be marked by telic applications of such principles to the social struggles in society, with the aim of harmonizing the conflicting interests and standards of life.

Social Control.—From such studies of the several classes of psycho-sociological phenomena arise the processes of socialization and social control. Dr. Edward A. Ross in his excellent work entitled *Social Control*, shows the several factors and agencies to be taken into account when one considers the molding influences of society. The sociologist is interested in seeking to make so clear the principles involved in social control, that society may definitely and thoughtfully plan to make its control more effective by eliminating, as far as possible, lower and inefficient social activities, and lending encouragement and aid to those agencies that build up powerful social forces, and intellects capable of controlling these for social purposes. In this process the members of society become *socialized* in that they become sympathetic one with another and learn the art of coöperative activity. This process of socialization, not in the sense of the simple imitation of static civilization, but through the agencies of rational suggestion and imitation, will be an end ever to be kept in mind by the student of social psychology. As society, therefore, grows more self-conscious and more rational in its methods, the study of the interaction of society and

its members will become increasingly important. For this reason it seems clear that such studies will need to be specialized into a separate science aiming to promote a constructive policy in social development.

Social control is, of course, exerted chiefly through the collective mass of social institutions. In the customs, traditions, and law of these numerous organizations are conserved the wisdom and folly of past generations. The family, the church, and the state, for instance, determine rules, adjust wrongs and disputes and through education seek to mold each new generation into racial and ancestral types. The youthful mind is plastic, and readily adapts itself to instruction, whether given by word or example. It is taught to respect public opinion, to obey law, to accept traditional beliefs, to act in conventional ways, and to conform to set standards of conduct. It is taught respect for power and knowledge, love for kin and country, and the principles of egoism and altruism.

Influence of Social Institutions.—The importance of social institutions, therefore, should never be underestimated. As agencies that mold the customs of newer generations they ensure social stability and conserve racial achievements. Yet in a dynamic age it would be a great misfortune if institutions were so fixed as to be changed only with great difficulty. On the other hand, it would be equally pernicious if customs and institutions were too easily modified, responding to each passing influence. Rigidity needs to be combined in social organization with flexibility, so that changes may come, but gradually, in order that the mind may become used to newer conditions as the older pass away. Economic and educational changes wisely planned with a telic

purpose in mind would allow this. It takes time for inventions, or for modifications in employment, in foods and in housing to become familiar to the whole of society. Scientific ideas and the ideals of cultural civilization have to be slowly absorbed and assimilated before results can follow, and a generation may pass before desired modifications are evident. Just as agriculture necessitates more patience and forethought than nomadism, so society must plan for a hundred years in advance, and its leaders be content to let others reap what they sow. At present men foolishly demand rapid results, and expect by mere legislation to introduce new systems. Fundamental changes too suddenly introduced upset more than they upbuild, and human experience has wisely decreed that haste must be made slowly.

If, however, economic and educational conditions are modified so that the extremes of economic wealth tend to disappear, if skill supersedes ignorance in trade and industry, and scientific and cultural ideas become familiar to all, there will follow gradually but surely, changes in the other institutions of life, tending to build up a more vigorous racial physique, and a greater mental flexibility for the assimilation of cultural ideals. The real importance of social institutions would then become clear. If based on scientific principles, stable yet progressive, they would develop in each generation more and more effectively men capable of rectifying the blunders of former ages, and of building up a civilization that would eliminate the weaker elements in society.

Relativity of Knowledge.—The fundamental necessity is that these great institutions should avoid a dogmatic attitude of mind. It does not much matter whether error be taught along with the good, if only

its teachers will admit the possibility of error and urge their pupils to seek out the truth. It is characteristic of static conditions to assume that parents, teachers, religious guides, great leaders of all sorts, the printed page, and ancient teachings, are all perfect. It is far better, while teaching the best one knows, to admit fallibility, to aid in the search for larger truth, and to stimulate the younger to join in the seeking. Our institutions must teach what seems true at the time, but with as little dogmatism as possible. Along with instruction in the customs, beliefs, and traditions of the age should be taught an attitude of mind, namely, a determination while holding fast to what is good, to reach out ever in search of the better, guided by an ideal of the best.

It is socially wrong to teach a child as absolute truth religious or other doctrines that in later years will impede his mental progress or necessitate a struggle for their modification or rejection. Freeing one's mind from error should be a joy, yet dogmatic teachings make disillusion painful. Hector voiced the noblest aspiration of humanity in praying that his boy might be wiser and braver than he was, and Elijah once prayed for death because he was no better than his fathers. Each generation should rejoice in seeing its successor eliminating defective teachings and enlarging the mental horizon. There is probably no truth to-day so absolute that it should be taught without the implication of possible later modifications. When an attitude of receptivity and openmindedness is imparted along with static training and information, human mentality will grow more susceptible to truth, and static teachings will imperceptibly become dynamic. Civilization traditionally begins with a perfect Eden in the past, but it works

towards a Paradise made up of men become divine; it begins with a final good, but it tends to reach toward an ever enlargening truth.

Distinctions in Social Control.—In primitive civilization social control is the same for all persons in the community, and rightly so, for all are practically alike, since they are under the same conditions of life. But when social classes arise, and differences develop in respect to heredity, environment, and education, there should be corresponding differences in the quality and quantity of control—classes of highest cultural attainment needing least and those who are lowest in the scale of civilization needing most. This difference would not be so necessary if the lower social classes were expected to conform only to standards suited to their own conditions of life, but, unfortunately for them, they are, as a rule, expected to conform to standards of a higher grade of civilization, and compliance becomes well-nigh impossible. The prevalence of so much vice and crime may thus be partially explained, since much that a high civilization condemns would meet with social approbation in lower civilization. Plainly, therefore, as society develops a wiser system of social control it will rely less and less on prohibitions and more on wise suggestion and education and the presentation of high ideals.

The Stimulus of Hope.—The real stimulus toward the attainment of ideals comes when men are inspired with the hope of success. If men can confidently hope to attain wealth, social standing, honor, and reputation, social activity is assured. Society will simply need to explain its regulations, so that each may play the game fairly—with disqualifications for foul play. It

is the hopelessness of attaining what is worth while that turns many aside to depraved forms of activity. A normal person loves to do his share in the common life and to feel that he deserves the approbation of his fellows. No man can resist public opinion definitely expressed. At the worst, he will, if under public condemnation, join himself with similar outcasts and enjoy their approbation.

If society is retrograding, it may be well, as in the East, to advocate passivity, abnegation, and fatalism; or if static, to urge contentment with one's lot; but in a dynamic, progressive age, boundless wants and ambitions imply broader achievement. For this reason society should arouse men from inactivity by stimulating and multiplying their wants, should by training and regulation guide them to the best methods of attaining their desires, and should seek ever to make the agencies for social control more effective, having as an ideal human beings so normal in heredity and so well environed and trained, that their desires will harmonize with social demands.

Social Forces.—Just as the steering-gear of a steamer is useless if there is no steam to regulate, so there can be no social control unless there be something to control. This something in society is the mass of bodily passions, the desires of the human mind, its ambitions and its demands—the social forces. In a weakling individual or group these are feeble and there is nothing worth controlling. Such people are molded by environment and companionship. As a basis for effective social control, therefore, it is vastly important that powerful desires surge through the individuals of society. An ascetic contempt for the joys and ambitions of life is

socially suicidal. Men must wish vigorously and work mightily to accomplish their desires. Through society as a whole there should be a craving for wealth, for bodily comfort, for the satisfaction of conjugal and parental feelings, for altruistic service, for a realization of ideals of morality and beauty, and for a conception of the essential harmony of the universe. A society lacking these is inert, contemptible, and destined to extinction; but with them, though there is the possibility that the violence of its ambitions may work its destruction, it also may become an irresistible factor for progress.

It is an important function of society, by economic and educational regulation, to develop these social ambitions to their utmost. If society by scientific knowledge and invention can banish disease, build up a vigorous physical race, and increase economic production and food supplies, it thereby will stimulate the psychical energies of men, so essential as a basis for social activity. Then if a wiser educational system would teach social standards, the reasons underlying law and morals, and ideals of cultural civilization as stimuli to ambition, these social forces would need simply wise social guidance and information as to the best methods for the accomplishment of ambitions. Society, therefore, instead of seeking to repress human desires by restrictive legislation and prohibitive forms of morality, should rather encourage the strengthening of these forces, and should preferably devote itself to the study of wiser methods of regulation. Enforced celibacy, for instance, in place of being a saintly virtue, is socially a sin against the race; the love of money, instead of being the root of all evil, is the basis of material civilization. Cæsar, instead

of being murdered because he was ambitious, should have been urged to become patriotically ambitious. Palissy, the inventor, instead of being blamed for burning his furniture to keep up the heat under his pottery, might have been forgiven had he used his neighbor's woodpile also. There are, of course, perverted feelings in society that demand rigid training and even repression for the time, but such instances should prove fewer in number as society learns wiser control. A father no longer has the power of life and death over his wife and children, and the use of the rod is passing from home and school. A teacher who cannot control without the threat of punishment may well be urged to find another occupation. Society begins to realize that there are necessarily no evil passions, if normal heredity and environment are supplemented by wise parental and social control. If, however, with a defective physique because of malnutrition, and a warped mentality because of improper training, a person under the influence of defective companionship acts perversely, the blame should be charged to the conditions of life, and without the assumption that normal persons normally trained need the same sort of repressive control.

Class Control.—Still another aspect of social psychology may be mentioned in illustration of its many problems. There are, broadly speaking, two natural classes in society, those who by heredity or through superior social advantages have become prominent as social leaders and those who through inferior heredity or the lack of social advantages have failed to attain prominence and hence are spoken of as the masses. Now a leading class historically has regularly been a predatory or an exploiting class. Although by theory they are the

leaders among equals, the servants of the people, yet the fact soon becomes evident that they deem themselves leaders of inferiors and natural or divinely appointed rulers of the people.

Being in power they acquire a firm grip on the fundamentals of power, namely, wealth, intelligence, prestige, and office, and so arrange the social system that they may remain in power indefinitely. To this end the great social institutions are so organized that they support the rulers in their claims. Law, religion, custom, tradition, and beliefs are so ordered that they impress on the masses their moral and religious obligations to their betters, to whom, it is taught, they owe obedience and loyalty. This is class control or, in its harsher form, class domination. Class control in its lowest aspects maintains the power of the leaders by cruel and vindictive measures whenever necessary. The army, the courts, and the police service are ever ready to punish with the utmost severity any mutterings of discontent, and punishment even may extend after death, since religion may threaten the terrors of hell against impious rebels and traitors. In this stage it is essential that the masses be kept in ignorance and in abject poverty, so that no possibility may exist for the rise from the masses of rival claimants for leadership.

In a somewhat higher form of class control punishment is less emphasized and the leadership is kept in power by emotional appeals for personal support based on claims of fealty, loyalty, reverence, and devotion. In this stage, however, the leaders must be less exacting in their extortions and exploitation lest the devotion of subjects turn to hate. Nor is it necessary that the people be kept ignorant and poverty stricken, provided a safe education of a static sort only is allowed and heavy taxa-

tion, weighing chiefly on the masses, concentrates wealth, as before, into the hands of the ruling class.

Control Through the Elite.—In the highest form of social control, when class interests yield to social interests, that democratic type towards which the world is hopefully tending through the ultimate defeat of militarism and class exploitation, the leading class depend for their leadership on the free choice of the people, and the sources of power are democratically controlled. The notion of *punishment* is minimized and reserved for atavistic types of men, emotions are stressed as aids in control, but always as subsidiary to intelligent appreciation on the part of the people of the purposes and ideals inherent in any proposed policy. Education, therefore, is no longer reserved chiefly for the ruling classes, and ceases to emphasize a content that looks backward to the "glorious past." By contrast, it aims to familiarize the people, both old and young, through the press as well as through the school, with the meaning of the social life environing them and with such information as may through opportunity develop the potential vocational and cultural capacities of all.

Leadership in such a system is for the talented and is open to all who demonstrate their ability to build up along better lines the social organization with its institutions and to expedite social progress by socially beneficial achievements. For, in passing from class domination to a democratic social control, there must be modifications and reorganizations of social institutions, in order that they may voice the newer ideas of freedom instead of the older methods of terrorism. Democracy, in other words, must dominate the ideals of economic life, of politics, religion, education, and family, so that in consequence there

would follow revisions of customs, traditions, and beliefs and a greater emphasis on the ideals and standards of morals, æsthetics, and intellectual life, or as the Greeks put it, the good, the beautiful, and the true, all of which ultimately may be considered useful.

As these became democratic in type, the *control* of social life would come to be of the same sort and would become higher in degree with advancing civilization. As this kind of control depends on the personal intelligence of each individual, society would be composed, not of men of a dull average type as under despotisms, but of persons of strong, intense personalities directed through social opinion into lines of action socially beneficial.

These broad principles underlying the theory of social psychology have far reaching applications. As at present organized, even in the United States, society is made up of classes widely different in power, wealth, and intelligence. By ancient custom the ruling classes may seek to maintain themselves in power through exploitation and intimidation. A leader may be a capitalist who has nothing to arbitrate, a clergyman who plays skillfully on the fear of hell, a teacher or a father with rod and threat, or a domineering husband in charge of the family purse. On the other hand modern changes strengthen the laborer through the ballot, the trade union, and the social approval of the demand for a decent standard of living; the laity may prefer teachings of social fraternity to the terrors of hell and refuse support to an exploiting church; the rod and the threat yield to emotional and intellectual appeals; and the wife claims to be equal, if not superior, to her husband. Differences become minimized, agreements are emphasized, and the struggle of classes slowly yields to the coöperative unity of leaders and led.

PART II

SOCIETY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

CHAPTER X

EARLY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Social Origins.—As “society” is the center of sociological discussion it is important at the start to form a clear idea of its historical development, noting its gradual change from a simple band of savages to the highly complex society of closely related institutions so common to our thought in these days. The term “society,” it will be remembered, is regularly used in sociology to denote a human community held together by common elements and interests. The term “social group” has a somewhat narrower meaning, not emphasizing an integration of social institutions, but rather a unity of specialized interests.

While many of the conclusions of the anthropological sciences are merely hypotheses (because knowledge based chiefly on remnants and survivals of earliest human civilization is meager and is likely to remain so), it is, nevertheless, to these sciences that we must turn for information in respect to the origin of man and the conditions of his primitive life. From these conclusions it is, however, fairly reasonable to hold¹ that man evolved from animal forms and for many ages remained, to all intents and purposes, an animal. In this part of his history he made no tools nor implements of any sort, nor had he mastered the art of fire-building. Like an animal he left at death noth-

¹For short studies of this sort, see in Temple Primer Series, *Primitive Man*, by Moriz Hoernes, and *Ethnology*, by Michael Haberlandt. In each of these may be found a brief bibliography.

ing behind him but his bones, and, except by some rare chance, even these in process of time crumbled into dust. Consequently we begin to know man with some exactness only when he had begun to make tools and weapons, to use fire, and to dwell in settled habitations such as the caves of western Europe or the lake dwellings of Switzerland. The charred bones of animals used as food, the implements found in the débris, and the graves left by these hordes of human beings give hints of their attainments in invention and civilization. For the last ten or twenty thousand years the development of European man can rudely be traced, not as the history of the rise and fall of nations, but as the record of man's achievements, as he perfected his tools and weapons, developed an æsthetic sense as shown by his fondness for ornamentation, and thought out rude theories of religion as shown by methods of burial. At the present time here and there in secluded or inhospitable parts of the earth may still be found simple races that doubtless reproduce with a fair degree of accuracy the earliest civilization of man. In some cases undoubtedly these races represent a retrogression from a higher civilization. Beaten in warfare and fleeing from their conquerors, they settled in bleak and sterile lands desired by no other human beings. Thus, lacking incentives to progress they sank back in the scale of civilization.

Other races again, like the blacks of Australia,² represent early man after a seclusion of many thousand years, cut off from intercourse with other races, and typifying in their hoary yet primitive civilization the maximum of attainment possible to a group when out of contact with vigorous and aggressive alien groups. Traditions of

² See Spencer and Gillen in bibliography.

primitive civilization, largely imaginary, are common among all prominent races, and are familiar to us through Semitic and Aryan legends and through the story and verse of the classical writers of Greece and Rome. It was the Eden of Genesis, the Golden Age of Ovid, and the simple life of early times that Greek and Latin philosophers finally evolved into the famous theory of the primitive state of nature. In this condition, so the philosophers said, men lived happy, peaceful lives doing justice one to another, living on the natural fruits of the earth, and having fear neither of the gods nor wild beasts nor of one another.³

However attractive these pleasing fancies were down even through the Eighteenth Century when the French encyclopædists and Rousseau⁴ so emphasized nature and natural conditions, to-day some of the glamour has faded from those bright pictures of primitive man, and we see him through anthropological researches more nearly as he was in those early days; a human being to be sure, but not sharply differentiated from his animal ancestry and subject to the conditions of that precarious life. He lived in the midst of dangerous animal competitors who loved the taste of human flesh; his half-starved body shivered in the cold rains and blasts of the winter; or he lay gorged and enervated by the riotous plenty and heat of the summer. His awakening intellect was multiplying his enemies by surrounding him with supernatural beings, malevolent and hostile. He lacked the speed, agility, and muscular strength of his animal rivals, and yet preferred to seek his safety on the earth's surface instead of among

³ See, for example, Plato's *Republic*, Book II, Secs. 369-376, and his *Laws*, Book III, Secs. 676-684.

⁴ See John Morley, *Diderot*, and Rousseau, *Discours sur l'inégalité des conditions*.

the trees, where he would have enjoyed comparative immunity from attack by animals inexperienced in climbing. Yet the very strenuousness of these conditions gave him the environment that stimulated the development of mentality and finally gave him supremacy among all the beasts of the field. Unquestionably the harsh competitive conditions of his life developed in man a mental shrewdness that in process of time sharply differentiated him from other animals. Just how this took place can best be seen in the statements of anthropology, but we feel sure that as man assumed an erect position and developed a flexible hand, he slowly acquired the use of tools, probably beginning with a stone in the hand or a knotty branch used as a club, and from these slight beginnings gradually added to his stock of implements and weapons; devised ornamentation, clothing, and housing; and began to utilize empirically the most obvious powers of nature, such as the force of gravitation, flowing water, fire, and the propelling energy of wind.

Human beings were in the beginning only slightly gregarious and not much inclined to mass in large numbers. When men live by hunting and on natural foods, competing for these with animal rivals, the land can support only a scant population. Primitive man knew no kin save the natural connection between mother and immature child; and recognized no friends outside of his immediate horde. Though he must have recognized his *kind* as distinct from other forms of animal life, yet it would be more natural to be *on guard* in the presence of strange human beings, rather than to assume the existence of friendly feelings and sympathetic ties. Even yet men of northern climates often prefer to live apart from human kind and would enjoy least of all a communal life

like that of the bee or the ant. The crowd is "maddening" to many, and while a social disposition is best cultivated through congenial companionship, individualism of an intellectual sort demands at intervals the closed door, the wilderness, or the mountain top.

Definite Social Grouping.—The change to a definite and fairly permanent group life probably came about through intellectual growth. Individuals, surrounded by enemies and eking out an insufficient and precarious livelihood, slowly began to perceive the real utility of living in a group, first as a hunting band in the hunting season, and then permanently as a war band organized for offense and defense. Whenever such a primitive horde became fairly permanent, so that a race through its descendants held together in tribal relations for generations, from that time civilization may be said to have definitely started, since a stable condition was secured as a basis for future progress. The reason for this is obvious on a moment's reflection. When human beings become permanently associated, their habits and customs by social imitation become similar, kinship ties become clearer, and the family becomes a fixed institution. Knowledge of implements also and inventive notions of all sorts become common property and are handed on by tradition from generation to generation. Prohibitions in the form of tabus and regulations of individual activity become possible, and then must follow the conviction that some authority must enforce these. Especially in war did it become necessary to emphasize supremacy, subordination, and obedience to command, even though group safety had to be purchased at the risk of life or limb to the individual. At the same time war placed a premium on skill in battle, on effective organization, and on the invention of new

weapons for offense and defense.⁵ In group life, also, men through conversation readily exchanged their rude imaginations respecting the supernatural agencies by which they were surrounded, or in their fear they listened eagerly to the experiences of those who had by chance or reflection learned how to propitiate these dread-inspiring beings. Most important of all, by frequent contact with one another they began to acquire some facility in language, to accustom their vocal organs to the reproduction of definite sounds, to extend their vocabularies, and by means of words to enlarge their stock of ideas. We see then that from the time when men definitely combined in hordes for safety's sake, there developed a group organization that slowly and unconsciously began to evolve the great permanent agencies and institutions of social life: language, the family, religion, economic activities and government, law, and crude systems of education. Such a horde-group is the unit of ancient society and the starting point for studies of social development.

We are not to assume that these permanent hordes developed very early in human history. Presumably for thousands of years groups of savages, held together by temporary ties, broke away from their accustomed habitats and roamed the country, relying on their weapons for support, following the game, seeking fertile spots where nature spontaneously supplied natural fruits and edible vegetation, and developing in their blood a *Wanderlust* that still carries peoples and individuals far away from their home lands, in search of some El Dorado or Utopia lying toward the rising or the setting sun.⁶ Had these

⁵For an interesting study of early weapons, see Pitt-Rivers, *Evolution of Culture*.

⁶For an excellent illustration of this spirit, see a fascinating account of Raleigh's voyage to New Guinea, *Newes of Sir Walter Rauleigh*, 1618, London, probably written by Raleigh himself.

conditions of primitive migration remained permanent, advanced civilization would not have been possible; like lowly savages of secluded parts of the earth, all mankind might have remained indefinitely a child-like race, living from hand to mouth, fixed in low mentality, and unable to make progress through the instability of their group life. As a rule, animal life in any given area is kept within bounds by starvation and mutual slaughter, the natural means whereby the amount of life is adjusted to the food supply. Human kind in its beginnings doubtless multiplied slowly because of this principle, so clearly explained by Malthus.⁷ But when primitive man, by means of weapons, obtained his food supplies with greater facility, and, relying on his skill, wandered far and wide over the face of the earth, mankind must have multiplied with wonderful rapidity. Yet, after centuries of increase the old trouble became manifest; in fertile river valleys and on the grassy plains population was multiplying faster than nature spontaneously furnished food, and a change of some sort became inevitable. Doubtless at this time began what later became the solution of the question, at least for many ages, namely the knowledge of agriculture and the domestication of animals. But the beginnings of these were slow and difficult, and the advantage to be derived from them not immediately perceived. Before they had attained any prominence, another remedy for the population difficulty had been found in war.

Former Utility of War.—It is hard in these days to appreciate the former utility of institutions now condemned by public opinion. War is to-day looked on as a necessary evil, but it is in common opinion an evil

⁷ T. R. Malthus, *The Principle of Population*.

from which we should escape as soon as possible, for world-wars in modern centuries retard civilization through their destructiveness and engendered suspicions and hatreds. Yet wars in low civilization had a decidedly useful function when there was a surplus population, and no peaceful means of migration. At any rate, when in early days the garden spots of earth were filled with a teeming population, and hungry hordes on the outside fingered their weapons and speculated on their chances of success in battle, trouble was inevitable. As Ovid puts it, the golden age was succeeded by the ages of silver, of brass, and of iron, as men pitted themselves one against another and fought for food, plunder, and land. Then the contented and peaceable disposition of savage civilization that so easily accompanies a full stomach began to yield to a fierce and pugnacious spirit that warred for spoils and for the mere joy of killing. Then probably developed the practice of cannibalism, when men hunted their enemies as a source of food; the custom becoming fixed and sanctioned, as the pressure of population on food supplies intensified, since there was then no repugnance at the thought of eating human flesh. For many centuries this state of continuous war lasted in the attempt to adjust population to food supplies, until the slow development of pastoral life and of agriculture, lessened the frequency of war by allowing a larger population to subsist on a given territory.

There were certain obvious social benefits arising from this stage of warfare. It meant the survival of the strong and the elimination of the weak; men in defense of their hunting grounds were stimulated to greater mentality and inventive ingenuity so as to be able to cope more successfully in war; they were compelled to form larger

and more permanent groups and thereby developed a "consciousness of kind" and fighting strength against the foe; and racial boundary lines developed of necessity, if only the faint and movable line of the hunting ground. And with growing fixity in racial population and habitation, the social group came into existence with rapidly differentiating institutions, yet integrated through the leadership of the group. In such ways as these a civilization founded on the war group was started.

It is possible, therefore, on the basis of this knowledge of early civilization, to trace the intimate connection between war and high civilization, and to explain that seeming paradox of history, why the fiercest and most war-like of nations regularly represent the high-water mark of civilization, and why the most kindly and peaceful of peoples have so regularly served as serfs and slaves to their opposites. On the one side we have from Christ to Tolstoi the teaching that the meek shall inherit the earth; on the other side we have the Gallic *væ victis* and the superman of Nietzsche, who proudly tramples on the meek and accepts as his due the devotion and service of those he oppresses.

War, with all of its implications, has become a part of social competition, and a love of it is deeply ingrained in the blood of the dominant races. A problem of social progress is to turn the intensity of this fierce desire for conquest and mastery away from thoughts of human subjugation and toward the conquest and mastery over nature and the subjugation of bestial survivals in the human heart.

Social Principles Underlying Development.—From such teachings of the anthropological sciences in respect to social development, many theories have been advanced

which aim to set forth the social principle underlying development. It is hardly necessary here to discuss most of these, but attention will be directed briefly to a few of the explanations that have been advanced by prominent sociologists. We see that to-day the institutions of society are numerous, highly specialized, and exceedingly complex. Yet ages ago, as already shown, these were few, simple, and easily comprehended. What has been the order of the changes, and why did the simple become complex? Herbert Spencer, in his *Principles of Sociology* endeavored to show how the activities or functions of society multiplied, how each fundamental activity would subdivide or differentiate, how institutions or social structures developed through which these activities could best be carried on, how agencies for the regulation of these activities developed one by one, and how other agencies arose to see to the proper distribution of the products of social activity. In connection with all this he sought to show that the principle of evolution, as explained by him in his *First Principles of Synthetic Philosophy*, held true in social development also, and hence that the cosmic principles of evolution would explain the slow changes in the development of society. Thus, by implication, if one comprehended both the process or law of development and the principle of evolution, he would also be able to foresee the trend of social change, and thereby become a wise guide in respect to current social movements.

Sympathy and Imitation.—Other sociological writers have not ventured to follow Spencer in his exhaustive historical researches into the development of institutions,⁸

⁸ For the data used by Spencer as the basis for his *Principles of Sociology* see his charts of *Descriptive Sociology*.

but have been content to accept the results of investigations in such matters made by others. From a knowledge of these they have endeavored to set forth some principle that would explain why human beings hold together at all and how the simple primitive horde evolved into modern complex society. In such explanations one set of writers tends to emphasize the permanent aspects of the mind as reproducing themselves over and over again in successive generations, modified only by slight variations, but tending always to return to the fundamentals of human nature. For instance, the sympathy and sociability that naturally exist between mother and offspring in mammals, may in human kind broaden out so as to include kin, clan, tribe, nation, and all humanity, and hence may explain the growing solidarity of the human race. Or, again, as the natural disposition is toward the path of least resistance, persons in their development find it easier to imitate and to grow like those with whom they are intimately in contact; hence the strength of social unity comes from the growth of kinship ties and common customs, traditions and beliefs, men preferring the like to the unlike, the usual to the unusual.

The Intellect and Innovation.—Still another school of writers emphasizes the intellect as the important factor in development. The mind learns slowly to perceive its truer permanent interests, and aims to attain these, not merely to satisfy animal feelings, or to imitate automatically the members of the group. By reflection it learns the advantage of seeking to satisfy the demands of special and individual interests, the utility of which is perceived. Hence, they argue, development comes not merely from the gradual differentiation by slow variation from some fundamental horde type, or from the

mere imitation of set standards of an older generation, but rather when men deliberately cut loose from the beaten paths, introduce innovations, and strive to have these standardized as types to be imitated by the inert mass who neither reason nor originate. From this standpoint emphasis is naturally placed on the genius, the nobility, the learned aristocracy of a group as the real originators of social progress.

Group Differences.—Other writers again call attention to the importance of group differences and rivalries as a factor in development. Just as conflicting forces tend to equilibrate or balance, so the differences that exist owing to the influence of varying environments regularly tend to assimilate when they come in contact. The moment that two dissimilar groups approach each other, they tend to coalesce and ultimately to harmonize. This process may be a violent one, as when warring groups become unified by conquest and compulsory and unconscious assimilation takes place, or it may be conscious and peaceable, as when through commerce and other forms of social intercourse two dissimilar civilizations slowly exchange ideas, and by mutual imitation and assimilation in course of time approximate toward a common type.

These several theories all unite in the conclusion that there is a definite law or order, in accordance with which society advances and human institutions develop, and that there is some principle of causation which explains how this development takes place. They differ somewhat as to whether this principle is in substance that taught by Spencer, or the principles of sympathy, imitation, innovation, or conflict. All of these principles in fact have their part in the final explanation, and it is per-

haps needless to assume that there must be one principle, and one principle only, in explanation of social development.

Illustrations of These Theories.—If we turn again to our knowledge of primitive horde-groups, we may see illustration of these theories in group development. Suppose a group of human beings comfortably settled in a favorable environment, untroubled by dangerous neighbors, and even apart from the rest of humanity. It is easy to see that development would be natural, spontaneous, and chiefly through imitation. By intermarriage the members of the group would become a kindred, and would become solidified in sympathy by common customs and interests. Changes might come, but these would be relatively insignificant since the people and their environment are practically fixed. Through imitation they would develop a common type of economic life, of family, religion, and government, and would discourage innovations as tending to destroy the time-honored teachings of their ancestors.

Again, suppose that this group meets with an important modification in environment, for instance, that by natural increase there comes an excess of population over food supplies. There would now be need for some important innovation. By chance a leader may arise who suggests to them that they reduce population by putting to death female infants and the useless, such as the aged or the weak; or shows them how to draft off the surplus population and compel them to migrate; or teaches them how they may increase food supplies by the domestication of animals, by agriculture, or by improved tools, or by exchanging surplus goods for foods, or by warring on neighboring tribes and capturing their supplies and

resources. Any one of these suggestions would necessarily compel changes in the old-time system. The sympathetic ties of kinship must be violently broken or shattered through senicide, infanticide, or migration; the economic customs of the hunting group must be exchanged for the methods of pastoral or agricultural life; and a governmental system suited to peace would be readapted for purposes of war or commerce. Evidently in such circumstances the innovator would be a powerful factor in social development, and he might be remembered for centuries in tradition and history as a founder of a new civilization, like Moses, Cecrops, Servius Tullius, or the Incas of Peru.

Again, suppose that the group under consideration concludes to engage in commerce, or starts out on a career of conquest. In the one activity it comes in contact with another civilization, differing institutions, and other ideas and ideals of life; the contrasts are noted, and slowly a peaceable assimilation takes place, each group modifying its own by the partial adoption of the other's culture. In the other instance by conquest it settles as a ruling class over the surviving members of the conquered race. Without necessarily intending to, the races soon begin to amalgamate. Many of the conquered females become subordinate wives of their conquerors, the offspring partake of the characteristics of both, language and customs tend to become assimilated, economic interests slowly unite them for common purposes, and the necessity for joint action in war from time to time cements them into one people. If the amalgamation is between two fairly equal or not too dissimilar stocks, the resultant strain is probably superior to either of the original stocks. Deterioration follows too close inbreeding, whether of races or civiliza-

tion, and advance is made by mingling differing, but not too different, kinds.

In these suppositions we find illustrations of a process that has gone on since human society first began. As long as conditions remain practically the same, social imitation dominates, and a static or stationary civilization prevails; if serious modifications take place in conditions, either innovation must be accepted or degradation and extermination become inevitable; if through commerce or war differing, but approximately equal, civilizations are brought in opposition, the resultant amalgamation of races and assimilation of civilizations imply progress. In almost any period of human history, or in any part of the earth, numerous illustrations of these three principles may be found. Everywhere in static civilization may be observed that natural disposition of mankind to settle back and believe in the goodness of the past and the perfection of the present; to frown on the radical who suggests the possibility of improvement by change; and to throw up the hands in holy horror at the thought that any good can come to Judea from out of Nazareth. On the other hand, we see the long, long roll of martyrdom as men and women in all ages sought to introduce innovations in social, political, and religious life, and went to their deaths in the faint hope that the day would yet come when their persecutors would realize that they had killed those who had sought to upbuild their people. Finally in the long and bloody record of war, of massacre, slaughter, and persecution, we see arising from it all, races of mixed blood, energetic, forceful, ambitious, who inherit along with the fighting qualities of their ancestors their mental and moral qualities also, as the basis for a higher and more enduring civilization. The old riddle of

Samson still has point, "Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."^o War is followed by peace, and peace also has its record of victories.

^o Judges XIV, 14.

CHAPTER XI

ACHIEVEMENT AND CIVILIZATION

The words, "civilization" and "achievement" have particular significance and importance in sociological usage, for sociology is deeply concerned with the history and study of achievement, and with the possibilities of improvement in civilization through human achievement, since civilization after all may be considered as the sum total of achievement.

Animal Achievement.—It is possible to speak of the achievement of animals and to call attention to their successful attainment of ends through effort. One might also speak of their civilization and grade them as high or low in the scale of development, according to the quality of their achievements. They grow weapons of offense and defense, such as the claw of the lobster or the antlers of the stag; they grow or build homes, as the shell of the snail or the nest of the bird; wolves organize hunting bands, ants engage in war, and bees live in industrial communities; beavers construct dams, squirrels store food for the winter, and deer place sentinels while browsing.

Family organization in its familiar forms of polygamy and monogamy is well defined among higher animals; instruction, by example at least, is given to the young; there seems to be a clear appreciation of some distinctions in morals and æsthetics; the rudiments at least

of human intelligence may be observed in the elephant, and in the dog's attitude toward man there is a rude sort of religion. Indeed, when the highest animals such as the chimpanzee or the orang-outang and the lowest savages such as those in Tierra del Fuego are compared, the observer is often tempted to declare that the advantage is rather in favor of the animal. It is entirely possible, therefore, to study a sort of animal social phenomena and to trace the record of animal civilization and achievement.¹

Human Achievement.—And yet, even though the border line is vague, there is a sharp distinction between the animal and the human being, not so much perhaps in kind as in degree and quality of development. Presumably the chief distinction is that what the animal does is on the whole done instinctively or through habit, without any clear notion of purpose in the mind or a comprehension of the means employed. While man also has his instincts and his automatic activities, he has, in addition, developed the power of conscious reasoning through which he deliberately sets before himself desirable ends, seeks to comprehend the best methods of attaining these, and performs the resultant activities with conscious observation, comparison, and experiment. Furthermore, after accomplishing an achievement he does not depend for its reproduction on the processes of natural selection, or on an endless repetition, or even on an immediate conscious imitation, but he stores away the idea of it in his memory, or else confides it through language to his or a succeeding generation, thus making it a social possession which can be recalled into use even after many gen-

¹As studies of this sort, note Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid* and Espinas' *Des sociétés animales*.

erations of forgetfulness and disuse have passed. In other words, human achievement is mental, the product of the intellect, and is stored up in the mind, while animal achievements in the main are physical and automatic, involving no conscious mental process.

If human achievement is fundamentally intellectual, then civilization must be based on mental attainment. Civilization is not merely the possession of a series of achievements; it implies in addition a comprehension of the ideas underlying these. A troop of monkeys inhabiting the ruins of a deserted city in the jungle of India is not thereby civilized, nor did the barbarians who conquered Rome at once attain civilization when they took possession of its cities; nor would a savage become civilized if by chance he were clothed in the height of fashion and lived in the midst of the most highly developed social institutions. Furthermore, no nation that possesses wealth, machinery, magnificent edifices, and well-stocked libraries can for that reason lay claim to be fully civilized. There may be within it a large per cent of primitive savages, rude barbarians, half-civilized clanish conservatives who belong far back in patriarchal times, and a comparatively small per cent only who comprehend the ideas back of machinery, invention, social institutions, and the ideals of cultural civilization.

That nation only can call itself civilized in which the general body of citizens has grasped the ideas of achievement, and knows how to use them effectively. If this knowledge is held by but few, as is usually the fact, the nation is seriously handicapped, since the many are to all intents and purposes lower in the quality of their civilization, inasmuch as their actions are dictated not by the intellect but by unreasoning custom and imitation.

For such reasons no modern nation so far is capable as a whole of understanding and perpetuating the ideas of advancing civilization, so that each nation should seek to remedy conditions that necessitate a retarded development for so large a proportion of the population.

Material Achievement.—Charges are often made against certain nations that they emphasize unduly the material aspects of civilization. Properly defined, a material achievement involves a knowledge of the methods of utilizing natural materials and forces. No society can have too much of this sort of knowledge. The very essence of social progress of all sorts is involved in the possession of a constantly increasing mass of material achievement, and the lack of it would plunge mankind back into primitive savagery. But when an exploiting class monopolizes these achievements of material civilization and uses them solely for selfish purposes, at the same time exploiting the wage earner and debauching the ethical standards of society, then charges may well be brought not against material civilization as such, but against those who, lacking the ideals of cultural civilization, use the low standards of former ages in building up their selfish interests at a time when the social conscience is demanding higher standards.

Cultural Achievement.—If to material civilization we add cultural civilization, *i.e.*, the totality of ideas and achievement underlying the ethical, æsthetic, religious and intellectual development of society, we have before us the two great aspects of civilization, material and cultural, one emphasizing the utilization of matter and natural energy, the other emphasizing the utilization in social life of the attainment of higher culture as achieved by the human mind.

The relationship between these two forms of civilization is intimate. Broadly speaking, the material always precedes the cultural. Lacking material civilization, a society is condemned to an endless struggle for existence in which no leisure is left for the development of a higher life. As material civilization increases, leisure becomes possible for a steadily increasing per cent of mankind, who thereby obtain opportunity for the discovery and invention of newer forms of material achievement, and at the same time opportunity for mental and moral advancement. Of course, here and there in the midst of strenuous economic conditions may be found ambitious persons of strong personality who, while engaged in a ceaseless struggle for existence, may also find time for study and occasionally make an achievement; just as among a leisure class may be found many who misuse their opportunity for advancement and become parasitic by failing to make achievement. But, in general, every society must develop a material civilization before it can hope to develop a cultural civilization, and this, moreover, depends for its development on the amount of material civilization and the extent to which its benefits and a knowledge of it are shared by the people as a whole.

In passing from these definitions it may be necessary again to emphasize the fact that civilization consists fundamentally of the ideas underlying achievement. If a society should by chance lose all of its material wealth in the form of houses, goods, machinery, and other tangible possessions, it would remain civilized if it retained the ideas involved in the making of these and could reproduce within a few years all it had lost. If, however, it lost the ideas of the things and retained the things

themselves, it would have the shadow and not the substance of civilization and soon would lose even that.

Meaning of Achievement.—If civilization is made up of the sum total of achievement, it is important to understand clearly just what is meant by that term. In plant life the possibilities of development are determined by the conditions of a fixed environment. In animal life, however, there is a possibility of change of environment since animals have the power of locomotion and may, if necessary, migrate and thereby place themselves under more favorable conditions, as when flocks of birds move to warmer climates at the approach of winter. But man may remain in his accustomed habitat, and through his intellect he may consciously make use of natural materials or forces in such a way as to produce direct modifications in the conditions of life, thereby making achievement. Nature is the mother of all things and in cosmic history has brought into existence stellar systems innumerable, and earth's many forms of plant and animal life, including man with his dominant intellectuality. This inherited energy pulsating through the brain of man has stimulated him also to become a creator. Under the stress of keen competition his mental faculties became sharpened and he saw how he might lend strength to his muscles by utilizing as a weapon or tool the rounded stone supplied by the streams, or a massive club from a fallen tree. From this time forth he definitely entered on his career as a maker of tools and weapons, and the first great class of material achievements had made its appearance. Similarly, he learned in time to comprehend how he might modify his environment by means of clothing and habitations and how he might add to the comfort, ease, and pleasure of life by

utilizing the natural forces displayed so powerfully about him. Hence came the use of fire for warmth and the preparation of foods, flowing water to propel his simple canoe and carry his burdens, and wind to fill the sails of his primitive boat. Then came the ability to utilize animals by domestication for purposes of food and burden bearing, and the capacity to compel the earth to yield him foods by artificial cultivation.

Tools of the Mind.—In connection with these came one by one the three great typical “tools of the mind,”² *language*, first in spoken and then in written form, reaching its perfection through the invention of the Greek alphabet and its numerous modern adaptations. Then also came the beginnings of *mathematics* as man began to grasp more exactly the distinction between the one and the many, and later developed the decimal system, the Arabic notation, and the many modern aspects of higher mathematics. Then, as his intellectual processes became more exact in their methods, simple forms of *logic* were comprehended, awaiting only the passing of centuries and the insight of great thinkers for the development of modern logic and inductive methods of reasoning.

Social Institutions as Achievements.—Again, as men combined in groups they saw the advantage of definite organization, and so, little by little worked out the great fundamental institutions of the social order, namely, institutions economic, domestic, religious, educational, and political. From these also were worked out by specialization and differentiation secondary institutions, such as the great historical systems of kinship and the ceremonial forms of marriage; the industrial arts and trades;

² See Chapter II.

sacerdotal institutions of all sorts typified by the church; and the many secondary institutions of government as illustrated, for example, by the rise of law and jurisprudence. As notions of goodness, beauty, and truth budded up in the human mind men developed ideals of art, ethics, and philosophy, and made these concrete through the fine arts, through the development of moral and philanthropic codes and systems, and through organizations for the development of intellectual achievement. In this manner can be traced a long list of achievements, both material and cultural, slowly thought out and made tangible, under the spur of stern necessity, through mental sweat wresting from nature its secrets, each tending to make human existence more endurable and happier.

A little reflection shows that the social history of man would consist in a discussion of his achievements and their effects, that its list of great men would be made up of those who have added valuable achievements to civilization, and that the immortals of social life are not those who merely devastated with fire and sword, but those who thought out a great invention, made a scientific discovery, or formulated a fruitful idea, and gave it to their fellows. The real Adam of social life was he who first devised a tool, and the real Eve she who first taught her offspring the simple rude sounds of primitive speech. Each achievement when made is treasured up by the human mind, handed on by custom or tradition, or confided to the written or printed page, and lives as long as its utility is evident, passing away only when superseded by a better and greater achievement. Every material achievement should lighten the labors of man, should yield him for his toil more abundant fruit,

and give him the hope that the time will yet come when he will so completely master the knowledge of how best to utilize for his purposes natural materials and forces, that he will be virtually free from the stress of economic competition and the struggle for daily bread. Then, freed from the "curse,"³ he will no longer eat his bread in the sweat of his face but shall "sit under his vine and fig tree, none making him afraid."⁴ Similarly, as he adds to his mental and cultural achievements he will understand better the possibilities of his own mind, he will find that there really is a "royal road to learning," he will master the sciences one by one, will learn how to unify his knowledge, to moralize his practices, and to beautify his life, until as a god, knowing good and evil, he will begin to reach out after the hidden knowledge of the universe veiled from his thought at present because of his ignorance and crude mentality.

Genetic Achievement.—Early civilization and achievement from the social standpoint are *genetic*, not *telic*, and achievements for the most part are *individual*, not *collective*. In other words, social groups as units did not deliberately plan out their achievements or fix on their standards of civilization. These grew spontaneously, naturally, genetically, and were determined by the particular needs and conditions at the time or as the whim and fancy of the moment suggested. So, likewise, an individual, urged on by pressing need, would hit on some material achievement or invention that would speed-

³ Genesis III, 17-19. "Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field; in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

⁴ Micah IV, 4.

ily be imitated and reproduced by his fellows. Or the thinker struggling painfully with ideas well nigh too large for expression or full comprehension would, as prophet, poet, or philosopher, set forth for the satisfaction of his own mind thoughts so strange and wonderful to his companions that to them he was as though inspired by some divinity. In all this there was no far-sighted social end in view; achievements came from individuals under the stress of material necessity or of a growing mentality seeking means of expression. Yet out of this chaos of achievement by slow accretion century after century, there came into the world as a whole an appreciable civilization, even though its development was so slow that at times it seemed stationary and in places was even recessive.

At rare intervals under the stimulus of a great crisis and under the guidance of a powerful leader, a people or nation might seem to rise to the consciousness of a glorious attainable future, and for a period might strive consciously and purposefully to push forward in achievement and civilization. But the inciting stimulus died away, the great man was succeeded by apathetic sons, and the untrained masses gladly settled back into inertia, wearied by the unusual exertion of planning for the morrow. Warlike leaders, fiery prophets, inspiring poets, may, for a time disturb the customs and traditions of the multitude, but when the storm of agitation is past, the seemingly irresistible billows sink back into the bosom of the sea and scarcely a ripple marks the place.

Telic Achievement.—The reason is perhaps clear. Great changes are not made through genius and enthusiasm unaided. There must be a real and fundamental modification of environment, there must be an achieve-

ment that gives to man a powerful weapon to use against environing conditions, a new conquest must be made over nature, and the idea back of the achievement must become familiar at least to the thinkers of the group and preferably to the masses. Then, as the newer ideas of achievement sink into the common consciousness through education and social imitation, men begin to see that their interests and happiness are plainly involved. From that time forth they respond easily and naturally to the stimulus of the situation and a higher stage of civilization is ushered in.

Static Civilization.—As such great crises as these are few in number, society as a rule is seemingly *static*, not *dynamic*. In other words, men easily incline towards conservatism, even though they have in themselves the potential capacity to become radical. In static civilization they are nurtured and trained in the habits and customs of their ancestors, they use the same tools and weapons, are familiar with the same institutions, and hold the same beliefs. Some changes may creep in during the course of a generation but they are relatively few and comparatively insignificant in amount. The aged, being more experienced and wiser than the young, are revered and honored as rulers and priests and stability marks the entire social organization. But when through some important modification in conditions such as the warring impact of a different and aggressive civilization, a dynamic age arrives, then change and instability are the order of the day. The old, by assumption, becomes inferior, and the new is theoretically best; customs and beliefs change; conservatism, once the bulwark of static civilization, becomes a handicap to progress; the aged who modify their ideas and beliefs less readily than the

young are rejected, and the "dead line" creeps into the industries and professions. Men's hearts fail them as they see familiar landmarks go one by one, and they struggle desperately to hold on to what once seemed good and right. This resistance acts as a sort of check to innovation, the energy of the assimilating movement begins to spend itself; slowly and gradually the old and the new harmonize, part of each is rejected. The old institutions still exist, but in modified form, and the newer system in a generation or two becomes the accustomed; static conditions once more develop, and stability again characterizes the age.

Static Contrasted with Dynamic Civilization.—

This distinction between static and dynamic civilization is important, and further explanation may make the contrast clear. If in a given society the fundamental conditions of life are practically fixed, and the interests for which men strive are virtually uniform, a static civilization develops. This does not imply that no changes are taking place. Conditions are never entirely fixed, and the interests for which men strive are never fully harmonious, yet as long as the changes in conditions are slow and infinitesimal, and as long as the interests striven for remain practically the same, one may assume that to all intents and purposes the institutions and ideals of society are static. The institutions are slowly changing, the ideals imperceptibly altering, but no generation is conscious of any break with its predecessors, and it is only when centuries have elapsed that one can see distinctions between the old and the new.

On the other hand, a dynamic civilization is always preceded by some profound change in the physical or economic environment, with its resultant changes in cultural

environment. Through war or migration racial stocks and civilization may be brought into forced union, and a dynamic condition exists until assimilation and amalgamation take place. A pastoral people may through necessity be compelled to turn to agriculture, or an agricultural people to mining or to commerce, or a commercial people to manufactures, and the period of transition is dynamic. Dormant energy bursts forth as illustrated by Saracenic⁵ and Japanese⁶ civilizations, and movement takes place until the conflicting modes of life come into equilibrium, are harmonized, and static peace resumes its importance. Or again, scientific discovery may unsettle a static civilization by introducing new factors of fundamental importance, such as the invention of printing or gunpowder, of the steam engine or the cotton gin, or the use of electricity as power. Rapid transportation and the telegraph to-day bring human civilizations into contact as never before. The scholarship and science of any part of the world readily become the common heritage of all scholars. Inventions and manufactures pass freely into all parts of the earth; western civilization forces itself upon the attention of the East, which tries in vain to close its doors against such unsettling influences. In consequence, old-fashioned economic systems have to undergo revisions; governments of the autocratic or monarchic type are rejected in favor of democratic, constitutional forms of government; systems of education become antiquated within a generation; time-honored religious dogmas and symbols lose their hold on human imagination; and the sciences become inductive in

⁵During the centuries immediately following the Hegira of Mohammed, 622 A.D.

⁶Since 1868.

their methods and cheerfully modify their teachings on fair proof of error.

Unquestionably as the result of the world war such dynamic conditions, accompanied by other wars and revolutions, will prevail far into this century, but little by little, here and there, conflicting interests will harmonize; new generations will arise not versed in old traditions and accustomed to the new; intense radicalism and ultra-conservatism will both die away; the conventional once more will have importance, and progress will be at its ebb until new discoveries, new changes in conditions will once again bring in a flood tide of civilization with dynamic changes in social institutions. As long as physical and economic changes allow a larger development in dormant capacity, and by competition bring about an elimination of the weaker or falser elements of civilization, progress is assured, and humanity will move forward from achievement to achievement toward the goal of a more perfect civilization. Should, however, in any part of the earth the reverse prove true, civilization would there slowly deteriorate, that nation would fall, having had its day, and worthier rivals would take its place.

National Progress.—Nations rise and fall, not in proportion to years but rather as they understand or fail to understand the conditions of survival and of national achievement. A nation as a whole, through knowledge, should understand so well the conditions of progress, that instead of a genetic development, with its ebb tides and floods, its times of transition and doubt, it may be able to work out progress with forethought and scientific precision. It should have in mind a clear perception of national ideals and possibilities, a clear knowledge of the

best methods of attaining such ends, and by adopting a careful and methodical policy it should move steadily towards the attainment of its purposes, just as a captain guides his vessel across the Atlantic. The science of sociology is convinced that such a telic policy is even now feasible, and aims to show the way, so that man may come into his inheritance by becoming in large measure the arbiter of his own destiny on earth.

The Material as a Basis for the Cultural.—If it be true that cultural civilization depends for its growth on material civilization, it is an added argument why society should pay especial attention to the development of an excellent economic system based on science and invention. The truth of this theory is perhaps not immediately obvious, especially to those who have been taught to look with contempt on economic struggle, or to those whose ideal is one of "plain living and high thinking." The doctrine of the simple life is an individualistic teaching, inapplicable to society as a whole. The Emersons and Thoreaus, the Tolstoys and Wagners may develop culturally under this régime, stimulated as they are by the intense and complex civilization around them. But if these philosophers were to persuade all men to live the simple life and to neglect economic achievement, the culture of the group would inevitably become as simple as the contents of their larders.

For, if a social group is living under low economic conditions, vigorous bodily and mental capacity become well-nigh impossible. A half-starved body necessitates a mind concentrated solely on food getting. Culture and the higher life have no large part in such civilization. Spiritual and æsthetic joys and high moral standards have no meaning to a group whose only ambition is to satisfy

the cravings of hunger and to rest from unremitting toil. This is as true in high civilization as in lowest civilization, since even there the élite are counterbalanced by the "submerged tenth" and by the other two-tenths that are in constant danger of pauperism. These low economic groups are practically determined by their inevitably degraded social environment, and, as a class, cannot under such conditions by any possibility develop high culture or mental capacity.

If, however, the rigors of the situation are somewhat mitigated, so that there are occasional periods of abundant food supply and stimulating economic conditions, the group as a whole, and especially the superior individuals within it, released from the strain of the struggle for daily food, can, with the expansion of dormant capacities, make cultural achievements. If, as another illustration, the group becomes a leisure class, released from the strain of economic competition and able largely to determine its own social environment, obviously the probability of cultural and psychical development will increase proportionately. Although many, unquestionably would sink under such conditions into degradation through idleness and dissipation, others would make use of their opportunity to devote their energies to cultural achievement. On the other hand, if a leisure class through war or other disaster sank back in the economic scale to the extreme of penury, with no hope of recovery, a generation or two would see the loss of its high attainment, and a return to the groveling standards of the rudest group life.

One may, therefore, assert that a group subjected to a wretched physical environment is determined by it and has no possibility, under the conditions, of developing

either higher economic or cultural civilization. If, however, physical environment improves, the bettered condition of the group allows the possibility of economic and cultural achievement. Favorable physical conditions and development in economic and cultural capacity would give probability of increasingly higher economic and cultural development, so that the plane of civilization rises as the planes of physical, economic, and cultural conditions rise.

The Relation of the Group to the Individual.—It must, of course, be kept in mind that these statements apply to groups as such, not to every individual in them. A depressed group will have a low cultural attainment, even though, through variation in heredity or accidental education opportunities, there be an occasional individual who rises above the attainment of the group. So likewise a leisure class has opportunity to develop high culture, although individuals of it neglect the opportunities afforded them, and fall in attainment far below the exceptional individuals from the lowest classes. The failure of a person to take advantage of his opportunities for cultural attainment may be due to a lack of a family tradition of culture, to the depressing influence of vulgar or depraved companionship, or to the ease of satisfying bodily appetites compared with the difficulty of cultivating and gratifying higher emotions. The physical is suited to natural instinct, the cultural is the product of idealism and intellectual choice, hence in culture as in cultural religion "many are called but few are chosen." Or, again, individuals within a group may devote themselves so vigorously to the amassing of wealth that so far from gaining culture, they may lose what little cultural attainment they possessed. Nevertheless, their economic

achievements still remain in the possession of the community; their legatees or society as a whole reap the benefit of their labors; and somewhere at least there is the enjoyment of higher culture through their exertions.

Class Distinctions in Culture.—The theory, furthermore, does not assert that if national economic conditions are favorable, cultural civilization for the entire national group is inevitable. It merely asserts that national conditions will be favorable for cultural development. If, however, the national group is divided into castes or classes, one of which monopolizes the advantages derived from favorable economic conditions, that class has the opportunity for cultural development, but not the others. Each sharply defined class or caste tends to develop its own degree of cultural attainment, whether this be high or low. If caste distinctions are maintained by law and custom, each class will retain its own culture without mixture. If, however, there is no such separation, and the classes meet in some of the relationships of social life, there will be a superficial mingling of cultures, which, however, will never be complete as long as economic differences remain. Thus, house servants or slaves readily absorb by social imitation some of the culture and manners of their masters, and these in their turn, cared for as children by their social inferiors, imbibe coarser traits. In some such manner the courtesy of mediæval chivalry passed to Romance peasantry, as may still be seen in the natural politeness and dignity of the lower economic classes in Latin Europe.

The Growth of Talent and Genius.—On the other hand, it should not be assumed that all the members of a group are necessarily on a par. It goes without saying that some are more talented than others. In any group

there will be geniuses and men of capacity, and others again who are ordinary or even below the average in mentality. The laws of heredity are not yet so clearly understood as to enable society to declare dogmatically in what part of its membership genius and talent may be expected to develop. That knowledge may possibly come through biological and psychological investigations in later generations. Meanwhile it is safe to assume that greatness under proper conditions may be expected from the lower as well as from the higher social classes. Society must, therefore, see to it that the benefits resulting from economic achievement be as widely distributed as possible. Under genetic civilization they readily become the monopoly of a few, but under telic civilization society would make this impossible. The genius of great financiers, merchants, manufacturers, and the managers of large systems of transportation has never been adequately recognized by society, which has been too prone to pay to the warrior or the priest the homage really due to the financier and the merchant who made possible the success of the others.⁷ These achievers in the economic world, with all their shortcomings, represent a factor in society with claims comparable to those of scientific invention or industrial skill. Their reward, however, should not be in a permission to monopolize the profits of industry, but in well-earned dignities and honors such as only society can give. The benefits from their financial exertions, which would be fruitless without the coöperation of their employees and of civic agencies, should be shared alike by all according to the social utility of each. Society, on the basis of its natural resources, needs as a

⁷Note the interesting series by Elbert Hubbard for 1909, entitled *Little Journeys to the Homes of Great Business Men*.

foundation on which to erect the edifice of cultural civilization, the combined capacities of worker, manager, scientist, and inventor. Given these, wisely fostered, carefully regulated and safeguarded, as necessity demands, there need be no further anxiety in respect to cultural civilization, for it would develop easily and rapidly.

Social Importance of Cultural Civilization.—What then is the social problem in respect to cultural civilization? The answer can perhaps be more readily seen if one has clearly in mind just what is implied by the phrase cultural civilization. This has already been explained as the sum total of all society's religious, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual achievements. But these achievements are not tangible, material things, but are felt, desired, sought for, and perceived by minds arising from a delicately organized nervous system and a physical brain strongly convoluted and strengthened by centuries of ancestral thinking. Plainly society cannot make such organisms, as it might order a cannon or a ship. All that can be done is, on the assumption that its racial stock contains such quality, to arrange the conditions of life so that that kind of brain may have an opportunity for training and expression. If one assumes the truth of the Platonic idea that such capacity is not restricted to the privileged classes only, but is latent among the mass of the population and may be developed under proper conditions, then evidently society should endeavor to ascertain who are those in its population that have capacity and talent for moral, æsthetic, and intellectual attainment.

Social Demand for Talent and Genius.—There are especial reasons why this should be done. In the first place economic attainment is itself dependent on the de-

velopment of a certain amount of culture. Honesty and moral uprightness are essential to business success, but the keenness of economic competition naturally tends to lower moral standards, and there is need always of an infusion of higher morality from the cultural world, so as to keep economic attainment on a high grade. The farsighted manager sees that competition is best met by honesty, supplemented by an infinite attention to the elimination of waste, the perfection of organization, the utilization of labor-saving inventions, and a body of employees who work because of the interest they have in the business and not merely for wages. No nation can maintain supremacy in the economic world until high morals dominate its economic life. The trickery and double dealing so common in petty business becomes unprofitable in a larger industrial sphere. There is needed in economic life an appreciation of the artistic if only to enlarge the demand for finer grades of goods. The words *cheap* and *ugly* are almost synonymous, and what they stand for belongs to a low economic order. Economic achievements themselves readily become artistic, for there is a close relationship between the brain that can invent a machine and that which can fashion a statue. In the same way an economic civilization can never attain its height unless the scientist and the philosopher coöperate. The head of a great business must have vision, he must be a prophet, a scientist, and a philosopher by intuition; he must foresee the conditions of the market, accurately judge human motives and character, comprehend the significance of inventions and scientific discoveries; and he must view the parts of his establishment as a whole and in its relations to other departments of economic activity. As its economic life broadens, there-

fore, a country must develop culture and cultural education, and must use in its business the most capable men turned out by the colleges, by offering such men the stimulus of high pecuniary reward and an opportunity to feel that they are making a contribution to national progress.

Need of Cultural Ideals.—There is another reason why society must assist to birth cultural civilization. The most serious handicaps to social development arise from poor physique and low ideals. The sin, vice, and misery of life are, aside from physical causes, due to the defectiveness and insufficiency of cultural teaching and idealism. The stimulus that may come to a life through the inspiration of a great moral or religious idea, or a love for the beautiful in form, color, or sound has a refining influence that makes one abhor the vulgarity of vice. A knowledge of scientific truth is one of the most powerful agencies for the promotion of morality. The necessity of law, and the inevitable consequences that follow a violation of it, teach morality as no text-book can; and he who can rightly philosophize may make blunders in his life to be sure, but has an inspiration that lifts him above the primitive vices, enabling him to live a life of honor and nobility. Finally, society should favor cultural development, because only thereby can man enjoy happiness. After all, happiness is the aim of life as philosophy is the guide of it. In primitive savagery eating and mating made up the joy of existence. Then came the delights of warring and of besting one's opponent in economic competition. But as men pass into higher civilization, these pleasures pale into insignificance before the joy derived from the higher emotions and intellectual aspirations. Physical and competitive joys find their

proper place in life, but a society, whose members can appreciate the beauty of a moral, artistic, or scientific ideal, has within itself a happiness that will inspire the physical and the economic also, and make even monotonous work a pleasure. Cultural civilization springs from the material, and in return it becomes its most stalwart supporter, inspiring a more abundant economic life in society.

CHAPTER XII

CIVILIZATION STATIC AND DYNAMIC

Static and Dynamic Defined.—Although Comte coined the word "sociology," yet at first, and frequently afterwards, he preferred the term "social physics," subdividing this into *static* and *dynamic*. Lacking as he did modern knowledge of the newer biology, developed later under Darwinian and evolutionary impulses, his explanation of the distinction between static and dynamic has been modified to some extent. Under the former term from the modern standpoint properly should be included (1) studies of social structure, the social order or organization, including, therefore, the mechanism or forms of all social associations or institutions; and (2) the functional activities of the "social organism," performed through the agency of the social structure or social institutions. The notion *static*, therefore, corresponds to the similar biological studies of structure and function and includes consequently the study of "social anatomy" and "social physiology."

Now as long as social development is mere growth or mere multiplication within a given type such development is static. *Dynamic* properly implies changes in the type of structure and function, through the processes of adaptation to variations in conditions or in social environment. This would be true even though such adaptation was to an inferior social environment, for dynamic may

be backwards as well as forwards, but as a rule questions of human progress are under discussion, so that for the most part dynamic sociology would emphasize adaptation making for improvement.

Static Civilization.—In a group the desires of individuals are never exactly the same. Individuals differ in the number and in the intensity of their desires and in the inhibitions or the stimuli associated with these. But, when they come together for general purposes, a *modus vivendi* must arise. They must consciously or unconsciously agree on the joint desire of the group, sinking their individual differences, so as to work unitedly in common activities through a common mechanism. In other words, the individual desires are equilibrated, adjusted to conditions, and perform work with a minimum of friction. As long as conditions and the social desires working through the institution are stable the social institution itself remains unchanged, it is static and its activity becomes customary. As a matter of fact there is no such thing in social life as complete stability, all things are in flux, moving one way or the other, however slow may be the movement, but the approximations to stability are at times near enough for all practical purposes, so that one may speak of static social institutions. Thus, in a primitive horde individual food appetites and capacities for obtaining foods may vary widely, according to age or sex, but by agreement and custom all who are capable secure a common food supply and it is apportioned by rule, whether the amount of food be large or small. In this manner the food demand of the group is met, although no one individual may feel fully satisfied with respect to his own appetite.

Dynamic Changes.—On the other hand, suppose

there is a change in conditions, possibly through a too rapid increase of population in proportion to food supplies. Obviously the static institution developed for the earlier condition must change or the group will perish from slow starvation. The food appetite may unwillingly have to adapt itself to a vegetable diet in place of the flesh preferred. The members of the hunting band may have to devote themselves to war and forage in hostile territories, or the group may devote itself to the raising of flocks and herds, or to agriculture. But this would imply a readjustment of the mechanism and the rules and customs of the former system. These changes would not be made in a day, years or generations may elapse before the institution is fully readjusted, but in due time the elders in their traditions would record that far back in the memory of their tribe, their ancestors had migrated, or become predatory, or had developed the arts of domestication of animals, or had devoted themselves to agriculture, and henceforth passed from nomadic existence to the settled life of the village.

This illustration, based on a change in food supplies, shows also how closely other social institutions are dependent on the fundamental institution of food-getting. For, a horde dependent on the hunt for its foods necessarily is restricted in membership, since nature spontaneously does not furnish in a given locality a continuous food supply for a large population. But through domestication or agriculture, a much larger population can be supported on a given area, so that a fertile plain or valley may support a dense population, as against the scattered hordes of a hunting stage. But a dense population necessarily must have fixed abodes, permanent homes, well defined communal property rights, and a more defi-

nite organization for government and for defensive war. All this involves other economic changes, for specialized vocations arise; artisans, perhaps serfs and slaves, and a leisure class of chiefs charged with the responsibility of leadership and freed from the daily toil of industrial vocations. The rights of individuals or of families must be defined in the sharing of the product of the flock and herd and in the use of land for purposes of food, fuel, and grazing. The family organization itself must be readjusted, for the loose relationship of the horde becomes impossible. Kinship bonds must be carefully defined, so as to trace descent and prevent incest; the respective rights of male and female in the family group must be settled, since they must live together amicably in daily contact in a family abode; and the "blood bond" must be emphasized as an additional reason why clan and tribal unity should be maintained as a guaranty of group safety. Even religion must change, for whereas in nomadic life their gods, friendly or hostile, were those suited to a wandering and precarious existence, in the settled life of the village the gods became adjusted to the new environment, they become better known, their powers for good or evil are carefully estimated, set methods of sacrifice, propitiation, and worship are devised and the whole system entrusted to definite persons charged with the responsibility of maintaining friendly relations with the gods.

Contrasts Between Static and Dynamic.—From these and other illustrations readily occurring to the mind on reflection, it becomes obvious that social institutions may be studied dynamically as well as statically. A static institution implies a balance secured by the adjustment of social desire to environing conditions. If the

adjustment is disturbed, however slightly, readjustments must be made, though of course these may be well-nigh imperceptible if the change in desire, or condition, or both is comparatively slight. Still, the fact that readjustments are taking place renders the situation dynamic rather than static. For convenience, however, if the changes generation by generation are barely perceptible the civilization may be called static, although, as already said, a really stationary condition never exists in fact. On the other hand if the changes are important, deeply affecting the food-getting or economic condition, then the recognized interrelationship of all other social institutions with the economic implies that important and fundamental modifications will take place in them also. But, when readjustments are complete, if they do become complete, status prevails once more and civilization moves on smoothly in its accustomed grooves.

In static civilization the voice of the past speaks with authority. The law of the land is in theory permanent and immutable and the customs are ancient and long-standing, tracing back to a "time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." The gods are well-known and for the most part friendly, their desires and methods of action are familiar to their worshipers, and religious traditions are accepted without hesitation no matter how absurd they may be in fact, for heresy and innovations are crimes and free thought is impiety. Every man at birth settles into the niche inherited from his fathers, like a cog in a machine he performs his allotted task throughout life without thought of rebellion, and at death joins his ancestors in their family tomb. In such systems we have the reign of custom, tradition, and fixed beliefs and of set standards in law and morals.

The social status of the individual is determined by the accident of his birth, so that fixed classes or castes with hereditary leadership become inevitable. Social control emanates from the ruling class and the principle of imitation is in full swing, the lower imitating the higher, so far as convention allows. There is a certainty and exactitude in static life wonderfully satisfying to the average man, who dreads the unknown and hates the necessity of new decisions. As Bagehot put it, "One of the greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea." This, however, is not an anomaly but natural for nature, on the whole, changes by processes infinitesimally slow, so that the natural man is inherently conservative and, animal-like, prefers the well-trodden paths of bygone generations.

For such reasons in sociological discussions the analytic and static aspects of sociology have been studied far more than the synthetic, dynamic aspects. This was necessarily so when sociology was under the influence of the newer biology, for the structural and the functional play so large a part in biologic studies that they easily assumed similar importance in social studies, to the neglect of the social energies pulsating through society. Yet, after all, in the long run social movement is the really fundamental aspect of sociology and should receive the attention really due it, even though one must admit that the static aspect of life with its round of daily food, sleep, and petty duties is all absorbing to the masses of mankind. But as already indicated, this sort of thing is suited best to a petty stage and a narrow environment, for with the broadening of human contact and social environment social groups must become flexible and adaptable. If they lack the capacity to adapt themselves to new

conditions and cease to be in harmony with their environment they run the risk of rejection and elimination. Just as in the Darwinian struggle of individuals for survival, the number eliminated in the struggle is far in excess of the number of survivors, so in the social struggle the elimination of the socially unfit is a most important factor in the process of survival.

Mutual Aid.—A social group, to be sure, modifies to some extent the competitive struggle among its members. There is "mutual aid"¹ within the group, so that under favoring conditions, the weak, the sickly, and the aged may survive much longer than normally would be the case. Yet the maintenance of the weak is to some degree an economic handicap on the group, what gain there is comes through the growth of kindly sympathy and altruistic activity. But, when conditions are adverse, there is a limit beyond which support cannot be given, so that in times of stress, such as those occasioned by famine, pestilence, and war, there is a tendency to revert to former conditions, so as to ensure if possible the survival of the group by the sacrifice of children and weaklings. Civilization, extending even to present times for a large part of humanity, has never been able to cope adequately with famine and pestilence, and since war has been chronic for thousands of years there has been a continuous elimination of those groups that in competition with other groups proved to be inferior, whether in bravery, energy, or achievement. Extermination, slavery, or serfdom became their lot, so that opportunity for advancement was no longer theirs. On the other hand, conquering groups had to maintain their leadership by continued attainment or else they also in turn became

¹ See Kropotkin, in Bibliography.

the conquered and lost the initiative in the struggle for existence.

Periods of Transition.—It must be obvious that in a dynamic civilization like that of the Twentieth Century, important changes in conditions may come rapidly, together, or one after the other, in which case the process of readjustment becomes exceedingly complex, as illustrated by the wave circles of a pond whose surface is disturbed by numerous stones thrown in at intervals and in different parts of the surface. At such a period all institutions seem to be unsettled, nothing remains fixed or stable, ancient traditions, beliefs, and customs are discredited, yet at the same time the new is looked on with suspicion. These are always danger periods for social groups and nations, since each, through inability to get its bearings, may reach wrong conclusions and lose opportunity for progress. Yet if wise leadership comes to the front, and public opinion is plastic and intelligent, the crisis passes, new standards are attained, the old becomes adjusted to the new, and the next generation inherits the tradition and custom of the readjustment and feels at home under the reorganized institutions of social life.

The implications from this explanation are presumably clear. The student of social institutions must carefully observe the changing environing conditions of society, the group, or the nation; he must seek to see how social forces should be readjusted through the education of public opinion, so as to suit the newer conditions; and he should seek to understand the processes of the changes taking place in social activities, so as to aid in the modification of the mechanism through which social activity works. Obviously also he should never expect that the

resultant of changes will be a return to *status quo*. He should "let the dead past bury its dead," and in Socratic illustration he should like a midwife assist to bring to its birth the newer age that rightly follows dynamic changes. In the great world war, for example, as each nation entered the conflict, rapid readjustments had to be made in its conditions, its attitude of mind, and its mechanism for war and food-getting activities. The more wise the readjustment, the more vigorous and telling the activity, but obviously the final readjustment, with returning peace, cannot be a return to *ante bellum* conditions, since each, and the world as a whole, has to readjust itself to the handicaps and losses inevitable from such a crisis in world history and to formulate new international policies, according as victory or defeat was its portion.

Economic Basis of Changes.—In the illustrations given, stress has been placed on economic changes as determinant of changing social institutions. As the fundamental social institution on which the others finally depend this stress on economic relationship has its justification. Every important change in the process of securing foods or wealth, will inevitably effect corresponding changes in the other institutions, and to that extent there is truth in the teaching in respect to the economic interpretation of history. If, therefore, there are economic changes that are plainly improvements over the older system, such, for example, as developments of new supplies of foods, as when animals were domesticated or the art of agriculture acquired, or new inventions like the machinery of modern farming operations, the adoption and general use of these newer economic devices should correspondingly cause improvement in other social institutions; for larger food supplies, newer supplies

of metals, the inventions and discoveries of science, all should have the effect of removing the society benefiting by them farther from a "pain economy," towards greater comfort of life, a larger period of leisure, and, through better conditions of living, a greater supply of physical, mental, and social energy, which may be directed towards achievements in morals and the fine arts and in science and philosophy. Every vigorous increase, therefore, in a nation's food supply or in its wealth should automatically and spontaneously result in an increase of cultural activities and a movement towards a "pleasure economy." On the other hand, a worsening of economic conditions would correspondingly depress the standards of the other social institutions, so often illustrated in the "decay of nations" after repeated defeats in war.

Other Factors in Change.—It would, however, be wrong to assume, as has been done at times, that economic conditions *absolutely* determine social life. They tend to determine it, and do unquestionably powerfully modify it, but there are some limitations that need to be kept in mind. The economic benefits of changes, for example, may be monopolized by a small per cent of the population, a nobility or a capitalistic class, as under the *laissez-faire* régime of England in the Nineteenth Century. The very advantages these acquire may be used to depress economically the masses of the population, so that the average condition of the group may be worse than before. A homely illustration of this may often be observed in farming communities, where a farmer's profits are not always expended in adding to the comfort and happiness of the family, but are used to make additional purchases of land involving additional burdens. Obviously, therefore, a social group or a nation should see to it that the economic

benefits of new inventions or discoveries are not monopolized by the few but are shared by all. This, however, involves many difficulties. The possessors of power naturally secure additional power if possible and are not inclined to share it altruistically with the less powerful part of the population. Social institutions are rigid, hard to change, and hence they do not readily respond to newer conditions. Then too there is rarely enough intelligence to *see* the newer demands and social energy sufficiently to insist on readjustments in an equitable manner. Thus, in any period of economic change, it is not sufficient to note the change itself, but one must also take into account the ambitions of the few; the inertia and ignorance of the many; the rigidity of custom, tradition, belief, and social institution; and the difficulty of getting an intelligent public opinion aroused early enough to insist on a fair method of social adjustment. A benevolent despot might do it of his own accord or an altruistic nobility or capitalist class, but it is far safer to assume that despots are rarely benevolent and privileged classes never altruistic. In the long run, general intelligence in all classes and in both sexes is the only real basis for an attempt to socialize the achievements of an energetic civilization.

Human Inherent Capacities.—The historic social struggle of groups, races, and nations shows clearly how a static changes to a dynamic civilization and also what factors are likely to determine progress. By heredity every man, and consequently every social group, has inherently innumerable capacities for development awaiting opportunity for expression. Whenever, therefore, the environment, physical or social, proves stimulating to what may be called socially progressive capacities, there should come a development that will result in social move-

ment or progress. In biological theory the most primitive savage had in him latent potentialities that in due time through variation, mutation, and selection will culminate in the highly civilized man of the dim distant future. If in any given social group those in social control were wisely intelligent enough to surround the rising generation with a social environment best suited to its capacities, there would come a development of talent and energy ample to push higher the standards of that civilization. Unfortunately, in human history the wise were either not in control, or if in control they lacked the conditions necessary for efficient guidance, so that human society had still to await the time when progress may be made systematically.

If progress, however, could not formerly come through foresight it is possible to make a slower progress by "hindsight," though with many a backward slip and with ebbs as well as flows. This involves a reliance on experience, personal or social. Our familiar saying, "Experience is the best teacher," or "history teaches that . . ." illustrate the idea. Of course, past experience is chiefly a series of blunders, false beliefs, and opinions, but the presumption is that one may impartially survey the past and decide what should have been the right path in the maze of aimless wandering. Obviously the decision is usually a guess, more likely to be wrong than right, and in any case a policy that would have been right under former conditions is not necessarily a correct one under different conditions. As things have been in civilization past experience was practically all there was for social guidance, supplemented by occasional supposed revelations from the gods through prophets and seers who had developed to some extent the telic faculty of foresight.

Four Factors in Progress.—When, however, in these more modern times we look back over human history and view it in the light of modern theories of social progress, it becomes possible to see the processes at work that have resulted in progress and these will briefly be explained under the four following headings: amalgamation, assimilation, comprehension of nature, and opportunity.

Amalgamation.—By amalgamation is meant the intermarriage of different kindred stocks and racial groups, resulting in a synthetic group, which includes in its heredity the varying character of the parents. One of the oldest of known tabus or prohibitions is that against incest. Even among the Australian blacks there were many precautions, through the establishment of marriage-totems, against the intermarriage of those closely related. Biologically, close inbreeding under uniform conditions of environment tends to weakness and incapacity. This truth was discovered to some extent through social experience, so that the group sought to prevent the marriage of near kin. At times it went farther and by stress on exogamy put a premium on intermarriage outside of the group, a system greatly aided by capture and purchase marriages. Intermarriage between members of the same stock living under widely differing environment seems to be not open to the same objection, for the reason that different potentialities are called out by differing environments. Aside from the closest inbreeding some maintain that the incest tabu is chiefly social, not biological, being developed so as to secure neutrality between the sexes within the home circle. At any rate, few doubt the advisability of *out-breeding*, provided the parents are not too dissimilar in heredity and social attainment. Intermarriage between

those closely alike in heredity and attainment tends to static conditions; variation in stock, if not too unlike, gives the promise of a larger variation in the offspring, and hence a greater capacity for progress under a favoring environment.

One of the great agencies, therefore, in the progress of society is the intermingling of stocks and races through war and migration. Formerly a migrating group was an armed band seeking to win new homes by the sword from those in possession. If successful, after a partial extermination of the conquered, there followed amalgamation. If defeated, the conquered survivors, as war captives, in time mingled their blood with their conquerors. This process has been going on for thousands of years, so that existing nations are in no case "pure" in blood, but represent innumerable amalgamations brought about through war. Gumplowicz, followed by Ward,² has shown how social progress has come from this struggle of races and from the blending into a compound race of the potential capacities of myriads of widely differing stocks. In modern days, peaceful migration is often encouraged by newer nations in need of a larger population. Though immigrants for a time may live segregated from the native-born stock, yet in due time amalgamation begins and in the long run they are absorbed into the national population, which henceforth includes in its hereditary characters the contributions made by its composite stocks.

Assimilation.—Assimilation is in essence exactly the same as that discussed under amalgamation, except that the "intermarriage" is between varying types, differentiations of cultures, or civilizations. Naturally amalga-

² *Pure Sociology*, Chap. X.

tion is followed by assimilation, but assimilation may take place without amalgamation. Civilization is used as a comprehensive term including the social institutions with their achievements, customs, traditions, beliefs, and knowledge. Each specialized group has a civilization more or less variant from those of its near or more distant neighbors. When exogamous amalgamation takes place the differing civilizations held by the male and female slowly blend and the resultant passes on to the newer generation by imitation. The resultant, of course, is not the sum total of the blending civilizations. Part is eliminated altogether, part survives in modified form, and again there are "survivals" from each of the uniting civilizations, though in fact these also will gradually disappear. Illustrations of this last sort are common enough, like the many survivals of heathen custom and festival in modern Christianity, or the survival of idioms or quaint pronunciations in local dialect.

It is, however, not necessary that amalgamation take place in order that there be assimilation. Commerce, travel, and the products of the printing press are powerful factors in bringing into contact differing civilizations. Each type, in so far as it differs, is a series of suggestions to the others, and if the one is suggestible through mental flexibility and intelligence, there is an absorption of what seems useful or attractive in the others. Differing so widely as civilizations do to-day, an intelligent capable nation can vigorously accelerate its progress by noting achievements of others, not possessed by itself, and appropriating these for its own purposes, with suitable modifications. It is easy to see that this method of assimilation is destined to be an increasingly powerful factor in higher civilization. For it virtually implies that

progress is more likely to be made in a social world made up of nations of differing civilizations, yet in touch one with the other through friendly intercourse, than through a dominant nation bent on forcing its type of *Kultur* on other nations, through the old-fashioned methods of terrorism and the sword. As illustrations of such methods of the interchange of culture may be noted the exchange among the nations of the knowledge of scientific discoveries, inventions, and mechanisms of all sorts. The daily Commerce Reports issued by the U. S. Department of Commerce aim to give concise statements of new discoveries and valuable achievements made in any part of the civilized world. In the fields of literature, art, and philosophy also ideas are constantly passing over national boundaries, all tending towards the slow assimilation of differing civilizations as the nations are brought together in peaceful intercourse.

Comprehension of Nature.—The thought underlying the familiar term "conquest of nature" might better be expressed as comprehension of nature, for there is no notion of a vindictive struggle between two opponents, but rather the recognition of the fact that nature rightly comprehended is man's best friend and counselor. An animal's attitude toward nature is that of passivity and fatalism, because it fails to comprehend the law in nature. As best it can it instinctively conforms to nature's ways and demands, but never dreams of altering the conditions of its life. Primitive man in his early stages was also animal, but, having larger brain capacity and a more complex nervous system, he was beginning to have fleeting thoughts of the why and the how of things. In later centuries problems of whence and whither also occupied his mind but these led largely to philosophic and

scientific speculation, rather than directly to the comprehension of nature. As the centuries passed, he slowly began to see that the nature by which he was surrounded was in part comprehensible and that in proportion as he understood it he might through his knowledge multiply his foods, ward off his enemies, and attain a leisure that would enable him to banish misery from his life to some extent and enjoy happiness. Slowly he began to learn how to manipulate wood, stone, and metals, so as to secure tools and weapons; to understand the mysteries of plant life, so as to select useful vegetation and multiply it through cultivation; to select docile animals and to train them as beasts of burden or to serve as food supplies. Little by little he learned the secret of utilizing flowing water, moving air, or the force of gravitation and the blessings of fire and artificial light. The mysteries environing sex, birth, old age, and death occupied his attention, and each addition to his knowledge gave him larger power of achievement in the strengthening of social institutions. The ills of the body, whether from wounds or sickness, aroused his interest, and the arts of surgery and medicine developed in consequence.

In the same manner the phenomena of the heavenly bodies and of the earth's atmosphere, the workings of his own mind, and the supernatural beings who peopled the unknown world he believed in—all these he thought about and sought to comprehend. In these days we accept as an article of scientific faith the teaching that all nature, physical, physiological, psychic, and social is in theory comprehensible, that its actions are reducible to law and principle, so that human progress is not a thing that comes by wish or by fiat, but comes *pari passu* with our comprehension of nature and its methods. This is really what

is meant by the all embracing term "science." It means that men must know in order to live happily, that they must *see* in order to *foresee*. Science is not merely the knowledge of astronomy, of physics, and of chemistry; it is also the knowledge of the laws of life, botanical, zoölogical, human; it includes a comprehension of psychic and social life, their activities and their possibilities; and if there be a supernatural life and supernatural beings, it must ultimately be able to explain the relationships of these with man and to show his place in the universe. Such comprehensive knowledge is not merely for the whiling away of idle leisure, but rather is the basis on which man may remake his world for human purposes, so far as that can be done, so that avoidable misery, sin, and degradation may disappear with the passing of ignorance, and human happiness be multiplied by telic applications of known principles in the natural sciences, as well as in psychology and sociology.

From the foregoing the relationship between the comprehension of nature and social progress can readily be seen. The comprehension of nature implies effort, hard study, and the expenditure of energy both physical and mental. Applications of such knowledge imply social coöperation, intelligence, and the telic capacity to attain ends *indirectly*, through means often apparently remote from the end sought, yet necessary for the efficient attainment of purposes in mind. The results of efforts such as these are inventions, scientific discoveries, improvements in social institutions, and, broadly, those achievements in moral standards, in the fine arts, and in intellectual pursuits, that unitedly multiply the cultural or spiritual enjoyments of life so necessary in a really high civilization.

Suitable Opportunity.—Under the three preceding headings attention has been given to the progress that may come through the multiplication of inherent potential capacities, through amalgamation, and the development of these through the assimilation of differing civilizations and through the achievements accomplished by consequence of efforts expended in many-sided attempts to comprehend nature. Arising from and dependent on these three there is a fourth process that in a sense is the capstone in the theory of social progress. Through amalgamation and the law of survival a modern human generation is born with a wonderfully complex mass of potential capacities. Many infants, of course, by heredity are born physical weaklings or are doomed to idiocy, feeble-mindedness, or some other form of mental defectiveness, but these relatively are few in number. The great mass of mankind are born normal, or with such slight abnormalities that they are relatively of small importance. Moreover, as an offset to the defectives there are always many who have in them potential talent and genius, and the possible achievements of these far outweigh the handicap placed on society by the presence of persons of inferior heredity. Given, therefore, the great mass of human kind, as things are, from among these a relatively few may be brought into contact with a stimulating social environment which would incite effort leading on to achievement. Through contact and effort these few take part in the progress of their time and their achievements may slowly permeate the whole mass through social imitation.

It is easy under such conditions to assume that all that can be attained has been attained, and hence that social progress cannot be "speeded up." Yet it is

certain that if the opportunity of contact with higher standards had been presented alike to all members of the social group and not merely to the favored few, the potential capacities latent in the masses of men would in most cases have sprung into development through the stimulation of suggestion and inevitably there would be a rapid multiplication of effort, if wisely directed, in the direction of useful and constructive achievement. At present, even in the best of national groups, only a slight proportion of the population have anything like a real opportunity, through social environment and education, to develop their potential capacities except in a mediocre way, and hence they have no possibility of achieving, and the nation consequently loses the benefit of the achievements they should have made. Rightly environed and trained, every normal human being, male or female, might double or treble his achieving capacity and thereby add to the sum total of possible human happiness. The fourth process, therefore, in social progress is the systematic multiplication of opportunity for the rising generation through cultural surroundings, leisure, freedom from economic worry, and the stimulation of education, so that body and mind and social nature may expand to the standards and ideals of the social environment and become fitted thereby in turn to add their contributions to the achievements necessary for social progress.

Thus, a family ambitious for high standards must pay attention to these four principles. It must study the inherent quality of those in the family and of those who desire to enter the family by marriage. It must, also, seek to come in contact with the best possible social environment, must altruistically make its contribution to the general welfare, and must see to it that its younger

members be given every opportunity to develop their capacities and to test their powers in competition with capable rivals in achievement. In the same manner, but on a larger scale, a nation must carefully study the racial quality of would-be immigrants, must seek to multiply national and international contacts of a high order, must aim to encourage invention and achievement by proper legislation and education, and must telicly endeavor to eliminate from the social environment of the rising generation whatever depresses and degrades. Constructively it must formulate policies, so as to multiply opportunities for the expression of these in achievement. This is the so-called gospel of social opportunity and in combination with the three other processes discussed it is the surest guaranty of social progress.

CHAPTER XIII

THE CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Unity of Social Institutions.—Attention has already been called to the distinction between the civilization and the achievement of animals and of man. The animal, it will be remembered, accomplishes its results in the main automatically and instinctively; man, on the other hand, achieves through reason and for the accomplishment of a definite purpose in the mind. A similar distinction should be made between the instinctive feelings and interests of the animal and the reasoned basis for the achievements of the man. All the higher animals, including man, instinctively act under the stimulus of the primary feelings of hunger and love. The promptings of hunger and sexual appetite are imperious and must be satisfied at all hazards as long as they are mere instincts. But in man's case, at least, his intellect slowly develops as a factor in the situation, and becomes a guide to these primitive impulses. It checks and regulates, or even suppresses them as in voluntary fasting and celibacy, so as to accomplish other conflicting purposes suggested by the mind. Sociologically speaking, therefore, it is important to understand how the intellect of man has been able to guide and control these fundamental feelings, and how economic and domestic institutions have arisen and developed in the process. From these two primitive and fundamental human impulses or desires have probably

differentiated all the other human feelings and wants, and these in their turn have come under the guidance of the intellect, with the resultant development of appropriate social institutions. There is thus a bond of connection among social institutions, an interrelationship and a filiation, since all are derived from the two fundamental appetites and their corresponding institutions.

Social Parallelisms.—Social institutions as they develop seem to follow a definite sequence which varies with environing conditions and the stage of mentality attained by the group. If, for instance, men are similarly situated in respect to conditions of life and mental development, they will tend to develop similar institutions, even though the groups are separated by thousands of miles. Hence the anthropologist and the ethnologist find many parallelisms in customs, institutions, and traits of human character among races widely apart but similarly situated. This truth is one aspect of the so-called economic interpretation of history; one may assume that two races living under similar economic conditions for many generations will tend to develop the same kind of social institutions, for example, the same types of domestic, religious, and political organizations. The longer such conditions remain constant, the more closely the institutions will approximate toward common types. This principle, of course, will seem truer in simple civilization. The complexity of advanced civilization with its many contacts introduces wider variations and retains also survivals from earlier stages, preserved by custom.

Classifications of Social Institutions.—The unity of social institutions may be shown in many ways, and sociologists are not yet agreed as to which system of classification best indicates it; whether of social institutions, phe-

nomena, forces, or interests. For instance, all fundamental social institutions may be listed and arranged in some order, either that of historical development or of logical connection or of filiation; and then their secondary or derived institutions; and lastly, their related phenomena of a more temporary sort, not sufficiently integrated to be considered as institutional, may be similarly classified. Or again, social phenomena or activities may be arranged under appropriate headings and put in some definite order, as in the case of institutions. If psychological influences are strong, instead of fixing attention on institutions or phenomena, the fundamental social feelings or desires or the interests that may exist in the social mind as the result of reflection are listed and arranged in proper order.

In deciding on the number and relative importance of the fundamental forces or institutions listed, there are naturally variations and modifications due to the varying personalities of the several writers and their special modes of interpretation, but they all practically agree in showing the inherent unity of social institutions and the basal importance of those that grow out of attempts to satisfy physical wants and needs. This unity of the social organism and its evolution from the simple activities of primitive social organization are important sociological teachings and should be made clear, first by a brief statement of the meaning of the term social institution, and then by an exposition of the chief classifications employed by sociologists.

Meaning of the Term Social Institution.—It may be assumed that back of every individual or social action there is some dominant feeling, desire, or emotion, and that the actions unitedly make up the field of phenomena

of individual and social activities. These actions, of course, may be the result of conscious or of instinctive, unconscious desires in the human or social organism, and if these are permanent, there arise definite and orderly modes of activity. Thus, in primitive life the need for food stimulated men to activity in hunting, and by a rude sort of reasoning based on experience, hunting in combination was seen to be advantageous, since individuals working in combination can accomplish more than the sum of the accomplishments of individuals working singly. The customary methods of the hunt used by the hunting-band resulted in the formulation of definite rules and regulations of procedure. Hence in the growth of the institution of the hunting-band one may note (1) the need or longing for food, (2) reasoning as to the best methods of securing this and the formulation of regulations, (3) a definite organization, and then (4) the resultant activity.

Genetic Development.—Whenever, therefore, human groups are driven by permanent desires to united activity, there will regularly develop social institutions as a means and an aid to the satisfaction of their desires; these social institutions at first will develop almost automatically under the spur of necessity, but in later times they may develop under the guidance of the intellect, and thus become susceptible of constant modification, varying according to the reasoning capacity of the group. The structure of the institution may remain apparently fixed, but its parts and the energy underlying it may undergo many modifications under the pressure of dynamic civilization. Marriage and government, for instance, as social institutions, are among the earliest achievements of civilization, but in detail and spirit these institutions

present historically such wide variations as to seem at times almost like new creations. Yet in essence they are the same now as they were thousands of years ago; in the one case is involved a regulation of human sexual relations, in the other a regulation of human warfare and economic struggle.

The Economic Institution is Basal.—Social institutions can be studied also from the standpoint of their relations one to another. In any orderly arrangement the necessity of assuming the economic as the fundamental social institution is clear. Men must eat, and strenuous toil is necessary even yet for the mass of mankind to obtain sufficient food. Hence economic institutions are primary in social theorizing. Next to this in fundamental order is the sexual impulse or desire for mating. As civilization advanced, this natural feeling became subject to social regulation and developed the institutions typified by formal marriage and legal kinship. Human beings gradually became associated for the purpose of preserving and continuing life, in addition to the organization of the hunting-band and the family group, so that there came with growing intellectuality organizations for offense and defense—the beginnings of the state. And, about the same time religious organizations developed, primarily for the sake of protecting the members of the group against supernatural enemies and later for the purpose of cultivating friendly relations with the most kindly divinities. In connection with these four great institutions grew up a mass of custom and tradition aiming at group safety and representing the *morals* of the horde; this was passed on from generation to generation by social imitation, though formal instruction in the most important matters was given to the young.

These developments were in the era of "pain economy" and group energies were absorbed in considerations of safety, so that there automatically developed set ways and beliefs sanctioned by experience, departures from which, being dangerous, were forbidden under penalty of punishment, outlawry, or death. The preservation of custom and tradition in pure form being so important, the wisest and most capable men were intrusted with authority to safeguard, to interpret, and to hand these on by instruction to each newer generation. In this way developed leadership, in charge of economic and warring activities, of religious rites and ceremonies, of law and custom, and of beliefs and traditions.

Cultural Development.—Through formal methods of instruction, at the initiatory rites for the youth, for example, and through specialized training in the use of tools and weapons, education had its beginnings, supplemented by play as the connection link between vocation and education. Occasional leisure gave opportunity to gratify innate appreciation of color, form, rhythm, and sound through the early forms of drawing, painting, adornment, music, both vocal and instrumental, and the dance; thus the development of æsthetic feelings necessitated æsthetic institutions for perpetuating the standards of beauty and harmony recognized by the social group. What little philosophizing was done in those days was vain speculation about the problems of birth, life, and death and fanciful reasoning about the powers and phenomena of nature; it was veiled in legends and myths, and was chiefly identified with religious speculation. At a later period philosophy and rudimentary science were differentiated, developing their own methods apart from religious speculation. Thus, one may trace in early

civilization the slow rise and development of economic, domestic, political, religious, moral, educational, æsthetic, and intellectual institutions, with their numerous derived and secondary institutions, and so have in mind a picture of human development which can be of great assistance to a proper understanding of human history and thought.

Differentiation in the Study of Social Institutions.

—This very complexity of social phenomena, however, and the many-sided possibilities of varying emphasis make clear why in these days it has become impossible to study society as a unit. It is too complex and too highly differentiated to be included in one comprehensive study, so that inevitably there have developed movements in the direction of an analysis of society into its component parts, in order that by an intensive study of each of these, there might follow a synthesis of all into a basal science of society. This movement has taken various forms, all fundamentally occupied with the same problems, but stressing different points of view. Sociology itself has gained thereby, since, of course, a truer notion of society can be obtained from a synthesis of many viewpoints, rather than from one, however clear and exact it may be. Several of these points of view will now briefly be mentioned as illustrations of the field of social phenomena under discussion.

Comte's Teaching.—Comte thought of society as a "collective organism," functioning through individuals. Individuals, he assumed, are social by nature and naturally grouped into families, so that the family to him becomes the fundamental social unit, a family of a somewhat patriarchal type, in which women, though of a higher affective and spiritual capacity, were considered to be intel-

lectually subordinated to men. Society arises from the intellectual and moral grouping of families into a larger unity combined coöperatively for common purposes. The unity of effort involved in coöperation implies government, which develops readily when necessity demands, and finds its function in the integration of social activities, thus becoming the agency for social cohesion. This is about as far as Comte got in his *Positive Philosophy*, but in his *Polity* he indirectly discusses to some extent, with a little more elaboration, familial, economic, educational, æsthetic and governmental structure and function, ending with an elaborate explanation of the structure and function of society best suited to the development of the religion of humanity, since this embodied in essence his theory of social progress.

Spencer's Study of Institutions.—Spencer, in his *Principles of Sociology*, thinks of society as an organic entity made up of discrete units (individuals) which retain their individuality throughout, though they are under social regulation. He considers society as made up of races composed of these discrete units, and conditioned by environment; inorganic, organic, and sociological. Social structures arise along with social functioning and he discusses these under broad headings, namely, institutions industrial, domestic, political, ecclesiastical, including professional, and ceremonial, the last four of these being ranked as regulative. His method was, as is generally known, to accumulate all known information that might properly be classed as social phenomena, then to reclassify this material under the above headings (given fully in his charts of *Descriptive Sociology* as far as these were printed), and then to generalize from this material his conclusions as to the evolution of social

institutions. Spencer fully recognized the fact that the above institutions are by no means the complete list, and in his original plan he intended to include studies also of language, play, morals, laws, the æsthetic arts, religious beliefs, and intellectual activities voiced by education and science. His task, however, was too great for the capacity of any one man and he gave no systematic discussion of these later subjects.¹

Schäffle's Social Organism.—Schäffle's encyclopædic work on the *Structure and Life of the Social Organism* (the first volume of which was published in 1874) emphasizes both social structure and function. The influence of Comte and Spencer, however, is observable and "social psychology"² has its place in the scheme. Schäffle's study, however, is based on European conditions in the main and hence in his classification of structure and function, he is obviously thinking of his own environment. The family, state, and economic systems are vigorously stressed, with suggested anticipations (provisions) of world systems in the future. Lesser emphasis is placed on language, on education of all sorts, religion, æsthetics, and social intercourse or play. Ethics, law, and morals are quite fully considered, and all in addition to a study of evolution and of the many forms of environment and demographic factors. The author's devotion to biological analogies has caused this famous work to remain largely ignored in the English speaking world, especially as there is no English translation, but considering the date of its publication it should be considered as a noteworthy exemplification of great erudition and some genius.

¹ Some of these were briefly discussed in his essays, note also his famous work on *Education*.

² Vol. i, Sec. IV.

Ward's Classification.—Another early classification of importance illustrating the modern stress placed on psychic desires is that of Lester F. Ward, who in his *Dynamic Sociology*, published in 1883, set forth his theory of social forces and gave a classification of these.* This classification was modified somewhat in later writings and appears in its later forms in *Outlines of Sociology*, page 148, and in *Pure Sociology*, page 261. In substance he classifies social forces under two headings, (1) physical forces such as the ontogenetic, seeking individual preservation, and the phylogenetic, seeking race continuance; (2) under the heading of sociogenetic forces he gives the moral, seeking the safe and good, the æsthetic, seeking the beautiful, and the intellectual, seeking the useful and the true.

The essential point in this scheme is that attention is no longer directed to social structure, function, or phenomena, but to the psychic feelings, desires, and emotions surging in society, resulting, of course, in the formation of structure, the performance of function, and the growth of social institutions. In Ward's discussions of social institutions he stresses as primary the economic, political, and familial and as derived or "spiritual" institutions the æsthetic, moral, and intellectual.

De Greef's Classification.—A famous classification of social phenomena is that of De Greef, the well-known Belgian sociologist, given in Volume 1 (1886) of his *Introduction to Sociology* and again in Volume 3 (1902). This presents chiefly from a structural standpoint, and as a supplement to Comte's classification of sciences, a classification of terms which may apply equally to social phenomena, or to social institutions, or to the special social

* Vol. i, pp. 472, 480-482.

sciences. As a basis for society De Greef adopts the Spencerian elementary factors of land (including inorganic and organic but not social environment) and population (individuals considered as biologic and psychic). The combination of these two elementary factors results in the constitution of society, animated by social forces and engaged in activities. Each class of social phenomena, as already said, may be considered as a social institution or as the field of a special social science, and each such science has its many subdivisions of subordinate sciences. Sociology, in his opinion, should be considered as a synthesis of these social sciences, which may be grouped into a series of seven headings: (1) economics, (2) genetics, (3) æsthetics, (4) collective psychology (religious, metaphysical, and scientific beliefs), (5) ethics (including morals and customs), (6) law, and (7) politics.

Of this classification he says: "Each of these sciences has its special philosophy. It is the abstract *ensemble* of these philosophies that constitutes the domain of sociology. This classification represents to us the totality of the social sciences according to their natural, logical, historical, and dogmatic order of increasing specialization and complexity, or of decreasing generality and simplicity, in conformity with the classification of antecedent sciences established by Auguste Comte."⁴ He later states that this scheme of classification is provisional, and hence is subject to modification as more exact information is obtained through investigation.

Other Classifications.—Ratzenhofer,⁵ a follower of

⁴ *American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1903, p. 480; and note also chart of this classification in Small's *General Sociology*, p. 235.

⁵ *Sociologische Erkenntniss*, pp. 54-66.

Gumplowicz, but who broadened and improved his system, prefers to classify social activities from the standpoint of interests, meaning by this term the needs and desires, both physiological and psychical, that stimulate to activity. He has a five-fold classification; the reproductive or race interest, the physiological interest (hunger and thirst), the self-regarding or egotistic interest, the social interest, and the transcendental interest culminating in religion and philosophy.

Professor Albion W. Small in his *General Sociology* has emphasized a classification based on interests or objective wants.⁶ These he explains to be desires, the satisfaction of which is necessary for the realization of one's personality. The most general classes of interests he would emphasize are: Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty, and Rightness. Of these he says that in general all the acts which human beings have ever been known to perform have been for the sake of these or some combination of ends which may be distributed among these.

Ross in his chapter on Social Forces,⁷ after discussing and comparing various systems of classifications, suggests the advisability of a double classification, one based on the desires as "the primary forces as they well up in consciousness" and the second based on interests, "the great complexes, woven of multicolored strands of desire, which shape society and make history." He then divides desires into (1) natural, those present in all men, namely, appetitive, hedonic, egotistic, affective, and recreative; and (2) cultural, those clearly differentiated only in culture-men, namely, religious, ethical, æsthetic, in-

⁶ For illustrations of these see *General Sociology*, pp. 447-468 and also Chap. I.

⁷ *Foundations of Sociology*, Chap. VII.

tellectual. These "elementary social forces," he then argues, "give off impulses which run together and form the *economic, political, religious, and intellectual* interests, which constitute in effect the chief history-making forces."

From the foregoing it may be seen that in a study of society one may note objective social phenomena, or social institutions, classifying these as thoroughly as possible for the sake of closer study; or, on the other hand, he may devote attention to the underlying psychological aspects of social phenomena or institutions and seek to ascertain what "forces" are at work, or what "interests" unite individuals into groups in the performance of social activities with resultant group activity.

Ward's Social Forces.—Lester F. Ward's theory of social forces and their guidance through the intellect definitely placed sociology on a psychological rather than on a biological basis. As a monist he argued the hypothesis that, arising from cosmic energy, through chemism, there finally evolved three fundamentals for human existence, namely, organic life, feeling, intellect. Feeling, he argues, with its concomitant appreciation of pain and pleasure is for organisms a powerful aid to survival, so that in a long course of time, a nervous system develops reaching its maximum in man. In human beings the feelings become highly differentiated and become integrated through the development of the intellect, which, in brief, is the capacity to perceive relationships. Naturally the most intense feelings would be found associated with the instincts and would result in activities tending to satisfy the demands of the physical nature. Instincts should warn of satiety but the mind, which becomes conscious of the pleasure derived from the satisfaction of intense feelings, stimulates the passions to excessive indulgence,

and thereby drives the organism towards extermination through degeneration. Slowly the intellect perceives the relation between over-indulgence and death, or moderation and life, and places inhibitions on intense feelings like those associated with hunger, sex, fear, and pugnacity, and at the same time stimulates related derived feelings, later in origin, like those of wealth-seeking, affection for kindred, and moral bravery. In this manner social activity tends to moderate the excesses of original passions and to strengthen those social activities based on the higher emotions such as the moral and the æsthetic.

In this explanation it is important to note that while logically feelings can be considered apart from the intellect, yet practically the two are compounded together in the passionate desire or the emotion, since even the original feelings of hunger and sex in human beings are perhaps never purely instinctive in their activities. It is important, however, in Ward's theory that this logical distinction be maintained for the reason that the feelings, desires, and emotions represent the dynamic aspect of the mind, and the intellect, which merely *perceives* relationships, like those of identity, similarity, difference, and causation, suggests or directs by inhibition or stimulation the proper line of activity which the organism should follow. Hence Ward names the collective feelings, 'the conative faculty,' 'the will,' 'the subjective aspect of the mind,' 'the dynamic agent,' and speaks of the intellect as 'the objective aspect of the mind' or 'the directive agent.'

If now we return to the term "social forces" the full significance of this can readily be seen. In society, in social groups of every sort, there are desires demanding expression through social activity. These theoretically

may be considered as (1) instinctive or animal-like in kind, built up in social heredity along with inhibitions or stimulations based on social experiences; or as (2) original feelings quite fully under regulation, or (3) the original feelings of hunger and sex may be considered as so highly differentiated, and so integrated more or less completely in social "ganglia," that the "derived" feelings play an important part in any scheme of social activities. In other words, in social activity the social, æsthetic, moral, and intellectual forces are from the standpoint of progress more important than the original forces of hunger and sex, necessary though these are to social existence.

Social Interests.—Looking at the matter of classification from another point of view it will be noted that some prefer the social word "interest" rather than the word "force," so obviously derived from the science of physics. The word "interest," however, directs attention to what seems obviously in consciousness as a more or less clearly defined aim. Its emphasis seems intellectual rather than affectional and its meaning has to be strained somewhat to include organic interests hardly perceived by average men. Few persons, for example, or few groups have any conscious interest in health, though the health interest is organically fundamental. The term "social interest," however, has a distinct utility in sociological discussions, though perhaps mostly useful in the discussions of telic rather than genetic activities.

The Social Institution.—It now becomes possible to see in review what is meant by the term "social institution." If there is in a social group a definite permanent desire demanding satisfaction, like the desires for food, safety, or race continuance, these will result in the rise of conscious interests and in definite and permanent so-

cial activities. These by custom will be performed in set ways through definite organizations. There are, therefore, the four essentials already mentioned, namely, a permanent desire or interest, a permanent kind of activity, and a permanent organization, functioning through sanctioned methods. To be sure in time there will be variations and differentiations; the hunger desire may differentiate from itself the desire for wealth, the hunting activity may develop into commerce enterprises, and the organization may change into a system of markets and banks, but after all the *commercial institution* is fundamentally nothing but a differentiated and highly specialized form of hunt.

In the same manner the sex desire, which instinctively leads merely to seasonal intercourse, becomes in the social group a social force for the continuance of the race, acting through the organization of the family, under set rules in respect to courtship, marriage, and divorce. Here again the forms of courtship, marriage, and divorce may change, as the sex passion becomes less physical, less economic, and more romantic or conjugal in type; or the sex passion, inhibited by social convention, may express itself in religious ecstasy, altruistic activity, or æsthetic emotionalism, but these *derived* feelings develop each its own type of activity, performed under set methods and organization, and thereby develop into other social institutions, remotely or closely affiliated with the fundamental institution of the family.

Many Classifications Are Possible.—It may, furthermore, be obvious from this explanation that in a discussion of social classifications no special stress needs to be placed on any particular classification. No one should assume, for instance, that Ward in classifying

forces as preservative, reproductive, moral, æsthetic, and intellectual meant to imply that in the individual brain there are special compartments for each of these sets of forces. Broadly, one may speak of a social force in thinking of the physico-psychic energy surging in human beings massed into a social group, and this may be thought of as differentiated into specific social forces, but the distinction between these forces is largely logical; the social forces are interrelated or integrated, each more or less closely shares in the nature of the others, so that, for example, the hunger and sex feelings are rarely if ever experienced apart from moral, æsthetic, and intellectual considerations; and these *derived* forces likewise, if analyzed, show their bases in the feelings of hunger and sex. In our conversation we unconsciously imply this connection. We hunger after righteousness, we thirst for knowledge, we eagerly embrace the truth, and certainly we enjoy our food better when we know that it has been honestly acquired, daintily served, and is scientifically apportioned to our bodily needs.

Any classification of social phenomena, institutions, forces, or interests must for the present be largely a matter of the personal equation, or of some particular point of view, or based on the general activities of a special type of society. It is not necessary, therefore, to assume that any one of the several systems of classification already given is to be standardized and the others rejected. If psychology should ever be able to agree on the definition of instincts and inherited mental tendencies or capacities, and to state definitely what of these were inherent and fundamental in primitive man or even in modern man, a real basis for a theory of social forces would exist. On the whole, one is fairly safe in say-

ing that man has undoubtedly instincts for food and sex and, if not instincts, at least inherited tendencies towards fear or pugnacity. Pugnacity is common in the hunt, in war, and in male courtship. Fear made the gods we are told by the ancients and by the anthropological sciences, but in later religions fear becomes awe and reverence and notions of divine helpfulness and love are also common in religions. Play, so largely æsthetic at present, is historically vocational, pugnacious, amative, and religious, though at times it is merely the aimless expenditure of surplus energy. Presumably, therefore, classifications of social phenomena might well vary with the kind or degree of civilization, emphasizing always the two fundamental classes based on hunger and sex, noting the growing differentiation of these with advancing civilization, and stressing vigorously the derived or cultural interests in more advanced civilization. It may be assumed also that in later stages of human progress these will be even more vigorously emphasized since modern utopias usually assume that in later ages the higher emotions and the intellect will be dominant.

CHAPTER XIV

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The study of the development of social institutions, so well begun by Spencer, covers a wide field to-day in sociological investigation, and the results are contained in numerous works. Since it is important that the sociological process of change be comprehended, at least in its fundamentals, the chief points in respect to the development of certain of the great classes of social institutions will be explained from the standpoint of sociology, emphasizing, as most important, dynamic changes and the rationalizing of the institutions themselves.

In seeking to ascertain what kind of data are important for sociology, attention has already been called to the basal sciences of biology and psychology. But in the study of social phenomena proper the economic is admittedly basal, since physical life, which is sustained through economic efforts, is essential to psychic and social development. Just as the human mind is dependent on a nervous system for expression, so the cultural aspect of society depends on its economic situation and develops with it step by step. The implication is that their relationship is intrinsic and that each may be the better comprehended by seeing the many connections that unite it with the other. They are the two sides of the same shield, and it is as absurd to avow on the one side a "bread and butter philosophy" as to proclaim on

the other a transcendentalism of "high thinking" without even "plain living."

Influence of Physical Nature.—There is a school of sociologists that tends to emphasize the importance of natural physical conditions in the determination of social development. From Plato to the present time writers have called attention to the influence of climate, the fertility of the soil, the necessity of mining-wealth and of commercial facilities in the form of good harbors and navigable rivers, and for manufactures natural energy, such as falling water, available for power. The argument is that man is largely the creature of his physical environment, with a sort of implication that he has no control over it. In very primitive civilization, when savage hordes lived for thousands of years in restricted habitats, having few achievements or knowledge of any consequence, there was doubtless truth in this theory. Nature selected those adapted to the climatic environment and molded them to suit such conditions. But from the moment when man began to achieve, and pass from savagery to civilization he began to modify his physical environment. He modifies climate by clothing and housing; he adds to the productivity of the soil by right cultivation and by fertilizers; if good ports or rivers are lacking he digs harbors and transports his goods on canals or railways; if natural power in its older forms is insufficient he utilizes other forces of nature by the scientific development of steam and electricity; and if his own region fails to supply him with ores, he imports them from his neighbors. In other words, while man is determined somewhat by his physical environment, he himself decides by intellectual processes what modifications in the environment he desires to make, and

then deliberately seeks to create about him such an environment.

Migration.—This he may do, aside from scientific achievements, by the simple expedient of migration, and early human history is one long record of the migrations of peoples from less favored to more favored parts of the earth. Migration in its peaceable form, and subject to national and international regulation, is still a prominent factor in civilization. The distinction between the old and the new may be readily seen by comparing Cæsar's merciless treatment of migrating Helvetians and Germans, with the newer policy of Americanization for immigrants within the United States. Migration, however, is a temporary expedient, and in civilizing influence is low in grade when compared with readjustments within the social group, so as to meet satisfactorily newer conditions. Migration on a large scale is looked on with decreasing favor, and each state henceforth should aim to retain its own population, as its most valuable asset, by proper readjustments of its economic system.

The Demand for Foods.—If economic development depends so largely on the physical conditions already alluded to, it is easy to see that the economic history of man could be shown by noting his increasing capacity to dictate the kind of physical environment under which he desires to live. Now the fundamental economic desire is the demand for food. Man must eat to live and hence the fundamental and most important human activity is the search for foods. A person well supplied with nourishing food has a good basis for all other forms of development. No race poorly fed on improper food can make any great social advance. A variety of good foods regularly supplied and wisely used is a social

necessity. Unquestionably we are just passing into a more scientific period in respect to food supplies. Science will yet dictate the kinds and quantity of food needed for high development. Meanwhile faddists, "poison squads," and pure food laws show the trend of the times toward a better comprehension of what constitutes a scientific food.

In primitive days, however, men were more deeply concerned with the quantity than with the quality of food. When food was abundant they gorged, at other times they starved; fresh or putrid, raw or cooked, coarse or delicate, vegetable, animal or human, all was promptly transferred to their stomachs. As Ward puts it, "It might almost be said that the length of time it requires for food to pass from the lips to the stomach is a measure of civilization."¹ It was a great advance when men began to exercise forethought by forbearing to eat all on hand, having learned how to dry foods in the sun and so to preserve them against times of scarcity. An echo of this achievement belongs to our generation, when through the development of the canning industry and of the process of making artificial ice, the refrigerator car and steamer, and the cold-storage plant became possible, thus largely increasing our capacity to preserve for long periods perishable foods. Because of these developments the tropics will furnish to the temperate zones increasingly larger stores of fruits and flesh foods, and become thereby the center of great economic activities.²

Nomadism and Agriculture.—Another achievement was made when, whether by chance or intention, animals were domesticated, probably through woman's ingenuity

¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 285.

² See Kidd, *The Control of the Tropics*.

and desire for an assured food supply for her children. The economic importance of this is easily seen. In the dog, man had an assistant in the chase and, if necessary, a food supply; beasts of burden served a double function as means of transportation and as food; other animals were used to furnish milk, cheese, butter, flesh foods, and clothing. From that time on the hunt ceased to be the chief means of support, and became secondary to the breeding and care of flocks and herds, so that men no longer needed to starve through the winter, since they could subsist on the abundant food supplies in their folds. Evidently this meant a revolution in industrial life. Instead of the wild free life of the hunter came a compact group with definite occupations, skilled in defending their wealth against wild beasts and hungry outsiders. The story of Jacob and Esau illustrates the conflict between these two occupations, just as the legend of Cain and Abel illustrates the antagonism between the pastoral and the agricultural.

In primitive civilization the males by hunting supplied flesh foods, and the females armed with the digging stick, ancestor of the spade and the hoe, secured vegetables as supplementary foods. In pastoral life the flesh of animals still furnished the staple food, which was supplemented by natural fruits and by the products of the rude agriculture performed by the women; but with increase of population and a larger consequent demand for food of all kinds, the supply of flesh foods became relatively smaller, and edible grains became the staff of life. Then the males had to assist in the cultivation of the fields and to forswear to a large extent the more favored occupations of hunting, shepherding their flocks, or warring with their neighbors. Cæsar and Tacitus give us

amusing accounts of our barbarian Teutonic ancestors, dwelling on their small love for agriculture and specifying as their favorite amusements eating, drinking, hunting, and fighting. Thus, as time passed on, and population increased faster than the land afforded sustenance for cattle, men were compelled unwillingly to devote themselves more and more assiduously to the irksome task of the cultivation of the soil. The horror of daily and monotonous labor seemed a curse to them, and the uncertainty as to whether they should reap what they sowed acted as a drag to their energy. It required much patience and forethought laboriously to till the earth and then to wait weeks and months for returns. A new type of occupation, a new type of man, and a more compact civilization were the results. It was through farming that men learned the secret of hard, unrelenting toil, patience, hopefulness, forethought, and stability, and passed definitely from the flesh diet of nomadism to vegetative foods.

Rise of Slavery.—Fortunately, perhaps, the reason of man hit on a happy device whereby some, at least, might escape the hated drudgery of daily toil. In early days man-hunting for cannibalistic purposes had been a favorite amusement, combining profit with pleasure. When, however, the taste for human flesh declined, due possibly to the additions of flesh foods furnished by flock and herd, massacre and the torture of captives took its place, women and children alone being sometimes saved for slavery.* Later it was perceived that the male also might be spared and compelled under the lash to perform laborious toil for his master. Thus arose the institution of slavery, as a substitute for cannibalism, massacre, and torture, and hence in its beginnings a benevolent

* See, *e.g.*, Deuteronomy XX, 13, 14; I Chronicles XX, 3.

institution, if we assume that to the slave compulsory labor with life was better than a painful death. At any rate all over the world, wherever men had drudgery and enemies, these latter were enslaved if possible and forced to labor. An economic benefit from this was that agriculture as a definite occupation became much more feasible. The daily routine was performed by slaves, who thereby acquired the capacity and habit of unwearied industry. The number of slaves increased through war and compulsory breeding, but in due time slave labor, performed as a hated task, failed to compete successfully with free labor working for wages, beggarly though the compensation was. Yet, when as serfs or as a peasant population their lot became somewhat lightened, they still kept up their tireless work for the compensation of daily food. Even to-day the peasant forms the largest part of the world's population and performs the great mass of drudgery in civilization in return for bare subsistence. As peasants in China, Russia, India, and Latin America, and as unskilled laborers in Europe they toil steadily and laboriously, still receiving as pay the mere necessities of life, scarcely knowing to-day whether they will have food and shelter on the morrow.

Rise of a Leisure Class.—An important indirect effect of slavery was the rise of a leisure class. By this term is not meant those who have no work whatsoever to do, but rather those who are not compelled to labor strenuously with their hands in the industries in order to obtain their economic support. In primitive life doubtless the energy of all was chiefly expended in the pursuit of daily food; the occasional leisure was probably in most cases wasted, although at times it may have been

utilized by a few for reflection and achievement. With slavery and larger wealth more would be freed from economic necessity and thereby given opportunity for mental improvement and achievement. Unquestionably many would waste their leisure riotously and foolishly, but others again would utilize it to the utmost. In this manner there evolved a leisure class as distinguished from a slave class, and on the basis of this distinction came, in later generations, caste and class systems, emphasizing aristocratic forms of organization, based on the dominance of noble birth, learning, and wealth.

Trade and the Industries.—There was still another possibility, aside from the use of slaves, of escaping from the irksome drudgery of agricultural life. Far back in civilization men had bartered their surplus for commodities enjoyed by their neighbors, and in this way had begun the development of market places, trade routes, a means of exchange in some form of money, and the trader's occupation. Others again had found a peculiar satisfaction in the making of tools and weapons, and had become facile in smithing of all sorts. Others had become expert in the use of tools, and were busily engaged in simple forms of manufacture. To many, such occupations seemed more attractive than farming, and wherever opportunity allowed, commerce and manufactures developed, resulting in the rise of the city with its complex life, so favorable to high civilization.

Resultant Social Achievement.—The advantage of this change from the standpoint of achievement is easily perceived. Manufactures meant inventions, greater skill, wider knowledge of natural resources and a vastly greater output in proportion to the energy expended. Commerce meant social intercourse, the mingling of civiliza-

tions, larger ideas, and the stimulus of activity through the hope of gain. No purely pastoral or agricultural people can ever hope to become wealthy and enjoy a high civilization. They may live a simple life and have homely virtues and sterling qualities of mind, but they lack the thrill and vigor of urban civilization, which develops only through commerce and manufacture. Nor can they ever draw far away from the fear of famine since their very existence depends on the proper proportion of sun and rain, and they seldom have a reserve supply of foods to be drawn on in case of successive poor seasons, nor have they manufactured goods to be exchanged in commerce for food. Evidently, then, the rise and predominance of a civilization built on commerce and manufactures imply still greater social achievement, and history may be illuminated by noting how a nation rises into prominence when it becomes the center of commerce and manufactures, and then sinks back into relative insignificance as a more adaptable and inventive nation conquers it in war or economic competition.

Through such changes urban life no longer needed to center itself in the midst of a fertile region, its natural site, but found location wherever commercial facilities offered themselves or hidden mines of metals could be found. For this reason throughout the ancient and modern world urban centers may be looked for (1) in the centers of fertile plains and valleys, (2) at the mouths, junctions or head waters of navigable streams,⁴ or on the harbors of islands, lakes, and seas, and (3) wherever there are mines of metals or quarries of stone suitable for building purposes, or falling water to furnish power.

⁴Canals and roads of all sorts from this standpoint may be considered as artificial streams.

In the rise of commerce is developed of necessity the process of transportation. In place of the pack on the human back come the canoe and the beast of burden, then roads are built, canals are dug for transportation as well as for irrigation, and finally come the sailing vessel, the steamboat, and the railroad in all of their numerous present and possible forms, as well as inventive achievements for the transmission of news and messages, culminating in the present system of wireless telegraphy.

The Utilization of the Materials and Forces of Nature.—Since the anthropological sciences trace the development of man in his early mastery over the materials and forces of nature,⁵ attention here need simply be directed to the sociological significance of such development. In these days, in place of a continuous struggle for mere subsistence, we desire abundant food of good quality, and many comforts and luxuries besides. We desire leisure for mental, moral, and æsthetic enjoyment, and prefer to spend as little economic energy as need be, in order to attain these things. In other words, we demand a relatively greater return for a smaller economic effort. This becomes increasingly possible as we discover how to utilize what nature so generously supplies to us; as we learn to use more effectively wood, stone, and metal, and to increase our store of these through the preservation and enlargement of our forests, the manufacture of artificial stone, by the making of steel, the extraction of aluminum from clay, or nitrogen from the air. As also we pass beyond the sail and the water mill to the enormous energies stored in steam, oil

⁵ Such books as Wallace's *Wonderful Century*, or Hies' *Inventors at Work*, show the scientific discoveries and inventions of the present age.

and electricity, we reach a condition when Malthusianism becomes old-fashioned. For through these achievements food supplies are multiplied enormously, and the energy needed to attain them passes as a burden from human muscle to nature itself. The brain of man invents and guides the machine, and natural power does the rest. The man behind the machine symbolizes a great factor in dynamic civilization, as well as the man behind the gun. The real hopefulness of the situation at present is, that as long as the intellect of man can continue to make improvements in machinery, and utilize more efficiently natural resources, mankind will become more and more free from the fear of starvation; the standards of life will rise; slavery, serfdom, and unskilled labor will disappear, and with shorter hours of labor, which will involve intelligence rather than muscle, even the working classes will have leisure to devote themselves to cultural attainment, as is not possible under a system involving strenuous toil and unremitting poverty.

The Natural Wages of Labor.—The implication from this is that economic consumption will tend more and more toward a better system of labor rewards, a question complicated by the existence of private property. In primitive civilization property was communal except in such matters as weapons, ornaments, and clothing. In other respects all shared and shared alike whether in hunting or in spoil.⁶ In pastoral and agricultural civilization there was communal property and also family possessions; not only were there variations in the wealth of different families, but there was also a non-propertied class of serfs and slaves. In urban civilization

⁶ See *e.g.* Numbers XXXI, 27; I Samuel XXX, 21-25, for Hebraic illustrations.

based on commerce and manufactures individual rights in property are fully recognized even as against the family. This is in harmony with individualistic ideals so necessary in an age of enterprise and private initiative. The gospels on several occasions announce a principle which in substance is that, who has much will have more, and who has little will have less.⁷ In modern form it is the question whether or not the rich are growing richer and the poor poorer. Under genetic development the rule seems to hold good, and Loria⁸ explains the principles involved. Those who have wealth have power, dominate legal standards, and control social institutions; hence they naturally tend to arrange the system in such way that they will increase their wealth. Lacking, however, deep insight and broad knowledge they do so at the expense of the many and drag down civilization in consequence. In modern times with more wisdom the social aim is to increase the wealth of the community as a whole, and so to arrange the distribution of it that the proportionately larger share shall go to the many, not to the few. Historically it can be shown that under genetic development the wealth of the community flows into the possession of the privileged classes, the nobility, clergy, and leisure classes generally. This inevitably results in a two-class system, the very rich and the very poor. Aristotle sought to show in his *Politics*⁹ that this evil could be checked by wise legislation, as Plato before him had tried to show a remedy in utopian form.¹⁰

Modifications in Higher Civilization.—The break-

⁷ See e.g. Mark XII, 25.

⁸ *Economic Foundations of Society*.

⁹ Books IV and V.

¹⁰ In the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

ing down of this system begins with the era of commerce, which tends always toward democracy. Energy and capacity, irrespective of birth, are in demand, and large rewards go to the man who has ability, even though he is ignobly born. Manufactures tend in the same direction, and as the result of these influences a middle class is formed made up of commoners who acquire wealth. As skill and energy come more and more into demand, others from the ranks rise into the professions, into highly paid, skilled trades, and into positions of responsibility in business. These also receive a proportionately larger share of wealth. If statistics were available, it would be possible to show the march of civilization by noting historically the decrease in per cent of those who live from hand to mouth. It is probable that intelligent legislation will have to supplement the genetic development initiated by commerce and manufactures, and society by its wisdom may have to place handicaps on excessive fortunes, through specially devised systems of taxation, as, for example, through income, corporation, and inheritance taxes. On the other hand, it will need to pay special attention to the stimulation of those who in civilized countries are still below the standard of a decent living wage. No civilization can honestly claim to be high in which a relatively large per cent of its population is below the level of fairly comfortable subsistence. Unskilled labor should receive such training as will develop intelligence and energy, and at the same time supply opportunities for economic and cultural advancement. A skilled worker should receive as compensation for his labor an amount amply sufficient for the comfortable support of himself and family without the necessity of eking out an income

by the additional labor of wife or child. These changes should not come as concessions from master to man, but as the result of joint administration of a common industry in which owner and worker have common interests. Sociology, basing itself on historical experience, sees no need of any return to the primitive condition of communal property or a system of equal sharings, but does insist on the supreme importance of a system in which every person, through the exercise of a moderate amount of energy and intelligence, may have the opportunity to attain a fair livelihood. This condition, impossible in earlier civilization, becomes possible and even inevitable as man transforms his environment by his mastery over natural forces.

Economic Production and Distribution.—The social problem may further be illustrated from an economic standpoint by considering economic activities under the three usual headings of production, distribution, and consumption. These terms apply not merely to foods but to anything whatsoever in the economic world that can be produced, distributed, and consumed.

A primitive horde relying entirely on natural foods, obtained without the use of tools or weapons, can not be said to produce at all. Nor indeed can they be said to form a society, since to all intents they are merely animal. But when the horde begins to manufacture devices and weapons for purposes of hunting and war, and tools as aids in other arts involving social activities, then it becomes definitely a producing group. Assuming that it produces simply for its own needs and imports nothing from other groups it is self-sufficing, and whatever distribution and consumption there is takes place also within the group. This is the static ideal, praised by classic

philosophers like Aristotle as the best form of society and formerly exalted by the Chinese as the celestial system.

As population groups multiply and come in contact one with another it becomes increasingly difficult to remain self-sufficing. A surplus in production develops, and though it may at first be simply allowed to waste, in process of time such surplus products are passed on to neighboring or even to more distant groups, in exchange perhaps for other goods needed at home but in excess elsewhere. From this time forth social energy may expend itself in two directions: (1) in deliberately fostering the production of surplus products, so as to obtain goods in exchange, and (2) in broadening out and developing means and methods of distribution, so as to facilitate exchange. From this develop the processes of manufacture, machinofacture, and commerce, giving an immense stimulus to social intercommunication, so necessary for the growth of higher civilization. Socially speaking, emphasis on distribution is much more important than on production, for surplus production will take care of itself if only there be convenient and efficient avenues for distribution. By contrast, an emphasis on production to the neglect of means of distribution means only wastage and economic loss.

Social Consumption.—Again, from the social viewpoint, consumption is obviously the most important of the three processes. Men produce and distribute solely in order that they may “consume,” or utilize, the goods produced or exchanged. This is clearly so in the case of foods, the fundamental of all production and distribution, and is no less true in the case of other goods utilized to satisfy the demands of decency, comfort, and luxury in social life. Socially speaking, what a man “consumes”

is all important. If the return to the average man for his share in production and distribution is a mere pittance, a bare subsistence, with a minimum for decency, the civilization of his group is low in grade. In other words, the average standards of living prevalent in social groups testify to the quality of their social development and grades them as high or low. Some persons, to be sure, may so misuse their incomes through ill-balanced expenditures, as to show standards of living inferior to what might be expected, but they are the exception, not the rule. If the average man consumed wastefully, civilization to that extent would be hindered or even rendered decadent. From this standpoint, therefore, the real aim of "social economics" should be to adopt progressively higher standards of living, so as to remove the average man from the plane of a bare subsistence wage up to a condition in which, on the basis of a socially decent living wage, he may through leisure aspire to share in the higher achievements of his people. Social consumption, however, is dependent on an increased social production and a fairer social distribution. In other words social interests demand (1) the furtherance of education, science, and invention; (2) coöperative, unified activity in production, without parasitism; and (3) a just distribution of the goods produced, without exploitation or monopoly on the part of a favored few.

Present Economic Trend.—It is likely that the remarkable concentration of national and international energy and resources, necessitated by the world war, will have, as its most beneficial result in due time, the destruction of the exploiting and monopolistic systems of the old régime of capitalism and the substitution of a more fra-

ternal and equitable system, so as to permit the development of a real democracy among nations.

Indications of these tendencies in the United States are already quite remarkable. The army and navy are becoming great educational systems for the development of science, skill, and unified action. The great industries and the systems of transportation, developed largely along monopolistic and exploiting lines, were for war purposes unified, and compelled to work solely for national aims, and this lesson will not be lost. In the same manner religious aims, philanthropic activity, and educational systems feel the necessity of radically modifying their particularistic methods of former years, so as to devote themselves to the common purpose of strengthening the ideals and cultural interests of national civilization. Some suppose that this national "omelet" of the war period can be "unscrambled" and a return made to former conditions, but such expectations are entirely fallacious. Between the new and the old a synthesis will take place and the ultimate benefits derived therefrom will, in the United States at least, far outweigh the cost of the war in life and wealth.

CHAPTER XV

THE FAMILY¹

The Primitive Family and Kinship.—While the family is usually considered as the unit or fundamental group of modern society, the term family has had a different significance at different times. When mankind was emerging from animal conditions the family group included in the horde probably consisted simply of mother and child holding closely together merely during the helpless period of infancy. The mother herself presumably provided for and protected her children, who as they matured would feel a sympathetic connection because of their descent from a common mother and the common life in which they had been reared. This furnishes the basis of the so-called matriarchal, or metronymic, family made up of a mother, her children, and her daughters' children, forming a natural kin.² The family group was at first

¹ See the author's *The Family in its Sociological Aspects*.

² Kinship may be natural or artificial. Natural kinship implies in popular opinion the possession of a common blood, and in its primary form exists between parent and child, or among children having the same father and mother. It exists in a secondary form between children and the other natural kin of their parents, or between parents and the descendants of their children. In the widest extent of the word, all mankind may be said to be kin on the assumption of descent from an original pair; or under evolutionary hypothesis a natural kinship may be said to exist between all sentient life, both human and animal. In the metronymic period kinship through fathers was ignored, just as kinship through mothers was slighted in the patronymic period.

Artificial kinship is established by custom or by law. A group may traditionally but incorrectly assume descent from a common

held together by intuitive sympathy, but at a later stage human reason became able to see the utility of kinship ties in the formation of larger groups for purposes of hunting and defense. From that time forth kinship was recognized as a social bond, and regulations of marriage and degrees of consanguinity became general with the passing of the centuries.

Conjugal Relationships.—As the function of the male in generation was then unknown, fathers as such were not recognized as members of the family, maternal uncles and uterine brothers forming the male kin and the natural protectors of the women and children. By the time of the patriarchal, or patronymic, period, the father's share in reproduction had become known; he had definitely laid claim to kinship with his children, and even had asserted his belief that fatherhood was far more important than motherhood. Then too, as wars became common, wives were readily obtained by capture or purchase, so that the husband had a property right in his wives, and consequently in their children, irrespective of fatherhood. Under this system came a kinship based fundamentally on male descent and paternal authority, and a more compact and permanent family organization. In later times, as for example under the empire in Rome, came the system of tracing kinship through double descent, and this, now justified by biological knowledge in respect to the mammalian ovum, will probably remain permanent, and

ancestor, or in totemism may claim kinship through relationship to a common totem considered to be a sort of ancestor. Again, artificial ties of kinship may be formed by marriage or by adoption, as, for example, in the legal kinship of husband and wife and the customary recognition of relations-in-law. A still wider form of artificial kinship may be illustrated by the brotherhoods of religious orders and the fraternities of social organizations. In church relationship, for instance, a father and a son are technically brothers, both being sons of a common spiritual Father.

children be considered as the offspring of both parents and related to the kin of each. Artificial kinship arose by claims of descent from a common fictitious ancestor, as in totemism, or in tribal traditions, and by adoption or by marriage, the last two, of course, being well recognized forms of kinship to-day. On the basis of real or fictitious kinships, grew slowly recognition of tribal, clan, and national kinship, broadening at present into humanitarianism, or a recognition of the essential kinship of the entire human race.

Sexual connection was in primitive life dictated merely by natural instincts, influenced by propinquity and passion. Whether marriage was polygamous, polyandrous, or monogamous, temporary or permanent in form, is of small moment. For sociological purposes the nature of the relationship is of no consequence until it became a social one, recognized by the group, and involving mutual rights and obligations. For from that time a new form of kinship was recognized, implied in the marriage tie between husband and wife. This enlargement of the family group by the inclusion of the husband is marked in the histories of primitive marriage by the rise of numerous regulations of the status of marriage, which henceforth definitely takes its place as a social institution. It seems evident, moreover, that during this period economic considerations as well as sexual appetite became a factor in marriage. The woman began to have a definite economic function in the communal group as the supplier of vegetable food, as domestic drudge, and as burden-bearer on the march. Her proficiency in these respects, therefore, became a consideration in the eyes of her suitors. Women captured in war were valuable not simply as supplementary wives but also as slaves having

a definite economic value. At the same time men as hunters, warriors, and shepherds were frequently engaged in warfare, and developed thereby an aggressive, masterful, and bloodthirsty disposition. Under such conditions it is not hard to see that women as slave- or purchase-wives, toiling laboriously within the inner circle of the group, would tend to become more and more subordinated to the males who were expert in battle and engaged in mentally stimulating occupations. Hence the free mother of semi-human existence had become by the time of the agricultural period a submissive slave to her husband and master and was characterized by the natural slavish qualities of patience, endurance under suffering, and passivity in matters external to her own interests. This inferior place she still holds among the larger part of the world's population. The marriage relation is still based almost entirely on sexual passion and economic considerations, and in the family economy of the poor the woman's duty is that of field hand and household drudge, though her status rises in importance wherever monogamy prevails, since her lot is mitigated by her undoubted usefulness and by the possibility of ties of affection within the narrow family circle.⁸

Kinship and marriage would be in sorry condition if this were the end of social development. Fortunately there is another aspect to be emphasized. This may be explained, first, by the gradual refinement of sexual relations and, secondly, by a rise in the standards of family affection.

Refinement in Sex Relationships.—The prompting of sexual passion in animal life is instinctive, and its

⁸For interesting studies from this standpoint, see Eliza B. Gamble, *The Evolution of Women*; Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Chap. XIV; Thomas, *Sex and Society*; and Anna Garlin Spencer's *Women and Social Culture*.

indulgence spontaneous in season. When the intellect of man developed sufficiently to enable him to reflect on his desires, sexual indulgence became conscious, artificial, excessive, and ceased to be seasonal. Then came social tabu and regulation, aiming to check the evils of licentiousness that threatened to sweep away the existence of the race. These involved mainly requirements of female chastity, and sterner regulations respecting marriage and divorce. Civilization has, however, unquestionably strengthened the intensity of male sexual passion, by removing him from the harsh, physical conditions of savage life with the primary attention given to the procuring of foods, and by developing in him a sexual imagination. A civilization dominated by males has been in consequence rather half-hearted and unsuccessful in its attempts to regulate sexual irregularities and vices. Great religious teachers have done their best to set up high standards of sexual ethics, but no religious system can boast of much success in results. Sanctified prostitution (in the East), legalized polygamy, a divorce at the will of the male, celibacy enjoined on both sexes, and a tabu on open discussions of sexual relations seem to be some of the evil results of former religious teachings on sex relationships.

Sex Passion Essential.—Yet little by little religion and science have been drawing together on the matter and begin to lay increasing emphasis on some rather important teachings; namely, that sexual passion of itself is proper, natural, and necessary for race preservation; that the very vigor and intensity of it is helpful to civilization since it gives energy and ambition to the man, and grace and charm to the woman; but that indulgence in sexual passion is not a matter to be decided by the wish

and whim of the individual, or even by the dogma of church or the decree of law, except as these conform to the teachings of human experience scientifically interpreted. In other words, society must increasingly insist, as its standards, that every individual be properly trained in scientific teachings in respect to sexual relations, and that persons of low sexual standards must rigidly comply under penalty with social regulations placed on sexual indulgence. Freedom of contract in the marriage relation would, under present conditions, result in licentiousness. It is a remote ideal suited to a population characterized by self-control, well trained to regulate their primary instincts, and will not become possible until in practice it would amount to permanent monogamy.

Regulation of Marriage.—In place of the absolute freedom demanded by extreme radicalism might better be emphasized a stricter regulation of socially injurious marriages, extending in many cases even to prohibition. Public opinion intelligently informed and directed through moral agencies should make impossible the marriage of those physically, mentally, and morally defective. Attention should be directed more and more away from a purely individualistic theory of marriage for personal pleasure, to a view of it as involving racial consequences. In place of ancestor worship might well come a sort of worship of posterity, so that persons might take the same pride in providing capable offspring for future generations, as some do now in tracing their descent from illustrious ancestors.

Woman's Influence.—The modern movement in the direction of higher sexual morality has come about largely through woman's influence. Its beginnings, of course, date far back in human history when standards of vir-

tue arose through requirements of female chastity. Slavery and the practice of polygamy by the leisure class, who thereby monopolized surplus women, strangely enough, helped on the cause of virtue by accustoming the great mass of mankind to monogamy, a form of marriage in which women naturally acquire a greater influence than under polygamy. Roman law and early Christianity also helped matters by emphasis on woman's dignity and equality; the church honored motherhood by its emphasis on the Madonna; chivalry in its turn tended to idealize women as a spiritualizing influence in social life; and the standards of chivalry and Christianity became common through the prestige of church and knight and through social pressure and control.

The great movement of the Eighteenth Century toward human equality had a profound effect on woman's status, since from that time agitation for woman's rights definitely started.⁴ Such rights are only incidentally political, agitation for which has dwarfed other movements, some of which are relatively more important and will receive attention with the coming of women's suffrage. Woman's rights are based on a demand for the development and expression of her personality and properly include such demands as that for higher education, for freedom to enter economic life if necessary, for control over her own children and her own property, for a larger social life than the narrow circle of domestic routine, and for the rights of free choice in marriage and of maintaining her self-respect in marriage by control over sexual relations, even to the extent of demanding divorce in last resort. This great movement toward women's equality

⁴ Mary Wollstonecraft's book on *The Rights of Women* was issued in 1796.

is already producing marked changes in social life, and is one of the powerful factors in improving the moral relations of the sexes and in the elimination of the grosser forms of sexual vice. Unquestionably another century of progress in this direction will help greatly to purify the moral atmosphere of social life, since women will insist that the standards of sexual ethics shall apply to both sexes alike.

Rise in Standards of Family Affection.—This improvement in social standards can be made clearer by noting the changes in the relations between husband and wife. As already explained, the freer marriage of early civilization was followed by the sexual and economic slavery of women under patriarchal civilization. Even under such conditions there were influences at work that slowly helped to elevate the position of women. A really capable woman, economically speaking, was worthy of respect and even honor.⁵ Again, the males of a leisure class demanded in their wives beauty and accomplishments, and women so favored had great power. Women as well as men inherit from their parents intellectual capacity, and wherever they have had opportunities to develop this, through access to a stimulating environment the benefits, social and domestic, have invariably been large.

Again, the influence of women in modern times is set steadily against polygamy or any system that allows to the husband a larger freedom in sexual relationships than he is willing to allow to his wife. Monogamy, a form of marriage forced on slave and peasant populations by necessity, became to woman the ideal form of marriage because of the larger equality she obtained in that

⁵ See *e.g.* Proverbs xxxi, 10-31.

system, and this ideal became fixed in the standards of enterprising, progressive races. All influences combined developed in advanced civilization some men of nobler quality who began to hold a different attitude toward women. Sexual and economic values relatively diminished in importance, and an idealizing tendency developed. In the age of chivalry, and again through the romanticism of the Eighteenth Century, the lover began to look upon his mistress as the inspirer of activity, a wise counselor, the charm of existence, a sympathetic friend, and loving companion. The relationship in other words became idealized through the higher emotions and intellectual appreciation, so that the purest form of monogamy became possible, namely, the permanent union of two persons of opposite sex, harmonizing with and supplementing each other. In higher civilization, therefore, courtship and marriage are characterized by emphasis on friendship and a romanticism, which, though based on sexual passion, calls into lively exercise the higher moral and æsthetic feelings.*

Ideals in Sex Morality.—When such conditions exist sexual morality rises to its highest pitch. Infidelity even in thought becomes abhorrent, and sexual passion, guided and subordinated by idealism, becomes a servant and not a master. Undoubtedly as women free themselves from the handicaps still placed by society on their higher development, they, with their greater sensitiveness and moral idealism, will insist on higher standards in their suitors and husbands, thus by elimination of the unfit gradually raising the standards of sexual morality. Since males as well as females can be trained to high sex-morality, the

* See Henry T. Finck, *Romantic Love and Personal Beauty*, and Ward's *Pure Sociology*, pp. 390-415.

social ideal of sex-ethics should become a common standard demanded from and rigidly applied to both sexes.

The Permanent Monogamous Marriage.—This ideal of a permanent monogamous marriage is in practice far from common, and yet the fact that it is frequently attained indicates that ultimately it will become the favored type, if cultural civilization continues to develop. Religion and law in Christendom both assume the existence of such a standard of marriage at present, even though sexual irregularities, both legal and illegal, are rife. Such irregularities were once supported or condoned by public opinion, but for centuries society has insisted on at least outward conformity to social standards of marriage. In order to facilitate this, marriage and divorce are sometimes made flexible, as in the United States, so that one may enter or leave the marriage state at small cost and with comparative ease. If this were not done under present conditions of sex-morality, illegitimate connections of all sorts would of necessity multiply. Toward the ideal of a permanent monogamous marriage men must strive by means of telic cultural development. As this grows, our present concessions to human weakness will disappear one by one, and regulations of the marriage tie will grow fewer in number. The trend, therefore, will be in the direction of mutual freedom of contract and mutual freedom within the marriage relation, but a freedom that will guide itself to meet the approval and sanction of an intelligent public opinion, voicing the ideals of a strongly ethical civilization.

Kinship Ties.—A similar development may be observed in the fundamental kinship ties within the family. The natural animal relationship between mother and child invariably ends with the weaning or the maturity

of the offspring. But as social organization develops through growing intellectual capacity, the tie endures longer and passes from an instinctive affection to one founded on the higher emotions and the reason. Especially is this true while both remain under the same roof. This proximity tends to develop affection through the developed harmony of common habits, interests, and aims. Daily intimate contact also develops among the other members of the family group a conventional bond of affection which the reason strengthens by motives of economic interest, domestic comfort, and mutual helpfulness. When the father also claimed his place in the family circle, he likewise shared in the affection of the family group; though paternal love did not attain the depth and fervor of maternal devotion. His assertion of ownership and kinship, however, tended to center his interests on the economic and general welfare of the household, so that the child began to have the fostering care of both parents, although in patriarchal civilization the father gave his male offspring a disproportionate amount of attention to the neglect of his daughters.

Maternal Ignorance.—The most serious defect in the organization of the patriarchal, or even of the modern family, arises from maternal ignorance. Under polygamy and economic monogamy the mother is a mere instrument of sexual pleasure or economic service to the husband, and consequently her training of offspring is instinctive and traditional, but lacks the elements that can arise only when mothers are intelligently trained and influential in cultural advancement. Race progress is intimately involved with the quality of child-training, and civilization is always retarded by a failure to emphasize intelligence and idealism as a prerequisite condition for

those in charge of child culture. There can be little hope for rapid social progress as long as leisure classes confide their children to the care of ignorant servants, and the mass of mothers are kept from cultural training and compelled to devote their energies chiefly to household drudgery and economic occupations, leaving their children to the well-meaning but wretchedly paid and largely unskilled teaching of our graded and ungraded schools. When society learns to educate its citizens, so that they will become intelligent enough to train their children wisely; when it frowns alike on the excessively large family of the poor and the childless family of leisure; there will be hope that each generation may make rapid advance over its predecessor.

Family Ideals.—Movements in this direction are noteworthy. Conventional affection is weakened almost to the vanishing point by long-continued absence, but out of the natural, instinctive affection of parent and child, supplemented by ties of social interests, arises a higher form of kinship affection into which enter the ideals of life. The mother loves the child of her imagination, the idealization of what she desires her child to be; the father looks hopefully forward to those who will carry on the ambitions of his life and bring honor to the family name. In the same manner the lover sees in his mistress the perfection of all womanly qualities, just as he may seem to her to be the personification of manly virtue. This idealizing affection may really grow in absence or be renewed, as the imagination is not checked by the prosaic experiences of daily contact. When developed, it becomes the highest form of domestic affection yet attained by human kind, enduring in sickness, misfortune, and, even in spite of sin and degradation, often cheerfully giving its energy

and life for the sake of its object. In its expanded form beyond the family it becomes altruism, missionary zeal, patriotism, or devotion to truth and to the teachings of one's conscience, and these ideals become endeared by personifying them as members of the family. A man finds inspiration by loving his *fatherland*, his *mother country*, his *alma mater*, his *Father* in heaven and his *brothers* in the slums or in heathen lands. For these reasons sociological theory teaches that on the foundation of sexual passion and domestic affection, should be developed, especially during the period of adolescence and early maturity, the emotional ideals of the race, such as the higher forms of filial, conjugal, and parental affection, love for country and manhood, and devotion to honor, virtue, beauty, and truth.

Telic Improvement in the Family.—A comparative study of domestic institutions brings the conviction that the family as a social institution is still moving toward a stage of higher development. Even the evils so manifest to-day are less intense and far less brutal than in former periods of civilization, and though they still form a powerful hindrance to physical and cultural development, they are such as can be removed by scientific foresight. This telic idea is rapidly growing, and constructive plans for building up domestic morality are taking the place of older emphasis on prohibitions and restrictions based on ignorance. If society would give less attention to its prohibitions in sexual matters, if it would waste fewer tears on the sexual depravity of the male, and devote itself earnestly to positive movements for raising the tone of the home, giving to its children a thorough education in scientific knowledge of sex hygiene, it might pass much more rapidly than one would suppose, to a condition of

civilization where sexual perversity would be abnormal enough to insure its incarceration in asylums.

Changes in Woman's Status.—It is likely that the ending of the world war favorably to the allied states marks a definite turning point in woman's history. Her services were so clearly useful in the national crises which came upon the nations, that suffrage rights were granted to her as a matter of course quite generally throughout the warring nations, and the others will fall in line in due time.

Women with ballots in their hands will take their new responsibilities seriously and unquestionably will devote early attention to the evil conditions that environ family life. One may anticipate that home standards of decency and morality will gradually enlarge and become urban, state-wide, and national in their scope. Presumably at first attacks will be made against vicious housing conditions, the slums, and the labor of children, against immoral amusements that coarsen and debauch onlookers, and against the prostitution of women and the greatest curse of modern times—the black plague.

But in later years her policies will lay stress on the more constructive aspects of social progress; on the need for a larger wage, a better education, and a demand for the refining influence of the æsthetic in civic development. Through woman's larger freedom of choice in marriage, less influenced by economic considerations, the man of poor mentality and unregulated passions will gradually be blacklisted, boycotted, and eliminated from society in due process of time. The idealism of woman will demand higher standards in men and through intelligent education she will see to it that the father of her children is a worthy mate who conforms to the single standard of

chastity. Undoubtedly woman's coming freedom to determine marriage choices will do more to upbuild civilization than any other one factor.

Civilization will cease to be "man-made," and will be developed by the united efforts of both sexes, and the more rapidly, as the newer social environment begins to call forth the latent talent so poorly developed as yet in the average male and so long dormant in women, because of their former condition of subordination and quasi-servitude. The Twentieth Century is seeing the dawn of a new day and the modern family will benefit greatly from its newer "place in the sun."

CHAPTER XVI

THE POLITICAL INSTITUTION ¹

Beginnings of the State.—The state is the chief institution through which society carries on its functions. Originally this was not so true as now, since in former ages other institutions, such as those of the family and religion, competed with it for supremacy. Yet the state in its simple beginnings as a war-band had a real importance, and finally won in competition because of the prevalence of war and through the need of an umpire with power to enforce decisions in times of domestic turmoil. The modern state is a political unity having sovereignty, regulating and controlling, as it does, all matters of political importance. Such a notion, however, would have been incomprehensible to primitive man. He merely knew that for safety's sake it was a good thing for him to combine with companions for offense or defense, and that he would get a larger share of food if he hunted in combination with them. The hunting-band and the war-band, however, are the ancestors of the state, representing social coöperation for the two chief functions of government, namely, military and economic activities. In these organizations, too, we have the fundamental elements of the state: within the band there is the authority or sovereignty of the leader, or leaders in combination; there is a notion of law in the command

¹ See the author's *The State and Government*.

of the chief and in the customs of war and hunting; and there is a common unity, since all members of the group were combined for the purpose of general welfare. Intercourse between hordes was regulated by a fairly definite mode of procedure, the beginnings of diplomacy and international law. Permanency, which was lacking in savage hordes, came in later years to characterize the group, as communal interests became solidified through the growing complexity of social relations and through possession of a common hunting ground to be defended, if necessary, by main strength.

The State of the Patriarchal Period.—The next really important development in political organization came in the patriarchal period. At that time society, organized economically for grazing and farming purposes, fused the old-time organizations for war and industry into a common organization with family and religious institutions, making the clan, or in some cases the tribe or combination of related clans, a compact organization with differentiated functions, ruled by its elders as governmental chiefs. The clan or the tribe was a body of kinsmen organized at once for war, for industry, and for the observance of common religious rites. Race struggle, conquest, subjection, and slow amalgamation and assimilation marked this period. Out of this fusion of races and civilizations came three great institutions that profoundly affected political development: private property, a leisure class headed by a king, and the law of the state. The rise of private property involved a growing need to regulate conflicting claims to property, and to settle the custom to be observed in respect to inheritance. The rise of a leisure class meant that a privileged set of persons henceforth monopolized the wealth

and governmental power of society, held all offices of importance, and asserted its right to determine the law of the land, to exercise jurisdiction in cases arising under the law, and to fix the status of aliens, slaves, and citizens.

The State as a Matured Institution.—When these three great institutions had definitely developed, the state as a unit was fully matured, presenting the essential features of modern states, and prepared to win for itself supremacy in social control. There were, to be sure, changes within the three institutions such that the spirit of government necessarily had to change from time to time, but the idea of the state remained practically the same, irrespective of functional and structural differentiations. These changes are familiar facts of history—the power of the state in exercise may oscillate between king, nobility, or people; the form of government may be autocratic, aristocratic, feudalistic, or democratic; property may incline toward communal or individual ownership, and consist chiefly of land or, on the other hand, of capital; law may be merely enforced custom, or it may be subject to change and amendment by the ruling classes or representative assemblies. Social functions considered as apart from governmental jurisdiction are performed indifferently by family, church, or social group, according to custom or the necessities of the occasion.

Distinctions of Class and Caste.—Government in its earlier stages emphasized integration and centralization, not expansion and differentiation. Conflicting property rights, disputes over legal privileges, and the need of a vigorous organization for military and industrial purposes, all assisted in the development of a governmental organization centered in a ruling aristocracy, maintaining its power by subordinating inferior and conquered

racess through exploiting and predatory methods. The more vigorous the need, the firmer was the attempt to separate by hard and fast lines the gradations of social ranks within the community. The leading class accomplished this by insisting on its divine or noble origin as against basely born classes below it, by monopolizing civil and religious power and landed wealth, and by prohibition of intermarriage between classes. Such distinctions, at first enforced by violence, later became set by custom, hedged about by divine sanctions, and identified with the will of the gods. In this way developed caste systems, even yet common in India, and partly retained in Western civilization,² though they tend to merge into class distinctions based on wealth or intellectual attainment. Village communities controlled by a village lord and feudalism are the natural outgrowths of this system of landed aristocracy and may result, according to conditions, either in a loosely organized confederation of equal or partly equal districts, or through growth of common interests may develop into a compact empire of confederated provinces more or less firmly united accordingly to the capacity of its ruling class or the pressure of rival nations. These are the natural and genetic governmental types of an aristocratic state founded on patriarchal vocations, and developed by numerous wars of conquest.

The Influence of Commerce.—The next stage of development is brought about by the growth of commerce, domestic and foreign. This implies manufactures for export purposes, good roads, improved methods of transportation, the rise of cities, greater knowledge, and the readjustment of class lines on the basis of other

² Royal families, for instance, practically form a caste.

forms of wealth than land. Under such conditions caste distinctions tend to fade away, and instead of the noble and the warrior, the capitalist and the merchant become important. This change implies the rise of the third estate,³ and a movement toward oligarchy and democracy, since a larger class of citizens become interested in governmental stability, and new men constantly push to the front, so as to secure the interests of their wealthy and intelligent plebeian friends engaged in commerce and manufactures. Commercial civilization tends naturally to expand, so as to seek new markets. This expansion may take place peaceably through trading posts or colonization, as in the case of the Phœnicians and the Greeks, or may be predatory or warlike in character, as in the case of the Romans. In Rome the imperialistic idea reached its maximum as a type of world state, not made up of loosely confederated parts, but centering control in the capital by systematically subordinating the economic interests of the provinces, and slowly assimilating the mass of population through a common civil law and the usual methods of legal and social control. It was Rome that first developed a flexible legal system, by emphasis on procedure and by telic modifications in the content of the law brought about by codification, edict, commentary, and interpretation. The Roman legal system still furnishes the basis for much of the law of Western civilization along with the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence, just as its imperialism remained the pattern for Europe down to the Nineteenth Century.⁴

³ The *equites* of Rome, the *bourgeoisie* of France or the middle class of England.

⁴ For brief studies of these topics, note James Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, 1904, revised edition and Wm. C. Morey, *Outlines of Roman Law*.

Commerce Is Favorable to Democracy.—Commerce, with its adjunct manufactures, regularly tends to favor a democratic trend in social relations. Its great demand is that there be men who are intelligent, free from restricting beliefs, and willing to break away from custom whenever necessary. Constant intercourse with other races tends also to foster liberalism in customs and beliefs, and to favor a sort of cosmopolitanism, instead of a narrow tribal prejudice. This development, however, may be true chiefly of those engaged in the larger aspects of trade and commerce, the mass of population, still engaged in agriculture, may remain steeped in conservatism and fearful of the liberalism of the cities, so that there can be no permanent commercial success unless there is general intelligence throughout the whole population. But as men become free, liberal, and intelligent they become democratic in their relations one with another and, therefore, a democratic trend in a social organization founded on a broadening commerce is inevitable.

Growth of the Powers of the State.—The trend toward democracy can best be observed historically by noting the changes taking place in patriarchal civilization as the new economic system creeps in. The governmental aspect of society slowly gains power at the expense of the other social institutions; the state assumes the right to regulate inheritances, kinship, marriage and divorce, and rights over children; it subordinates the ecclesiastical organization to the political by controlling its property rights and, to some extent, its offices and its creed. It successfully competes with the church in provisions for education and philanthropy, it fosters economic interests, and develops a system of taxation as recompense. It poses as the friend of morals, art, and philosophy and

thereby wins the support of the leaders of these great social agencies. In this way the state wins the right as against other institutions to dictate the conditions of social life and to act as final arbiter in all disputes. When this stage is attained, sovereignty may well be defined as supreme authority, since the state has become the dominant institution of society. There is an obvious advantage in this development if government is democratically organized, since as all social functions are subject theoretically to a central organization, conflicting policies are thereby eliminated.

The Class Struggle.—Under the old system of autocratic or oligarchic government this supremacy of the state might prove dangerous, since the dominant office-holding class would naturally be tempted to exploit other classes, checked as it would be only by the fear of factional disputes of rival claimants for power. But when the claims of a dominant class are disputed by other classes, who also have important interests to conserve, minor factional differences become merged into a class struggle, which in modern times voices itself through political parties. Historically parties may be traced (1) as factional struggles within a dominant class, such as dynastic wars, (2) struggles for supremacy between two opposing institutions typified by the historic struggle of church and state, and (3) struggles between conflicting economic interests such as a land interest as opposed to a commercial-manufacturing interest, or capitalistic claims as opposed to those of an interest-paying, wage-earning class. These fundamental interests supply basic principles for political parties, which in modern governmental systems usually fight out their disputes at the polls through the ballot, instead of by the ancient methods of

insurrection and rebellion. This more peaceable method of settling difficulties places in possession of government a resultant of all conflicting interests, and this by mutual compromise seeks to merge them all into a great national policy. Under such conditions it is easy to see why the functions of a government democratically organized multiply so enormously. If a class controls, or a special interest, it is always afraid to broaden the sphere of its activity, because it would multiply thereby the antagonism of unrepresented interests whose privileges are being interfered with. But when practically all classes and parties are represented, the government may go far in the direction of regulation and "interference," without dread of rebellion.

Aristocracy Becoming Democracy.—The process whereby modern democracy succeeds an aristocratic system may briefly be indicated as follows: king, nobility, and special classes lose little by little their important, peculiar prerogatives, retaining, if anything at all, the mere shadow of their former power, which, through popular agitation and revolution, passes slowly down from class to class until all theoretically share in rights and privileges. Monopolies and special privileges, for instance, in land, mines, and economic opportunities are stoutly resisted and slowly become public or are thrown open to general competition. Governmental offices and honorable occupations of all sorts cease to be prerogatives of the nobility, and all citizens become eligible to them. An opportunity to obtain education is placed before all. The privilege of lawmaking passes to the citizens as a whole or to their representatives; freedom in thought and speech is secured by forbidding social institutions to dictate beliefs and standards, and the rights

of all in person and property are safeguarded against the arbitrary whim of the powerful.

Changes in Governmental Organization.—This development also is indicated by the differentiation taking place in governmental organization. The sphere and functions of the state's two chief rivals, the family and the church, are first carefully marked off, and the residue of governmental authority becomes divided among several departments; the judicial functions of the executive become a separate department; then the administrative functions are delegated to a ministry; a lawmaking body develops for the purpose of revising the law and adding to it from time to time; and the executive aided by a cabinet oversees the system as a whole and formulates broad lines of policy. Local administration is separated from the national, and their spheres of authority are carefully distinguished. The effect of these differentiations as a whole is to decentralize authority over details, but to centralize it over fundamentals through the general power of supervision and regulation.

Conditions Necessary for Democracy.—It is not to be supposed that democracy in its complete form has yet been attained by any civilization. Nothing is so misleading in theorizing as to assume that things are necessarily what their names or their ideals imply. There have been and are many states called democracies, but these differ widely. Contrast, for example, the bloody despotism of the republic of Haiti before it came under the control of the United States, the oligarchic despotism of Diaz in Mexico from 1876 to 1911, the strongly centralized system of France, the capable decentralized Swiss republic, and the soviet form of government established in Russia soon after the fall of the empire. Evidently the

mere name of a governmental type is not sufficient as a basis for classification. If, therefore, by democracy is meant not a formal but a real government by the people, one would have to admit that the word denotes an ideal, not a condition realized. A democracy should imply that the people as a whole, both sexes alike, are intelligently trained and capable of giving a fair judgment in respect to policies under discussion. Furthermore, no large per cent of them should be so straitened by poverty as to be debarred from leisure and warped in judgment. So long as ignorance and extreme poverty handicap a society, it is impossible for that body to become fully democratic. In other words, the two fundamental conditions for democracy are that education be accessible to all, and that economic extremes in society be eliminated, namely, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few, and the impoverishment of the masses. Lacking these fundamentals, even though a state is democratic in form, power will always in fact be controlled by the wealthy, who can regularly rely on the support of the professional and the educated classes, if these also are recruited from the few.

Any state, no matter what its form, will tend toward a democratic condition if the opportunities for the acquirement of knowledge and property are shared by all alike. Since, however, genetic development is aristocratic not democratic, in order to become really democratic a society must deliberately counteract natural tendencies and use telic means to accomplish its purpose. As such movements already exist in parts of the earth where conditions are favorable,⁵ approximations toward a true democracy may be observed and the marks of political progress indicated. As the basis for such observation one may note

⁵ Australia, New Zealand, and Switzerland, for example.

those policies that seem to make for progress and that are based on telic rather than on genetic development. The substitution of rational ends, attained through scientific knowledge, for haphazard development is one of the surest indications of progress. If also there is a steady disappearance of pain and misery, the multiplication of human happiness, and an approximation toward equality of opportunity through education in a fairly diversified economic system, one may feel reasonably sure that the general trend of society is toward the attainment of democratic ideals.

The Slow Elimination of War.—In general one may argue that the coming of real democracy will in the long run banish war and its heavy burden of expense. Nations may still dispute and compete, but the contests of future centuries will be on a psychical plane, and science through skilled intellects will win the battles. The great coördinating international agencies of modern times, namely, the religious, economic, educational, and cultural factors, will tend to unify human interests, and boards of arbitration and leagues of nations in case of dispute will obviate the necessity of war, which in any case should become obsolete, because of its needless waste of life and property. National resources will be carefully husbanded, production in all its forms made scientific, distribution more equitable, and a more generous consumption made possible for every citizen, looking always toward the elimination of unskilled labor, and the inclusion into the leisure class of the entire population. This will be accomplished when through invention and the greater utilization of natural power, a well paid short-hour day becomes possible for all, so that the masses also may have leisure for cultural development.

Development of Democracy.—In political activity it is essential for democratic development that governmental machinery, now so cumbersome and awkward, be simplified, thoroughly coördinated, and made sensitive to public opinion; and that governmental policy when formulated into law be scientific. Nothing in politics is so disheartening at the present time as the multiplicity of laws, mostly unnecessary, and rarely, even the best of them, based on any farsighted knowledge of human nature and social development. Laws should be simple and general, details should be left to administration, and the few principles promulgated should be harmonized with science. Prohibitions of all sorts should be reduced to a minimum, regulations should be general, taking into account human nature so as to incite it to compliance and make the law self-enforcing. A law difficult of enforcement is either defective or demands too high a standard for the conditions of civilization. It should be repealed, or modified, until the standards of civilization are raised. Laws so numerous and complex as to develop litigation are socially injurious. The law should assume that men desire the right, not the wrong. If the reverse in experience proves to be the case, social organization is defective, and wiser legislation would presumably remove the difficulty. Every law should be formulated after thorough discussion and deliberation, should be based on principles easily comprehended and endorsed by expert authority, and should be so carefully worded as to convey the meaning intended.

Scientific Legislation.—The legislation of so-called democracies at present is in the main a reproach and a disgrace to the body politic. No disillusion of democracy is so keen as the pessimism existing in respect to the

utility of lawmaking bodies. Not until legislators are more truly representative and intelligent will they resume their former importance. Then society might confidently look forward to a much more rapid development of the cultural aspects of life. Legislatures as a rule are so little acquainted with the theoretical principles of morals, æsthetics, and education that they seldom attempt to legislate in respect to these without expert advice, which when given is seldom taken, since it is beyond the comprehension of the average legislator. The entire cultural life, therefore, is left to private initiative. Yet whatever the efficiency of private agencies, there is need always of a larger coördination, a broader view, and a deeper insight than can possibly be supplied in this fashion. Unquestionably these private associations should become national, should formulate great policies, and thereby a process of education may ultimately induce the state to embark definitely into the function of stimulating a cultural civilization.

At present the state educates chiefly in the rudiments of general knowledge and in industrial occupations and professions, but already under the pressure of public opinion it is beginning to moralize the conditions of life, to teach the elements of art in the schools, and through national universities to foster scientific research. When the cost of war, crime, vice, and pauperism shall begin to diminish, as societies become wiser, it is natural to assume that the vast amounts now wasted for such purposes will be diverted toward a constructive policy, and used to build up the fundamentals of material and cultural civilization. This should be the aim of scientific legislation, and the statesmen of the future will be those who can most effectively utilize the power of the state

in constructive activity, rather than in devising new prohibitions and tedious regulations for the maintenance of the *status quo*. The Samaritan of the Twentieth Century is not the man who assists the traveler that fell among thieves, but he who sees to it that the economic conditions of employment are so bettered, that the thieves who infest the road to Jericho may have honest occupations. The elimination of waste by a more complete utilization of human energy in useful directions is as wise a policy in politics as a similar principle is in economics.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION

In studying the development of the religious institution, sociology makes use of ethnological discoveries,¹ supplemented by history, and the comparison of existing systems. In using this comparative and historical method, it looks merely, as already explained,² at the institutions and ethics of religion, leaving to philosophy and theology all discussion of fundamental beliefs.

Beginnings of Religion.—It seems probable that religion had its beginnings when primitive man felt a sort of dread of uncomprehended forces surrounding him and there arose a dull desire on his part to understand them. Fear, and the desire to comprehend the reason for his fears, so as to free himself from them, combined to give him beliefs respecting a world outside of his own. At first, in the fetishistic stage, his crude intellect surmised that there were mysterious powers in many of the objects by which he was surrounded, in animal and plant life, for example, and in unusual natural phenomena. These he feared or cherished, according as they brought him good or evil. A belief in luck, or in lucky and unlucky objects, is a common modern manifestation of this. In

¹For brief studies of this sort, with references, see *The Temple Primer Series: Religion, its Origin and Forms*, by J. A. Macculloch. Also, C. H. Toy's *Introduction to the Study of Religions* (1913).

²See Chapter V.

the animistic stage the strange appearances and energies of nature were personified, along with the souls of his ancestors, and he sought to establish friendly relations with his innumerable gods by prayer, propitiation, and sacrificial offerings. Or, by superior knowledge, through magical formulæ and incantation, he strove to render them obedient to his will. Odd as it may seem, in so doing he was beginning to probe into the secrets of nature, and becoming the ancestor of the modern scientist, the clergyman, and the physician, for successful magic implied a comprehension of some of the manifestations of nature. When with keener imagination he began to see coördinating principles and to grade as higher or lower the various gods of the universe, he was becoming a philosopher, slowly working out theories of cosmology and theology. Still later with growing power of discrimination, he began to group inferior gods under one supreme god, thereby forming hierarchies of gods, and at times classified the gods as good or evil, arraying each class under its own leader. He then endeavored to show the relationship of these one to another and to men, idealizing these latter relations through emphasis on standards of right. In process of time thoughtful men ceased to believe in, or ignored, lesser divinities and advanced to a monotheistic theology. Others abstracted the notion of personality from divinity altogether, thereby reaching pantheism; or as atheists they rejected belief in the supernatural altogether and discoursed of natural elements, blind chance, and cosmic principles. In Comte's positivistic religion he ignores supernatural beings altogether and would make humanity the object of reverence and service. This brief outline of the development of religious belief hints at the history of man's striving to

understand the mysteries of nature, and to define his own relationship to the cosmos and its energies.

Higher Development of Religion.—Subjectively, as the mind of primitive man gained emotional strength through a better comprehension of the majesty of nature, his unreasoning fear deepened in intensity and became awe. As this became tinged with speculative thinking respecting the mysteries of the universe, it changed into reverence, devotion, and love, as God became revealed to him as the creator of the world, the giver of all good, the author of justice, and finally as a loving father. So, likewise, the rude incantations, the bloody sacrifices, and selfish supplications of early civilization slowly change into higher and purer forms, and culminate in spiritual worship, and in the sacrifice made by clean hearts and right spirits, which aspire to come into close communion with the divine and to partake of its nature. In the same way symbolic rites slowly lose their significance for later generations; their ruder and bloodier aspects are eliminated; and very gradually they pass into an æsthetic symbolism, emphasizing music and the beauty of form and color. Even these grow less important as higher civilization advances, and an inner worship takes its place, as human insight becomes able to comprehend the spiritual in the universe without the aid of material representations of the divine.

Influence of Environment.—The influence of environmental conditions on religious development is marked. Since social development largely depends on economic status and intellectual training, wherever low economic and intellectual conditions prevail, the religion of such a civilization, by whatever name it may be called, will tend to become a low form of animistic worship, filled

with superstitions and relying on magic, charms, and holy relics for safety. Tendencies toward polytheism demand a somewhat higher grade of development since the gods are appraised, classified, and specialized, each for a distinct service. Such a system finds its natural support in the economic conditions and social classifications of patriarchal, aristocratic, and monarchic civilization. The broadening of economic possibilities, such, for example, as develop through commerce, facilitates the rise of higher religions developing through the contact of many contrasting forms of religion and typified by the many varieties of religious belief formerly taught by the wisest philosophers of Asia Minor and Greece, at that time the center of international commerce and where the world's highest civilization flourished. In the same manner the spirit of religion in society as a whole is largely determined by the economic and intellectual conditions of its adherents. It will be dominating and dogmatic in a narrow environment, and conciliatory and democratic if conditions are high. It is harsh in its morals when cruelty is common, and strongly ethical when humanitarianism is at its height. It will be petty and provincial under patriarchal conditions, and will broaden out into a world religion only when the times are alive with world views and movements. As civilizations assimilate, their religions assimilate also, so that, as future centuries unite the divergent types of the East and the West, the religion of that time must inevitably be a synthesis of the dominant qualities of the world religions then existing.

The Priestly Class.—The priesthood, or sacred class historically prominent in practically all religions in every age of civilization, finds its beginnings in the wizards, magicians, sorcerers, or medicine men of primitive

life. These had worked out beliefs about the supernatural and methods of approach, so as to win their favor and ward off evil. They also knew the secrets of charms and exorcisms, and by their knowledge of the medicinal properties of plants, could heal many diseases. They were not impostors in such claims, but really were able to accomplish much by simple remedies and by suggestions made to a suggestible clientele. The more thoughtful among them saw deeper into the mysteries of life, becoming soothsayers and prophets. Their emotional natures throbbing with exalted emotions were so quickened that they gained increased insight into the mystery of life so that their thoughts seemed to them an inspiration from the gods themselves, who, like Socrates' *dæmon*, imparted to them wisdom and understanding. They had acquired the power of looking both "forwards and backwards" and were rightly deemed most useful members of society. These several classes of priests were really the philosophers, teachers, physicians, and scientists of their time; they accumulated knowledge and handed it on by tradition, thus safeguarding for future generations society's treasures of intellectuality, much of it, of course, dross, but with a solid residuum of real social value.

The utility of the priestly class is not so obvious when it became hierarchical in form, as in Egypt, and when it began to cherish its best knowledge as a secret to be taught only to an inner circle, deliberately striving to keep the masses in ignorance. Matters became worse when it heaped up a great load of useless ritual, benumbing social energy, involving wasteful sacrifices, suppressing innovations, and resulting in the compulsory support of a large body of priests in charge of the routine of worship. A priestly leisure class made up of non-producers can be

justified only if they really add to mental or cultural achievement, and seek to build up the people in spiritual knowledge. Otherwise they handicap development by emphasis on superstition and wasteful observances.

Evil of Rigidity in Teachings.—In the same way progress is hindered if the teachings of the priestly class become fixed, or if the interpretation of the sacred codes or writings becomes a monopoly entrusted to the priestly class only. Dogmatism of a rigid type, relying chiefly on the teachings of the past and belittling newer information, is regularly inimical to progressive civilization, and the better religions always provide some means whereby new truth may be received and old teachings rejected if outworn. These means may vary from a divinely inspired ecclesiastical head or council of clericals at one extreme, to a purely individualistic system based on a theory of "soul liberty" ⁸ or freedom of conscience. As is the case in law, traditional meanings also may be modified by their codification into creeds, as a sort of fundamental law, and by commentary, interpretation, and the decisions of official bodies. Ultimately religious teachings must harmonize with well-established truths in science and philosophy; the two systems of teaching may occasionally seem to be in opposition, but a faith unreasonable in its basis is finally atrophied and sloughed off as credulity or superstition, or else is retained as a mere conventional belief. No religion founded on unreason and injustice, or in opposition to demonstrated scientific teachings can retain its hold on the minds of thoughtful men in an age when men are striving to come into harmony with the highest and best in the universe.

⁸ See Richmond's *Rhode Island*, p. 20, in discussion of Roger Williams.

The Church as a Social Institution.—The church is the institution developed for religious purposes, and there should, of course, be included under that term the organization, its rites, and ceremonies, its creeds and sacred books, and its priesthood. It is, of course, called into being by that desire or emotion, whether fear or love, or that ecstatic thrill in human hearts seeking to come into harmony with the supernatural world. The term church may loosely be applied even to the primitive organization of savage life, for the idea underlying it is essentially that of modern times. Like other social institutions the organization of the church is always patterned after the typical social organizations dominant at the time, *i.e.*, after monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic models, though ancient forms may survive long after the spirit underlying them has changed.⁴ The church rarely originates ethical systems but rather selects the codes of its generation and to some extent emotionalizes and idealizes them, teaching them as if revelations of the gods, thus imparting to them a religious sanction. Like other social institutions, it tends to be static and conservative, its office, as always, being to conserve the best of the past, not to originate the new. For this reason whenever in society any really important religious change becomes inevitable, its advocates must arise from outside the church or withdraw from it in schism. This naturally arouses antagonism, for human experience shows that social institutions strongly entrenched resist vigorously all forms of opposition or rebellion. A church, like states and economic systems, wars against its antagonists if it fears them, and the more bitterly perhaps, if it maintains that

⁴ Note, for example, the many variations in the types of governmental organization among the numerous religious bodies of the United States.

its teachings only are inspired, and that it alone knows the truth. Such religions, animated by a proselytizing spirit, become fanatical when opposed, and develop a policy of "no quarter." Hence one of the saddest records in all history is that series of bloody wars and persecutions, waged by churches against their rivals and against those who seem to be advancing teachings at variance with what is claimed to be "the word of God" or the creed of the church.⁵

Separation of Church and State.—Active suppression of opposition is only possible when church and state are in close sympathy and united in a common policy. It becomes impossible when rivalry between them develops through the desire of the state to enlarge its functions at the expense of the church. Historically this rivalry has regularly resulted in the victory of the state, which has either subordinated and subsidized the church, retaining it thereby as a useful ally, or, on the other hand, has confiscated its endowed property, deprived it of political importance, and relegated it to the same status as that of any other social institution. In democracies, under the principle of freedom, the separate spheres of church and state are carefully defined, and a policy of mutual non-interference adopted. The subordination of the church, or the separation of church and state, becomes inevitable in practice when the state becomes the supreme authority. The church has then the alternative of becoming free but self-supporting, or subsidized but dependent on the state. Religious idealism prefers the former, but expediency the latter.

Whenever a church is under the necessity of relying

⁵ See White's *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*.

for support on its membership, there is a tendency to lessen expenses by simplification of services and to soften the rigidity of religious requirements, so as to win popular favor. The beliefs taught by the priesthood become more flexible, and thus toleration and religious freedom succeed dogmatism and illiberality. When dogmatic teachings and a rigid ecclesiasticism become susceptible of modification, the religious system as a whole much more readily adapts itself to a progressive civilization, and may thereby exercise a powerful influence over social life.

The Religious Institution Permanent.—The enduring quality of the religious institution in history is seen if we note its manifold interests. As a philosophy it had its cosmic theory, seeking to show the unity of all things in a divinity or divinities, who originated, controlled, animated, and guided the universe toward a predestined goal. In science it claimed to possess by revelation the essential facts of knowledge, and long insisted that scientific teachings should be harmonized with those supposed revelations. In ethics it laid down rules for human conduct, arguing that in so doing it acted by divine authority; in general also it asserted its right to dictate principles of action in economic, familial, political, and recreational affairs, and sought to regulate the methods of their functioning. Education it assumed as its own special function, reserving its inner and choicer teachings for its own priestly class.

Naturally such large claims and powers are now not always admitted by the other agencies in society, for philosophy and science defend their right to promulgate their conclusions even though at variance with theological teachings; social ethics begins to impress on the

church its teachings in regard to social morality; educational systems refuse longer to be subordinated to religious dogma; church and state are separating, each having its own functioning to perform; the civil law regulates the family and economic activities are entirely too numerous and complex to permit of interference by the church. Under such conditions the church of necessity must become either an anachronism, or else must work toward a higher stage of usefulness, cutting loose from routine and pettiness and endeavoring to serve again as a prophetic guide for man's idealistic longings.

The present century is obviously transitional for the great religions. The former static conditions environing the Asiatic and Mohammedan religions are rapidly breaking up, and these religions through contact one with another and with Christianity are bound to become modified in the direction of assimilation. The world war has completely unsettled religious conditions in Europe, especially in Russia and the Central Powers, and the ancient systems of these nations are to-day struggling for life. Throughout Western civilization far less attention is given to the religion of fear and punishment, and greater stress is placed on religious fraternalism. Dogmatic teachings and creeds are no longer to the front and there is a general lack of interest in the older teachings of heaven and immortality. Movements towards federative unities emphasizing united policies of social ethics and the avoidance of duplication of effort are in process of formation, and these are not merely national in scope but are broadening out into an international world policy. All is in flux and the church, along with the other institutions of society, is in need of wise leaders who see visions rather than dream dreams.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALS ¹

Three Stages in Customs.—When human beings began to come together in social relations there developed among them customs, or methods of action sanctioned by usage. If a person lives by himself he becomes a law unto himself, but if he lives with his fellows, his habits must harmonize with theirs for the sake of the common welfare. Hence in early civilization whatever conduced to group safety was enforced by public opinion. Conversely what was inimical to public safety was frowned on, and became *tabu*, or prohibited. If there was a custom partly good and partly bad, there would slowly arise a system of regulation aiming to guide social activity into the safer channel. These notions represent the three great stages of social morals or customs; namely, a social action may be approved, prohibited, or regulated. In any code of morals, whether civil, religious, or ethical, these three stages are well marked. The ten commandments,² for example, are chiefly prohibitions, but contain also an approval of filial reverence, and a regulation of labor; the law of the land, too, contains approved constitutional principles, prohibitions contained in the criminal code, and such regulations as those of inheritance

¹ In illustration of newer points of view in respect to social ethics note the following as typical references: E. Westermarck, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Ideas*, 3 vols.; L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, 2 vols.; W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*.

² Exodus XX.

or the existence of corporations. The logical trend in social development is from prohibition to regulation, and from regulation to approval.

Prohibitive Stage.—A civilization founded on prohibitions is necessarily backward and primitive. The tabu characterizes an age of immaturity and unreason. It assumes that persons are too ignorant or too wicked to do what is right, and hence must be forbidden to do evil by wiser and better heads. As persons too evil or ignorant to do right may prefer wrong action even though prohibited, a threat of punishment is regularly added to prohibitions, under the notion that the person who may not see the reason for the prohibition or the penalty, may yet dread the penalty sufficiently to refrain from evil actions. When this proved insufficient to deter, then penalties were made increasingly severe, until prohibitive laws came to be associated with one long series of torturing punishments, the infliction of which on offenders classes the perpetrators far below their victims in evil and ignorance.*

Yet a tabu stage was a natural development in a genetic civilization. The growing intellect of man became able to see a developing evil, but was not keen enough to know how to eradicate it. His only remedy for it was the natural and animal one of the blow or the bite, except that man, like a cat with a mouse, learned to protract the agony and duration of dying. His career of war also inured him to scenes of blood and suffering, so that he even acquired a delight in the infliction of punishment and torture. For this reason we see in history progressive and conquering nations easily surpassing their more primitive neighbors in cruelty; as illustrated, for instance,

* See, for illustrations, Henry C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*.

by the war methods of the Assyrians, the Romans, and the Spaniards in the Americas.

Modifications of the Tabu.—In still higher civilization, however, when, through a long period of peace, gentler emotions arise in the soul, a keener intellect revolts against the vindictiveness of such punishments, and seeks to devise kindlier methods for the promotion of social ends. As a result of this, torture and cruelty slowly fall into disuse, humane treatment creeps in, severe penalties are seldom enforced, and whole classes of prohibitions pass from the statute books.

From the sociological standpoint it is not difficult to see why the trend of higher civilization is entirely away from prohibitions of all sorts. If evil actions, for the most part, do not proceed from natural depravity or in-born tendencies, but are chiefly the effect of vicious environment and defective training in youth, as well as defective heredity, then the proper remedy is to eliminate evil conditions, not to place prohibitions on persons who should rather be stimulated to right activity through the influence of a proper environment. As mankind rises in the social scale, therefore, criminal laws of all sorts should gradually disappear, as scientific wisdom demonstrates how much better it is to regulate activity and develop capacity, than to repress and suppress misdirected energy.

Regulation in Morals.—The stage of regulation in morals or customs follows naturally after the stage of prohibition. If a certain form of social activity should neither be prohibited nor left entirely free, some restrictions for general purposes must be placed on the time, place, and manner of exercise, and these will be such as will seem on the whole most conducive to group safety.

For instance, sexual passion should not be prohibited in a group, nor can its indiscriminate indulgence be approved. If it can neither be wholly condemned nor wholly approved, it must be regulated, and this is clear when the differing interests of males and females and of rival males are taken into account. Hence there developed customs in simple group life that in effect fixed standards of chastity, regulated the institution of marriage, and ordained permissible methods of divorce. As long as this powerful passion is not dominated by ethical idealism and the intellect, there will be need of social regulation. If the time should ever come when humanity is pure-minded and self-controlled, then all such regulations would pass into disuse, and the marriage relation be dominated solely by the power of public opinion approving high standards of virtue.

Higher Standards of Morals Possible.—In socially developed societies there are undoubtedly many persons to whom the prohibitions and regulations of society are unnecessary. These persons violate no criminal code, they need no stimulus of fear or punishment to inspire them to right action, and they voluntarily conform to the highest standards set by society. Such persons illustrate the possibilities of human progress, and indicate the path of social development. Prohibitions and regulations are for the vicious, the immature, and the ignorant, and will pass into oblivion in proportion as society becomes able by wisdom to banish vice and ignorance from social life. Family and school discipline, religious teachings, and changes in criminal law, all furnish abundant illustration of the passing of tabu civilization, the reduction in the extent of regulation of conduct, and the growing assump-

tion that human nature rightly developed and trained can become a law unto itself.

Differentiation in Morals.—In a primitive social group customs were undifferentiated. Custom was custom, and no questions arose as to whether it was primarily religious, economic, or domestic. But when the intellect began to notice differences and make comparisons, there grew up a distinction in mind between religious customs that set the standards between men and divinity, and moral customs establishing standards of conduct between men and men. Likewise the customs involved in men's dealings with one another became differentiated still further, and it is possible to distinguish in practice a whole series of customs, such as civic, economic, domestic, educational, and the like. If some of these happen to be relatively insignificant, they are considered mere customs, unmoral by nature, and like the rules of etiquette, are left to social opinion for enforcement. If, on the other hand, they are deemed of real importance to group safety, public opinion may voice itself in a definite way through parent, church, or state, for example, so as to obtain and enforce its will. Opinion as to what is or is not important may vary according to the age and the group, and it may be conflicting in dynamic civilization, but for their maintenance a moral obligation will regularly be attached to whatever customs are thought to involve group safety.

Evidently the power to distinguish differences such as these implies mental acumen and a recognition of moral standards. If this insight is lacking, all customs seem of equal importance and a similar punishment may be meted out for a slight offense as for a heinous crime. Or again, if the same offense is committed by different per-

sons, a crude civilization may punish both alike, taking no account of differences in age, sex, personality, or environment. A high civilization, therefore, implies an ability to note carefully differences in conditions, to estimate moral values, and to set up standards in morals, and then to combine all of these conclusions into generalizations, which will represent the moral judgment of the community. This capacity is rare, so that the moral standards and judgments of society in dynamic civilization may justly be suspected of imperfection. As a matter of fact, society has often had to make its commands imperative by asserting an infallibility in its rules, and has grounded its decisions on other authority, such as a revelation from divinity, or on the ancient custom of ancestors, the will of a divinely inspired king or priest, or on a conscience supposedly in harmony with the principle of justice. More and more, however, the conviction grows that it is unwise to seek to fix standards of morality for all time by such assumptions, but rather that a developing civilization should see more clearly into moral principles with passing years and should revise its standards as knowledge increases and deeper reflection becomes possible.

Changing Standards.—For such reasons social ethics holds it advisable in an age of transition, to call into question from time to time dubious standards of morality, not for the purpose of overthrowing them necessarily, but so as to lead to the elimination of what may be obsolete, and the strengthening of what really helps toward the safety and health of society. Especially should prohibitory codes be carefully examined, so as to see whether society is not ready to substitute for them in whole or in part a system of wise regulation and control. In this

dynamic age, the entire field of civic and moral reform furnishes illustrations of this trend, and in all departments of social activity changing moral standards may be observed. For instance, religious teachers no longer insist on a lengthy series of prohibitions, as, for example, the tabu on certain amusements, or threats of punishment for those who fail to comply rigidly with ritualistic or ceremonial requirements, but they rather set up and emphasize spiritual and altruistic standards as ideals. Domestic and educational training is passing from stern disciplinary authority enforced by corporal punishments to a combination of kindergarten methods and comradeship. The prohibitive aspect of law is passing into regulation and control through the influence of public opinion and administrative departments; capital and other severe punishments die out, the jail and the dungeon are succeeded by the probation system for the young and industrial places of detention for adults, and the habitual drunkard is no longer considered a criminal fit only for the jail, but as a proper subject for medical treatment, just as the insane are placed under the care of a physician, instead of suffering maltreatment as demoniacs.

Group Standards.—In general the best instruction in ethics is no longer given by prohibitions but by incitement to right action through precept and example, in imitation of Chaucer's village parson, of whom it is said:

But Cristes lore, and his apostles twelve,
He taught, and ferst he folwed it himselve.

If it were at all feasible it should be socially unnecessary for society to insist on a common ethical standard in details for all conditions of men. As long as society

is divided into classes of differing grades of moral and intellectual attainment, full uniformity in moral conduct will be impossible, and attempts to insist on it will result only in social friction. All may believe in honor, virtue, and honesty, even though no two persons can agree in respect to fine distinctions and detailed applications of principles to conduct. A certain latitude is inevitable, if one takes into account differences in heredity and environment. Just as a Roman judge might administer indifferently either local law or *jus gentium* according to circumstances, or a judge in a juvenile court may assign different penalties for the same sort of offense, so a judge in morals might be able to insist on fundamental principles, even though he should make wide differences in application. A slight fault in one might deserve sterner treatment than a serious crime in another, just as a poisonous pin scratch may be far more serious than a clean wound from a dagger.

It would seem also as though the moral pride of a class consciousness is socially worth preserving. Some of our highest and best achievements in moral life have been class achievements, such as, for instance, the *bushido*,⁴ or knightly code of the Japanese, the high caste morality of India, the *noblesse oblige* and "honor" of Western civilization, and the pride of a workman, a farmer, or a manufacturer in the quality and honesty of his product. On the basis of group morals, no matter how simple and petty, might be built up a nobler standard, which should grow from, but never entirely supplant, its more deeply rooted but morally inferior parent.

Differing Codes of Morals.—In the differentiation of custom, already mentioned, is to be sought those great

⁴Inazo Nitobé, *Bushido*, 1905, 10th edition.

classes of morals that play so important a part in human civilization. Each set represents a great achievement, is conserved by its own peculiar social institution, and is imparted to succeeding generations in systems of instruction. The church, as the institution for religious purposes, has developed its schools and the priesthood, so as to teach, through these, principles of action for the regulation of conduct toward God and man. The family and school combined impart instruction in simple morals, and train the child to work coöperatively in the group. The state devotes its attention to such customs as concern the security and amplification of life and property. Economic institutions work out moral codes for business and fix by law and public opinion the rules of economic competition and fair-dealing. In numerous institutions for moral, æsthetic, and intellectual purposes, principles, standards, and codes are worked out and approved, so that in any particular department of human activity the custom or morals to be observed will be enforced by the particular public opinion attached to that institution. Thus, in every profession or economic occupation there is a well recognized code that must be observed by those within the group, such as the professional code of lawyer or physician, just as in athletics players must conform to the rules of the game, and just as even thieves must maintain fair play and "honor" among themselves.

Modifications in Morals.—Ethical customs of all sorts are subject to gradual modification in genetic civilization, though such modifications are at a minimum in static civilization. In dynamic civilization, however, change is so necessary, that society has devised many ways of accomplishing it. The easiest and most natural

is to introduce change by interpretation. Words acquire slight variations in sense through varying mentalities; there may be even deliberate misinterpretations by those in authority; secondary and primary meanings become confused, and all these causes combine to bring about modifications in moral codes. The process can easily be illustrated by a study of legal fictions, or of any commentary on law or on sacred writings.

A far more important system of modification originated when, as in legislation, persons in authority deliberately canceled an old custom, introduced a new, and compelled conformity to it. Roman judicial decisions under the empire, the councils of the church, and parliaments or legislatures of all kinds furnish numerous illustrations of the process. Artificial or telic customs of this sort represent one of the great achievements of dynamic civilization, and though legislation in morals is often unwise, and is responsible for many social evils, yet it is destined, as it becomes scientific, to be one of the greatest agencies of civilization for the removal of law or custom once useful, that in process of time has become a hindrance to higher civilization. Such revisions of codes should always, of course, be sustained by public opinion, though they will be voiced by the institutional groups of society, and by voluntary organizations formed for purposes of reform.

Group Morality.—In early civilization emphasis is placed wholly on group safety, and the entire system of morality is based on group custom. The special interests and beliefs of the individual, as such, are of no importance in comparison with the demands of the group, and he must be prepared to sacrifice life and family at the command of the authorities. This social requirement

has become so ingrained in humanity by centuries of training, that practically all persons still comply with social demands. Whenever public opinion definitely expresses itself, men yield to its commands, even though, as in war at the call of one's country, it may involve the loss of domestic comfort, property, or life itself. The same devotion is found also in the membership of other forms of group life, as in domestic and religious groups or societies, and in the numerous fraternities so common even among savage peoples.⁵ This group cohesion is one of the most valuable products of civilization, involving as it does coöperation, altruism, and the subordination of the individual to general welfare.

Opposition of Public and Private Interests.—Public opinion may demand even the subjection of one's conscience to public necessity, as voiced, for example, in Gino Capponi's famous praise of those "who love their country better than the safety of their own souls."⁶ Machiavelli's *Prince* is another illustration of this, being the familiar argument that for the good of the state one may do all manner of wickedness, since the end justifies the means. Modern illustrations are numerous enough; at times persons of excellent morals will carry out policies socially immoral, although seemingly beneficial to the group they represent. Hence we have the odd paradox in popular belief that a person may rightfully do for the group, what he as an individual is forbidden by conscience to do. As a diplomat or statesman he may give bribes, betray confidences, and oppress weaker nations, if a favorable opportunity offers. As a soldier in service he may commit murder or rape, steal property, and seek to inflict damage even on the civilians of hostile

⁵ See, for illustrations, Hutton Webster, *Primitive Secret Societies*.

⁶ Villari's *Machiavelli*, vol. iii, p. 253.

states. As the head of a corporation he may bribe, break laws, and steal franchises to the detriment of his fellow-citizens. As a politician he may debauch voters, break the laws of his country, and violate the rules of honesty and fair dealing; and as a lawyer he may use chicanery in practice, and teach corporations how to evade the laws he has sworn on entering the legal profession to uphold.

In the beginnings of civilization there was no such chasm between public and private interests. Property in the main was communal, social classes had not definitely been formed, and all shared alike in toil and reward. Under such conditions public opinion voiced by custom was a safe guide, and when a decision had once been made, opposition was probably selfish and rightly suppressed. Distinctions gradually crept in through the rise of classes and the development of individuals who dared to uphold their beliefs against group teachings, as illustrated by Antigone, who defied the orders of the king and obeyed the voice of an inner conscience. As private property grew in importance through the rise of individual ownership of land, capital, privileges, and monopolies, the owners of this wealth developed a code suited to their own interests, and not necessarily identical with one suited to the community as a whole. Again, as a leisure class arose and differentiated into the nobility and the professional groups these also built up their own codes, so that in process of time what might be right or moral for one class might be wrong or immoral for another.⁷ Thus, the dominant class or

⁷ A French nobleman of the Eighteenth Century naively put the thought in this form: "God would hesitate a long time before he would damn a gentleman"; who presumably was free to indulge in vice from which an ordinary man must refrain!

classes, in asserting their right to determine what was best for group or race safety, naturally insisted on a code suited to their own interests.

The decisions made by these, however, might be entirely contrary to the beliefs of the other classes, who, if intelligent, would be in a dilemma as to whether they should adhere to the command of the dominant group or to the standards of their own classes. Even in modern days such conflicting standards are numerous; should, for example, Friends, or other advocates of peace, be compelled to pay war taxes, and serve in the army; are men traitors, who, for moral reasons, oppose the policy of their government while it is engaged in war, as happened in our war with Mexico or Great Britain's war against the Boers; are dissenters rebellious who refuse to pay a tax for the educational schools of a state church; and should an oppressed mass of citizens fighting against a tyrannical government be treated as rebels or as patriots?⁸ History is filled with illustrations of the ways in which social ethics may differentiate into class ethics, and how each class may possibly consider its standards more worthy of obedience than the commands of society as a whole, if these are voiced through a rival but dominant class.

The question is still further complicated when individuals in advance of their age, or behind it, vigorously insist on their right to follow their own convictions as to their rightful course of action. Such a person may be bad or vicious, and insist on having his own will irrespective of general welfare; he may be one who sees more clearly the trend of development, who abominates

⁸ Note, for example, Franklin's famous remark to the friends of the Revolution, "We must all hang together or hang separately."

passing standards, and is willing to die fighting against them and for what he considers to be right; or he may be a "superman" rejoicing in his strength, trampling on the conventional, and determined to force his will on the community whether for weal or woe.

Toleration in Morals.—When society, in place of a simple general code of morals binding on all alike, finds itself thus torn by dissension among conflicting codes of group, class, and individual, its alternative is either to enforce vigorously a dominant code and stamp out opposition if possible, or to become tolerant, insisting merely on adherence to fundamental provisions and allowing a large freedom in all other matters. In democracies liberty is deemed so essential, that freedom to follow the dictates of one's conscience in morals, as well as in religion, is considered the mark of a developing civilization. Consequently one of the great sociological problems of the age is to show how an individual may cheerfully obey a code set by a group, and at the same time satisfy the dictates of his own conscience. In other words how can a person be truly an organic member of human society, and retain at the same time his individuality?

The solution is slowly being worked out in modern social regulation. There is, for example, an increasing recognition of the essential harmony of general economic and cultural interests. In place of fierce antagonism, and group and class struggle, there is a slow movement toward reciprocity, collective bargaining, joint agreement, joint administration, and the arbitration of disputes. The personality of individuals is respected more and more, and a sort of fraternalism succeeds class hostility. There are international associations of working men, interna-

tional groups for economic, religious, educational, and scientific purposes, and the diplomatic discussions of nations are inclining more and more to international courts, congresses, and leagues of nations and to joint action for common purposes.

Humanitarian Ethics.—This trend is powerfully supported by the growth of human altruism. Within the petty primitive group there was sympathy one for another and altruistic activity for general welfare, but enmity and a policy of exploitation expressed the group attitude toward all outside of it. Again, the cultural development of the group was so slight that what sympathy and altruism existed, was relatively of a low order, involving chiefly the satisfaction of physical needs. The movement to include within the group as worthy of altruistic service others than those of one's kin or nationality, has been remarkably slow in development, but modern illustrations of it can readily be traced in the great anti-slavery and missionary movements of the last two hundred years. The world war has temporarily disrupted international comity, so that we are yet far from an era of the brotherhood of man, even though religion theoretically assumes that "God . . . made of one blood all the nations of the earth." But when once again men are drawn closer together by common interests and better knowledge of one another's nobler qualities, there may tend to develop an inter-racial morality that will allow no distinctions based on difference in color or degree of civilization. As Burns puts it:

It's comin' yet for a' that;
That man to man, the world o'er,
Shall brothers be for a' that!⁹

⁹ Burns, *Is there, for honest poverty.*

Modern Altruism.—In addition to this broadening of human relationships there has been also a deepening of the intensity of altruistic feeling. The simple, spontaneous sympathy of natural kinship is unreflecting and often injudicious. It acts on the impulse of the moment, without thought of consistency or consequences. But as the race develops in experience and in mentality, its sympathies become ordered, purposive, and consistent. Temporary alleviation of distress changes into a desire to banish the causes of misery, and spasmodic altruism becomes a humanitarianism so generous in its scope as to include animal and plant life and an appreciation of the beauty of nature itself. This deepening of human interests can be traced best from the Eighteenth Century, when in western Europe, though especially in France, there came a growing emphasis on the humane and the natural. The strength of this newer sympathy can be noted even in the wild scenes of the French Revolution, when the French by legislation attempted to forbid cruelty to animals, to alleviate the conditions of the proletariat, to exalt the status of women, and to emphasize the equality and fraternity of mankind. From those to the present, in higher civilization cruelty in any form whatsoever has become abhorrent, and every attempt is made to lessen the pain of surgery, the suffering of neglected childhood, the woes of a half-starved proletariat, the misery involved in crime, vice, pauperism, slavery, or the ill treatment of animals,¹⁰ or even wanton injury to trees or natural scenery.

Changing Bases of Morality.—This altruistic development indicates the changing bases of morality. In a low economic civilization the cultural side of social

* See Henry S. Salt, *Animals' Rights*.

life must be correspondingly simple, and morality consists of the homely virtues developed through struggle against odds. When, however, economic conditions become complex, the earlier sort of morality expands, so as to adjust itself to the broader aspects of cultural civilization. The morality of freedom succeeds customary and compulsory morality. The individual must move in the midst of a thousand temptations and yet exercise self-control. He strives not so much to avoid a penalty as to learn how to choose happiness wisely. We are passing, as Dr. Patten puts it, from a pain to a pleasure economy. We are set against pain and purpose to minimize it. There is the desire to multiply the happiness of men and to develop their natures, so that they will adapt themselves to newer standards of altruism; for we are becoming deeply sympathetic one with another and will rest satisfied only with the perfect happiness of every man—an eternal task, since perfect happiness is always in the future, and impossible of complete attainment. Sympathy, therefore will become increasingly positive, but in place of sympathy with suffering, will come sympathy with joy and happiness, and the kinship of kindness will take the place of the primitive kinship of blood. Like the joy of a mother as she watches the play of her children and dreams of their continued happiness and helpfulness in maturity, so society as a fostering parent will strive to free her children from pain, to lead them into the paths of happiness, and as they mature will expect them to dedicate their lives to the common well-being.

Much might be done if the State should emphasize vigorously a policy for the upbuilding of health, wealth, and education, since it would thereby exert indirectly a most significant influence on ethics and religion. Just as

an individual may sin against a religious code and suffer ecclesiastical condemnation, or against a legal code and suffer the penalty of the law, so there are in social life normal standards which, when violated, result in social sin, with their inevitable evil consequences. Drunkenness, sexual immorality, crime, pauperism, and disease are chiefly artificial, and are the social consequences of a defective civilization. Society sins when it allows exploitation of man by man, or a large per cent of its citizenship to live at a standard of bare subsistence, or leaves the nation in such ignorance that the people know how neither to ward off disease, nor to become skilled in industry, nor to adapt themselves to an urban civilization. These sins of society are preventable, and the cost of prevention is far less than the cost of cure. It is very much cheaper and easier to prevent sickness than to pay doctors' bills, funeral expenses, and the demands of charity. It is far easier to reduce the demand for liquors and drugs as stimulants, than to pay the bills of drunkenness, crime, and pauperism.

By far the larger half of legal crimes could be wiped out if criminal procedure were improved and educational methods for misdemeanants substituted for the jail. No civilized country should be cursed with a large per cent of illiterate and unskilled population. All labor should be intelligent and every person skilled in some form of industry, even the children of the wealthy. The State, therefore, should devote itself wisely and judiciously to the development of the physical health of its citizens by removing conditions that breed degeneracy and disease; it should through science, invention, and carefully framed laws, build up its wealth on democratic lines, warring against all forms of exploitation; and should, through an education

founded on carefully tested psychological theories, impart to the citizen body a knowledge of personal hygiene, social sanitation, and a proper training in information needful for industrial and social life. Should it do so, the State would thereby so modify the social conditions of life that ethical and religious institutions would with ease exalt the ideals of life and develop a spiritual civilization such as heretofore society has imagined only in utopian form. Wiser parents practise such a policy in behalf of their own offspring. By proper medical care and nourishing food, by healthful and stimulating companionship, and by careful attention to the entire process of education, they strive to prepare an environment in which the natural capacities of the child can expand into a character able to maintain and add to the honor and reputation of the family. In the same way the State, by devoting itself assiduously to the development of an environment able to call out the best within its racial stock, will reap its reward in the moral earnestness and intelligent capacity of its citizens.¹¹

Idealism in Morals.—This coming stage in ethical standards will be brought about by the telic development of moral ideals in harmony with improving social conditions. Prohibitive codes and minute regulations of all sorts are already rapidly becoming obsolete; a full freedom of conscience must be maintained, to be sure, but a wise social policy will see to it that individual minds are trained under such stimulating surroundings that they will easily and spontaneously turn toward the nobler standards of action. The doctrine of the innate depravity of man has fortunately gone to join the hell from which

¹¹ See author's pamphlet on *Ethical and Religious Significance of the State*.

it sprang, and in place of it religion teaches men to believe in the essential Godlikeness of humanity. The goal, therefore, in social ethics is plain; on the assumption that men prefer right to wrong under proper conditions in life, the aim of ethical reforms should be to moralize the conditions of human existence through economic changes, to stimulate moral idealism by wiser education and training, to remove as rapidly as possible from our codes prohibitions and restraints, and at the same time, by the pressure of intelligent public opinion, to guide human conduct along lines that racial experience and reflection have shown to be productive of race safety and human happiness.

CHAPTER XIX

CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Basis of Cultural Civilization.—When Plato in his *Republic* tried, for argument's sake, to depict the delights of the simple life, fastidious Glaucon protested on the ground that such an existence was more suited to a community of swine than of men.¹ A similar objection would hold in regard to a civilization based merely on material achievement. If physical enjoyment and the amassing of wealth were the final pursuits of society, others besides Huxley would wish for a kindly comet to come and sweep away the earth into primitive chaos. Yet in social evolution all things are traceable to humble origins, and the Greek ideals of the good, the beautiful, and the true, are, after all, mere by-products of the material and the useful.

The chief defect of Indian philosophy is the neglect of this principle. Its philosophers in their search for truth failed to see the necessity of scientific knowledge as a basis for a developed material civilization, which in its turn would be a basis for art and philosophy. They fixed their attention on transcendental themes, to the neglect of the world of activity, which indeed to them seemed mere illusion in comparison to absorption in the infinite. By this reversion of the natural order of social evolution, India developed marvelous systems of religion and philosophy, well worthy of profoundest respect, the effect of

¹ Book II, Sec. 372.

which, however, has been to deaden social energy and to heap up an endless burden of ritualism and superstition on an inert and poverty-stricken population. Had that same intellectual capacity devoted itself to scientific achievement, yoking in that way intellectuality and material progress, India would now in all probability be a dominant federation of nations, wealthy and powerful, having all the conditions for cultural civilization, and it would supply to the world a philosophy less transcendental presumably, but more true to science. For through material attainment only does it become possible to free a relatively large part of a population from economic slavery, and to make knowledge accessible to all.

As long as a civilization is agricultural, neglecting commerce and manufactures, it is impossible to amass a surplus for the comfortable support of a relatively large leisure class. Increased wealth in the community makes possible a wide diffusion of knowledge and the utilization of dormant mental energy. Capacity for the highest mentality is potential in the humblest human stock, but can be called forth only by generations of training under favorable conditions. These, in the form of leisure and a stimulating mental environment, have come to some extent to-day, when a man by his comprehension of nature is enabled to perform through machinery the work of a thousand men. It is important, therefore, to see that sociological theory emphasizes the material as fundamental, not because it is relatively better than the cultural, but because without it cultural civilization becomes fantastic in aim, the monopoly of a few, and the adornment of a class, rather than the inspiration of a people.

Growth of Cultural Achievements.—Ethnological studies show clearly how readily the human mind, when

bodily wants are satisfied, and foods are abundant, turns toward the æsthetic, and reflects on the moralities of human relationships and on the supernatural. For under such conditions social companionship becomes possible, language grows by use, there is a play of mind on mind, and kindlier feelings are developed. Every achievement out of the usual attracts attention, and by imitation becomes a group possession; reminiscences and interpretations of experiences are exchanged, and the mind, receptive to such knowledge, becomes stored with useful information. Combinations of color, the rhythm of motion and tone, early captivated men's imagination, and the beauty of the celestial bodies and the blue sky called out a reverence for something bigger and better than the petty round of material experience. These higher appreciations reacted on the routine of their daily life, so that they saw beauty in the sheltering tree, in the spring that supplied refreshing water, in the friendly faces of companions, and in the graceful gamboling of playing children.² Then they strove to actualize their æsthetic imaginings, and made constant attempts to adorn their utensils, weapons, and habitations, and to beautify their bodies by ornamentation and clothing, itself probably chiefly intended then and largely even now for purposes of adornment. Under such influences by slow degrees through selective processes the human nervous system became differentiated, so as to respond to higher emotions, so that men sought to satisfy the craving for the thrill and ecstasy of life by rude attempts in dancing, music, poetry, and the drama; and, as the hand became flexible, in symbolic drawings. As the intellect became able to concentrate its attention

² For studies showing the social importance of play, see Karl Groos, *The Play of Animals* and *The Play of Man*.

on the properties and relationships of things, as well as on things themselves, there came notions of goodness based on an appreciation of what was safe for the group, and the conclusion that what the group considered useful, good, and beautiful was also true, and as truth should be fixed by custom and held sacred.

Static Standards.—As these standards became hallowed by time, they became conventionalized and tended to arrest the progress of civilization. Set customs, beliefs, and standards hold men in bondage to a dead ancestry, so that the very goodness of the past may become a curse to the present. As the Greeks used to say, "the good is often the enemy of the best." Civilization attains a relative goodness, sanctions it, passes it on by custom and tradition, and then easily assumes that anything in opposition is false and bad. Even in the United States to be charged with heresy and radicalism is a serious crime in popular estimation, but in static civilization it is high treason and the unpardonable sin.

Dynamic Changes in Cultural Ideals.—The fundamental conditions of social life have often, however, been upset by war or by economic necessity or by some great inventive achievement, and in consequence newer cultural ideals have arisen. This difference may be introduced by the differing ideals of the conquerors, or mentality may quicken through social friction, and cultural standards develop to a higher plane in the minds of the leisure class. These standards by imitation, conscious or unconscious, would pass down into the mass of the race and thus slowly supersede lower standards. By repeated changes of this sort there would develop constantly rising standards of cultural civilization, and slow progress would take place. If on the other hand the material con-

ditions of life should become steadily worse for a given race, degeneration would follow; for a people, like an individual, sinks into degradation when it loses its self-respect.

The Leisure Class.—Fortunately for cultural civilization dynamic changes developed a class of masterful persons who attained for themselves wealth and leisure. Out of this class, freed from economic struggle, came a long line of statesmen, warriors, priests, idealists, and thinkers, who devoted themselves to cultural achievements, and thus gave a mighty impetus to higher civilization. The members of a leisure class with relatively powerful mentality, debarred by custom from participation in menial industrial pursuits or trade, must turn their energy either into wasteful or else apparently non-useful directions. They may devote themselves mainly to dissipation, to games and athletic exercises, or to ceremonial social life; or they may seek to occupy their minds with æsthetic and intellectual pursuits, devoting themselves to art, music, literature, and the drama, or to science and philosophy. Doubtless a large part of the energy of the leisure class was wasted or worse than wasted, but here and there, tasks undertaken so as to escape ennui, the curse of leisure, became in process of time pleasurable in themselves, so that many persons became really fond of the æsthetic and intellectual. Their manifest delight in their new occupations stimulated others to like pursuits, and created a feeling of emulation, so that gradually there arose a conviction that mental and social superiority were indicated by the possession of cultural desires and by a knowledge of cultural achievements. Then began that movement toward cultural civilization into which mankind is slowly passing at the present time.

Cultural knowledge and desires have so far come to be considered the mark of high breeding, that every person who aspires to be ranked high in social estimation must at any rate have the appearance of culture, whatever his actual possession may be.

A New Slavery.—Hence, historically speaking, the children of the leisure class were to some extent withdrawn from play and natural pursuits and compelled to spend long hours in study, with the hope that they might attain a love for the æsthetic and the philosophic, or at any rate might seem to have a knowledge of these cultural accomplishments. In essence this is a kind of slavery. Just as forced labor selected a type of man who had a fondness for physical exercise and work, so compulsory service in mental toil, it is thought, may create ultimately a taste for higher education, the shibboleth of modern society. This newer slavery, like economic slavery, has its good and bad aspects. Economic slavery is certainly evil in that it emphasizes a dull and monotonous routine of tiresome labor, without incentive, and lacking all stimulus to higher achievement. On the other hand, slavery has a distinct utility, when it accustoms men to work and produces economic results; so also there may be a utility in compulsory mental work if it result in mental training. Yet the treadmill of higher education, in so far as it reproduces slavery in the intellectual field, has its evil aspect. As in the classical education of the Chinese, or the traditional curriculum of old-fashioned colleges, obsolete teachings, once noble and inspiring, may be so spun out into endless detail as to produce ineffable weariness in the mind of the student, who in daily life lives in an entirely different atmosphere. Yet the mind by endless repetition may become so used to its routine

as to like it, and may become blinded to higher and broader achievements through devotion to the dead; like the ass that, released from the weary path of the millstone, still treads it out of habit, to the neglect of the clover fields beyond.

Higher Education for the Elite Only.—One should never forget that compulsion and slavery are marks of low civilization, and best suited to the conditions and needs of primitive humanity. It seems like a contradiction of terms to think of compulsion in higher education, as though Socrates or Plato should compel his students to recite on Attic philosophy, or insist that they display high intelligence in their replies to interrogations, under penalty of expulsion. If Greeks are made slaves, one feels the incongruity of it. Compulsory education given from the view point of mental gymnastics, dulls the mind, destroys the incentive to achievement, and develops prigs and pedants instead of an élite. In other words cultural education should not be imparted merely to children of a wealthy class as a mark of social superiority, and should never be presented in traditional forms. Rather it should be held out in its highest and most inspiring forms as a prize for the capable, made accessible even to the humblest born; and those only should be encouraged to attain it who feel in their hearts the desire to get beyond the material and to grasp after the ideals of higher civilization.

The Receptive Mind.—There is a certain kind of mind that even in childhood begins to manifest its superiority by the receptive manner in which it holds itself toward the world round about. There are eyes that see not and ears that hear not, but a mind which has the scientific faculty of observation is different in quality.

It sees, compares, and classifies, thus storing up ideas and judgments for future use. If it then has presented to it a developing series of useful information and knowledge, with hints as to possible attainments in the future, imagination begins to work on the material already acquired, and to reshape it into creative forms. If the mind, for example, is made familiar with tools, the properties of matter, and the utilization of natural energy, it turns intuitively into the direction of invention, and by experimentation endeavors to make an improvement in some familiar field, or from known laws and principles seeks to work out in the laboratory a new scientific truth. If, again, the mind becomes familiar with æsthetic standards, during adolescence its higher emotions will turn toward ideals of beauty in form, color, or sound, and in sculpture, painting, or music will seek to embody in tangible shape the ideals of the imagination struggling for expression. As the years of maturity approach, a comprehension of nature and of æsthetic standards lead it to ideals of goodness and truth, and the great principles of ethics and philosophy fascinate one's attention. From that time forth the student has sounded the possibilities of human experience and is prepared to take his place in the life of his generation. He has passed from the material to the æsthetic, and thence to the moral and the intellectual. He appreciates both the worth of economic principles and the value of culture, and has become in the proper sense of the term educated.

Yet this is by no means a common experience. Many children through heredity are hopelessly dull and unimaginative. Many more are made so by defective training in home or school, so that the higher capacities of their minds become atrophied. Others may become ex-

pert in inventive directions but may never gain appreciation of the cultural elements of life. Others again may develop the æsthetic but not the moral or the intellectual, and become perverts, socially injurious in spite of their artistic qualifications. Or the moral may be developed without the intellectual, or the intellectual without the moral, or, as so commonly is the case, persons may be trained in all of these, but so defectively in method or in accuracy, that they are seriously handicapped by the necessity of rejecting in the future much of their past instruction.

Social Importance of Cultural Achievement.—Yet the hope of future improvement in higher civilization lies in the possibility of the multiplication of cultural achievement. Life must really be made worth living, not for the few only, but for the many. At present it is a mere existence to most, often unendurable, and frequently evaded by suicide. The pleasures of physical appetites, even if abundantly satisfied, as is rarely the case, are short in duration and decrease in intensity with age. A joyless old age is inevitable for those who live for physical gratification only. Even if happiness is found in economic pursuit and the amassing of wealth, absorption in this alone dwarfs a man's intellect and starves his soul. Economic attainment and achievement are fundamental to the individual as well as to society, but chiefly as the means through which he may cultivate a love for art, a thirst for knowledge, and the joy of achievement. The happiness in cultural attainment is permanent, for it is easily recalled to the memory, strengthens by use, and remains through life. The physical passions and appetites are few in number, are easily satiated, and over-indulgence becomes painful; but the

æsthetic, moral, and intellectual desires are innumerable, and the more one develops his capacity in these directions, the greater becomes the number of possibilities for their satisfaction and his happiness. When such ideals as these possess the mind, it becomes absorbed in them to the exclusion of vice and dissipation. The higher subordinates the lower, and the person has, sociologically speaking, passed from death unto life and "become converted."

The Telic Achievement of Culture.—For such reasons the social importance of having a fraction, at least, of society set apart for cultural achievement should be fully recognized. In genetic civilization this, of course, is done by separating from the mass a nobility or a professional class, freeing them from the necessity of economic toil, and then in a sense trusting to luck that they will produce a cultural civilization worthy of the group. Whether or not this is the result, it is, at all events, like all genetic achievement, highly expensive in proportion to the benefits received. Not only do these classes achieve much that is socially injurious along with the beneficial, but the good relatively decreases as the classes become hereditary. If a noble and professional class were made up only of those who had shown their capacity by their deeds, it might well be given generous economic support, so as to induce it to continue its achievements. An hereditary class, however, produces the usual per cent of dullards and aimless individuals, who naturally should drop back into the ranks of industrial workers, but who instead are supported at the expense of society and become social drones and parasites.

A Career for Talent.—The first great demand, therefore, in social theorizing in regard to the leisure

class is that membership in it be thrown open to competition. Plato in his *Republic* advocated such a system and would have the highest positions in society open to the most capable citizens, irrespective of rank or sex. The ancient Chinese system of office holding is based on the same idea, and, aside from the fact that the standards of success demanded a mastery of antiquated knowledge, if honestly administered would be most excellent. At any rate one of the most important developments in social history is the rise of a demand that an hereditary leisure class shall give place to one chosen for capacity and achievement. As Napoleon put it, there was a marshal's baton in the knapsack of every French soldier; and in recent years we have seen a saddler mount to the headship of sixty millions of people and two exiled outcasts rule the Russias in place of the Tsar.

This democratic movement we already see in process of consummation. In nearly all civilized countries men from low ranks may push to the front, lead armies, govern nations, manage great economic interests, enter the professions, or aspire to become the artists and philosophers of the age. In consequence of this change many offices formerly unsalaried are now salaried, so as to furnish a means of support to their holders; fees, patents, and copyrights supply income, and artistic achievements find a ready sale in the markets. Membership in the leisure class, therefore, is in part on a competitive basis; it is thrown open to all members of society, and economic support is freely given from the returns of industrial production to those who maintain cultural achievement.

Genetic Choice.—There are, however, other possibilities of improvement in connection with the leisure class. Membership in it is filled by genetic not telic

choice, and here again much social waste is inevitable. Society makes no attempt to select its capable citizens and train them for cultural achievement. It waits until a person has fought his way to notice and made his achievement, and then receives him into the charmed circle of leisure. The theory in justification of this is that a talented person or a genius will inevitably become famous, and that the very process of intensive struggle is essential to greatness. There is, of course, some truth in this; some great men do struggle up from the ranks to leadership, and a certain kind of greatness is best developed in the school of hard knocks.

The question arises, however, whether many naturally gifted persons are not physically and mentally stunted by the wretched environment of their early youth; whether many others are not so poorly circumstanced through poverty and the lack of stimulating mental surroundings, that the energy of their minds is expended in inferior directions; whether others again are not distorted by unscientific education, so that they never attain to their real possibilities; and whether, finally, there are not some natures so sensitive and refined, that their best products become blighted in a keenly competitive system, so that the aggressive only survives but not the ethereal and the spiritual. "In quietness the divine is born," not in Wall Street or in the stock yards of Chicago.

Latent Talent and Genius.—Gray's *Elegy in a Country Churchyard* is an apt illustration of the newer thought. There is latent in the mass of mankind, of whatever degree of civilization, a very much larger per cent of talent and genius than ever will come to notice through its own unaided exertions, and some method

should be devised whereby this potential capacity, so greatly needed by society, may be developed and utilized for cultural achievement.⁸

There is undoubtedly latent in every society an enormous amount of capacity for material invention, only awaiting proper training and opportunity for usefulness. In the same manner right training and opportunity in cultural civilization for all would call out latent power that would enrich with its achievements the society that gave it life and nurture. If children at birth are favored with a normal physique and mentality, are wisely trained in body and mind, are freed from the handicap of extreme poverty, surrounded by the evidences of cultural life, and stimulated by contact with higher education, all the conditions are present that should result in the development of whatever talent and genius there is. Then if society is dynamic, abundant opportunity will arise and allow expression to talent or genius. It matters little whether this be in one direction or another. Rarely does it happen that talent is suited to one occupation only. Any sphere of activity that opens itself is sufficient, for, pent-up energy, guided by a well-trained intellect, soon finds its appropriate task and will achieve in almost any conceivable direction. One of the chief aims of society, therefore, should be to provide for its citizens a healthful physical and economic environment, favoring environment in the way of libraries, museums, art institutes and kindred cultural agencies, and provisions for carefully planned systems of education. Its reward will come in the material and cultural achievements made by its citizens.

⁸ See Chapter XX.

Leisure and the Industries.—There is still another point needing attention in respect to the leisure class. To many it seems unfair that society should be divided, even if intelligently done, into a leisure class and a class of industrial workers. It is argued that the leisure class also should engage in industrial labor, so as to keep in touch with the material side of civilization and thus be identified with humanity as a whole; and, on the other hand, it is asserted that the industrial class should be allowed leisure in order that they might make some attainment in cultural knowledge and share to a small extent, at least, in its achievements. From the sociological standpoint the force of the argument must be admitted. Permanently mankind cannot remain half cultural, half industrial in occupation. Yet if participation in industrial life by the leisure class meant a lessening of achievement in cultural civilization, it would be more expedient to condone a social cleavage than to lessen the output of higher civilization.

Indications, however, are pointing to a possible solution that in process of time may solve the dilemma. As man advances in knowledge he learns how more effectively to master nature, to manipulate its resources at will, and to harness for his purposes its energy and productivity. Each forward step implies that men shall henceforth rely less on their own muscular exertions and more on mental capacity. The mechanical, routine drudgery of life is slowly passing away, and in its place is coming a demand for trained intellect utilizing machinery. But this implies far greater productivity for the same amount of human energy. Hence it is becoming possible to reduce the necessary hours of daily labor from fifteen to twelve, from twelve to ten, from ten to

nine, from nine to eight, and the time will yet come when from three to four hours per day will be ample for all purposes. As the working day decreases in length, the worker will find himself with abundant leisure on his hands, and he also will find pleasure in the arts, in science, and in philosophic meditation. In short, all will become members of the leisure class, for all will have energy and opportunity for the cultivation of the higher life. It is for this reason that sociology insists on the final elimination of unskilled and wretchedly paid labor and the substitution of machinery for it. With it will go the large family of the improvident, reared in crowded tenements and so prolific in vice, crime, and pauperism. When unskilled labor and ignorance disappear from civilization, the social reformer will at last come into his own, and utopians may rest in peace.

The Real Classes in Society.—Sociology, therefore, is in essence neither aristocratic nor democratic, but prefers a synthesis of these social ideals. All are called to social achievement, many strive to accomplish, and some succeed beyond their early dreams. The real élite in society, the real aristocracy, is made up of those who add to or improve the sum total of social achievement. Whether this be done in the industrial world or in the realms of morals and religion, of art, science, or philosophy, whoever improves the conditions of social life, who adds to the happiness of his fellows, who builds up the material and spiritual capacity of the race, is to the extent of his achievement a member of the aristocracy of civilization. There are many, to be sure, who for special reasons cannot count themselves among the great. Yet as long as they turn their faces toward the light and struggle manfully to impart to their children wiser and

better training than they themselves had, they form that sturdy stock from whose descendants in later generations society will constantly recruit the ranks of the coming nobility.⁴

At the bottom of the scale are the social parasites for whom improvement or extermination must be the alternatives. No society can afford permanently to support a mass of idlers made up of the unemployed rich, those engaged in useless occupations, and the commonplace tramp, criminal, and pauper. Much of this idleness is due to defective social arrangements in respect to inheritance, industry, and education. But unquestionably one of the first fruits of the development of a higher culture must be the gradual elimination of all forms of social parasitism, so as to have those only enjoy the blessings of civilization who contribute their share toward the up-building of all that makes life worth living.

⁴See H. G. Wells, *A Modern Utopia*, and note how he works out this thought in his *Order of the Samuri*.

CHAPTER XX

SOCIAL GRADATIONS AND GENIUS

The Average Man.—In modern statistics the theory of averages plays an important part. Quételet, for example, who may be considered as the first to apply definitely statistics to social phenomena, developed the notion that in any social group there is an average man who is the type of masses of persons composing the group. As variations from the average man will be found those above or below the average, who are from that standpoint *abnormal* even though those above the average are obviously men of talent and genius. If, therefore, the population of any considerable social group were arranged on a scale in the order of their social importance, the mass of the population would be found ranged about the middle of the scale, above and below, and above the mass there would be a superior, and below, an inferior class, each of these including a relatively small part of the population. In different social groups the exact fractions of the scale occupied by the masses and the superior and inferior classes would depend on the economic conditions and general intelligence of the particular group. In social discussions, therefore, attention may be directed to the average man or the masses, or to the small fraction of humanity considered to be below the normal, or to the *supernormal* man, the higher classes, including the supermen of

Nietzsche and George Bernard Shaw, the men of talent and genius.

Social Superiority.—The notion of social superiority readily assumes a threefold aspect, namely, superiority of race, or of class, or of individuals. (1) There may be a classification of races, nations, or civilizations, indicating some as superior, enlightened, or dominant, by comparison with those of relatively smaller attainment; (2) or a large social group may be considered as differentiated into specialized groups, among which may be recognized a dominant group or superior groups—the superior classes or castes, such as the warriors, the nobility, the priesthood, the intellectuals, or the capitalists; (3) or stress may be placed on superior individuals, persons of talent, genius, and of dominating personality.

I. Race Superiority.—If the whole of the world's population be taken into consideration there may be a classification involving comparisons between grades of civilization, like that of the West and the East, or broad racial distinctions like that between the white and other racial stocks, or there may be comparisons of national groups distinguishing the leading or dominant nations from those apparently of small importance. In early civilization especially, but also in all ages, capacity in war was made basal for claims of superiority, like that of the Suevi, who, in Cæsar's account of the Germans, deliberately kept desolate the lands adjoining their own as a proof of their superiority over other tribes. On the other hand, Pericles in his *Funeral Oration*, addressing the citizens of Athens, belittled the militarism of Sparta as a basis of supremacy and stressed by contrast the culture and intellectual greatness of the Athenians: just as, in further illustration, ancient China under the em-

pire slighted its military class in favor of the learned body of mandarins, expert in Chinese classics. Supremacy, again, may take an economic aspect, as when a nation boasts of its leadership in commerce or industries, or in inventive capacity, or in *per capita* wealth; or it may take a political aspect in a nation's pride in its army or its sea power, or in the efficiency of its governmental machinery, or in a superior type of democracy; or it may take even a religious form, like the Hebraic claim to be a people especially chosen of God for some definite purpose. In history we read of contrasts between war-like aggressive nations and peace-loving passive peoples like the Slovacs among the Slavs; or Christendom is compared with the heathen or the Mohammedan world, or Occidental with Oriental civilization, or the Scandinavian blond with the Mediterranean brunette or urban-loving dolichocephalic stock is contrasted with rural brachycephalic races. Unquestionably there are such differences, some types are superior, others are inferior, but there is as yet no consensus of opinion as to whether these differences are inherent through heredity, or, as is more likely, are for the most part the results of long continuing environment of varying quality.

II. Class Superiority.—Even in primitive hordes there apparently developed an appreciation of difference between the masses and the superior few. Varying with social conditions of peace or war, or the intensity of superstitious beliefs, there arose a respect for older men, the elders or *senatus*, who, in a comparatively static situation, by virtue of age had acquired a larger experience, the benefits of which they retained in memory as guides for future decisions. These consequently were wiser than younger men, men of small experience, who, in de-

fault of written traditions, had to rely on the wisdom of the "ancients" as their source of general information. In these earlier civilizations elders regularly were treated with deference by younger men, as illustrated, for example, by the respect paid by the Greek chieftains besieging Troy to old Nestor, who had already outlived two generations of his tribe, and was then the ruler over the third (*Iliad*, Book I). These elders were the war leaders, the wise men and the *seers* of their time; they were expert in a knowledge of traditions and customs, and from their knowledge of the past and the present, might to some degree *see* into the future and give wise counsel. If their experiences became specialized in particular fields of activity, so that they became leaders in these, then *skill* added to their prestige as leaders in war, or in the art of healing, or in their knowledge of the supernatural, and the best methods of appeasing angry deities. The lives of persons so important as these were socially valuable and their services were worth more in their specialties than in the ordinary vocations of society, so that they were freed from economic toil and larger portions and the better grades of foods became theirs by general consent, and this generosity became sanctioned by custom into rights. When communal property developed, these leaders held it in trust for the community managing and administering it for the common good, reserving, as before, a larger proportionate share for themselves; naturally when private rights in property became prominent, the larger share, or even the whole of the communal property came to be considered as the personal possession of the elders, and when autocracy developed, as the especial property of the chief noble or ruler of the group.

Hereditary Classes.—Under the earlier system, any person who survived the intense struggle for existence in those days, became an elder and might aspire through skill to become a leader in war or in the priestly craft. But, in process of time, close corporations arose in the form of professional or trade guilds which regulated admissions to their ranks by requirements of submission to the authority of the inner leadership, accompanied by gifts and pledges of service. Still later, with the rise of definite kinship ties, rights of membership tended to pass as a family inheritance, so that persons were *born* royal or noble, or into professional classes. Custom, law, and religion in process of time sanctioned and hallowed these distinctions, which were strengthened by the rise of the inheritance of private property, thus guarantying, as it were, an economic basis of wealth to the superior classes. But when the possessors of privilege were able to determine who their successors should be, by means of their power to determine conditions of admission or by insistence on hereditary right, the older theory of leadership slowly passed into oblivion, since control no longer depended on age, skill, or intellectual acumen, but on birth and favoritism.

In the case of a superior man, his greatness is easily obvious because in attainment he stands head and shoulders above his fellows. A superior class, likewise, justifies its existence by the achievements it makes and stresses its social obligation as the chief ground for its privileges (*noblesse oblige*). Yet although the class itself may be superior to other classes of the same group, many of the individual members of it may, to a large extent, compare unfavorably with the better members of these other classes. Class superiority, as a rule, is

sanctioned by ancient custom and traditional beliefs, it is strengthened by ceremony and the prestige of rank, it even may be hallowed by religion and venerated as a class placed in power by divine authority. But the prestige of the class as a whole permits of a membership partly useful and partly, perhaps largely, parasitic in type. Like the image of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the head was of fine gold, but the rest of the body grew progressively inferior in composition and ended in feet partly iron and partly clay.¹ One serious social consequence from the presence of these inferior individuals lies in the fact that these may so dominate in numbers as to handicap seriously the social group in its competitions with other groups, since leadership would often be in the hands of the incompetent. In consequence, in times of great crises, a theoretically superior class or classes may fall under the social ban, as in the French and Bolshevik Revolutions, or if they remain in power, may bring destruction to their nation through their incompetent leadership. It is an excellent illustration of the social principle, that the relatively good of a static age may become evil in a dynamic movement. The demand for leadership is natural and inevitable. Primitive civilization met this demand by furnishing an equality of opportunity and honoring those who showed capacity in safeguarding and strengthening the group. The human egoistic impulses reach out for a monopolization of privileges and seek to perpetuate these through law and custom, emphasizing hereditary rights. Social systems thereby become crystallized, ossified, and resistant to modification, so that they pass automatically in process of time into the limbo of degeneration and atrophy.

¹ Daniel II., 31-33.

Class Distinctions.—Illustrations of class distinctions are of course numerous. As far back as history goes there existed a warrior class, or warrior tribes and nations, like the Ashantees of South Africa, the Maori of New Zealand, the Aztecs of Mexico in the time of Cortes, the military aristocracy of Sparta or the Rajput caste of India, the Samurai of Japan, or the Knights of the Middle Ages. A warrior class, holding lands, readily becomes a nobility class, devoted, as a rule, to war and government. Intellectual preëminence also has regularly been recognized by special privileges like those bestowed on the priesthood or on the philosopher or the professional classes generally. Capitalistic wealth, developed through commerce and manufactures, also becomes the basis of class distinction, like the *equites* of the later Roman Republic, and, as the "third estate," becomes the stratum of population from which the most capable or the wealthiest are promoted into the ranks of the nobility and the intellectual professions, although promotion into the higher classes may be possible at times even from slavery, as in Imperial Rome or modern Turkey, or from the peasantry, as in China through its ancient system of examinations.

Class distinctions frequently arise as the result of the struggle of races competing for survival. Ancient wars resulted in conquest and subjugation, so that the conquerors settled down on the territories of the conquered and exploited them after a partial extermination. In such cases class superiority is racial and there may be definite attempts to preserve racial purity by religious prohibitions against intermarriage or entrance into higher vocations. Specialized vocational classes thus protected against amalgamation or rivalry, and sanctioned by re-

ligion readily develop into castes, like the caste system of India,² which represents the extreme of specialization and rigidity. When conquests are compounded, social stratification becomes very complex since several grades of inferiority may thus readily develop, as illustrated, for example, in the social distinctions that developed in the composite populations of former Austria-Hungary and in the Balkan States. In racial conflicts a race may in a sense become outlawed on the theory that they are socially dangerous, and attempts may be made to exterminate them, as illustrated by the policy of the Israelites under Joshua towards the urbanized Canaanites,³ or their decision to blot out the tribe of Benjamin because of its sins,⁴ or the many attempts of modern Turkey to massacre the Armenians, on the ground that they destroy the unity of the Empire, because of their insistence on the maintenance of their own religion and nationality.

Oppressed Classes.—In the traditions of ancient history, as shown by the great states of former days such as Egypt, there seem to have regularly existed gradations of social classes. This was true also in democratic Athens and still more so in oligarchic Sparta. Plato's *Republic* sought to find a reasonable and just basis in heredity for a classification of population on the theory that the best and wisest should rule, since, he argued, society will never be well governed until "rulers become philosophers or philosophers, rulers." Aristotle's *Politics* also had a thorough discussion of the relation of classes in a state and lays great stress on the importance of a middle class as a sort of buffer between the rich and

² Note, Ketkar's *History of Caste in India*.

³ Deut. XX.

⁴ Judges XX-XXI.

the poor. Both of these Greek writers had a lordly contempt for aliens, mechanics, and artisans and held that most men were by nature unfitted for freedom, since they lacked wisdom and virtue.

In all social history, both ancient and modern, sharp contrasts in rights are to be found between the privileged and the oppressed classes, between the noble and the peasant, and the master and the slave. On the masses was placed by far the larger share of misery and suffering, along with savage and vindictive punishments for wrong doing. Little value was placed on human life and the lives of the masses were of no more value than those of other animals useful to their masters. They were considered mere pawns in the game, to be played for the advantage of king, warrior, or priest. As inferiors they could claim no rights as against their betters nor did the "ten commandments" hold in the moral relations existing between the two classes. On the one side was merciless exploitation, on the other a hatred of the oppressor and a glorification of the Robin Hoods and Dick Turpins who "rob the rich to feed the poor." Sabotage is a modern illustration of this dualism in morals, just as formerly buccaneering or smuggling was blameworthy or praiseworthy according to the point of view.

The enslavement of the masses is favored most in static groupings of semi-tropical civilizations based on old-fashioned methods of agriculture. In such situations the production of foods from a given area is practically fixed, so that there is a Malthusian struggle for food on the part of a multiplying population, as illustrated in the biblical tradition of Joseph,⁵ who in time of famine took advantage of the necessity of the Egyp-

⁵Genesis XLVII.

tians and sold them food in return for their lands and liberty. When the struggle is not so keen, or newer lands are available for expansion, or when changing conditions bring about a changing civilization, emphasizing perhaps handicrafts, manufactures, and commerce, then there arises a middle class characterized by greater intelligence and skill. The presence of a middle class is a great incentive to enslaved masses, since they gain the hope that through energy the slave may become a serf, the serf a freeman and he, or his descendants, may aspire to wealth and an honored place in the community. Thus, classes arise, as against castes, since men may rise or fall in status, whereas in castes men may fall but never rise from a lower to a higher caste.

Dreams of Equality.—In social literature speculation in regard to the masses has its idealistic, religious side. From time to time there have arisen through philosophers, prophets, and poets idealistic teachings, based often on the tradition of the primitive golden age, a *natural* society founded on justice and fraternity, asserting that all men should be free, equal, and kindly in their relations and that the strong should help, rather than exploit, the weak. At times this teaching would arouse a reaction against the members of the exploiting class and there would come stern denunciation of those "who grind the faces of the poor." So far did this emphasis go at times that it came to be assumed that the rich were presumably wicked and that the poor were inherently good, so that at death Dives automatically goes to a place of torment and the beggar to Abraham's bosom.⁶ Another point of view was reached when idealists dreamed of a coming

⁶ Luke XVI, 19-31.

utopia where injustice and misery are unknown and all men again become brothers living in social concord, for

When Adam delved and Eve span,
Who was then the gentleman?

There was, however, another aspect of this problem of classes that later came to be voiced by Karl Marx as the "class struggle" theory. Castes and classes may represent economic as well as racial differences. In Rome as history narrates, there were century-long struggles between the patrician and the plebeian, the *equites* being the middle or buffer class. The success of the plebeians stimulated the lowest classes to react against the wretchedness and misery of life, so that they also revolted against their masters. There were revolts of slaves, gladiators, peasants—the heavily exploited classes who had traditions of former freedom.⁷ Revolts of this sort are signs of betterment, both economic and intellectual, for the abject never rebel. Men must feel their injuries and have manly reactions against tyranny before they will risk all in battle. As Moses said symbolically in one of his songs, "Jeshuran waxed fat, and kicked," and as Plato represents in his picture of democracy, even the donkeys on the street feel the stimulus of the air of freedom and kick up their heels at their masters. Proletarian revolts, therefore, are signs of coming progress and as they near attainment we dignify them with the title of revolutions.

Rise of the Masses.—After the "dark ages" following the decadence of Rome there came a definitely forward movement on the part of the masses, as new economic situations and the enlightenment of the print-

⁷ See C. Osborne Ward's *The Ancient Lowly* (A History of the Proletariat).

ing press came to the front. Peasant revolts and artisan uprisings broke out throughout western Europe; middle class rebellions against the domination of noble and priest soon followed; and then came the revolutions of the Netherlands, of England in the Seventeenth Century, of France and the Americas in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. The Twentieth Century, even yet young, has already given us the revolutions of China, Russia, and the Central Powers, and it is fairly safe to say that the world will be rather completely revolutionized by the end of the century.

It should not be assumed however that class and racial struggles will thereby end. Civilization is still too immature for such concord which is yet far in the future. New aspects of struggle will arise, fundamentally economic and racial as always and these find their solution only in the slow passing of years along with the growth of idealism and intelligence. Ideals of this sort, to be sure, are here now and have been from the beginning, but for real effectiveness they must be held by the many, not monopolized by the few. In the Eighteenth Century, for example, the popularization of modern idealism may be said to have begun. Humanitarianism with its stress on liberty and equality and its demand for education became prominent and agitation developed against slavery and the ill-treatment of the insane, the poor, and the criminal. In religion came such movements as Congregationalism, Methodism, foreign missionary enterprises, all emphasizing the worth of the individual soul. Individualism in politics came to the front through social contract theories and Adam Smith set forth an economic policy of individualism and *laissez-faire*. Women also began to assert their equality with

men and to demand their rights and in educational theories, like that of Rousseau, it was assumed that even children had the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." These sweeping assertions of broad humanitarianism were followed in the Nineteenth Century by numerous movements of all sorts, aiming to accomplish reforms of particular social evils or making utopian suggestions of social reorganization, or more thoughtfully making intelligent studies in respect to class relationships, the elimination of social discord, and the possibility of working towards social philosophies and schemes for social betterment and reorganization.

III. Individual Superiority.—It of course should not be assumed that persons of talent and genius exist only in highly developed societies. In the rudest civilizations there are genius mutations, far superior to their fellows, and revered by them as akin to the gods. But great though these are in their rude social groups, they after all seem petty by comparison with the great men of higher civilizations whose dormant powers are called out by a stimulating environment and who find before them opportunities for achievements utterly impossible to those in savage groups. Genius in and of itself is not sufficient, it must have opportunity for development, and a suitable field for its activities. Genius, therefore, in lower civilizations remains largely potential, but when opportunities multiply and achievements become possible, potential genius becomes focalized into powerful personalities gifted with keen insight and the "will to power." An apparent dearth of genius implies low social progress or decadence, but genius multiplied means arithmetical progress, provided that the achievement of genius is not perverted into anti-social directions. For, in the

case of individuals, the person of talent or genius is not necessarily socially helpful. By contrast he may be socially detrimental and pass into history as the Tyrant, or be apotheosized by later generations into an evil deity, or represented as a self-seeking deity like the Satan of Milton's *Paradise Lost*. The rarity of genius in olden times made it seem like a gift from the gods, or as incarnate in a being born from them, or inspired by them either through divine indwelling or direct instruction. When philosophers cast doubt on the possibility of human birth except from human parents, discussion then centered about the question as to whether genius was inborn, or acquired through training, or was the resultant of both, as Cicero argued, in the *Poet Archias* (paragraph 15). Plato in his myth of the metals raised the other mooted question, as to whether genius might arise from all grades of the population alike, or should be expected chiefly, if not entirely, from the superior classes. These conclusions represented on the whole the best decisions of thinkers down to the Nineteenth Century, when the rise of biology opened again the entire question of genius.

Ancient Beliefs Respecting Genius.—The historical and easy method of explaining the appearance of great men is to assert, as the ancients did, that they were sons of the gods, having a parentage both human and divine. In Greek tradition, for example, Hercules was the son of Zeus, and Achilles had Thetis as a goddess mother. The *Iliad* also gives many illustrations of how men of human parentage might be so aided and counseled by a friendly god as to achieve results otherwise unattainable. The Roman tradition of King Numa who received wise instruction from the goddess Egeria, and the Israel-

itish belief in the inspiration of their divinely called kings and prophets likewise illustrate this form of explanation of greatness. Akin to this is the belief in the coming of a Messiah who will restore greatness to a nation, or such widespread beliefs as that some great national hero, like King Arthur, or Frederick Barbarossa, will some day return to his people and lead it again to victory and supremacy. In Confucius' *Superior Man* by contrast there is not so much an explanation of greatness, as a catalogue of the qualities that unitedly make up a superior man, with instructions for the cultivation of these virtues by those eager for wisdom. A variation of this in classic times is the attempt to depict an ideal ruler or perfect statesman, as in Xenophon's *Cyrus* or Cicero's praise of Cato Major (in the *De Republica*), or the *Agricola* of Tacitus, or the ancient notion of the perfect wife, as in Xenophon's *Economics*, or in the Book of Proverbs (Chap. XXXI). Plato in the *Republic* and to some extent in the *Laws*, goes farther than this in assuming an inherent greatness in a small fraction of mankind, which can best be developed by a carefully thought out system of education, supplemented by a social reorganization, resulting, by a process of progressive elimination, in the selection of a warrior class, and of a philosopher class, or even at rare intervals in the choice of one man who excels the rest as the statesman or the philosopher-king. As Aristotle also argued—If one citizen in an aristocracy because of his preëminence in virtue be better than the other members of the government he should rule over them, since he is as a God among men (*Politics* III, 13).

The Genius Tyrant.—Just as the ancients strove to depict the genius statesman as the wise leader of his

people, so in the same manner they painted the character of the genius tyrant as the one who ruled selfishly and so despotically as to drive his people to abject submission or revolt. The two most famous pictures of the Tyrant ⁸ are given by Plato in the *Republic*⁹ and by Aristotle in the *Politics*.¹⁰ These sketches, especially Aristotle's, furnished the basis for the famous *Prince*¹¹ of Machiavelli, in chapters XV-XIX of which occurs his discussion of the proper policy a Tyrant should follow.

Mediæval discussions of greatness followed in the main ancient models and, as already indicated, the newer trend develops with the rise of Darwinian and evolutionary teachings, although as a sort of echo from the past comes the emphasis placed by Thomas Carlyle on *Heroes and Hero Worship*, and his apotheosis of the Prussian Frederick the Great as a sort of glorified Machiavellian Prince.

Genius under Darwinism.—The rise of Darwinism marked an epoch in theories of genius. The popular fancy was attracted by the idea of *struggle for supremacy, survival of the fit, and elimination of the unfit*. There was a sort of fascination in the Spencerian hypothesis of a gradual glacier-like movement of the entire cosmos, evolving during countless millions of years starry systems, suns, moons, planets, and on the earth myriad forms of life, both vegetal and animal, culminating apparently in the evolution of the human mind. It is easy

⁸ A Jewish version of the Tyrant may be found in the book of Samuel (I Samuel VIII, 11-18) and in the *Agricola* of Tacitus a dark picture of the Roman emperor Tiberius as a Tyrant is given.

⁹ Book VIII, paragraphs 566-end.

¹⁰ Book V, paragraphs 10 and 11.

¹¹ For a delightful modernization of the Tyrant of Aristotle and the Prince of Machiavelli see Henry Champenowne, *The Boss*, an essay upon the art of governing American cities. 1894.

to see why such teachings revived the study of genius. On the face of it, talent and genius represent the winning factor in the struggle for survival. Brute force must yield to mind force, the dullard is unfit in the struggle for survival, and weaklings, pathetic though they may be in their helplessness, are doomed to elimination, in order that not the *meek*, but the *brainy* may inherit the earth. As an ancient philosopher once said, "On earth there is nothing great but man; in man, there is nothing great but mind."¹²

Then, too, the newer teaching allowed men to discard the obsolescent teaching of genius as divinely born, chosen, or inspired, and to interpolate instead the idea of Nature—the metaphysical stage of Comte. Nature produces genius in society as an aid to survival, so that every genius is a *natural* agency for the furtherance of human progress. The genius is intuitive and sees clearly what the average man comprehends dimly, if at all. Geniuses are the personification of nature's unseen forces, the embodied spirit of their times, working out lines of evolution for humanity and as such they are nature's prophets and messiahs, to whom ordinary men should yield willing obedience, since thereby they also will survive through the wise leadership of their natural leaders.

The Nietzschean Superman.—This sort of teaching found its best exponent in the German philosopher Nietzsche¹³ who stressed the importance of the superman, the man of will, energy, and intense personality, whom Nature inspires to will the accomplishment of his heart's desires, irrespective of the conventional morals of mediocre men, trampling into the dust, if necessary,

¹² Respecting this quotation see *Pure Sociology* by Ward, p. 496.

¹³ See also the stress on individualism in Ibsen and George Bernard Shaw.

the weaklings among men, who merely handicap the strong by pleading for help and compassion. As the Austrian Gumpłowicz put it, in applying the same doctrine to group and national struggles for survival:

In group struggles individual opinions play no part, each group struggles inexorably to satisfy its own interests, to demonstrate its own power. Blind natural law controls the action of savage hordes, of states, and of societies.

And again, "States oppose one another like savage hordes: they follow the blind laws of nature; no ethical law or moral obligation, only the fear of the stronger, holds them in check; neither right nor law, treaty nor league, can restrain the stronger from seeking its own interests when the opportunity is offered."

Professor Sumner also in his *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* emphasizes the same point from the standpoint of Spencerian *laissez-faire*. Government, he argues, should not interfere with economic competition, the wretchedly poor and the poverty-stricken are not fitted to survive in nature's competitive system, and state charity or any other kind interferes with nature's processes and to that extent retards the evolutionary movement of society. Obviously in these three types of theory Nature is a sort of aristocratic but abstracted deity, contemptuous of the masses and bent on filling up his heaven with the powerful who survive the competitions of life and climb up to Valhalla on the bodies of the weak and vanquished.

Galtonian Eugenics.—There is, however, a more scientific method of approaching the study of genius, and this also found its stimulus in the Darwinian era. Quételet had shown the possibilities of attaining social prin-

ciples through the use of statistics and Darwin had shown the all importance of scientific observation in biology. Galton combined these two methods and, starting out with the hypothesis that genius is hereditary, sought to show that there is in humanity a genius class from which, for the most part, should be expected whatever talent and genius society produces. The implication, of course, is that if the membership of this class can be ascertained, then social effort properly should be expended in fostering these, so as thereby to be assured of a bounteous crop of geniuses as a guaranty of social progress. This argument logically leads on to the science of Eugenics, launched by Galton in 1904-5, through which society by statistical investigations, carried on among all classes, should endeavor to ascertain what part of its population may be considered as *well born* and, therefore, worthy of reproducing its kind, and what part on the other hand should be discouraged from propagation, so as to relieve society from an inert or degenerating mass of population. The emphasis in the Galtonian argument is placed on heredity as the fundamental factor, and the assumption that inborn genius is bound to manifest itself, though with an admission that environmental factors may favor or retard hereditary genius. There seems also to be an assumption that genius is inherently a male character, since women are consistently slighted in his discussions, though presumably he would assert that talented women would naturally spring from talented families and would intermarry within their own class, thus doubly assuring the descent of genius and talent from eugenic stock. Eugenics, therefore, from a Galtonian standpoint would seek to ascertain statistically and otherwise those principles of heredity which, if socially emphasized, would

result in the multiplication of a positive, progressive stock, sound in mind and body, and, on the other hand, in the diminution of a negative, degenerating stock, physically and mentally weak. It seems evident that eugenic studies, as long as they base themselves on Galtonian hypotheses, would tend to stress at the one end a comparatively small per cent of talented families and at the other end, a similarly small per cent of degenerates doomed by nature to be eliminated, neglecting to a quite large extent the average man, the masses, who presumably represent the material to be influenced or molded by men of talent and genius.

Lombroso's Abnormal Genius.—In Galton's argument runs the assumption that talent and genius are normal products of nature, but, being higher in quality than the average, they are forerunners of the forward movement in human progress, and, in a sense, blaze the way for future generations as indications of the possibilities of human mental development. By contrast, in Quételet's argument in respect to the average man there is the static implication that the average man is the normal man and is the type or standard of what nature desires the race to be. From this standpoint, those who are above the average as well as those who are below, are to be considered as *abnormal*. Genius, therefore, is abnormal, and being so, may as readily prove to be a curse as a blessing to society. The Italian Lombroso voices this aspect of genius, which, according to his theory, is pathological, and associated with epilepsy and insanity. Brilliant, therefore, though the genius may be, he after all represents equally with the criminal the notion of degeneracy, physical or mental, and is merely an illustration of social decadence from a healthy norm of average

mediocrity. Human progress, therefore, if made at all, is accomplished, not by decadent and unhealthy genius but by the infinitely tedious and slow process of raising the masses by natural evolutionary methods of genetic selection. These conclusions Lombroso endeavored to establish by observational and statistical methods but possibly was unduly influenced by his pessimistic belief in the abnormality of genius, and hence slighted the distinction between *abnormal* and *supernormal* genius.

The Theory of Helvetius.—The Galtonian theory of genius is in marked contrast to the social and philosophic discussions of the Eighteenth Century. These in general assumed the equality of man and argued that all men by nature are equal and that what differences actually exist are wholly due to social conditions and environment. From this standpoint, if uniform conditions and a social environment of high type were provided for all classes of normal persons alike, society would in due course become composed of citizens approximately equal one to the other. This, it will be noted, is not a theory of genius, but a theory of an average attainment by the average man. In Helvetius, the great exponent of equality through education, there is an extension of the argument to the effect that talent lies latent in humanity as a whole and hence that under proper conditions it is as likely to come to light from one class as from another. In other words, he argued that genius is potential, needs opportunity for development, and is inherent not in all persons but in all classes, so that when right conditions and environment are secured, talent and genius will blossom forth indifferently from peasant or noble stock alike.

From this standpoint there is a vigorous emphasis on

the importance of environment, but an admission that scattered here and there throughout the human race there exist natures that potentially are superior to the masses in their capacity for development, and the argument that this potential genius will not inevitably be actualized, but must be kindled by a stimulating environment and by opportunity.

Ward's Discussion of Genius.—Now this theory is different from that advanced by Galton. Galton seems to argue that genius is inherent in a social class, possibly in the males of this class, and that it inevitably will manifest itself, irrespective of environment or opportunity. The other theory argues that genius is in the race not in the class, in both sexes alike, and needs for development the stimulus of opportunity. Lester F. Ward in his *Applied Sociology*, using as the basis of his argument Odin's statistical study of the great literary men of France, takes up the cudgels in behalf of the Helvetian doctrine and, after carefully considering the literature and weighing the evidence pro and con, endorses the conclusions of Odin which substantially agree with Helvetius. As Ward puts it, most of the potential genius of mankind remains undeveloped under present conditions, actual genius under a proper organization of society might readily be multiplied at least a hundred times, and if women also were taken into account, as properly they should, the manifest genius of any generation might be multiplied by two hundred—to say nothing of the raising of the mental capacity of the average man under the stimulus of a better environment. The real factors in environment that stimulate and develop potential genius, as shown by Odin and corroborated by Ward are:

(1) centers of population containing special intellectual stimuli and facilities; (2) ample material means insuring freedom from care, economic security, leisure, and the wherewithal to supply the apparatus of research; (3) a social position such as is capable of producing a sense of self-respect, dignity, and reserve power which alone can inspire confidence in one's worth and in one's right to enter the lists for the great prizes of life; (4) careful and prolonged intellectual training during youth, whereby all the fields of achievement become familiar and a choice of them possible in harmony with intellectual proclivities and tastes.¹⁴

Study of Genius is Becoming Scientific.—In conclusion of this argument it seems obvious that theories in respect to genius are no longer merely speculative, but, since the *Hereditary Genius* of Galton, there have come into discussion scientific hypotheses to be finally established, when established, by biological investigations in respect to heredity, and sociological studies of environmental factors. At present, in the light of recent investigations it may be safely assumed (1) that there are real hereditary distinctions between superior and inferior men, (2) that these distinctions are to be found alike in both sexes, (3) that the genius manifest in a social group is merely a small fraction of the potential genius and talent latent in that group, and (4) that there are certain definite well-ascertained environmental factors, that if stressed, should result in the more rapid multiplication of genius.

If in a given civilization these environmental factors

¹⁴ *Applied Sociology*, p. 224. For a similar study based on the United States see pamphlet by George R. Davies, *A Statistical Study in the Influence of Environment* (reprint from *Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota*, April, 1914). An abstract of this pamphlet may be found in Davies' *Social Environment*, Chapter IV and appendix.

are practically monopolized by the few—a nobility, a learned caste, or a wealthy class—then actualized genius will be found among these only, and the masses will seem inert and stupid by comparison. If, again, they are monopolized by one nation, as against other nations, that nation will seem superior and become dominant, the others by contrast seeming to be inferior and fitted only for slavery or servitude. On the other hand, in a real or social democracy these civilizing environmental factors would be socialized, in the sense that they would cease to be the monopoly of the few, but would become the privilege of all. No one believes or expects that every human being would respond equally to his environment, but all should have the assurance that the potential capacity of each would find opportunity for expression, so that potential stupidity as well as potential genius would gravitate each to his own place, some to leadership and others to become “hewers of wood and drawers of water.”

A Newer Democracy.—To many this may not seem to be democracy, for American democracy developed in the Eighteenth Century, when older and obsolescent theories of equality prevailed. These emphasized the teaching that all normal men were similar in heredity and if surrounded by the same environment would become practically alike and be equal one to the other. These early democratic teachings were based on the assumption that men would live a simple life, in small village communities and be engaged chiefly in agriculture. Under such conditions a society of approximately equal citizens might be possible. But in these days the United States has over one hundred millions of citizens living under

widely different conditions and engaged in almost every vocation possible under the sun.

Then, too, the science of biology has come, with its teaching of heredity, stressing the importance of hereditary strains, variations, mutations, and eugenic mating. In other words, the Eighteenth Century assumption of a negligible heredity and a similar environment as bases for equality has, in the Twentieth Century, been discarded. Democracy has to be reinterpreted, therefore on the assumption of wide differences in heredity and environment and hence can no longer be a democracy of equality but a democracy of equal opportunity. This sort of a democracy has not yet been fully attained, although the nation is working steadily in that direction. Even if it were attained, it would not mean a social system in which men would be equal one to the other. It should mean equal opportunities for leisure, education, happiness, and vocational choice, but inevitably some would seize their opportunities and make the most of them, others, on the other hand, would neglect or waste their opportunities or prove incapable of appreciating them, so that in due season there would develop social differences among citizens in attainment, worthfulness, and distinction.

Capable and intelligent parents would naturally give to their children a more careful training and higher social environment than incapable and dull-minded parents could furnish, so that the newer democracy must assume the inevitability of real social distinctions between the grades of its population, but should see to it that such distinctions do not become inheritable through legal discriminations. Society should so control the situation that each generation may readjust itself as may prove

necessary, so as to secure for all children as equal an opportunity as conditions will allow to show their capacity to respond to the demands made on them as citizens. Democracy, therefore, should no longer imply an impossible equality in capacity or attainment but should imply an increasing equality of opportunity, with the understanding that when all is said and done, there will exist an élite of leisure, attainment, and achievement; a body of average citizens characterized also by attainment and achievement, but to a lesser extent; and finally, as always, the depressed or "submerged tenth" who, in general, will represent the atavistic and backward part. In time, through policies of social betterment and uplift, this fraction may be vigorously reduced, but presumably in any society there will always be the extremes of superior and inferior classes, separated by the masses of average population.

PART III
SOCIAL PROGRESS

CHAPTER XXI

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

The term "society," as explained in Chapter I, is used with widely different interpretations. Properly, however, it should always include the notion of a complete grouping, a complex of all fundamental activities, and not a mere group specialized for one purpose only. A mere economic group is not a society nor is any social institution by itself. Of these, however, the family comes the nearest in its resemblance to society since it is a sort of social microcosm, retaining as it does so many survivals from patriarchal conditions, when the family organization practically determined society.

Individualism.—Various attempts have been made to show the relationship of society to the individuals who compose its membership, on the assumption that the parts that make up society are the individuals who unitedly compose it. From this it is easy to assume that each part by nature is as important as every other part. By stressing the importance of the individual the unity relatively loses importance, so that we reach theories of anarchism, individualism, human equality, and democracy. A man may "make" himself and become a "self-made" man, he has his inherent rights, his personality is sacred, through his conscience he gives final decision as to what is right or wrong, since he is the "measure of all things" his duty is "self-realization," and he is the "ar-

biter of his own destiny," the "captain of his soul," determining the course of his life on earth and his place of abode after death.

This individualism, so strongly taught by the Sophists and Epicureans of Greek philosophy found its chief renaissance in the social contract theories dominant in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. According to these theories individuals endowed with natural rights and reason, living in a state of nature as free and independent persons, agreed to form social groups under a general government, and to submit themselves more or less to control, taking care to dictate to it the methods of control. These contract theorists wisely placed such social agreements far back in time when men lived "in a state of nature," thereby evading the query as to whether after all human personality is not the product of society itself rather than the reverse.

The Socialized Individual.—On the other hand, Thucydides in the *Funeral Oration*, writing in the time of the Sophists, represents Pericles as explaining to the Athenians that all they had they owed to the State, which had reared them, trained them, and given them opportunity to become enlightened citizens rather than ignorant slaves. Aristotle also, in speaking of the social nature of man, asserted that a man who by nature lives apart from a state is either a god or a brute, being a stranger to "tribe or law or hearth." This organic viewpoint of Athenian civilization can undoubtedly be so emphasized that individuals may become mere automata under a paternalistic militaristic régime, responding blindly to every order or suggestion given, and becoming mere fractions of men rather than the theoretically powerful personalities of individualistic societies. There is un-

questionably danger from both extremes and modern civilization is still seeking the happy "golden mean."

The Socius.—The modern sociological compromise made between these two extreme theories is voiced by the word *socius*. No man is born "free and equal" in the crude sense of the social contract theory, for he has inherited from his ancestry an heredity that, to some extent at least, will determine his life. On the other hand, this heredity is apparently not a lengthy catalogue of things foreordained, but rather a series of interrelated potentialities awaiting stimulus from social environment, in order to develop a vigorous life. By contact with this, every person develops a social nature and becomes a *socius*. A solitary man never in contact with his fellows or social environment would be merely a brute of a somewhat higher order than other animals. The human part of man is brought out by contact with human beings, and the more numerous the contacts and the higher in quality these contacts are, the more truly human and social does the normal man become.

For such and similar reasons, modern sociology does not stress the older individualism of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, nor, on the other hand, does it favor a social paternalism that represses variation and crushes out the individuality inherent in heredity. Rather it seeks to consider the individual as a member of groups, numerous and widely variant, each stimulating him in one direction or the other and all unitedly arousing his potential nature into activity. From this standpoint obviously it is important that human heredity and its possibilities become more fully understood through biological and psychological research, and that every individual be so environed socially that the lower potentialities of

his nature will find small encouragement, and his higher capacities be stimulated to their highest expression. This latter task naturally falls to the lot of those institutions that exercise social control.

Social Control and Individualism.—One of the most important problems in social philosophizing is the maintenance of a proper balance between social control and individual initiative, the one tending toward static, the other toward dynamic civilization. It is easy with Plato to approve a form of society in which the wisest regulate with perfect system the entire social order. If only the community could be placed under the guidance of a benevolent monarch, or of the most capable class, and be told what to believe and how and when to work or play, social arrangements to many would seem ideally perfect. Unquestionably in every national group a large part of the population would prefer just that system wishing for no better lot than the privilege of transferring all their anxieties to a ruling class under the guaranty of a sheltering roof, a full stomach, and social companionship.

Yet in every community there always are others who in heaven itself would demand the privilege of introducing innovations.¹ Pushing, restless individualists, fond of the stimulus of danger, they are eager to try experiments even though in the attempt they blow themselves skyward. What they lack in numbers they make up in energy, and they insist on stirring up discord, even when social order has been established and a "Roman peace" proclaimed. One class prefers peace even with ignominy, the other liberty or death. It is the eternal

¹ Milton's Satan, in *Paradise Lost*, is an heroic figure and seems to many more attractive than his opponent.

cosmic opposition between inertia and motion, the centripetal and the centrifugal, heredity and variation, aristocracy and democracy, socialism and individualism.

Social control has before it the problem of harmonizing individualism with social standards and ideals. It should emphasize the importance of a social order with its definite law, customs, and institutions, but should make the maintenance of this order depend on the quality of the individuals, seeking always to make these energetic and intelligent. It would have society dominate individuals who have themselves fixed the conditions of their subjection, and who find under the conditions a ready scope for their energy and ambition. There should, therefore, be a social control and an individual initiative, both necessary factors for social order, but so adjusted that order would become progressive and move steadily forward toward its goal.

Importance of Personality.—On several occasions attention has been directed to the importance for progress of variation, innovation, genius, talent, a leisure class, and individual initiative. All this practically amounts to an emphasis on the importance of vigorous personality. Every individual has a personality peculiarly his own, even though it may be rather colorless. But there is a personality that cannot always be molded into a social pattern; it erects its own standards, crushes opposition, and creates achievement, whether socially beneficial or injurious. There is such a glamour about vigorous personalities that public opinion is inclined to take them at their own value, to call them "supermen," and to place in their hands social destiny. Yet after all such men are the products of heredity and environment like other human beings, and probably have a certain

amount of defectiveness in their natures, and, if one may judge of history, our supermen have done possibly as much harm as good.

Science is not yet acquainted with the laws of heredity sufficiently to be able to foretell the birth of a genius, but if society, assuming much latent talent and genius in its members, should develop proper conditions for the production of genius, it would get the benefit of a great additional amount of capacity and would probably give the genius when born truer ideals of action and a deeper insight into social needs than those he might evolve unaided. It is important that society understand that genius is not superhuman. There are geniuses in plant and animal life and specialists in these branches are becoming expert in multiplying them. A genius has human parentage and grows up among human beings, acquiring from them and nature every particle of his knowledge. From the sociological standpoint the essential thing, therefore, is not to wait for the coming great man, the new Buddha, with the expectation of bending the neck to his yoke, but rather to study into the biological, psychological, and sociological factors that unite to produce genius, and then to develop these factors so as to multiply it, instead of waiting for chance to bring some superman, as likely to trample down civilization as to upbuild it. Fortunately there is already sufficient scientific knowledge existent to enable society to make a start in this direction. A vigorous stock of good physique and mentality furnishes the basis for a parentage from which capable offspring should develop. From the psychological standpoint it is then necessary by a wise education of the feelings to develop powerful interests which will lead to a varied activity or by concentration to a

special form of activity. The next essential is that the intellect be trained to observe, to concentrate attention, to relate ideas, and to form conclusions readily. Preferably these intellectual processes should be trained in connection with the interests aroused through the feelings, so that the mind will become used to working harmoniously. Lastly should come the stimulus from contact with the great thoughts of the time: through travel, intelligent conversation, reading, and reflection, or by observation of human life with its vicissitudes, its aspirations, and its toil. As society through social control and its system of education approximates to these conditions, or as families begin to surround their children with incitements to right development, talent and genius will be multiplied far in excess of the crude methods of nature unassisted by the human brain.

Individuality.—There are certain results arising from wiser education that sociologically are of great importance. An untrained mind is prone to superstition, to unconscious imitation of environment, and is readily influenced by foolish fads or the wild excitement of mobs. Training, however, gives the power to discriminate between the true and the false, to be moderate in fashion in spite of the influence of social contagion, and, when passions are aroused by the frenzy of a mob, it enables one to call the intellect to correct the illusions aroused by deeply stirred feelings. Again, it is socially important that an individual be able to make wise judgments in respect to his environment. Naturally each person remains subject to the habits of early environment, and becomes static. But a mind trained to make comparisons sees possibilities of improvement in other environments, and deliberately selects these, so as to develop higher

standards of conduct. In this way he imitates consciously what his judgment approves, and can add to his capacity by assimilating a larger knowledge than otherwise would be possible.

Individualism a Social Necessity.—But all this is merely another way of saying that the person has become individualistic. This word unfortunately is often used to mean that a narrow-minded person insists on his own way because of his very ignorance. Even a mule has that form of individualism. But the truer meaning of the term implies that the person is no longer influenced by the crowd, or by the prestige of a great man, or an influential class; that he is no longer the creature of his natural environment, but rather that his mind has made for itself a home in that larger world of thought, that he has his passions under the guidance of a well-informed intellect, and works consciously toward definite purposes. The development of this form of individuality is essential to true social development. He will best support social order who understands and approves it. If there is need of change he seeks to accomplish this with law and plan, carefully reasoning out methods and ends. Such men in a community steady it, aid in its development, and amply repay the costs of general education. Society should increasingly seek to develop this type of citizenship as the surest guaranty of social prosperity. From it will come achievements in economic and civic life. Cultural standards will broaden under its influence, and the man of the coming century will be prefigured: forceful, intellectual, of keen insight, idealistic in temperament, toiling for higher civilization. Such men combine in themselves the harmony of the conflict between the static and the dynamic. They repre-

sent stability with variability; they are the real aristocracy, the *élite* of society, who through education have been led to believe in man and in his capacity for progress. They believe in a right social order, but also believe in progress so that they are neither conservative nor radical, but individuals who may be either as necessity demands.

Individuality through Education.—The development of individuality through right education will in due time become one of, if not the most important aspect of social control. If society through a knowledge of sociological principles may accelerate its own progress, individuals also should be able to utilize these same principles, so as to ensure greater success in life, provided heredity has supplied to them a proper physical and mental basis on which to build. Any person who has foresight and perseverance, other things being equal, and a capacity to comprehend a telic policy for himself and to persevere in seeking to accomplish it, should be able to make attainment beyond his *natural* expectation. Such a policy should first be initiated by parents and teachers, who should seek to build up above all things sound bodies and minds harmoniously trained in feeling and intellect. As maturity is attained each individual for himself must continue his own development, preferably under guidance, until he gains the confidence that comes from experience.

Telesis in Education.—It is essential in the first place that the mind grasp the importance of a telic policy as against a policy of drift, or genetic development. Then the general aspects of a telic policy should be fixed and consistently carried out, modifying details as necessity arises. To this end forethought and insight into causation should be developed, so that one may become used to the notion of working for a definite end, through

causes to anticipated effects, a mental habit readily built up by training in the experimental sciences, for instance, and by a study of inventions.²

In the second place the distinction between static and dynamic development should be made clear, and the utility of each fixed in the mind; the one standing as it does for stability, and the other for progress. Education too often fixes the static, but not the dynamic. This latter process may be emphasized by evolutionary studies—biological, psychological, economic, religious, and so on. When a mind has once been trained to use prevision and causation, and has grasped the distinction between stability, fixity, and permanency on the one hand, and changes through modifications of environmental conditions, adaptation, and assimilation on the other—it from that time on has the fundamental qualifications for telic progress.

Environing Conditions.—Then one should study his own environing conditions, looking first at the physical and the economic. A vigorous physique must be developed as a basis for later activity, but in so doing the body must always be kept subordinated to the mind. Not muscle and bulk merely, but a muscular system regulated and controlled by the intellect, so as to make the body flexible, able to endure toil, and to ward off disease. This necessitates, of course, a capacity to regulate bodily appetites and to subordinate them to higher ends. In respect to economic attainment a person should see its importance and become familiar in a general way with economic achievements. Preferably he should handle tools, should become somewhat familiar with the utiliza-

² Herbert Spencer's work on *Education* makes many valuable suggestions for self-training.

tion of natural power, should learn the value of money, and by experience the difficulty of earning it; then he should follow up this knowledge by a study of government, so as to understand its organization and its methods of protecting and developing life and property. This should lead to a study of governmental machinery, the possibilities of improving it, and the ways in which governments may best become telic in policy, so as to adjust themselves to newer conditions.

The Period of Adolescence.—In adolescence the really important crisis in life is at hand. Then, if ever, a person must develop a powerful personality by telic means. As the feelings grow in strength, every attention should be paid to their proper development. Desires and ambitions collectively are the dynamo that will furnish energy for life's activities, and while they are building up in intensity they should be regulated and guided. A vigorous appetite for food is essential but should be under control and guided by a knowledge of dietetics; sexual feelings should be powerful, but should be diverted from vice and pruriency, and trained into chivalry and a deep respect for womanhood; eagerness for economic attainment should be encouraged, but shown to be subordinate to larger ends more worthy of permanent pursuit; the imagination of youth should be directed into the idealism of early manhood, and the great moral aims of society made clear, such as domestic integrity, patriotism, and social standards of right. In adolescence and early maturity the mind is easily brought under the influence of rhythm, motion, harmony of sound and color, and beauty of form. These æsthetic cravings should be rendered vigorous by close attention to the study and enjoyment of the truly artistic, as against vicious pas-

sions or the shallowness of sentimentality. This absorption in the artistic may not be permanent, but during the time when it is especially vigorous, a person should build up an appreciation for art in forms that by their refining effects on his higher emotions will elevate and idealize all of his later activities. In this period of bounding juvenescence he must remember that feelings in themselves are not injurious, that the more numerous and the stronger his desires, the more powerful will be his activities, but that these dynamic energies of his, like other forms of power, are dangerous if uncontrolled. If he loses control, and allows his passions the upper hand, disaster will inevitably follow.

Adolescence also is the proper period for the systematic development of the intellect itself. Up to that time it has been growing under mechanical processes, and largely stored with routinary and miscellaneous information, much of which fortunately is speedily forgotten. Intellectual development is chiefly a personal process, though others may suggest and guide. For this reason higher education is useless to many persons. Unless a youth will himself devote his energy to mental attainment, the time and expense of a college or university course is largely wasted, from the intellectual standpoint at least. Many, perhaps, seek a college degree merely for the sake of the social life of the campus or the social prestige arising from residence in or graduation from a university. On the other hand, the value of a college education is beyond measure to one who is eager to avail himself of its opportunities and desires to cultivate his intellect.

The Mental Processes.—In the training of the intellect it should, in the first place, be considered a ma-

chine and trained to work easily, rapidly, and steadily; in the second place it should be considered a storehouse where information should be systematically and carefully arranged.

(1) The first process is simple enough, demanding only persistent labor. Knowledge first passes into the mind through the senses, and each of them must be trained for swift and accurate observation, so as to gain exact information as to the properties of things. Here again science, the laboratory, and fine arts are far better than overmuch poring over books or work in memorization. When the senses have been well trained in early years, so as to become efficient servants in maturity, attention can then be given to reasoning and generalizing, a most essential mental acquirement. The mind through heredity and the constant repetition of experiences, performs automatically a large share of reasoning, through the so-called unconscious or sub-conscious processes. But, in addition to this, a person must reason with full consciousness, selecting some subject as in a debate, reflecting on it, combining information on hand with newer information sought, and seeking to work out correct conclusions. This practice should be constantly repeated, considering subject after subject, preferably those in which one feels interest, such as questions of ethics, politics, theology, and philosophic and scientific hypotheses. By thus using the mental processes over and over again, taking increasingly harder subjects for reflection, and seeking to develop speed by concentration, mental machinery becomes so easy in its workings that one forms judgments almost automatically, and thus accomplishes vastly more mental labor than if it were necessary to take each step in reasoning with deliberation. Every

capable person must be able to think and to decide rapidly and exactly, and as a rule facility must be developed by long experience. In skilled games no person becomes really proficient until he acquires intuition, so that in any given emergency he *sees* what to do without conscious reasoning. This power he acquires by constant practice and many-sided experience. In the same way a judge in a police court makes his decisions with great rapidity and correctness, because he has gained intuitional power. Reverse the tasks of the player and the judge, and each would have to consume much more time in the work, and the resulting decisions would be far less satisfactory than if each were in his proper place.

The Memory.—If the desires are vigorous, the senses keen, and the intellect in fine working order, the memory will be good also. If the memory seems defective in any aspect, assuming a normal condition of body and mind, it is because one has no interest in, or has not given good attention to, the subject matter, and has not trained his intellect to deal with that kind of knowledge. For example, a person ordinarily finds it hard to remember names. If he desires to cultivate facility in that sort of memory, he must arouse an interest, such, for instance, as a priest or a congressman may have in his constituency; he must carefully observe peculiarities on introduction, and must consciously try to associate the name and face. Interest, keen powers of observation, and conscious effort, would in time give the person "a good memory for names and faces."

(2) *Importance of Right Knowledge.*—As one approaches maturity, wide fields of knowledge open before him, entirely too vast to be compassed in the space of a lifetime, and hence one must select such departments of

knowledge as seem most pleasing in themselves or most useful for later years. But whatever branch or branches are taken up, one's intellect should seek to see them as a whole, and in their relations to other knowledge, before burying one's self in details. Many capable minds are ruined because overwhelmed with a great mass of specialized information, piled up helter-skelter. The capacity to see the thing as a whole is essential to mental greatness. Many officers can handle a regiment admirably, but it takes a Foch to handle an army as a skilled player moves his chessmen. No great business can be well managed except by a man who sees the whole of it in his mind's eye, who knows the relative importance of each of its parts and can put his finger on the weak spots of the system. This capacity develops through continuous experience in generalizing an argument, or by forming judgments and conclusions; and the lack of it of necessity condemns one to a comparatively insignificant position in life.

The Choice of Ends.—It is by means of proper information stored in the mind that the intellect is able to direct feelings and desires toward telic ends. Ordinarily, for instance, a person conforms to his social environment and imitates social custom. If, however, his intellect has at its command a well-stored mass of information, it may see that a particular influence or custom is retarding progress or is even injurious, and therefore it would suggest or call up another possibility in better accord with higher demands. Scientific knowledge, for example, in respect to the body, may call attention to the effects of tobacco, liquors, or sexual immorality on bodily conditions; psychological knowledge may suggest probable effects on the mind; and sociological

information may emphasize social consequences of physical indulgences, and, as an alternative, suggest self-control for the sake of a larger and higher enjoyment in later years. Lacking such knowledge a person would much more easily be influenced to follow the dictates of urgent physical desires, if only for the sake of present enjoyment or of social companionship. Growth in knowledge, also, would cause the intellect to appreciate the importance of an ever-improving and broadening environment, so as to enable a person to adapt himself readily, and be "at home" under all circumstances. In other words, personality develops; and the individual, instead of taking his tone like a chameleon, from his immediate environment, selects or creates his own environment, and affects those who come within the circle of his influence.

Social Leadership.—In so doing he becomes a leader, not a follower, among men. As an aid to this end by experience and study he must become familiar with human nature³ and its motives and acquire a knowledge of the best methods of managing men. It is obvious that to do so one must "radiate power" and this becomes possible only when a person has developed a powerful dynamo in his feelings, trained his intellect to think, and has his mind well stored with useful information. Needless to say that such a personality almost inevitably will succeed in life, in the sense that he will attain a far higher place than naturally would have fallen to him. Accidents, of course, are possible; against the fates not even the gods can strive; a blow on the head from a footpad might ruin the brightest intellect. But rules hold, even though there are at times seeming exceptions.

³ One of the best aids of this sort may be had from such works as Mary O. Stanton's *Encyclopedia of Face and Form Reading*.

Choice of Occupation.—In conclusion, a word may be said in regard to a choice of occupation. Sometimes heredity determines that by pronouncing unmistakably in favor of a certain pursuit. At other times environment may plainly mark out an occupation, as, for instance, when a young man has before him an attractive opportunity to continue the successful business or profession of a father, relative, or friend. But ordinarily it makes small difference to a young man in what direction he turns his energy. A well-trained mind is capable in almost any direction. He should intelligently survey the field, try to form an estimate of the possibilities of future development in a given occupation for the next fifty years, take account of his tastes and capacities as he understands them, then make his decision and seek for an opportunity. If experience plainly proves the decision wrong, he should not hesitate to change; but as a rule changes should not be made, and will be unnecessary if proper consideration has been given. It is regularly unwise to stay long in some other occupation taken up as a makeshift. The energy of early manhood should be exerted in permanent directions, and not be allowed to waste itself in work on which the highest ambitions are not set.

The Pursuit of an Occupation.—In taking up his life work one should devote himself assiduously to it and master it, even to the loss or partial neglect of social enjoyment. It is impossible to have everything in life, and in general one must choose between physical and social pleasures as an aim, and business as an incidental, or reverse the process, and make such pleasures subordinate to the higher satisfactions arising from the performance of duty. A well-trained mind will absorb happiness from almost any environment, and will find its

highest enjoyment in the performance of a chosen vocation and in the practice of civic and social virtues. When a person is once in an occupation, he should develop the qualities of perseverance and concentrated energy, although always he must remember that there is a golden mean between idleness and strain, and that a capable man needs leisure to mature his plans and to add to his happiness by the diversification of his interests. Finally, if he will use a well-stored intellect in coöperation with his feelings in the early choice of a sympathetic and intelligent wife and in the foundation of a home, he will show forethought in a most useful direction, and the benefits arising therefrom will be emphasized with passing years.

CHAPTER XXII

SOCIAL PROGRESS

From the sociological standpoint there can be no question as to the solid utility of social investigations. On all sides men are busily engaged in attempts to understand the causes of social discontent and suffering. Social, sympathetic, and altruistic feelings have become so strong in recent generations that men cry out in protest against conditions, forgetting that pain and suffering are the normal experiences of sentient life. When nature seems kindly and bountiful, men forget that underneath the smile it is, as Tennyson put it, "red in tooth and claw."

The Struggle for Survival.—The natural end of an animal is starvation or a violent death. Nature is entirely too fond of multiplying her offspring, and regularly brings into existence far more than can possibly survive. The weaker, and the strong that fail to secure a favorable environment, disappear in the struggle for survival, and the survivors live only as they pursue an endless search for food, and ruthlessly carry on a war of exploitation and extermination.¹

This is true also of human kind. Under natural law the larger proportion of human beings should perish before maturity through starvation, disease, and slaughter. Few of the mature should reach old age, for in primitive savagery there are not many leaders who have "known

¹ See, for illustrations, Ward's *Psychic Factors*, Chap. XXXIII.

three generations of men." Dr. Patten has well characterized such a condition as a "pain economy." Human effort in earlier ages was spent chiefly in vain attempts to ward off misery. Occasionally gleams of pleasure brightened the gloom of fear, but on the whole "few and evil" were the years of life. Outside of the group were savage beasts, hostile men, and angry divinities; within were starvation, disease, human cruelty, and a constant dread of danger. The epics and legends, the myths and theologies, even of later ages, are filled with a spirit of despair, heightened by a dread of an immortality either of torture or of empty existence.² Even then Elysium was for the noble and learned only; the masses, as always, in theory were regularly doomed to destruction. From this standpoint, therefore, one might be tempted to pronounce the present state of humanity, with all of its imperfect social happiness, good by comparison with the natural conditions of primitive and ancient civilizations. Even taking into consideration the present high death rate, the large per cent of infant mortality, the prevalence of disease, the starvation, suffering and toil of an unskilled proletariat, one may yet be almost optimistic as he compares these with conditions ages ago.

Pessimism comes when one takes into account an ideal of perfection. Before us as a goal is a time when humanity, by a comprehension of nature's law, will be able to induce nature to work for man, not against him. When that time comes nature will prove beneficent, not malevolent. It will be a "pleasure economy," not a pain economy. Infant mortality and disease will become accidental, not usual; starvation and vice will be abnormal, not

² See James A. and Vincent A. FitzSimon, *The Gods of Old*; A. D. Godley, *Socrates and Athenian Life in His Day*, Chap. XI; Thomas D. Seymour, *Life in the Homeric Age*, Chap. XV.

normal phenomena; and life will become joyous even to the masses of men. It is because of this ideal, the product of modern humanitarianism and evolutionary teachings, that men grow indignant over modern social conditions and labor feverishly to lighten the burden of the depressed classes, launching lurid tirades against the sins of society, the apathy of the church, the corruption of politicians, the knavery of capitalists, or the demagogism of labor, as though these ancient evils were phenomena unheard of up to our generation!

Social Reforms as Panaceas.—While social investigation is valuable, the very quantity of social agitation sometimes tends to become a handicap to progress. There are so many reforms to assist, so many appeals for financial aid in humanity's name, that by their very reiteration men's minds become dulled to the whole social question. They call down a pest on reformers as radicals and cranks, and soothe their consciences with the thought that the world has wagged along safely for a few thousand years, and probably will last their day out at least. "After us, the deluge" is still the sentiment of many men. And yet any one at all familiar with the times must be convinced that in their hearts men are eager for social improvement, and would welcome a system that would give play to the nobler emotions and ambitions of life, and result in the lessening of human misery. They are simply suspicious, and rightly so, of the numerous panaceas that are warranted to cure all social evils, like so many patent medicines, which are more likely to hasten than to retard degeneration. There is a sense, therefore, in which it might be maintained that our numerous social reforms are doing more harm than good. Persons engaged in them are often so busily occupied with special phases

that the situation as a whole is neglected, and waste in time, energy, and money becomes inevitable. One would not be rash in saying that the waste through social vices is to a considerable extent duplicated by the waste due to the defective and competing methods of religious, moral, and social agencies in reform.

The Utility of Sociology.—Can there not then be found in sociology, if not well-established laws, at least suggestions that will afford a basis for a larger, more inclusive policy, than can be furnished by experimenting one after the other with the many reforms of the day? Sociology is not so rash as to announce itself with smug complacency as the science already possessed of the knowledge needed to make man wise. All that it can do at present is to take up the problem as a whole, to indicate the possibilities in the case, and to study more and more deeply into the situation, so as to be of help in the elimination of evil and in the strengthening of beneficial tendencies in society. It is not at all probable that much will be accomplished in a generation or several of them, but even if thousands of years^a should be needed for the at-

^a Lester F. Ward estimated that under present cosmic conditions man may expect to find the earth habitable for at least 3,000,000 years longer! In an article on Mars in the *Brown (Univ.) Alumni Monthly* (March, 1907), he said:

"The human race is supposed to have existed between 200,000 and 300,000 years; let us say one quarter of one million years. It has been conscious of its existence only about 10,000 years, and really alive as a psychic being less than 5,000 years. The most that it has accomplished of any value to itself has been done within 2,000 years, and its great work within 200 years. In a word, relatively speaking, man has only just begun to exist. His golden age, as Saint-Simon said, is before him and not behind him. His history is but the threshold of the Psychozoic age. The whole of that immense period lies before him. The conditions of existence on this earth are now at their optimum. Abundance of air and water, heat and light, great variety of surface, soil, climate, mineral resources, and all the materials and forces of nature ready to yield to the magic wand of science. There are no indications that these

tainment of a fair degree of social happiness, the consummation will come the sooner through telesis, and even a slight acceleration in the rate of progress is worth striving for.

One thing, however, is sure, that if society is to continue to make progress it cannot permanently allow to exist the present hindrances to a better civilization. These hindrances are removable for they are either natural conditions that can largely be remedied by a deeper knowledge of science, or they are defects of the social system, the products of low civilization, and the same human mentality that in ignorance created them can with a deeper insight exterminate them.

Static Civilization.—It is essential, however, that civilization cease to be considered static and that it be recognized as dynamic. Static civilization implies that society has already attained its standards of perfection, or has them so clearly in mind that the realization of them seems immediately possible. Such beliefs have been held in the past, as for example in the celestial kingdom of China, and in times of ignorance there may be justification for emphasis on static conditions. It certainly must be a satisfaction to a man to survey in his mind the social institutions and the standards of his country, and to decide that they need no alteration. There is an inevitable

conditions will change in an entire geologic epoch. These favorable conditions are certainly liable to last as long as the Tertiary period just closed has lasted, namely, 3,000,000 years. They may continue . . . 12,000,000 years. And what does a million years mean? . . . For us the Psychozoic age, or any considerable part of it, means *eternity*. Thus viewed, man's prospects, instead of being dark, are fairly roscate, and the contrast with that old decadent orb [Mars] that is now telling us its story, instead of depressing us, should inspire us with thankfulness that we are young, with faith in an unlimited future, and with buoyant aspirations for the progress of humanity."

craving in every mind for just such a decision; the average person is inclined to think his own family, his religion, his country best, and this self-satisfaction, with its resultant inertia, readily favors the development of a static civilization.

There really is a justification for such a condition of mind. What has been proven by long experience is at any rate good, and changes are as likely to be bad as beneficial. The mother dreads to see her child leave home for the sake of a larger life, and apprehensively seeks to retain him under her watchful care. It is easy to sympathize with a religious body that dreads to favor "modernism" in thought, or with a government that hesitates to change its fundamental law, lest in either case the flood gates be swept away and old landmarks obliterated. Nations naturally prefer to surround themselves by Chinese walls, or to point grim cannon at intruders, and to look suspiciously on foreigners and alien institutions that threaten to "break down the bulwarks of our civilization." And yet, notwithstanding this natural conservatism, social thinkers are agreed that society should become dynamic, and that it, like another Columbus, should push resolutely out on unknown waters in the hope of finding a shorter route to Utopia. But the experience of nations plainly shows that change involves danger. There is safety in the old, even though glory is lacking, and the path of progressive states is marked by national wreck and ruin. It is the static East that survives, and the stirring nations of the West that rise and fall. Yet Tennyson remarked once, "Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay," and apostles of the strenuous life from time immemorial have chosen death in battle in preference to a weak old age. Urged on by the vigor of a combative

ancestry, Western civilization in its philosophy is definitely committed to the doctrine of progress.

Dynamic Movements.—In the Eighteenth Century philosophers of the type of Rousseau inferred that dynamic changes could only be accomplished by eliminating the old entirely, and making to order an up-to-date system warranted to satisfy the requirements of the most exacting utopian. The French Revolution was a remarkable dynamic movement, and the effects of it, which were experienced throughout the entire Nineteenth Century, showed clearly the possibilities inherent in dynamic changes, but argued against any attempt to revolutionize conditions by too hasty measures. The experiences of Russia at present are of the same sort, but in due time out of the welter of its chaotic experimentation will arise new teachings and object lessons, illustrative of the potential energies of a great nation in a revolutionary era. Even if society knew absolutely what is the ideal of social reorganization, it would be far wiser to favor a policy of "watchful waiting," to introduce changes gradually but systematically, training men generation after generation to a character suited to the newer civilization. Sociology, therefore, is not in favor of revolutions so much as for a progressive civilization in which changes are made after proper preparation, one step at a time but a step every time. A dynamic movement may be genetic or telic, as already explained. If the movement is genetic, the changes seem accidental; they may happen to be either good or bad, and not being consciously caused by society, seem to be beyond its control. For that reason men charge such changes as may be noted to fate, to the will of the gods, to blind chance, or the iron law of destiny, they become pessimists in misfortune, optimists in

prosperity and fatalists at all times. On the other hand societies that adopt telic policies and slowly break away from static standards, may happen to be rash in their choices. Social movement may be forward or it may be backward. Even in the East there is a Korea and a Japan; one fallen, for the time, from its former greatness, the other pushing forward from genetic development to telic progress.

Genetic or Telic Purpose.—In the settlement of the Great West a family might wander aimlessly toward the setting sun, following buffalo paths and streams, and finally settle where impulse led or obstacles prevented further progress. Or it might by inquiry ascertain in advance a desirable location for a home and the best route for travel, and then might make suitable preparations for reaching its destination with the proper equipment for farming in the new country. In both cases there is purpose, but in the first it is hazy and genetic, in the other thoughtful and clearly telic. In the same manner a social group committed to a progressive policy, will more probably attain its purpose if it should first thoughtfully formulate clearly the policy, plan the means of accomplishing it, and then gradually push it through, making modifications in the plan from time to time, if such should seem necessary. The development of governmental policies of this sort is marked. Japan reorganized its government after plans carefully worked out by commissions; Switzerland bases much of its legislation on the reports of experts. The Hague Conferences, Pan-American Congresses, the Postal Union, and the League of Nations illustrate the growing universality of the idea that group activity should be based on the carefully prepared opinions of expert authorities. This tendency is

not so evident in those institutions that by nature tend to be static, such as law, medicine, the church, and education. In these, precedents, dogmatism, static authority, and vested interests unite to maintain the system and to suppress innovations. The best illustrations of telic progress can be found in economic life and in science, whose leaders of necessity must favor innovation and achievement and cut loose from outworn methods and obsolete knowledge.

The question next arises whether modern society, if one assumes that it is definitely identified with a dynamic and telic civilization, has available sufficient knowledge on which to base a forward movement. The answer should unquestionably be affirmative. The immediate need is not the amassing of more information, but rather the larger, dissemination of the truths already discovered, and incidentally, investigations as to the best means of applying these principles to the varying conditions of social life.

Social Utopias.—A suggestion in respect to this matter can be obtained, strangely enough, from the striking unanimity of utopian writers in respect to social betterment. Famous utopians, from Plato's time on, agreed in emphasizing the fundamental necessity of a proper balance between carefully planned schemes of economic and educational reorganization. Rarely does a utopian in his writings lay much stress on the form of political organization, or on religion, or on the family group, or on the necessity of formal moral teaching as the determining factors in social life. These are assumed to be of importance, but matters that on the whole need small attention, if only the fundamentals already mentioned are carefully worked out. This practical unanimity of utopian writers is not to be ascribed to a mere imitation of

great models.⁴ It represents the logical conclusion of a poetic and philosophic type of mind becoming prophetic as it tries to see the outcome of the chaos of conflicting interests by which it is surrounded.⁵

This conclusion of utopians seems to be corroborated by the trend of recent sociological writers, who after a careful study of the determining factors in social development argue strongly for solutions in which economic and educational factors are emphasized. The great socialistic movement of the day, which is so powerfully affecting the legislation and policies of Europe, is an economic solution, based on the so-called economic determinism of Karl Marx. It is probably neither wise nor expedient to adopt Marxian socialism as the last word in the solution of the social problem; but undoubtedly some newer economic policy, coupled with a more vigorous educational system, is inevitable. Society should evolve gradually, and it is the part of civic wisdom to keep the movement under telic control; but if barriers are erected in the hope of maintaining permanently existing conditions, the rising tide of discontent will sweep them away by revolution. Telic evolution is far better than revolution, but even revolution is to be preferred to repression and stagnation.

The Social Goal.—Society in seeking to expedite progress should properly have before it a tangible goal towards which it should strive. Now sociology has no

⁴ There is a tendency on the part of utopians to follow the educational pattern set by Plato in his *Republic* and *Laws*, or the economic system offered by Sir Thomas More, but there are wide variations from these in the more modern utopias.

⁵ Among the most suggestive of modern utopias should be mentioned: Bulwer's *The Coming Race*, William Morris' *News from Nowhere*, Hertzka's *Freeland*, Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, and *Equality*, Sweven's *Limanora*, the *Island of Progress*, and Butler's *Erewon* and *Erewon Revisited*.

ideal in the sense that there is a fixed social model in harmony with which all details ought to conform. The ideal of sociology will presumably change from age to age, since millions of years yet lie before us. What seems good in the light of present knowledge may in later generations be deemed defective, because of changed conditions and larger knowledge. The personal equation in Western civilization is different from that in the East, so that even from the same facts another type of intellect might reach a different conclusion. Heredity and social environment also determine "an attitude of mind," and this is a factor in any process of reasoning. Yet different conclusions have their utility, since a generalization of many viewpoints has a certain sort of finality. At any rate, such a consensus is a fairly safe guide for practical purposes, and, after all, if the general direction of movement is known, the landing spot may be ignored. Columbus believed that he would find India by sailing westward, but, though failing in that, America was not a bad substitute. So in sociological theorizing one may feel sure of certain general principles, even though the varying factors in heredity and environment are too complex to justify a prediction in details. No attempt, therefore, will here be made to work out a description of a utopia to be attained through sociology, but rather certain aspects of social development will be restated, as basal for any theory of social aim.

Social Change.—From this standpoint, therefore, we may well start with the evolutionary teaching of change. We know that there is nothing fixed in the universe; all is in constant motion, and changes involving integration and disintegration are always in evidence. Things seem unchanging to us because of our shortsight-

edness and mental incapacity. Our most permanent institutions and beliefs have their history of origins and development, and instead of there being "no new thing under the sun" it would be truer to say that all things are ever new. The many institutions, customs, and beliefs that seem to us so stable are only relatively so. No generation, therefore, should seek to imitate ancestral customs *in toto*, and every generation should expect to find that its successor had a different viewpoint in belief and activity.

If the relativity of static conditions is perceived, and the eternal law of change admitted, then a society should avoid a pessimistic attitude by seeking so to use its intellect as to guide to some extent at least the genetic changes of nature. Ingrained stupidity destroys the possibility of progress, and a society mentally inert might as well fold its hands and take passively the bitter experiences that nature will so abundantly supply. Progress belongs to the society that realizes that its evolution can become telic, that it is possible to work out a policy of improvement, and that the necessary basic knowledge is already existent. Presumably no general policy could be put into practice instantly, for forethought and planning involve patience and time, and human experience teaches that the best always costs most and comes with infinite slowness.

Social Flexibility.—In developing a social policy of progress, it is not sufficient, therefore, to reproduce by imitation past attainments; society must also encourage by every means improvements, and add constantly new achievements to strengthen its civilization. Not the least of possible achievements would be a mental capacity to discard the obsolete in favor of a better device and a truer knowledge. Society, like some animals, must occa-

sionally shed its skin so as to allow growth and vigor; like a business establishment or a household, it has its garret where is stored long-accumulated trash, awaiting a cleaning or a burning. It is socially more dangerous to hold on too long to the old than to reach out too eagerly for the new. Old books are best, but most old books are obsolete, and as a rule every generation makes its own best books. A society should be willing, like a manufacturing plant, to throw on the junk heap its outworn social machinery, customs, and teachings, and conserve and develop what is most useful for present conditions. Its primary achievement, of course, will be the wiser utilization of all forms of material and energy supplied by nature, so as to free mankind from the curse of unskilled labor, and with a more scientific biological and chemical knowledge to improve the quality and quantity of foods.

Socialization Through Education.—On the basis of these attainments should come all sorts of scientific achievements, a broadening of the influence of art in all of its forms, the moralizing of social institutions, and the unifying of knowledge. Education through the press and the school, should be pushed far more vigorously than at present, so as to spread broadcast the most useful knowledge, and thus to create a public opinion that would sustain a social telic policy. The process of socialization is best carried on through education. A narrow education results in a socialization characterized by self-satisfaction and inertia, easily becoming unprogressive. The more and larger the education the more truly does one become at the same time socialized and individualized. A fixed education restricts a man's mentality, but a mind that absorbs broad knowledge grows

by what it feeds on and develops personality. The aim of socialization is to create a sort of federation, made up of strongly individualized personalities unified for common social purposes. Education accomplishes this by building up the higher emotions and the intellect, supplying them with information, and opening up a great field of social activity.

Social Activity is Constructive.—It is important to fix clearly the principle that social activity tends to be either prohibitive, regulative, or constructive in kind. Prohibitions imply that there is social depravity and that offenders must be punished or exterminated. Regulations assume the general ignorance of mankind, which must be guided by its more capable members. A constructive policy develops when the average person is intelligent enough to appreciate and originate improvements in the social system. Society should free itself from a morality of *don'ts* by eliminating, as far as possible, human depravity through scientific knowledge of racial and eudemic⁶ improvement. It would have regulation grow less burdensome, less compulsory, less imitative in kind, and become the regulation suited to a democracy; that is, such as public opinion sees to be necessary under the conditions, and formulates into law, cheerfully obeyed by its makers. It would have society through education develop a type of citizenship able to comprehend the life of society as a whole and constructively to build up a higher form of civilization. In passing through these stages, one by one, the methods of social control change from intimidation to persuasion, from the fear of punishment to the stimulation of hope, from a compulsory uniformity to a

⁶ See article by Lester F. Ward, "Eugenics, Euthenics and Eudemics," *American Journal of Sociology*, May, 1913.

conscious imitation of the good and a deliberate attempt to find a better. It eliminates constructively, by tearing down while it builds, and using for the new edifice the valuable parts of the old. Society will therefore enter on its rightful inheritance when it, through science, sees clearly how to improve its racial stock, to add continuously to its economic and cultural achievement, and to impart its knowledge wisely to each generation through the stimulation of human desires, under the guidance of a well-trained intellect supplied with useful knowledge.

Social Ideals.—In so doing society will find its chief stimulus in a still deeper insight into the possibilities of development. Evolution looks forward as well as backward. The backward glance causes men to see as through a glass darkly; they are yet to see face to face.⁷ They must forget the things that are behind and stretch forward to the things that are before.⁸ As incentives to human activity, society already offers many social ideals familiar through the great humanitarian movements of the last two hundred years. The social history of that period clearly indicates how men have toiled and suffered for ideals of freedom, democratic opportunity, and human brotherhood. About us at the present time we see the zeal and energy displayed in agitation for the rights of women and children, the rights of labor, and the movements for social reorganization and world peace.

Arising into social consciousness are demands for health, recreation, and a broader education; for a fair wage, a decent standard of living, a chance to "make good," and a "square deal." Soon there will develop a constantly growing demand for the eradication of pauper-

⁷ I Corinthians XIII, 12.

⁸ Philippians III, 13.

ism, disease, vice, and crime. The brothel and the slum must go, and perverted and degenerate stocks must cease to propagate their kind. There is a demand for the development of dormant capacity, for a larger life, and for an ideal of social welfare that will fill men's hearts with an ardent desire to assist in building up social achievement.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE ELIMINATION OF SOCIAL EVILS

Backward Civilization.—In any consideration of the forward movement of civilization one is impressed by the fact that there are in society many conditions that unitedly form a serious hindrance to progress. This dynamic age demands great adaptability in social institutions and human mentality, but these as a rule manifest a rigidity that resists even slight changes. Of course institutions and persons excessively conservative in time lose their importance, but their inertia retards the progress of the whole community. If civilization were throughout telic, it would advance evenly; as it is, however, there are always backward and degenerating communities, or favorable opportunities not utilized, to impede progress. Every country has sections where hopefulness and energy abound, and sections where stagnation breeds degeneration. If the unprogressive part is strong enough to hold back the progressive, even though dynamic conditions are favorable, a nation may sink from its rightful place among states, to be ranked as backward in civilization. So, likewise, a society may be retarded by unwise prohibitions, unscientific regulations, and by its inability through ignorance to see the best methods of taking advantage of opportunities. There is, for example, no inherent reason why society should permanently be depressed by a great weight of vice, crime, pauperism, and

ignorance. While these hindrances to civilization presumably will always exist to some extent, still, if society would use the wisdom already existent these evils should be steadily reduced until they would become a vanishing quantity. In place, therefore, of pessimistically lamenting the sins of the age, society should seriously set about the problem of removing retarding conditions; a task by no means chimerical, but scientifically possible.

Sociology and Social Problems.—At the same time every one knows that it is much easier to tell what should have been done than to explain what should be done. It is comparatively easy to point out the mistakes of earlier generations, but one has not the same assurance when he seeks to show the proper solution for present-day problems. The reason is obvious enough; time gives a better perspective, wise conclusions in regard to past policy are numerous, and partisan considerations no longer tend to warp the judgment. The opposite conditions exist when a current problem is pressing for solution, and the wisest person may in consequence err. Yet if sociology is simply to serve as a final judge on the past and not to be of real assistance in present difficulty, it will find no place in the reading of the man of affairs. It is essential, therefore, that if sociology has within itself scientific possibilities, it should throw some light on social problems, if only a candle gleam, and should work forward toward the time when it may illumine the path of social progress by its telic policies and by its scientific forecasts of social movements. It cannot probably for many centuries show in detail the program that society must follow, or work out, as in the astronomer's almanac, exact statements in respect to social phenomena; but it should soon be able to show the significance and probable consequence of any

important social achievement, and to suggest in outline the principles that should be followed in order to eliminate an evil or to build up a good. For there are certain conclusions from sociological principles that may well serve as guide posts as to the probable direction in which attention should be turned, in order to understand the significance of social events. After all, a mere knowledge of the facts of history is unimportant, unless one is able to see the law of causation underlying them and to learn wiser policies from its teachings. In illustration of this point may be cited well-known events in the racial and economic development of the United States, from which the contrast between a telic policy and one that grows genetically is evident.

Early Conditions in the United States.—As far as racial and economic conditions were concerned these were from the start unquestionably favorable for the development of a high civilization. The colonies started their national career with a population made up of members of a dominant fighting race, in possession of a wide and fertile territory of temperate climate, rich in fuels and minerals, and environed by no really dangerous neighbors. Traditions of civil and religious freedom and a touching confidence in the efficacy of education as a social panacea were prevalent. Through war, exploitation, and purchase, the national boundaries were enlarged from sea to sea, and generous provision was made by land grants for common school education. More than that, government stimulated invention by wise patent laws, encouraged manufacturers by a tariff policy, made internal commerce free, aided the development of transportation facilities by land grants and state subsidies, and stimulated agriculture by a land and homestead policy. Under such

conditions and with so wise a telic policy progress was natural, aided as it was by the growth of general intelligence and democratic forms of government.

Lack of Social Forethought.—But there is a genetic aspect also in our development, when forethought was lacking. We failed to understand the profound social changes involved in the utilization of steam and electricity as power, and in the enormous productive capacity of new machinery. When Lancashire cotton mills using steam, for example, began to demand cotton in ever-increasing quantity, the South, with its soil suited for cotton, and the cotton-gin supplied by Eli Whitney, lacked only labor to satisfy the demand. Then if ever a foresighted policy was needed so as to induce the immigration of European agricultural laborers, and to stimulate the invention of improved machinery suited for the plantation. A telic policy failing, the path of least resistance lay in the direction of the illegal importation of slaves and in the systematic breeding of a negro stock. The rigidity of a constitution, amended with too great difficulty, prevented a legislative remedy, and in consequence there came a century of strife, a civil war, and a permanent negro problem. Racially speaking, the country lost a million of its white males by war and disease, reduced correspondingly the proportion of its native stock, and has one-tenth of its population made up of a race that, however capable it may prove itself, cannot be absorbed by amalgamation without serious danger to racial vigor.

The Problem of Immigration.—A similar illustration may be found in respect to immigration. As long as land was abundant and immigrants were Celtic or Teutonic, there was the wise telic policy of an open door and easy naturalization. When an influx of immigration from

the Orient threatened, it was barred out because of its lower standards of living and the apparent impossibility of assimilation. But foresight failed when there came a demand for unskilled labor to be massed at industrial centers. Slight attempts only were made to regulate the number and quality of immigrants, or to provide suitable agencies for their speedy absorption into American civilization. The burden of this was thrown on the public schools, which failed for the most part to meet the demand, since they supplied merely rudimentary knowledge to the children and rarely any training for adults. Then, too, by mingling the races in the schools the cultural standards of the native stock were somewhat lowered. This influx of alien population of inferior civilization has had its usual consequences: there is an unskilled proletariat, wretchedly housed and environed, resulting in misery, vice, and crime; a stratum of native stock defeated in competition because of their competitor's lower standards of living, and depressed in general morals; another stratum of native stock committing race suicide, so as to maintain high social standards; and a middle class recruited from the most energetic of the alien stock and intermarrying. Fortunately the evils of this situation are not necessarily permanent. A telic policy may strengthen regulations in respect to the admission and naturalization of immigrants; may scatter them more widely over the country, so as to avoid overcrowding and excessive competition; may develop special agencies, so as to hasten the process of Americanization; and by better education may push the younger generation, at least, out of the unskilled into skilled occupations.¹ Racial amalgamation between

¹ See *Race Improvement in the United States, Annals*, July, 1909, Philadelphia.

these races and the native stock is inevitable after a few generations, and the future American will have in his veins a strong infusion of Romance and Slavic blood, adding thereby imaginative qualities to the somewhat prosaic Anglo-Saxon mind.

Economic Problems.—In the economic world had the natural influence of scientific knowledge on invention in respect to production, transportation, and labor, been foreseen, society might by telicly devised regulations at the beginnings of these economic movements, have avoided the evils of monopolistic tendencies, wild speculation in necessities, and the multiplication of an unskilled proletariat of industrial workers. The development of corporations, syndicates, and trusts, is another illustration of a genetic growth hardly retarded by telic foresight, which so far has failed to regulate what, like the bottled jinn of the Arabian Nights, was easily controllable in its beginnings, but now has become giant-like in its proportions. Here again a static constitution in a dynamic age has proved a serious impediment to a proper system of regulation. So likewise the movement of population toward the city might have been studied in its earlier stages and wiser provisions devised for the government of municipalities and their problems of housing and health, so as to avoid the crime, vice, and pauperism so largely due to civic ignorance. Unquestionably, also, the failure of cities to take into account the growing demand for breathing spaces, parks, and playgrounds, and a scientifically planned system of streets, is already increasing the burden of taxation. Here again forethought when land was cheap would have saved much later expense.

The Problem of Education.—Even our system of general education, which came as the result of telic policy,

might have been vastly improved, with untold benefits to civilization, had educational systems kept pace with educational knowledge. Nearly all of our great educational theories were devised before 1850, and throughout the Nineteenth Century many model schemes of wiser education were experimented on, from that of Robert Owen at New Lanark to the Armour Institute of Technology at Chicago. Education has not yet met the expectation of early enthusiasm because of the incompetence of school boards, and because of excessive conservatism in administrative systems, and the inadequate training of teachers. Yet the times are working towards a larger education that will advance our civilization far beyond its present attainment and society is demanding that the people generally be more thoroughly instructed, that they may be able to utilize the latest discoveries of science.

Need of a Telic Policy.—It is needless to multiply illustrations of this sort; every well-informed person can readily contrast for himself the economy of a telic policy, and the waste of genetic activity.² There are, however, certain sociological teachings which, rightly understood and applied, may aid society in the formation of a telic policy looking toward the elimination of social defects. At least the statement of these teachings may suggest the general direction in which society must look, if it would lighten its present heavy burden of taxation and misery.

Social Hopefulness.—It is obvious, for instance, that a courageous optimism is one of the most essential qualifications for sociological usefulness. Pessimism and fatalism are deadly sins, and find no justification in present social conditions. Fatalism is the attitude of the sav-

² The many social surveys of recent years in their statements of conditions well illustrate a genetic growth, and in the suggestions of experts, a telic policy.

age, the creature of an environment he can neither understand nor control. Pessimism characterizes those who understand conditions only, but do not know remedies. Education gives one the power both to comprehend and to utilize his environment sufficiently to see the possibilities of future achievement. Even though social conditions are bad enough at present, they have been much worse, and to-day the means of improvement are at hand. In place of despair and apathy sociology urges hopefulness and energy because the forward movement of civilization is working toward improvement and human happiness. For this reason it is idle to mourn over past errors and present deficiencies. Progress is best made by forgetting the past and turning resolutely toward improvement. One can dwell on the sins and suffering of society until he becomes morbid, but he might better trace the remarkable development of humanity from the brute to the man, and comprehend the processes through which he may free himself more fully from the bondage of hampering conditions. The first essential, therefore, is to look at society with hopeful insight, so as to see the germ of better things unfolding into a happier civilization.

Control of Social Energy.—It is also essential to think of social energy quite as the engineer may consider the power in his engine. Understood and guided, it performs useful work. Uncontrolled or ignorantly guided, it may do untold damage. Society has inherited from earlier centuries a notion that human passions and desires, which unitedly make up social energy, are essentially evil. The truer view is that they are inherently neither good nor bad, but under proper conditions tend toward goodness since they lead men on to activity and achievement. A socially wise policy, the policy of *indirection*, is

not to suppress or weaken these powerful human forces, but to study how best to strengthen and guide them into useful directions. Social control scientifically applied, and general intelligence through right education, would rid society of much of the enormous waste of social energy, now perverted into anti-social directions or latent because of lack of proper opportunity. Social forces implicit in men's desires and ambitions, should be studied as carefully as the physicist studies electricity; and social Edisons must show how society may utilize these forces for constructive activity.

Elimination of the Tabu.—Such a policy necessitates the disappearance of tabu civilization, and a movement toward higher planes of social life indicated by regulative and constructive stages of social activity. In low civilization life is made up of fear and misery, relieved by occasional moments of physical pleasure. As man advances in civilization his nervous system develops, becomes finer and more acute, until we have nature's crowning achievement, the human brain. But the finer the nervous system the greater is the possibility of pain, so that a highly developed human being, through his vivid imagination, may suffer physically and mentally far more acutely than a savage. On the other hand, his capacity for enjoyment is correspondingly increased, and the happiness which arises from the satisfaction of cultural or psychical desires, becomes a permanent possession through the memory. A highly developed person, too, through scientific knowledge knows how to avoid many pains and how to enlarge the scope of his happiness by social and cultural enjoyment, permanent and elevating in its nature. In consequence mankind is slowly passing from an age of pain into an age of happiness. Man is, in a word,

progressing from a system of social prohibitions to a system of inducements to activity and of suggestions offered to the capable as to the best methods of attaining ambitions. In place of forced labor and compulsory education will some day come a love of exertion and a joy in adding to one's knowledge. The criterion of increasing happiness and freedom is a real test of civilization, enabling one to decide whether a suggested policy is in the line of progress or is a return to the inferior methods of a pain economy.

Civilization is Constructive.—Again, civilization strengthens, rather than weakens man's physical and psychical nature. One often hears that civilization develops a type of man aged at forty and a nervous wreck at fifty. This, of course, is not true civilization, but a civilization in which social energy has been highly stimulated without being regulated by scientific knowledge, nor directed into the most useful channels by right education. Energy is too often centered on a single line of activity and needs to be switched off into many-sided interests. High civilization should be the human aspect of the principle of the survival of the fit. Social environment should be so adjusted that those who best adapt themselves to it and survive will be the best types of humanity. In piracy he who can rob most successfully and murder with the least compunction is suited to the environment and survives as leader. In a vicious slum the thief, the tough, and the harlot are fittest to survive under the conditions, and the moral man or woman is unfit. In the field of highly competitive, poorly paid labor he who can toil longest and hardest for the least wage survives. Yet in no one of these three cases of survival is humanity exalted. Society must itself develop for its

citizens an environment that will call out the strongest and best in them and that will slowly eliminate weakness of all sorts, and incapacity for high civilization. Thus, the wisdom of a social policy may also be tested by noting whether a suggested reform would tend to build up or destroy physical and cultural capacity. Nature eliminates by savage extermination and endless suffering. Social elimination, as it becomes perfect, will be accomplished by making the weak strong. It will take precautions that there be no needless multiplication of the weak, and see to it that the strong are not weakened by conditions of environment. Since high civilization depends on strong individualities for its continuance, its conscious aim is always to build up in the weak, if possible, strong bodies and powerful minds. Whatever, therefore, weakens in our present civilization is socially evil, since social goodness implies social capacity and strength.

Social Leadership.—It thus becomes evident that sociology resists a teaching which fixes attention on the individual to the exclusion of his environment. The corresponding error in concentrating attention on the environment to the neglect of the individual is a far safer blunder. Attention given to individuals to the neglect of environment may result in the saving of the elect, but in the damnation of the many. Emphasis on improvement of social environment will result in raising the mass, at the expense of the exaltation of the predatory few. But sociology would emphasize as a social fundamental that environment which would call to the front its best citizens and stimulate them by placing in their hands opportunities for social service. The process of socialization is difficult and contrary to crude human nature. Society

must build up through social control and education a type of mind that will become individualistic through social service. He who would rule must first obey; whoever aspires to leadership must first learn to serve. Social leadership must be based on a comprehension of social needs and a willingness to serve them. Men become socialized as they cease to war against society, or to fight for a narrow interest as against a greater, and as they acquire a keener insight into the essential harmony of personal and social interests.

Elimination of Social Weakness.—Sociology, in looking forward hopefully to the gradual elimination of social degeneracy, is conscious that no immediate solution of the problem is possible, even while it insists on the actual initiation of a telic policy for that end in social activity. Skill comes through practice, and society should use what knowledge it already has, learning to improve it by later experience and reflection. The essential thing is that society should become confident of ultimate success. Religion teaches of a good time coming when justice and peace shall prevail; utopians have regularly assumed the banishment of social evils from their ideal commonwealths; but science is now coöperating with social philosophers in perfecting the means for the attainment of such ends. Unfortunately the man of the street is more inclined to assume that social vice and evil are permanent phenomena, the price of existence and civilization. There are persons who would extinguish them by the radical remedy of a return to primitive conditions.* The simple life would probably cause the largest part of social degeneration to vanish, but human nature on the

*Note, for example, that attractive volume of Edward Carpenter's, *Civilization, Its Cause and Cure*.

whole prefers the present with its evils to the Arcadian bliss of Rousseau's state of nature. Many of the evils to which society is subject are really due to social progress. Had man remained a savage without achievement, there would be no social evils of which to complain. There would be physical pain, but man would neither have the wit to comprehend his own wretchedness nor capacity to add other evils than nature's to his portion. Social evils arise because the intellect of man enables him to pander to bodily appetites and to further his selfish interests. Yet the remedy should be sought in greater intelligence, not by reversion to primitive stupidity. The evils developed by an imperfect civilization should disappear with greater knowledge, just as the physical diseases of modern life will vanish with progress in biological science.

The Unity of All Social Problems.—In attempting in the following pages, to illustrate from principles sociologically justifiable, the methods that should be kept in mind in all agitation for social reform, it becomes evident at a glance that the several topics discussed are really parts of one great question. Under our present theories the class that under natural selection should have been eliminated as the "unfit," has been kept in existence through social philanthropic agencies, but in such wretched conditions as to make the "submerged tenth" of our population a crying disgrace to high civilization. No savage race probably is so hopelessly fallen as are the degenerate classes of Western civilization. In addition to these, the conditions of a strenuous competitive system intensified through war are dragging down another large per cent of humanity, and these, though struggling hard against their fate, are being slowly drawn into the vortex

of despair. According to the varying conditions of heredity and environment, some are driven into crime, and others to vice or pauperism. Disease, moral degeneracy, and sexual depravity surround them at every turn, and society heaps up for itself an increasing mass of social misery and degeneracy, against the time when a social crisis will come, and another "uprising of the masses" or "proletariat struggle," with its bloodshed and "leveling down."

Those who are freed from the bitterness of these degrading conditions, vainly imagine that the evils inherent in the system can be atoned for by charity or legislative fiat. Like the ostrich which thinks to escape its pursuers by hiding its head in the sand, society imagines that it has abolished its social evils by forbidding by law gambling, begging, crime, drunkenness, and prostitution. No system of tabu is at all efficacious, unless followed up by extermination, as under ancient conditions, or on the other hand by the methods of science and telic foresight. Appeals to reason and moral suasion are powerful influences for those who have leisure to think, and have trained minds and emotions; but before they can be used with any effectiveness on the depressed classes, social energy must be concentrated on the problem of improving the physical and economic conditions of social life environing our poorest paid labor. Teachings in churches and schools are comparatively useless, except as they supplement an economic uplift. Individuals here and there may be "plucked as brands from the burning," but they are *few* as compared to the *many*. If the altruistic and civic agencies of society would band together for a common purpose, working toward a clearly defined goal, using scientifically approved methods, the energy and wealth

new expended in well-nigh useless directions would be concentrated on the conditions whence most of our social evils arise, and would slowly but surely bring about changes that would reduce to a minimum the handicaps of modern civilization. Then the influence of ethical, educational, and cultural institutions of all sorts would have their rightful effect, and social progress would bring happiness and hope to our despairing classes.

CHAPTER XXIV

EXPLOITATION AND IGNORANCE

In the following pages a short survey of some important social evils will be given, selecting as typical such problems as exploitation, ignorance, poverty and pauperism, crime, intemperance, and sexual immorality. Each of these will briefly be discussed and attention directed to socially approved methods looking towards the lessening of these evils.

EXPLOITATION

Natural Exploitation.—The Darwinian principle of natural selection has made men familiar with the fact that exploitation is a universal principle. In its simple meaning the word is a synonym for utilization, but in its more common recent meaning it implies utilization for selfish or illegitimate purposes. This might take place in almost any social activity, but as it is found chiefly in economic life, attention will be devoted chiefly to that form of exploitation. One might poetically think of the sun or the earth as exploiting smaller bodies that come within the circle of attraction; or of a plant as exploiting the soil and the air; or of an animal as exploiting plants or other animals as food. When men first exploited their fellows in cannibalism, they were like animals, and felt no moral turpitude as they murdered their victims and consumed their bodies as food. Indeed, when cannibalism came

within the realm of morals, it was as a commendable act involving additional social prestige. Yet as socialization developed, cannibalism became evil, so that men to-day shudder at the very thought of using a human body as food. In the same way piracy, highway robbery, and slaveholding, the other historic forms of human exploitation, have ceased to be honorable occupations. Slave-hunting was a socially approved occupation in advanced civilization almost to the Nineteenth Century, and slaveholding was the mark of aristocracy in the South down to the Civil War. It is a question whether even yet the human conscience is really opposed to slavery itself, and not rather to certain aspects of it, as, for example, the market, the auction block, and the compulsory dissolution of family ties. Still no one doubts that this form of exploitation and its half sisters, serfdom and peonage, are destined to disappear before the developing humanitarianism of the age.

Exploitation of Man.—In passing from cannibalism to slavery and to serfdom and peonage, the movement was from an exploitation for food purposes to exploitation for economic profit. The real question involved was whether on the whole slavery was more profitable than cannibalism. Since by that time domesticated animals supplied needed flesh foods, slave labor seemed more valuable than the food value of their war captives, just as in later centuries slave labor proved in comparison to be not so valuable as free labor motivated by self-interest. Thus, the movement from slavery to emancipation the world over is economic as well as sentimental. One may feel fairly sure that slavery would not have become serfdom or peonage, nor would this have developed into a wage system, unless society as a whole, in Europe and in the

Americas, had found it economically worth while to make the change. Slavery would in any case have disappeared from the South in time had it not been forced out by war, just as serfdom died out in Europe and slavery has passed into peonage in many parts of Latin America.

Exploitation of the Masses.—If this be admitted, it is evident that even when the wage system with nominal freedom superseded the other forms of economic servitude, the spirit of exploitation remained unchanged, but manifested itself through slightly different machinery. The reason for this is clear: exploitation of one's fellows is a natural process. All nature exploits, as already explained; natural selection and genetic human history are one long series of exploitations. When the leisure class made up of nobility and professional classes developed, its members naturally assumed that they were to be supported by the masses, just as in Plato's *Republic* he assumes as a matter of course that the intelligent citizens are to be supported by the rest of the population, arguing, as did Aristotle¹ when he classified slaves among farm implements along with cattle, and declared that mechanics and tradesmen are incapable of virtue, since they lack understanding. As long as one class of people is convinced that it is superior to another through birth, or through the possession of wealth or intelligence, the natural tendency is towards exploitation of their supposed inferiors. Under natural conditions the stronger will prey on the weaker, taking, whenever profit is at stake, all possible advantage of weakness. This is natural law and natural tendency, and from the standpoint of genetic development it is right, since force makes right. Hence

¹ In his *Politics*.

in any system of natural ethics one cannot but agree with the individualist in favor of a dominant race, a great state, a superior class, a superman. Might is right, and the god of nature is regularly on the side of the heaviest cannon. The sword of Brennus determines the amount of ransom, and Bismarck's, "greatest possible weight of blood and iron," and the "might which antedates right," agree with Machiavelli in proclaiming the true basis of the moral law of nature.

Restraints on Exploitation.—Yet the thoughtful part of mankind has never rested satisfied with a system of exploitation. First kinship softened its harshness by inculcating sympathy within the kin; then Stoicism came with its teachings of an eternal justice and a world humanity, while Buddhism in the East, and Christianity in the West, advocated an ideal of human brotherhood. On these foundations society has, in opposition to natural morals, adopted a telic ethical policy,² and demands that men base their dealings on humanitarian principles; and religion goes even farther by insisting that special assistance be given to the weaker members of society. Unfortunately, in practice this ideal is far from realization. The principle of humanitarianism is contrary to the natural disposition of man. Society by moral injunction and by law seeks to enforce its standards, but has failed to educate the average man to respect them. Hence the natural man, relying on his power of wealth or position, calmly ignores or evades the law, complying, perhaps, with the letter of it while violating its spirit. This is shown in "high finance," in the relations of capital and labor, in the moral standards of buying and selling, in

² Kidd's *Social Evolution*, which identifies religion with altruism, makes the antithesis between the egoism of reason and the altruism of religion.

war profiteering and governmental contracts, in the relations of skilled and union labor to unskilled and non-union labor, in the attitude of the corrupt politician to the public, and generally in a system that permits the burden and misery of society to fall to the lot of those least able to shift it to others.

Ignorance Responsible for Exploitation.—Such abuses are inevitable as long as there is ignorance of social conditions and a general apathy in respect to social aims. Nothing under present conditions but broader education will bring about the desired change. It is no easy task to transform men's natures. Religion alone cannot do it, nor a legal system unsupported by public opinion. The Marxian remedy of class struggle would not prove satisfactory, for if the lower should conquer the higher, the latter would be exploited by the former, as in Russia. Although at present class struggle seems to be inevitable, wiser education would soften its bitterness and place it on the higher plane of arbitration and compromise.

Again, our legal system with its procedure is "fearfully and wonderfully made," and will be simplified if ever lawyers become jurists, and legislators, statesmen. Meanwhile racial experience shows that when education enables men to comprehend the meaning of their desires, society will proceed to eliminate exploitation according to the three usual stages of action exemplified in statute books: first, the meaner forms of exploitation, for example, cheating and swindling, gambling and "wild cat" speculation, should be sternly repressed through laws requiring speedy trials and punishment, so as to eliminate from the modern economic world persons whose morals belong too far back in civilization to entitle them to a

place in modern transactions. Secondly, persons of average morality, who in business dealings incline in either an honorable or dishonorable direction according to suggestion and environment, should be carefully regulated by law, and stimulated by public opinion to conduct their economic activities in harmony with moral standards. And thirdly, the real emphasis should as rapidly as possible be placed on the sociological principle that men must be led by their own interests to conform to high standards of honor. This involves a broadly intelligent public opinion determining moral standards and generously giving its approval to those who prefer honor to illegitimate profit. There are many commercial firms, for example, whose best asset is the confidence the public have in their integrity and in the quality and worth of their manufactured products.

The State as an Exploiter.—The state itself, unfortunately, is an agency in the furtherance of exploitation since it retains so many vestiges of the times when government was under class control and was employed in exploiting the masses for the sake of the classes. There is great need, for example, of a thorough readjustment of its system of taxation, which under present conditions is an excellent illustration of the exploitation of small owners under the form of law; of a vigorous reorganization of both its civil and its criminal law, each of which at present allows great scope for exploitation; and of a revision of its system of public education, which sends forth into economic life four-fifths of its toilers so poorly trained that they easily become fit subjects for exploitation because of ignorance. If these three fundamental departments were revised by the state in the interests of the public, other improvements, now held back in their devel-

opment, would much sooner become vigorous and dominant.

Social Parasitism.—The present tendency is to regard parasitism in all of its forms as socially wrong. Men are born to labor, and neither man nor woman should assume that he or she is by right of birth or inheritance free from social obligation. "If any will not work, neither let him eat,"³ is a social principle that is becoming a democratic ideal. When the sons of the wealthy begin to don overalls, and their daughters to prepare for useful vocations, it will need no prophet to foresee the time when parasitism will become unpopular and labor honorable.

Common Interests in the Industries.—In this same spirit is the modern movement to arouse the employees' interest in their work, so as to substitute the joy in work and product, for which William Morris stood, for a mechanical and clock-watching slavery or a desire to "beat" the employer by restricted output, unnecessary wastage, and sabotage. On the other hand should be noted the reciprocal acknowledgments of employers that employees are not merely *hands*, but heads and hearts besides, vitally interested in the business, whose special interests should be consulted as a matter of self-interest. Finally should be observed the present leanings toward another ideal of economic organization, in which sharp distinctions between master and man will disappear, as both see themselves laboring for common ends and joint interests, and mutual trust succeeds suspicion and exploitation. There are already in the economic world many illustrations of such relationships, where employers consider themselves as trustees and employees work "on honor," and both are

³II. Thessalonians III, 10, revised version.

kept keyed by the tone of public opinion in the shop and the office.⁴

It is no easy task to prevent men from exploiting their fellows, and should the time ever come when through telic policy stronger men recognize their kinship and foster their weaker brothers, society may well claim that as its crowning achievement. In that happier time men will still exploit, but the word will have lost its secondary meaning, and will resume its older definition of utilization; nature and human capacity will be exploited by man to build up the larger interests of humanity.

IGNORANCE

Ignorance in Ancient Times.—In the beginnings of civilization there were practically no ignorant persons in the community. The inevitable differences in individual amounts of knowledge were slight, as the little knowledge existent was simple, comprehensible, and open to all. But as the total amount of knowledge increased, as skill in the arts developed, and men began to speculate about the gods and nature and its manifestations of energy, it became less and less possible for one person to master the knowledge unitedly held by the members of society, so that each individual acquired merely that part of it needed for his special purposes. When speculative knowledge became important through the growth of a leisure class in part devoted to reflection, this knowledge became professional and was the privilege of the few. Naturally, therefore, as knowledge increased, it passed into the pos-

⁴For a careful study of movements looking toward "industrial betterment," see Wm. H. Tolman's *Social Engineering*, "A record of things done by American Industrialists employing upward of one and one-half million people."

session of specialized industries and professions, and each person acquired for himself only what he needed for use. In addition to this each person acquired some general knowledge from his social environment, varying in amount according to his mental capacity and his economic status.

In later centuries this general knowledge, definitely imparted as cultural information, makes up a large part of education. For, as democracy gains ground, it is deemed essential that each person be trained in civic knowledge, in order that he may become a more useful citizen. As theories of self-development gain foothold within society, a person may be given increasingly greater educational opportunities in order that he may telicly build up his body and mind, and acquire a deeper insight into human problems. Every normal person, therefore, in a well-organized society, will obtain knowledge of his business, some knowledge for general social and civic purposes, and perhaps some also for purposes of mental enlargement.

Ignorance a Social Handicap.—Now in static civilization with its fixed institutions and occupations, the average person acquires the knowledge needed for his sphere of life, and technically is well informed even though he may not have the general knowledge possessed by the community. In this sense one may speak of a laborer, a mechanic, a farmer, or a merchant as educated, if he understands his own business. But in a dynamic age, especially if it is also democratic, a new distinction creeps in. Men move into a larger circle than that about their own occupations; they are part of a complex civic and social organization; enterprising members are moving upward and the unenterprising downward. Hence the person who acquires the larger general civic and cultural knowledge

becomes, other things being equal, more suited to the conditions of life and is educated, as against another who is ignorant because he failed for some reason to attain this larger knowledge. Again, as the person educated is presumably fit for the higher demands of society, he meets with approval; but his fellow, who failed to make a similar attainment, is slighted because he is not capable of satisfying those demands. Furthermore, the most ignorant, being unfit for higher demands, are, according to the Darwinian explanation, in process of elimination. They receive accordingly a wretched wage, are poorly housed, are victims of disease and fail to guide their children intelligently in so complex a civilization. Ignorance, therefore, becomes a matter of real importance to society, for the individual is forced into conditions that push always toward ultimate extermination, and society becomes burdened with an ever-increasing dead weight of apathetic humanity.

Social Policy toward Ignorance.—Now if ignorance, incapacity, and viciousness meant the same thing, society should for its own sake hasten nature's methods and free itself from this unendurable load as soon as possible; but if, on the other hand, incapacity and viciousness are largely due to ignorance, and ignorance is remediable, then social policy should aim to banish ignorance, at least in its worst forms. This is the policy definitely adopted in democracies, which for freedom's sake banish censorship over speech and thought and make all knowledge accessible through the school and the press. Society has turned with telic purpose toward education, and is bent on making ignorance an impossibility. Recognizing that individuals, as such, cannot under the conditions of life be depended on to attain an education through their own

efforts, the state is committed throughout Western civilization to a policy of general compulsory education.

Social Education.—The chief difficulty heretofore has been to decide how best to banish the worst forms of ignorance. At first it was assumed that a knowledge of language and arithmetic was sufficient, on the naïve assumption that a person equipped with these would of his own accord obtain other knowledge also. This theory is rapidly disappearing through disappointment at results. The movement now is to furnish increasingly broader knowledge so that a progressive society must devote itself more and more to education, enlarging the "school population," so as to include even adults and relying increasingly for social progress on the quality of education given to its members. Society, therefore, through books, magazines, and newspapers, through lectures and cultural institutions and associations of all sorts, as well as through public and specialized schools, is devoting itself to the task of giving to its citizens industrial and technical instruction, knowledge of civic duties, a scientific comprehension of the simpler principles of hygiene, sanitation and dietetics, and opportunities to acquire the elements of cultural knowledge. Formidable as this list of knowledge may seem, it easily can become a common possession, and in many communities wider education of this sort is already a matter of course. It remains for society to systematize and enlarge this knowledge, and to insist that every person be given the opportunity, in fact as well as in theory, to get a vigorous grasp of the knowledge society has acquired from past generations and is increasing by its own efforts.

It is, of course, an error to assume that if such an educational system were in thorough working order, social

evils would thereby be eliminated. Economic conditions are also a determining factor in social life, and in some respects the most powerful. But if good economic conditions are supplemented by a real education, made general, one would not be rash in arguing that the basis for a right civilization at last existed, and that from henceforth the evils in social life would gradually tend to disappear.

CHAPTER XXV

POVERTY, PAUPERISM, AND CRIME

The discussion of the two previous topics naturally suggests the treatment of the present subjects. An appreciation of the significance of exploitation and ignorance is fundamental to any understanding of society's great defects. This is more evident in the case of pauperism than in crime or vice, for the connection between it and ignorance is obvious.

POVERTY AND PAUPERISM

A clear distinction should be made between poverty and pauperism. Properly speaking, poverty is a relative term and exists only by comparison with higher standards. A millionaire is poor to a multi-millionaire, and a man of moderate salary is wealthy to a low-wage earner. Socially speaking, poverty exists when a person's annual income is near or below the usual social standards of common comfort and decency for those of his class or vocation, and pauperism exists when persons need regularly to have their earnings or incomes eked out by public or private doles. In primitive conditions naturally there was no pauperism, and poverty was honorable since all were poor. Property was communal and private wealth did not exist. Private property in foods and land, civil law guarantying and regulating property rights, and the rise of a lei-

sure exploiting class, are the three agencies that in later centuries brought the problems of poverty and pauperism into the world. In theory it is better, in speaking of those in poverty or pauperism, not to consider as paupers those who, by reason of youth or old age, or physical or mental incapacity, are not capable of performing some kind of useful service. By common consent such dependency is entitled to aid as of right and obtains it in varying degree from family or society.

Poverty and Natural Selection.—Under a system of genetic development society should pay no attention to problems of poverty and pauperism; and alms, if given at all, should be looked on as unwise altruism deserving even social censure. For, under natural conditions poverty prevails; a few struggle towards and attain wealth and ease, others fail in the competition, and the weaker properly should die of hunger or its attendant evils. It is natural selection, and human experience voices it in the theory that war, or cut-throat competition, is the natural state of man. The socializing process is seen first when the kin or the brotherhood began to assume responsibility for those of their own blood, and wealthier men began to have "poor relations." Then religion, philanthropic agencies, fraternal orders, labor unions, and finally the state, took part in it one by one, as the struggle for existence became keener and humanitarianism grew stronger. At present society is so sensitive to human suffering, and so altruistic, that the burden of its obligations in respect to charity is becoming too onerous, and the old system is collapsing by its own weight, owing to the severe social crises that have developed in many countries because of the great war and its attendant financial crises.

Systems of Charity.—It would be possible to argue that charity in its numerous forms is on the whole socially injurious.¹ Large amounts of money and human energy of a high grade are annually devoted to palliative and statical methods of charity, in sad comparison with the small amount devoted to preventive and remedial measures. The system reminds one of a busy housewife vigorously expending time and energy in wiping up the water from an open tap, but failing in her excitement to turn off the tap itself. Charity workers of all sorts are well agreed that the real causes back of poverty and pauperism are (1) the lack of steady work the year round, especially true of inefficient and unskilled labor; (2) sickness through ignorance, wretched housing, poorly cooked or deficient food, and preventable injuries in business; (3) a lack of the knowledge needful for successful home making; and (4) vice and crime, largely products of social environment. Now if as a matter of theory the money, labor, and consecrated devotion at present expended in charity were diverted for even a limited term of years to efforts for the removal of these conditions, and the creation of a public opinion against them, unquestionably a large part of the present need would be eliminated. No such telic policy, of course, can be put into immediate operation, but the possibility of a policy aiming at the elimination of the causes of extreme poverty should be taken into account, and the worst features of the present system eliminated one by one. Poverty, as distinct from pauperism, is an international problem, the problem of a whole civilization,² and all that can be ex-

¹For an excellent argument of this sort see Sumner's *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*.

²An indication of the modern trend towards an international policy in respect to human suffering is seen in Article 25 of the

pected from a given government under present conditions is that it keep the standard of living fairly decent, and devote attention to the elimination of conditions below the standard.

Social Betterment.—As far as fundamental conditions are concerned, it is obvious that if industries are wisely regulated and careful oversight maintained over the conditions of labor, and if steady employment can be rendered more and more possible, and undue competition and exploitation reduced to harmless proportions by law and opinion, the chief difficulties will have been overcome. General and industrial education will aid much in the process. Through labor organizations and through municipal regulation, the conditions of labor and living should be improved, so that unnecessary sickness and injuries may be eliminated. As public intelligence develops and civic improvement is demanded, better housing, sanitation, and a knowledge of domestic economics will build up stronger bodies as a basis for growth in mental capacity. The time should come when society will look upon its entire burden of charity as an "old man of the seas," an incubus to be shaken off as soon as possible. Curiously enough, society now smiles approval at the establishment of a new asylum or hospital, but begrudges the money for improved schools or for scientific experiments looking towards the elimination of sickness and disease. When, on the other hand, it deliberately multiplies its educational agencies, lops off its charities one by one, cancels the charters of "benevolent" institutions as

League of Nations, which reads: "The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and coöperation of duly authorised voluntary national Red Cross organisations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease, and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world."

they cease to be needed, and prevents accidents by safety devices, then society may claim to have reached a condition of telic progress. Altruistic energy in that case will be devoted to progressive movements, aiming to build up the cultural standards of the race, instead of expending itself in an effort to perform a constantly increasing task on a relatively decreasing income.

Pauperism Should Be Abolished.—The fundamental social aims should, of course, be to abolish pauperism in its entirety. No economic system should rest satisfied with a condition in which physically capable men and women are supported without corresponding exertion on their own part. Farm colonies, labor colonies, industrial training, all such agencies should be utilized to free society from its parasites both rich and poor. The case of dependent children, the aged, and the sick is different, and agencies for the prevention of such dependency are essential. The chief remedies here, again, are improved economic conditions and education. Few children would be dependent if fathers earned a living wage and occupational accidents were reduced to a minimum.⁸

Poverty Should Be Lessened.—Poverty in itself is not an evil if a fair standard of living is assured, permanent employment tolerably certain, and proper facilities available for the health, comfort, and education of children. It is not likely that society for centuries will eliminate poverty, but it can conceivably banish pauperism and the strenuous conditions of poverty, so as to lessen the strain of a low-wage system. Any one at all familiar with the conditions of hard-working families, marvels at their skill in household economics and their devotion to one another and to their weaker neighbors.

⁸ See Hollander's *Abolition of Poverty*.

Some of the very best achievements in human character are to be found among the poor, who need but better opportunities to become our most capable and reliable citizens. Every precaution should be taken to prevent such persons from being forced into pauperism, for when once that taint of passive helplessness, or an eagerness for parasitic support, gets into the blood, degeneracy is inevitable. To the worthy poor, society owes sympathy and justice; to the desperately poor, a helping hand and wider opportunities; to the pauperized, self-reproach, pity, but a policy of elimination; uplifting if possible, otherwise segregating, preventing reproduction of kind.

Charity as alms-giving, on the other hand, should not be looked on as a high form of altruism; the better opinion of the age fights against that view of it. Charity is a temporary remedy, useful in backward, but obnoxious in higher civilization. The highly developed intuitively shrink from charity and prefer starvation or suicide as an alternative. Such feelings of pride and self-respect deserve to be fostered; they should not be stamped out by well-meaning but ignorant persons who give charity instead of intelligent service toward the removal of the causes for the need of it. The time was when men asked for bread and received a stone; now they ask for work at a living wage and receive bread. Of the two, the gift of bread is worse than the hurling of the stone. Fraternity and social justice are the proper gifts to those who need both food and kindness.

CRIME

Strange as it may seem, crime is considered a more hopeful social phenomenon than pauperism. If the

essential basis for social activity is vigorous personality, a criminal represents a higher type than an inert pauper, whose heredity is defective and whose chief characteristic is passivity. Even the crime of the one class may socially be less injurious than the vice of the other. In studies of defective heredity, of which there have been several in recent years, it is noted that the stronger strains of a degenerate stock turn to drunkenness and to crime, and the weaker to pauperism and sexual vice.

Changing Standards in Crime.—Criminality also may be looked on as a sort of atavism, a survival from former ages when murder and robbery outside one's family or clan were considered honorable. Many of our criminals would have been "leading citizens" a few centuries back, and extolled in legend like Robin Hood or Dick Turpin; just as some of our leading citizens to-day may in the next century be considered as criminals. Theft was once a civil offense, and the duel and the feud, to say nothing of lynching, still meet with public approval in some parts of Western civilization. It is a question whether the crimes of capitalistic "cornering," profiteering, and the many other forms of exploitation are in public opinion social offenses, or exhibitions of shrewdness deserving of approval.⁴ Theft to the thief is a sort of *lex talionis*. He considers that he has been exploited by society, and he exploits another's property as compensation for his own injuries. It would be possible by Nietzschean philosophy to glorify murder, theft, and seduction on the basis of a higher law, the law of might; excellent authority could be found for it also in Machiavelli, in individualistic philosophy, and in the argument

⁴ Read, *e.g.*, E. A. Ross, *Sin and Society*.

that the means is justified by the end.⁵ In common opinion crime depends on the amount of it: the greater the crime the more the tendency of the public to condone; and, inversely, punishment is relatively severer for petty offenses.

Crime in Its Development.—Treason was the only legal crime in early civilization, other matters being left to private settlement. Then crimes against the person were taken one by one under civic cognizance as being against the peace, and in comparatively late ages crimes against property became public offenses. Many a person is even yet in doubt as to whether offenses against his honor or that of his family should be given personal attention or referred to the courts. Corporations are comparatively new in the social world, and their property rights are not respected as are those of persons. Many a person would cheat a corporation, out of a railway fare for instance, who would scorn to cheat his rival in business. One might add also that many corporations still lack the conscience that presumably should accompany privilege and the gift of legal personality. In short, the notion of crime is ill-defined, as befits an age of transition when nations are passing from an agricultural civilization with its static conditions to a keenly competitive commercial régime. It is important, therefore, that in criminology one should not rely overmuch on notions of crime conveyed by statute books and commentaries on criminal law, for those are based on the past, and fail to take readily into account newer developments in civilization.

Crime as "Misdirected Energy."—If one's theory of crime is based on a study of social forces, it is hard

⁵ See Ragnor Redbeard, *Might is Right*.

to escape the conclusion that crime is "misdirected energy." In such sociological studies of crime as those of Lombroso and Ferri, for example,⁶ the question of hereditary criminal tendency is discussed with the implied conclusion that there is only a very small percentage of criminals who are inherently vicious because of inherited tendencies. In the case of such persons the only possible remedy is for society permanently to segregate them and to prevent them from propagating. If the marks of the criminal type can really be ascertained, as Lombroso asserts, or if certain criminals by their acts show such tendencies, the law should not hinder society from permanently separating them from their fellows, if not by a painless death, at any rate by lifelong seclusion in suitable confinement. As for the remainder of the criminal class, writers are agreed that their criminality is altogether due to the conditions of their environment. Now criminologists never argue that because a person has become criminal through environment, therefore he should be allowed to escape the penalty for his acts. Only an approximation to exact justice can be expected in an imperfect civilization. The criminal may not deserve *punishment* in the proper sense of the word, but irrespective of how he became so, he is a dangerous citizen and must be treated as such. Such treatment may involve detention, seclusion, compulsory training of some sort, perhaps even death, and some such action is socially necessary, even though there may be twinges of social remorse in the doing of it. Yet all methods of that sort ought to be considered as temporary, leading on to the larger policy of the practical elimination of crime. This should not in these days seem like a wild suggestion. No man living,

⁶ See Ferri, *Criminal Sociology*; Lombroso, *The Criminal*.

nor his son, nor his son's son will see the final disappearance of crime from society, and yet each should see it grow relatively less through scientific study and wiser law.

Sociological Remedies for Crime.—Physiological, psychological, and eugenic studies of abnormal man have already been begun and from them will come social oversight over degenerate stocks, stimulation of the better members, separation and the gradual elimination of the worse, and of all habitual criminals. Social oversight over degenerate families would, from every point of view,¹ be one of the most profitable measures which society could take.

In the second place, criminologists agree that most of our criminals are potentially normal persons, who have become abnormal physically and mentally through defective nurture, education, and lack of opportunity for advancement. This, of course, is mainly due to the existence of unskilled, poorly paid labor, native and alien, who lack proper food, housing, social enjoyment, and economic opportunity. The existence of such a class is preventable, and is a perpetual menace to higher civilization. Furthermore, the largest percentage of the criminal classes is made up of minors in adolescence and of the older youth of both sexes, who at that time most of all need what they so rarely have, namely, wise guidance and cultural stimuli. The success of a wiser policy is clearly shown by the results of a proper probation system, juvenile courts, industrial and disciplinary schools, and reformatories for older first offenders. If our poorer population were given fairer opportunities in education, and

¹ See for illustration, A. E. Winship, *Jukes-Edwards; a Study in Education and Heredity*, contrasting the descendants of the "Jukes" and of Jonathan Edwards.

a better preparation for industrial life and social enjoyment, crime among them would be minimized.

Conflicting Moral Standards.—There would still remain a large class of offenses due to the conditions of ethical standards. The old time religious basis of ethics is weakening. Many of the ethical teachings, of the Old Testament at least, are inferior to the practices of the present generation, and the opinions of councils and clergy on newer questions of ethics are taken at their face value only, even within the churches. On the other hand, the scientific basis for complete moral codes are not yet exact enough for use, so that public opinion is often unable to decide between right and wrong, except in the case of actions condemned or approved as the result of generations of racial experience. To meet these conditions social, religious, and educational agencies should devote themselves vigorously to the task of working out a newer ethics for newer social sins, and unitedly to develop as rapidly as possible a public opinion and agencies for social control, that will guide men's ambitions toward socially approved conduct. Under present conditions persons can commit crimes and retain their social respectability, because public opinion is too vague. For instance, questions arise as to the justification or condemnation of violence in strikes, lynching when law is incompetent, "corners" in necessities of life, bribery in politics, profits from the sale of narcotics, and the sale, tacit or actual, of one's vote in elections or in legislatures. All these are, of course, condemned by the moralist, but in practice are often condoned by public opinion. Until there is a reënforcement of ethical principles based on scientific teachings and standards of social utility, there will be crime, due to our transitional ethics. When once these prin-

ciples are formulated and socially approved, the power of organized public opinion is so formidable, that men will tend voluntarily to devote their energies in safer and socially wise directions.

Evils of Poor Methods of Regulation.—One of the defects of an imperfectly developed civilization is that attempts to regulate or suppress supposed evil often result in an aggravation of the evil itself.⁸ For instance, society has developed so vast and intricate a system of criminal law and procedure in respect to the detection, trial, and punishment of criminals, that with all the reform of the last hundred years it is still the despair of the philosophic jurist and the admiration of every believer in circumlocution and chicanery. Law schools, like theological seminaries, seldom graduate philosophers, so that lawyers are often skilled in the details of their business, but inexpert in the simple principles of jurisprudence and penology. As judges and legislators are chosen chiefly from the membership of the bar, the same emphasis on detail and technicality manifests itself in decision and law, so that too often a legal system seems, as Dickens put it, a device for "how not to do it."⁹ Unquestionably this is one cause of crime. The delays and evasions of the law, its failure to conform to newer social standards and conditions, its practical, though unintentional, favoritism, the expense of litigation, mostly unnecessary, all combine to sap one of society's most valued achievements, reverence for and obedience to law. It is inconceivable that if society had to make anew its legal system, it

⁸ The history of religious persecutions would supply many illustrations, and see also Herbert Spencer's discussion of "The Sins of Legislators" in *The Man versus the State*.

⁹ See, for illustrations, report of the Carnegie Foundation (1919) on *Justice and the Poor*, by Reginald H. Smith.

would deliberately devise anything like the present law, and, indeed, one of the earliest tasks of any successful revolution is a revision of law and procedure. There is need that scientific commissions be periodically convened for the purpose of revising and simplifying the law, and that their membership consist of jurists and penologists, rather than of those engaged in *criminal practice*, a somewhat ambiguous term.¹⁰

Reforms in Systems of Punishment.—Akin to the evil arising from the technicality of law, is the hindrance due to the slow movement of penological reforms. As long as crimes were thought due to innate depravity, it was natural enough to assume that harsh punishment should be meted out to the offender, as a sort of retaliation against a social enemy. But now, when it is believed that the great mass of criminals would be normal citizens, had society done its duty in weeding out degenerates and rightly training the young, vindictiveness changes to pity and a desire to better the conditions of punishment. The great historical stages of this change are: the prohibition of cruel punishments, the slow passing of capital and corporal punishment, improvement in the general treatment of criminals, and the introduction of reformatory methods even in the penitentiary. It seems evident that the trend of change is in the general direction of making punishment a system of industrial labor and education, with disciplinary colonies for, and permanent segregation of the most vicious, so as to secure the elimination of their stock. The ultimate remedy for crime itself has already been indicated. Society must not simply handle its criminals wisely, it must

* See Parmelee, *Anthropology and Sociology in Relation to Criminal Procedure*, Chaps. V-VII, inclusive, and Ferri's *Criminal Sociology*, Chap. III.

rearrange its manner of life so as to stop the manufacture, as it were, of a vicious population. It is a question, for example, whether minors who commit offenses, should ever be considered as criminals, or whether they should not rather be given wise advice and disciplinary training. It is probable that the idea of the juvenile court, probation, and the industrial school, will result in treating the offenses of minors as properly under special educational supervision, rather than criminal jurisdiction;¹¹ while the city welfare department will remove one by one the vicious conditions that drive so many young persons into offenses against the law. It is also probable that persons charged with minor offenses, especially if first offenders, will cease to be considered criminals and be placed on probation and made either to pay civil damages or be treated through other agencies than the prison, for example, the hospital, the industrial reformatory, or the farm colony.

Social Freedom from Crime.—It hardly seems utopian to hope that society might largely free itself from crime if it would systematically segregate the hardened criminal, supervise degenerate stock, give special training to youthful and first offenders, and make steady improvement in the conditions of life, raising economic standards, and simplifying criminal law and procedure. A generation of the next century may perhaps look at the ruins of our Sing Sings, with much the same feeling that a modern visitor gazes at the mediæval dungeons of Europe. William Morris may not have been far wrong in dreaming of a time when criminal law had become obsolete and criminals so rare that, if a crime were com-

¹¹ See Russell and Rigby, *The Making of the Criminal*; Thomas Travis, *The Young Malefactor*; Arthur Train, *The Prisoner at the Bar*.

mitted, the offender found his punishment in loneliness and remorse.

Crime Is Not Natural.—It is ordinarily thought that if punishment for crime were removed from the statutes, everybody would at once become eager to commit crime. As a matter of fact, our criminal statutes even now apply only to a very small percentage of the population. The larger part of a people are moral, and prefer to remain so because of their desire for social approbation. If popular opinion could be strengthened, and vicious conditions removed, it would make small difference to the great majority of the people whether there was a criminal code or not. Men naturally love to be in sympathy with their fellows, and nothing more quickly destroys the best in a man than the knowledge that he is looked on as a social outcast. The criminal's psychology is abnormal, because he is in an abnormal situation. Workers like Mrs. Booth¹² make clear the fact that prisoners are human beings, longing for a something they no longer enjoy; the consciousness of being an integral part of their race, working with it and for it, as every normal man should. Criminals should be socialized, not antagonized, and the process of socializing a potential criminal should begin in the cradle and be particularly emphasized through the adolescent period. If our present social organization, so prolific a breeder of criminals, would adopt a telic policy in respect to crime, the economic and social waste involved in "misdirected energy" and in policing might be diverted to useful social activities.

¹² See her work, *After Prison, What?*

CHAPTER XXVI

INTEMPERANCE AND SEXUAL IMMORALITY

INTEMPERANCE

Next to sexual immorality in its prevalence in modern civilization is the evil of intemperance. Though for the purposes of discussion this term will be chiefly restricted to phenomena arising from the excessive use of alcoholic drinks, yet in theory the use of narcotics should be included, since the effects from the use of drug and liquor are much the same. Certainly no one can deny the enormous evils incident to such forms of intemperance, evils so deep-rooted and widespread as seriously to hamper the forward movement of society. It is natural, therefore, when these evils first force themselves on the attention, to follow primitive instincts and favor a policy of tabu. For this reason, society, under the impulse of an awakening conscience, may, as in the United States, forbid the manufacture and sale of liquors, or it may refuse to allow their importation, or else may prohibit the sale of liquor to certain classes, when plainly inimical to social welfare, as, for example, in the case of minors or the skilled employees of railroads. All tabus have their utility, and are more or less effective in proportion to the thoroughness of enforcement and the strength of public

opinion. As a permanent policy society must have a more scientific basis for temperance.

Prohibition in the United States.—In the United States prohibition came as the climax of generations of agitation, and final action was powerfully aided by the war situation. It would be an error, however, to argue that public opinion was not, aside from the war, strongly in favor of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Three states¹ only withheld their approval, and these are relatively small and contain populations largely of foreign birth or parentage. It is not at all likely that the amendment ever will be repealed, although concessions through Congressional law in respect to alcoholic per cent may possibly be made. Presumably, for a whole generation there will be innumerable illegal stills and lax enforcement of law, but gradually, as the older generation dies away, the newer generation, unused to the saloons and unfamiliar with liquors as beverages will develop a public opinion definitely adverse to the return of former conditions. Unquestionably the economic gain and greater production through the passing of the saloon, to say nothing of increased social happiness, will give the nation an advantage that may have great influence in determining other nations to adopt the same policy. It is inconceivable, for example, that Canada can afford to retain the saloon and thereby become, like Cuba, a resort for those who prefer liquors to sobriety, making the Dominion into a sort of red-light district.

Other Policies in Use.—It may be, however, that nations other than the United States may prefer some other policy against intemperance than that of prohibition,

¹ New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.

for, after all, prohibitory laws in themselves are low in grade, as compared to a wise but slower policy of elimination through education and modification of social environment.

It should not be assumed, for example, that in Western civilization abstinence is synonymous with temperance. Stimulating beverages will probably be to some extent used in many parts of the world in the future as in the past. Drinking habits are too widespread, and the attractiveness of liquor is too powerful to permit of general disuse, for many generations at least. But a large part of the evils of intemperance should disappear and the sooner the better. If a policy of systematic reduction of the drinking habit were adopted, in place of attempts at complete annihilation, a first step might be made by insistence on the purity of liquors offered for consumption; the State should insist on a set standard of purity as a prerequisite for permission to place liquor on sale. Then, too, if liquors of low alcoholic per cent gradually supplanted stronger beverages, crimes of violence would be lessened in number. Furthermore, many improvements in the system of regulation can be devised, so as to eliminate certain evils inherent in license systems. There are many questions in a license system needing more careful study, such as, for example, the methods of obtaining licenses, the proportion of saloons to population, the evils arising from sales by clubs, drug-stores, and illegal bar rooms, and the relation of the police to those legally or illegally engaged in the traffic. Possibly as a substitute for a license system, experiments in monopolies of manufacture and sale should be carefully studied, so as to see whether or not the element of private profit can be eliminated. This would be a

most important modification, for if the economic motive for the multiplication of sales could be removed, sales would largely diminish, and advocates of temperance would be able to exercise greater influence in legislation. For this reason the Scandinavian system, in which a philanthropic corporation controls a monopoly of the business and supposedly devotes all profits above a low maximum to public use, is a method worthy of serious attention.

Then, too, the State might refuse the privilege of the mails to publications containing advertisements of liquor, just as the Federal Government of the United States refuses to allow lottery advertisements to be thus distributed. It is not unlikely, also, that public opinion might be brought to bear on newspapers and magazines, so as to induce them to bar from their columns all advertising matter in respect to the sale of liquors. In the same way a sort of social boycott, like that of the Consumers' League against sweat-shop goods, might be created against hotels and drug, grocery, and department stores that keep liquors for sale. An aroused public opinion, banning advertisements and restricting sales to licensed places handling liquors only, would cut off two great sources of the spread of the drinking habit; for judicious advertising increases sales, and the stimulus of private profit leads many firms to add the sale of liquors to their other lines of business.

Influence of Right Education.—Much, also, has been and can be accomplished by associations for the promotion of temperance. The influence of such movements is powerful when they seek to stimulate men to right action by appeals to higher motives based on a real knowledge of the situation. Scientific education

also is an influential factor, but all attempts to educate the youth or to develop public opinion should be fair and should seek to present the question as a whole, not emphasizing its abnormal and one-sided aspects. Exaggerated teachings in respect to intemperance are harmful in the long run, since more exact knowledge brings revulsion of feeling. If instruction in temperance is given in the schools, as in the United States, it is important that text-book and teacher handle the question intelligently, and present it, not simply as a physiological and moral problem, but as a matter affecting the whole of social life and demanding the formation of social standards and purposive activity. The churches also need to adopt the same viewpoint. Religious temperance agitation would better emphasize a scientific study of the question as a social problem, rather than make it a religious demand, involving a war against the saloon. Instead of arousing the combative and sympathetic emotions of their audiences, the ministry would better appeal to the intellect by a careful presentation of the larger aspects of the question arising from social and scientific studies. In place of their insistence on personal pledges, they would accomplish more by attempts to improve regulation and to modify social conditions.

Habits of Social Drinking.—The question of intemperance has, however, a more completely sociological phase, since the desire for drink is also a social force. As a desire it is in origin physiological, psychological, and social. In social life the use of liquors has become a custom, and many persons drink simply because it is usual at meals or in social companionship. They have no craving for liquor because of its effects, but merely partake of or furnish the beverage customary on social

occasions, whether it be coffee, mineral water, or liquors. Evidently the remedy for such a custom, if one is demanded, lies in its modification by argument, and through imitation of examples set by social leaders. It is, however, the least objectionable form of drinking, and, if it never went to excess, would probably lead to no further discussion than that over the growing use of coffee or tea. The custom may naturally become evil when the amount of liquor consumed becomes large, and the element of waste becomes a factor in the situation, along with tendencies toward drunkenness by the weaker members of society. A relatively large part of drinking for social purposes is done in saloons and club rooms, because these are natural social centers; persons who have no moral objections to the saloon readily find in it an attractive companionship and much sociability of a certain sort. In such cases the drinking may be merely incidental to the social features, and in many cases some other form of drink would be equally acceptable. It is probable, therefore, that when society definitely undertakes to furnish attractive recreational centers, where abundant opportunities are offered for social enjoyment, many persons who now frequent saloons will prefer to pass their time in these rival places of amusement, open, it may be, to their families also, and where liquor, if furnished at all, would be sold only in its milder forms, as in Europe. One of the really hopeful movements of modern times is in the development of such social centers, where numerous classes of people may secure light refreshments and amusements of a better sort for trifling sums.

Psychological Aspect.—If the desire for intoxicating liquor is psychological, it may be due to a morbid

craving for the excitement of drunkenness, or to mental strain caused by reverses in business, domestic losses, or disappointed ambitions. If a person drinks simply for the sake of the effects of intoxication, he is essentially irresponsible and should be treated accordingly. Probation or compulsory detention for purposes of education and training are the proper remedies, and sterner measures should be taken, if necessary, to prevent such forms of indulgence, leading, as they so often do, to crime and vice. If grief or financial reverses cause the demand for the stupefaction arising from intoxication, the chief remedy lies in the diversion of attention from the exciting cause, and the arousal of new interests through friendly assistance, advice, or even medical attention. Such cases as these are relatively few in number, and the mental conditions should pass away with proper care.

Physiological Causes.—The really serious cravings for stimulants arise from physiological causes. If a human body is improperly or insufficiently fed, if the lungs are not regularly supplied with a proper amount of oxygen, or if the body and nervous system are breaking down through overwork or nervous strain due to worry, then the physical system demands relief, and a feverish condition develops, an unrest indicative of approaching physical collapse. Under natural conditions this state should be followed by lassitude, weakness, susceptibility to disease, and ultimately premature death. The proper remedies, of course, would be nourishing foods, sanitary conditions of housing and labor, and relaxation from mental strain. Such remedies unfortunately are out of the question for low-wage earners, who must be satisfied with a niggardly subsistence and a wretched environment. Under present conditions they

must remain in this situation, largely because, through defective training and nurture, they lack intelligence enough to understand their needs and the danger of contracting vicious habits. If they had foresight, they would push upward in the economic world and would not remain among poorly paid workers; but in their shortsightedness it is natural enough for them, when they find themselves inert, to imitate the habits of their neighbors, in order to find a temporary remedy for their condition. Wherever there is poverty, there will be a demand for stimulants, not because of inherent wickedness, as is sometimes thought, but because of imperfect bodily development. Such persons are sickly, unsymmetrical, and age rapidly under the strain of life.

As liquor in all of its forms is easily obtained and is comparatively cheap, the average person in Western civilization turns to that. This can be illustrated by a study of the location of drinking places in any large city. The great mass of them will be found wherever the poor live. In the sections occupied by skilled workingmen, where economic and domestic conditions are better, saloons are fewer in number; in the so-called residential sections where the population has the maximum of household comfort, there are few or no saloons. Others will be found massed near the vicinity of red-light districts and business centers; in the last case so as to cater to transient trade and social drinking, or to furnish liquor supplementary to a meal.

Social Policies Important.—Drinking, heretofore, has been largely confined to men, but henceforth women, as they enter economic and social life, will demand the same privileges as their male kin; so that the drinking habit both public and private will probably be common

among women, keeping pace with the growth or decrease of the habit among men. Women under present tendencies will hardly be deterred by the argument that women are different and should be better than men, a point in ethics somewhat difficult to prove.

Now if this be a true statement of the case, evidently the remedy for intemperance among the poor will not be met by prohibition. Moral exhortations and educational information will make small difference, a pledge would be as a rule efficacious only when followed by a radical change in environment, nor will social substitutes for the saloon prove entirely satisfactory. Prohibition inevitably will be followed by illegal manufacturing, sales, and purchases. Remedies to be really effective must be far-reaching. It would be necessary, for instance, to fight disease in all of its forms; to make permanent improvement in sanitation, housing, and the conditions of labor; to forbid child labor *in toto*; female labor, except under healthful conditions; and to regulate fully under police powers male labor in dangerous and disease-breeding occupations. Systematic instruction in domestic economy and cooking should also be given to girls in the schools, and to mothers through mothers' clubs, so as to enable them to furnish their families with nourishing foods at no greater expense than that of the wretchedly cooked foods of poor dietetic value now usually provided. There should also be in every neighborhood, parks, gymnasias, reading-rooms, libraries, and social centers, through the utilization of school buildings and ward halls, or rooms furnished by churches interested in social betterment. If at the same time there was a general economic movement to eliminate poorly paid labor, it is obvious that the problem of intemperance would rapidly

assume less alarming proportions, and would become capable of ultimate settlement through social control and education.

Regulation of Drunkenness.—As far as drunkenness itself is concerned, there is need of a radical change in social policy. Drunkenness is still under the law considered a crime, though all science is against any such view. The arrest and imprisonment of drunkards form a large part of the work of the police, and the system in its effects is socially vicious. Drunkards should be treated as minors are under the modern system. The circumstances should be carefully investigated through a special court, probation used whenever possible, and cases of habitual drunkenness should have medical treatment and be segregated in farm and industrial colonies. Under this system, in place of increasing domestic cares by the imposition of a fine, the wages earned by the person under restraint could be legally directed to the support of his family. Those only should be treated as criminals who deliberately drink for excitement's sake, and commit acts of violence. For these the compulsory industrial methods of the modern reformatory are essential. If a careful policy of this sort were carried out for a few years, the expense of it would find ample justification in ultimate economy and social improvement.

Narcotics.—The United States by the Congressional law of 1914 has adopted a prohibitory policy in respect to narcotics. The law aims "to limit and control the use of opiate drugs and cocaine by making their possession and distribution illegal by other than those of professional and other status designated in the law."² The habitual use of cocaine results in crime and in moral

² *The Narcotic Drug Problem*, by Dr. Ernest S. Bishop, p. 95.

and mental degeneration; there can be no justification for its use and sale. Opiates, on the other hand, are essential in medical practice, and by timely administration in case of wounds or painful sickness may save life and reason. Unfortunately physicians and surgeons may give opiates unnecessarily, or protract treatment unduly, so that the physical system of the patient becomes adjusted to the drug and demands continued doses of opium, so as to deaden the physical agony that otherwise would result. Patients of this sort are not "dope fiends" who deliberately seek opium out of a love of novelty, or because of degenerate and neurotic dispositions. They became addicted to drugs innocently, largely through the ignorance or carelessness of their physicians, and are often persons of high character and intelligence. In place, therefore, of indiscriminate condemnation of all users of opiates as vicious and degenerate, a proper distinction should be made between those who deliberately indulge for the sake of the effects, knowing in advance the danger of their action, and, on the other hand, those who innocently became users of drugs under direction of those assumed to be capable of giving expert advice.

Yet in both cases the patient, once in the grip of opium, should be considered not as vicious, but as diseased. The remedy, therefore, is not in a sudden deprivation of the drug and consequent agony of suffering, but in a rational medical treatment by competent physicians well informed as to the scientific facts and best medical practice. Quack practitioners and illegal traffickers in drugs should, of course, be suppressed, and the public and physicians generally should be educated as to the legitimate special use of opiates and the great danger in the habitual use of drugs of any sort whatso-

ever. In any case, those addicted to the use of drugs should not be treated as vicious, criminal, or weak in will and intellect; they are physically diseased, poisoned, and need, not the jail or social condemnation, but rather careful medical treatment aiming to restore the patient to normal physical health. Physicians themselves are often users of opiates, owing to the strain and irregularity of life necessitated by medical practice; soldiers also, recovering from wounds, too often become addicted to drugs, because of their physical condition; many forms of patent medicine contain drugs that in time make the users drug addicts, without their knowledge. There should be more instruction of a scientific sort given through the press to the public at large, and, as already indicated, careful provision should be made for legalized practitioners and hospitals authorized to furnish opiates when necessary as part of a thorough treatment aiming to cure.

SEXUAL IMMORALITY

The problem of sexual immorality is one of the most serious that society has to face, and one in whose past solutions it can feel least pride. Sexual passion is a fundamental feeling, and being necessary for racial continuance, is not inherently evil. This passion is probably more intense in civilized man than in the savage, owing to the effects of a more stimulating diet, the use of clothing, and the development of a vivid imagination. By natural evolution, too, those in whom sexual feeling is weak tend to die out through failure to marry or through lack of descendants. On the other hand, the violently passionate, who fail to regulate indulgence through the intellect, tend to become degenerate through excess or disease. Under

the law of survival, therefore, the human race is chiefly perpetuated by those of average or vigorous passions, who are controlled by social or personal reasons and who conform to standards of sexual indulgence set by racial experience.

The Social Problem of Sexuality.—In past centuries the very intensity of sexual passion focalized individual and social attention on it; the dangers inherent in it were recognized, but the intellect in its ignorance tried to stem them by unwise measures, and the results have been disastrous. One of the saddest pages in all social history is the record of social tabu and regulation in respect to sexual passions. The problem now is not simply to work out a program for the regulation of human sexuality, but also to remedy, if possible, the consequences of past errors. It is a subject that demands the most serious consideration of thoughtful humanity, for the handicap of sexual vice is a most serious drawback on social progress and the racial benefits that might arise from a comprehension of and obedience to the laws of sexuality are incalculable.

The problem from the standpoint of sociology may be stated as follows; given a fundamental feeling so powerful in its potential energy that it vies with economic cravings of all sorts as a stimulus to human activity, how may it be guided into useful directions, while incidentally preventing it from becoming socially harmful. Had society from the beginning possessed this knowledge, it might have escaped many of the evils that now are seemingly so ineradicable. Even if modern science furnished this information, society might deem itself powerless in view of the conditions of civilization. Yet social handicaps cannot permanently retard civilization,

provided only that society sees its goal and plans systematically, so as to attain it.

The Sex Problem a Complex One.—Although the sex problem is fundamentally of great social importance, the study of it devolves primarily on other sciences, chiefly biology, psychology, economics, and ethics; for this reason a better understanding of the problem can be obtained by looking at it from these several viewpoints, as aspects of a common problem. Biologically speaking, human stock should be propagated from the strongest physical strains, and the weaker should be eliminated as rapidly as possible. Psychology adds that vigorous mentality also should be taken into account, and mental weaklings likewise eliminated. From this standpoint society should aim to assist nature in this elimination, by developing a powerful public opinion, placing a virtual tabu on the marriage of persons physically and mentally defective, and those afflicted with contagious sexual diseases. Already public asylums segregate many defectives and prevent them from reproduction, and if the prevalence of sexual diseases and their possible consequences were better known, marriage would become impossible to many immoral persons. If teachings of this sort were made emphatic, supported by scientific evidence, and set before the youth as embodying a standard demanded by the best social influences, a great forward step would have been taken.

The Racial Aspect.—Again, society should develop a system whereby the better part of the population, better, *i.e.*, in physique and mentality, would be encouraged to marry and to continue their stock, so that each pair would bring to maturity at least four children. Under present conditions it is estimated that two of the four

would die without offspring, so that, on the average, population would remain static at that rate of increase. It is unfortunate that society finds it necessary to segregate for war purposes so many of its most capable males in the army and navy with small opportunities for marriage and home life; or to approve a religious system which demands celibacy from its most consecrated men and women; or an educational system that insists on the celibacy of its women teachers; or an economic system which necessitates the system of early marriages and the production of large families among the poor and unskilled, and late and often childless marriages among the mentally energetic classes.

Evils from Celibacy.—Celibacy, when practiced by persons physically and mentally capable of marriage and intelligent parenthood, is a social misfortune, and no supposed benefits in religious, educational, or economic life can usually counterbalance such a social enormity. Religious, educational, and economic systems should cooperate with evolutionary processes in favoring the celibacy of the unfit and the marriage and parenthood of the socially fit; any system that works against this principle is *prima facie* wrong; and, if allowed to exist, should be able to justify itself by indisputable evidences of larger social gain to offset social loss. It is doubtful whether such a defense is possible. In addition to the social loss of a capable population, there are many serious evils involved in the celibacy of either sex. It often results in the secret practice of masturbation with its consequent weakening of physical, mental, and moral fiber. It results in the development of prostitution and immoral relationships, multiplying disease, wrecking homes, and blighting decency and the nobler ambitions. Among the

more moral it often develops an abnormal condition of mind by the constant repression of natural feelings, so that one's thoughts may become coarsened by secretly and almost unconsciously dwelling on forbidden aspects of life, or by developing a mystical trend and expressing sexual emotions under the form of an abnormal religious or philanthropic experience, manifested through some form of self-renunciation. It is theoretically possible, of course, for celibates to remain normal, to shun evil, and to perform much useful service in the world. Certainly the lives of many noble and altruistic men and women bear testimony to this fact, yet the question remains whether such sacrifices are really necessary and whether conjugal and parental feelings might not better be allowed proper expression.

Society and Marriage.—The celibacy caused by economic and social standards affects proportionately a much larger percentage than educational and religious causes; and, being more largely unchecked by religious and ethical idealism, is productive of great evil. Ambitious young men who desire to enter higher business or professional life, are compelled; if they marry at all, to postpone marriage until the earlier years of middle life. This practically means that a similar number of young women of social importance must delay their marriage a proportionate number of years. Young men, must, in consequence of this retardation of marriage, either develop a high morality and resolutely maintain chastity, or else yield to habits of masturbation or temptations to prostitution, with their inevitable consequences. Yet society, which is definitely committed to a permanent monogamous marriage and is working toward a standard of sexual ethics binding on both sexes alike,

neither sufficiently provides youth with motives of high morality nor shields it effectively against insidious temptation. Science would emphasize neither an immature nor a late marriage. Educational systems, therefore, economic incomes, and social opinion should combine to make it possible for marriage to take place soon after the completion of the adolescent period. Up to that time social effort should be exerted to train young persons in self-control. Parent and teacher can do much through carefully taught physiological knowledge of sexuality, through emphasis on the care of the body and instruction in dietetics, and by directing the surging passions of adolescence toward cultural ideals and higher ambitions. If habits of self-control are developed in adolescence, they will be continued in the marriage state also, to the manifest improvement of conjugal felicity.

Changes Needed in Social Policy.—Such a policy would involve several important changes in the present system. In the first place the tabu now enjoined on discussion of sexuality should be removed. It is a survival from an age when sexual ignorance had a cash value in the marriage market, or when a sexual feeling was thought to be of satanic origin, and sexuality an evil to be suppressed by castration or voluntary celibacy. It is far safer to take the scientific view, and to assume that sex passion is a natural force, which ought to be powerful so as to ensure racial vigor, but always to insist that it must be controlled and directed by the higher emotions and the intellect. Then, too, children should be taught how to care for the body and how to expend energy usefully in work, play, and cultural occupations. Young men, also, would have far fewer temptations to sexual immorality if they had simpler foods, physical

exercise, an outdoor life, and the stimulus of æsthetic and intellectual pursuits. A diversity of cultural interests and a knowledge of physiology and of the psychology of adolescence,³ have a highly moralizing influence. Ignorance of the facts of sex is one of the great causes of sexual immorality and indirectly is a chief cause of marital discord. Naturally such a change in policy as that indicated above would need to be supplemented by a broader general education, so as to make it possible for youth to develop many cultural interests, and to enter economic life earlier and yet with a wiser preparation and in a better physical condition. Inevitably the State must coöperate by furnishing opportunities for cultural advancement, by better regulation of economic activities, and by prohibition of marriage for the sexually degenerate.

There is need of a change of belief in respect to the sanctity of individual life. Every normal human life is sacred in its youth and while it is struggling to "make good." But society owes nothing but life-long segregation or a speedy death to those who persist in degrading the standards of social efficiency by their immorality. Sexual perverts, both male and female, should be carefully culled out of social life and secluded permanently, so as to prevent the continuance of their degenerate stock. No degenerate person has a right to marry or to become a parent, for group safety is more important than an individual's right, especially when he is a pervert. This step which now seems radical, will seem most natural when higher ideals in sexual ethics shall have become a common possession. Under the influence of an older

³ See, e.g., G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, 2 vols., and the rapidly multiplying literature in discussion of Freudian psychology.

type of religious teaching, society has too long devoted itself to the study of the sins of individuals, to the neglect of what is injurious or beneficial to society. The ethics of the future must pay far more attention to the sins of vicious groups, and to contaminating social conditions, at the same time seeking to develop a social conscience and social standards of right action. Under such a theory society would have the right to insist that persons plainly degenerate must no longer propagate their kind, or enjoy a freedom for which they have proved unfit.

Effects of Economic Conditions.—It is needless to say that economic conditions have a large share in sexual vice. The conditions of a poverty-stricken proletariat drive many women into immorality for the sake of economic support. The ideals of virtue and chastity lose their attractiveness in the face of starvation. A closely packed population of both sexes in tenement, shop, and mill, forms a condition in which the only wonder is that there is comparatively so little immorality and so much feminine refinement as there is. Another effect of vicious economic conditions is evident when young men of inherited wealth and few morals are turned loose in society to prey upon the weak or to become victims of the designing. A disbelief in the utility of the crop raised from "wild oats" is rapidly growing; and parents incapable of training their children for social morality and utility should transfer them to the compulsory industrial school. The lesson contained in Kipling's *Captains Courageous* is one well worth the consideration of fond but foolish parents.

Responsibilities of Medical Science.—It goes without saying that medical science also has its constructive work.*

*Note, for example, P. A. Morrow, *Social Disease and Marriage*.

If sexual diseases afflicted the immoral only, it might seem but fair retribution; but unfortunately, being contagious, the innocent suffer with the guilty, a suffering not simply physical but mental, because of the implied suspicion of immoral conduct. Gonorrhea, as is well known, is responsible for most cases of those blind from infancy and is a frequent cause of sterility. Often sexually diseased men are so low morally as to marry innocent women, who by contagion become syphilitic and pass on the taint to their children. Such men deserve the lash. Persons in such condition should refrain from marriage altogether and thus end their stock, and this should be true even though apparently cured by modern remedies. Along with the elimination of the perverse should go the elimination of these most loathsome and widespread of diseases. These should receive special investigation and their victims be detained in hospitals for contagious diseases. It is an imperative necessity that humanity rid itself as soon as possible of this most serious physical and moral handicap, sexual immorality and venereal disease, which at present drags back some of the best products of our civilization toward the profligate conditions which existed in the ancient world.

Women's Influence.—Too often in current discussion it is tacitly assumed that the remedy for sexual evils depends on the attitude of the male part of humanity, and under present social conditions there is much truth in this. Yet it is probable that the remedy ultimately will come from the sex most vitally concerned—the female, upon whom falls the burden of gestation, the danger and pain of delivery, and the toil and responsibility of nurture. Only the ignorance of barbarism, seconded by unregulated male passions, could have developed the theory that in sex-

ual relations the woman must be submissive to her husband in marriage, and out of marriage subject to male regulation. By analogy from the animal world, and by even a modicum of reflection, it should be manifest that in the field of sexual ethics the woman, and not the man, should dictate. As long as patriarchal conditions lasted and women were kept in ignorance, as playthings and drudges to their lords and masters, rebellion of any sort was promptly repressed by physical punishment, and by the terrors of church and state. But the coming of democracy, along with economic flexibility and freedom, has put a different face on the matter. The marriage of barter and sale, though still common enough, is conventionally frowned on, and society demands that, in appearance at least, love and voluntary consent be the basis of marriage. Through economic and educational changes women are becoming free, and are less and less inclined, as they become intelligent on the subject, to marry merely for the sake of a home and support. It has become essential that women have such training and opportunity that, as an alternative to an economic marriage, they may be able to enter economic life and support themselves. It is not likely that many women would prefer an economic occupation to a marriage on the basis of mutual love and domestic happiness, but every intelligent woman should prefer to enter economic life and refrain from marriage, if the basis of it is sexual subordination, physical degeneracy, and domestic infelicity. In other words, woman through modern freedom is developing personality and self-respect, and desires to maintain and to strengthen these in marriage, not to lose them.

The Marriage Relation.—The discoveries of science also corroborate this view of marriage. The phenomenon of "falling in love" implies an intuitive recognition of essential likeness of type, though there are often differences in detail. If there is also a mutual recognition of suitable moral and mental qualities, and a general harmony of social attainment, the proper conditions for marriage are present. A woman intuitively knows that such a marriage would bring her happiness, and that any other kind would be "with risk." Increasingly, therefore, a woman as she becomes intelligently trained and developed in personality, will demand sexual morality and self-control from her suitor and husband, and should have the right of divorce as a guaranty against deception or brutality. This implies that the truest and noblest women will mate only with similar men, and by social imitation the prestige of an élite will create similar demands in every social class. When women see that the real happiness of marriage is dependent on a radical up-building of male sexual ethical standards, they will begin definitely to war against conditions that promote immorality, to educate their sons to as high standards as their daughters, and to insist that in all relationships that involve sexuality the male shall supplicate and the female dictate terms. While the male has stronger sexual instincts, he also has, by his own admission, a more powerful intellect, and hence should readily be able to regulate his passions in order to attain the higher end of conjugal happiness and capable offspring. Science and experience unite in teaching that if a girl can be trained to abhor sexual immorality and drunkenness, a boy, with his supposedly more vigorous personality and mentality, can be trained to be chaste, and to be capable of controlling

bodily appetites, so as to utilize his bodily and mental vigor in socially advantageous directions. Parents and teachers should, however, not err in concluding that intellectual knowledge is alone sufficient. Education should devote vastly more attention than at present to the feelings. The higher emotions can be developed by arousing cultural ideals, which absorb attention and divert energy from physical appetites.

The Distinctions of Sex.—Society errs in emphasizing overmuch the difference between male and female; there is a proper distinction, and the terms *manly* and *womanly* should always connote a natural and fundamental distinction between the sexes. Yet the harem-like seclusion of woman and her timid dependency on the male are rapidly passing as the sexes mingle in the home circle, in educational and economic competition, and in the free social life of the times. The sexes inevitably will approximate nearer to a common type in cultural attainment, though kept different by biological and psychological differentiation and functions. After all, aside from these differences, there is no sharp distinction between the masculine and feminine. Every man has a mother and inherits from her, just as every woman inherits certain characteristics from her father. The extremes of male and female are far apart, yet, as the average is approached, masculine and feminine traits are not so different but that there may be many real harmonies in ideals, standards, and ambitions.⁵

While, therefore, biological differences will probably always result in mental differences, the fundamental likeness of a mentality inherited from a common racial stock,

⁵ For a short, interesting book on this topic, see C. G. Leland, *The Alternate Sex*.

will form the basis for harmony of purpose, and the distinctions due to sex and to differences in training will supply supplementary and mutually attractive traits. As newer psychological discoveries become part of education, attempts will be made definitely to develop qualities now lacking, so that mating may be based on scientific insight as well as on biological instinct and psychic attraction. When general knowledge is shared by both sexes alike, and racial ideals and ethical standards influence the purposes of both, they will plan unitedly for the final elimination of the demoralizing conditions now so rife through sexual profligacy. Experience shows that if ever the élite, fortified by scientific teachings, and animated by a hatred of vice and a love of purity, take a determined stand against the present low standards of sexual ethics, the mass of the population, by social imitation and by education, will conform, as a matter of course, to the standards set by social leadership.

CHAPTER XXVII

RACIAL FACTORS¹ IN SOCIAL PROGRESS

Human Origins.—The question as to the origin of man is anthropological, not sociological. Not until mankind had emerged from animal conditions, spread into the natural food centers of earth, and developed a group life with its achievement and civilization can sociological investigations begin. Ancient and classical traditions of human origins have, to be sure, had their influence on social policies, as for example, in the Hebraic account of human creation, and the "natural state" of the social contract theories, but modern teachings based on ethnography are still unable to decide between the monogenetic or the polygenetic theories of the origin of the human race, although the consensus of opinion points in the former direction. Naturally, theories of racial equality would be strengthened by the general acceptance of the monogenetic theory, whereas the teaching of inherent racial superiority and inferiority would receive support from the rival theory.

Racial Differences.—If one disregards the question of human origin, admittedly there are to-day races superior to others in achievement, just as many individuals of a race surpass others in capacity and attainment. The real question, however, is, whether such distinctions are

¹ For an excellent sociological study of races, see Wm. Z. Ripley, *The Races of Europe*.

inherent in the stock, or traceable to the effects of conditions, that if reversed, would within a few centuries reverse the place of higher and lower races. Or, from another standpoint, can the so-called inferior races be developed after a proper period of time to the same degree of attainment as their more fortunate competitors? Presumably, it may be assumed that in the beginnings of human life and under the determining influences of a tropical or subtropical climate, human groups must have been relatively equal. To this extent the teaching of the equality of man in the Eighteenth Century had a solid basis in fact. When, however, owing to multiplying population and relatively decreasing food supplies, men wandered into various parts of the earth differences slowly developed. In the more favored places where foods were abundant and population denser, the slow lapse of many centuries gave their inhabitants an advantage in physique and mentality, which was strengthened by repeated amalgamations, minglings of differing varieties of civilization, and the stimulus of war and economic competition. The great races surviving to-day are those who on the basis of such conditions have fought their way to the front, and who regularly display an aggressiveness lacking in the smaller races, which have shunned war by ready submission or by flight to remote regions where they found a wretched but peaceful existence.

On the other hand, a superior race, presumably, is so in a part of its population only and a small part at that. The average mass of a population becomes great under efficient leadership, not through inherent capacity, so that a serious defeat depriving a race of its former leaders and its prestige and initiative, may handicap it for generations, until new conditions create new opportunities and develop

a fitting leadership from the ranks of the more capable stocks. Nor, again, should it be assumed that there are characteristics inherent in a given superior race that mark it off as decidedly different from its rivals. The fundamentals for success are not inherent in racial or national nature, but in human nature itself. What seem to be national or racial peculiarities of character are presumably due to social heredity and are developed through contact with a social environment which has been standardized by tradition and customs. National character changes with the centuries because the times change also. It would be impossible for a national character to remain the same through a thousand years of history, if during that time national life passed from a farming to a commercial manufacturing type, or from isolation to world contact. Again, racial differences are not so much physical as psychical. The leading classes of superior races have a real advantage over others in the development and quality of nervous organization and this certainly should be true, if racial experience counts for anything. For they have built up through selective processes an economic capacity for patient labor, foresight, and ingenuity, and through war and economic competition they have developed individual bravery, energy, and self-reliance. They show, furthermore, in their activities a virility and a capacity for endurance that plainly mark a higher attainment than that made by the aimless, indolent, and hopeless masses of inferior civilizations. Under genetic development these inferior races in their secluded homes may remain stationary for centuries, but whenever they come in contact with a superior race, they are either largely exterminated in war or through inability to adjust themselves to newer

conditions, or they cannot withstand the vices and diseases of stronger races.

The Relation of the Superior to the Inferior.—If the superior races should ever recognize an altruistic obligation to raise the standards of civilization of these backward stocks, through a possible system of mandararies, unquestionably much could be accomplished, provided that the principles of racial development were followed. It is practically impossible, for example, to substitute outright a higher for a lower civilization. A higher may only be developed from the lower by expediting through telic processes the natural method of growth. Now, genetic growth is at its best when there are contacts with other groups, involving the processes of amalgamation and assimilation. Assimilation should result in economic stimulus and achievement and in social imitation of the cultural elements of a higher civilization. In changing from genetic to telic growth most emphasis needs to be placed on economic changes. It is useless to press on a race or a social class a higher cultural civilization than that suited to its material attainment. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether a simple and inferior race can adopt a higher economic system, in place of a lower, except after centuries of training. A race that in its experience lacks the education imparted by an agricultural civilization, may, for example, find it well-nigh impossible to pass at a bound from a hunting or nomadic stage to a complex system of trades and manufactures. Add to that the benefit that supposedly arises from repeated racial amalgamation, and it is hard to believe that a really simple race, still, in primitive conditions, could endure the vigorous strain of modern civilization, except after centuries of training and racial mixture. Even

if this were done, there is still the probability that the superior races would themselves continue to progress, and might even increase the distance in attainment between them and their weaker racial companions.

The Influence of Missions.—These principles find frequent illustrations in missionary enterprise. Christianity is a religion suited to a civilization of a high grade, but in order to be successfully propagated among an inferior race of alien religion, it must either seek to revolutionize the entire civilization by emphasis on advantageous economic and educational agencies, or it must adapt itself to lower conditions and become a mongrel religion, Christian in form but heathen in spirit. For this reason Mohammedanism and Catholicism, because of their emphasis on form and institutionalism, are more successful as proselytizing religions among inferior races than Protestantism, which inclines to demand individualistic and intellectual qualifications. When Protestantism makes progress among inferior races, it does so by furnishing in addition to religious teachings the arts of modern industry and the elements of cultural civilization, or else it eliminates intellectual elements as much as possible and emphasizes emotionalism. Hence, if Protestantism, in its missionary activities among low races, insists on the adoption of its high standards of ethics and doctrine, progress is slow, since few can be persuaded to withdraw themselves from the sympathetic ties binding them to the mass of their own people. Even if Protestantism is successful it brings in its train, through trade and commerce, contact with an intense civilization, and the influx of newer vices and diseases from this source tends to sap the energy of the native stock, which, losing confidence in its former standards and attainments and finding no rea-

son for its existence, wastes away in a forced civilization. For such reasons it is not possible that the weakest races can permanently survive. They will melt away before a civilization which is too fierce and competitive for their capacity, but adaptive individuals from them will presumably pass upwards by the usual processes into the superior stock, and become merged in the larger civilization.

Racial Competition.—In addition to these weaker stocks there are many racial groups that represent powerful races beaten in military or economic struggle and yet mentally capable. These may in later years, should they cherish their national and racial ideals, again have their opportunity and become powerful once more, or else, yielding slowly to the pressure of their environment they may become absorbed into the more powerful stocks near them, the ease of the amalgamation being determined by their relative similarity in civilization and racial stock and by the harsh or conciliatory policy of their neighbors. All of the great nations of the day in their racial composition show this process of amalgamation, from the polyglot populations of the Danube where assimilation is still imperfect, to France where the process of amalgamation is much further advanced.

Great nationalities themselves are under the law of competition, and success in the maintenance of national integrity lies on the side of effective organization, science, and financial capacity. Hence international rivalry is fought out by economic methods, through competing financial systems, through manufacturing and commercial struggles for supremacy, and through effectiveness in governmental organization, alliances and through the idealism of national traditions, war coming in at the end as a

sort of *coup de grâce*. The final loser in the struggle sinks from its position as a world power, and loses its racial and economic importance. A part of the population may degenerate through impoverishment, others will migrate and become absorbed into other racial stocks, and the better classes will restrict the number of their offspring and slowly die out by what Dr. Ross aptly calls "race suicide." The kaleidoscopic changes of political conditions sometimes permit of a fresh start after a generation or two of defeat, but otherwise the race as a whole tends to sink back in importance and awaits its fate of ultimate absorption into one of the future racial survivors in international competition.

Human Amalgamation.—Another question of interest arises in respect to the few really superior racial stocks in existence, such as the Teutonic, the Slavic, and the Mongolian. Will these finally amalgamate or will the old genetic process of racial warfare and extermination be permanently continued on a world scale? The question is purely academic, but ultimately the sociological theorist would say, there will be but one human race; complete amalgamation will have taken place, even though the process may not be finished for a million years. Naturally no one can foretell whether that ultimate blend will be predominantly white or black, or yellow, or whether one of the strains may not disappear in the process, for survival will not be determined wholly by superiority of civilization.

This is of great importance in giving a nation a basis on which it may push to the front and even hold supremacy for generations. But civilization is transmittable by social imitation, conscious or unconscious, and under modern conditions the attainment of each nation readily

passes to other capable nations who may absorb and utilize effectively the achievements of their rivals, as illustrated in recent Japanese history.

The high economic standards of an advanced race may even count against it when in competition with a race of lower economic standards but of similar capacity for achievement. For, nations of high economic standards tend to have low birth rates and numerically to fall behind and in the long run, numbers count in racial competition. In the final amalgamation of the human race, therefore, it may be possible that the white stock will not survive. By raising its standards of living, and at the same time sharing the achievements of its civilization with those who will later be its rivals, it may die out in racial stock even while its civilization survives. This process finds illustration in Latin America, where a Romance stock is passing on its civilization to a native stock, but is itself being absorbed by the very races it conquered. England meets the problem in India by endeavoring to transmit its civilization to the native but shunning amalgamation, just as in the United States the whites in the South do not amalgamate with the blacks to any appreciable extent, but yet impart to them their civilization. In general it may be said that the Teutonic and Slavic stocks do not readily amalgamate with other racial stocks such as the Negro or the Mongolian, or even with the Romance nations of Europe; but that these, on the other hand, amalgamate freely with any race with which they happen to be in contact.

Racial Survival.—A strong stock intuitively strives to perpetuate itself, and hence dreads an excess of racial intermixture. Yet an immense population like that of China, with its intense self-centered civilization, might

spread in all directions absorbing numerically weaker stocks, and yet after a few centuries hardly be affected by the admixture of races, even though a large proportion were inferior. In the United States the numerous and aggressive population can readily absorb the remnants of the Indian tribes, a process exemplified to-day in Oklahoma. Nor does it hesitate to amalgamate with large fragments of Germanic and Celtic stock, kindred in blood, trusting to the passing of centuries to obliterate minor distinctions. Doubt comes when the process involves an amalgamation with millions of similar stock, Romance and Slavic, but of dissimilar civilization. This doubt becomes a serious protest at the thought of amalgamating with millions of lower stock and lower civilizations, as in the case of the Negro, or when there threatens an influx of a numerous and powerful rival racial stock, as, for instance, from Asia.

Evils in Amalgamation.—These doubts, well founded in racial intuition, are fortified by reason. A vigorous racial stock makes no mistake in amalgamating with a similar stock of similar cultural development; the resultant is regularly better than the component parts. Even if the smaller is absorbed by the larger, there is compensation for the loss of racial differentiation in the gain in individual capacity. If, however, higher and lower races are artificially united under the forms of a common civilization, the consequences are both good and bad. The lower will inevitably become "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for the higher, *i.e.*, they will do the unskilled and tiresome labor of the community; their weaker members will fall into vice, crime, and pauperism under the stress of a low economic life, while the stronger part of the stock will be stimulated by contact

with the higher civilization, and will move up in the social scale, ultimately amalgamating with their superiors.

Under such conditions oftentimes the weaker members of the higher stock, brought into competition with the better members of the lower stock, degenerate. Others, under the influence of a class morality, seeing about them members of an alien and lower class, exploit them economically, or gratify sexual passion by immoral relations with women of the lower stock, thereby lowering the standards of their own race. The better members of the higher stock, finding competition keener and more unscrupulous than formerly, tend to develop for self-protection a class exclusiveness, and under the conditions, through inbreeding and race suicide, each generation produces fewer and weaker children until as a class they disappear. This is the natural and genetic process, easily traceable in social history, and on the whole disastrous to social welfare and race survival. For it means that the better elements in a race die out, their ranks are recruited from the more capable members of presumably inferior stocks, class distinctions become inevitable, and at the bottom of the social system is a mass of unskilled workers, of relatively low grade, struggling against the misery inevitable in that low economic stage of existence. Whatever advantage may come from the wealth produced by those of lower standards is probably more than offset by the consequent depression of the standards of the other economic classes and the diminished fertility of the dominant stock.

American Racial Problems.—It is probable that if the intruding stock were similar in race but inferior in civilization, the evils could be largely eliminated by wise telic action. If, for example, the United States of America

restricted the privilege of immigration to a relatively small number of assimilable stocks, healthy and moral, and if these were guided to sections of the country in need of their services, and surrounded by social agencies aiming to impart to them the language and ideals of American civilization, safeguarding them against exploitation and temptations to immorality and crime until they had become used to American standards, unquestionably the chief evils of the present system would be minimized, and racial amalgamation rendered easy. It is suicidal, however, to admit within the national borders members of alien races unless it is clear that beneficial results will follow from racial amalgamation in connection with an assimilation of civilizations.

Under present conditions, however, the racial problem within the United States is exceedingly complex and one may well despair of any immediate solution. Had telic foresight characterized our civilization throughout the Nineteenth Century we might have avoided our worst problems by checking the importation and multiplication of the Negro, and by reducing to a minimum the immigration of unassimilable races, as was done in fact with immigration from Asia. Failing in such a policy, we have a natural genetic development: the higher native racial stock commits race suicide through late marriages followed by the birth of few or no children. Others amalgamate with the better elements of the immigrant races, thus causing a racial modification, and at the bottom of the scale are those of native stock who are unable to maintain their standards of living in competition with immigrants of lower standards. This backward and degenerate stock becomes secluded in isolated valley or mountain regions or else falls into the ranks of the un-

skilled proletariat made up largely of alien races, from which arises, through low economic conditions, much of the pauperism, vice, and crime of our civilization. Down to the year 1914 our population, rapidly multiplying and constantly recruited by additions from southern Europe and western Asia, was manifesting all the evils arising from such a racial admixture. Race suicide was pressing lower and lower into the middle class, amalgamation processes were at work as shown by the steadily rising percentages of Americans of mixed blood, and the evils involved through the presence of a toiling low-wage earning proletariat were manifest in the development of rapidly multiplying slums and crowded tenement sections with their inevitable evils.

The Great War with its unprecedented demand for labor temporarily checked this tendency. Immigration fell off, great numbers of immigrant males returned home for army service and the country as a whole, becoming an armed camp, was searched from end to end for civilian labor, resulting in rapid movements of population, stimulated by the higher wage, and the draining of congested labor centers to localities competing for employees. Should similar conditions hold good for another generation it might not prove to be an unmixed evil. It is possible that European nations may prefer to hold on to their populations, tempting them to remain through democratic conditions and the ownership of land. Nationally there is no question that the United States is irrevocably committed to the policy of the exclusion of Asiatic immigration, and of African also, should that tend to become large in amount. The inevitable effect of such conditions would be a stimulus to earlier marriages and away from race suicide, resulting in a more rapid assimilation and

amalgamation of the native and racial stocks within the national borders. The many movements aiming at Americanization are illustrative of this tendency, and the whole movement, assuming national prosperity, should result in greatly improved conditions for the poorer whites and the blacks of the South, and the breaking up of racial groupings within our crowded cities.

Eugenics.—Historically there have been many suggestions as to the possibility of strengthening racial vigor. A favorite proposition even yet is that made by Plato in his *Republic* and *Laws*. It assumes that the laws of heredity are so little known that society is unable to assert dogmatic conclusions in respect to the production of a superior stock and yet that within a given race there are superior and inferior grades. Society, therefore, he argued, might better assume that all persons potentially are capable of high development, and should be given, through wise education, an opportunity for it. Then, when the quality of its various members is manifest, society should endeavor to build up its stock from the capable and to place handicaps on the weaker members of society, so as to prevent them, if possible, from unduly propagating their kind.

Another solution is that suggested in recent years by Francis Galton under the name of Eugenics.² In brief, his theory is that careful study should be made of the conditions and principles underlying the production of a vigorous racial stock, that this information be taught as widely as possible, emphasized as a part of the morality

²The original papers on Eugenics by Francis Galton, and the discussion of them, may be found in the *Sociological Papers*, published by the English Sociological Society, 1904, 1905. The *American Journal of Sociology* in July, 1904, 1905, reproduced the articles and parts of the discussion.

of religion, and enforced by a powerful public opinion. The effect of all this, it is argued, would be the elimination of the weaker stock and the upbuilding of the race through its stronger elements. The argument is a sound one, but it might prove weak in practice if it should develop into a theory of propagation through a leisure class chiefly, or base its conclusions on biological principles only, to the exclusion of a study of the economic conditions that so powerfully affect racial development, and of the stress that Galton rightly placed on education, morals, and the pressure of an intelligent public opinion.

Social Safeguards.—In both of these theories there is an assumption that society has the right, for its own sake, to fix the conditions of reproduction through law and public opinion. Such policies, of course, have always been practiced by individual families, by castes, and by classes of nobility in regulating the marriage of their own members. Utopias also regularly advise a eugenic supervision over marriages and births. If a national group as a whole should ever adopt such a policy, it would be a remarkable illustration of a collective telic policy arising out of social necessity. Under such a policy no individual would have an inherent right, as at present, to foist on society weakling offspring. Society would have the right to insist that no one should become a parent unless he were sound in body and mind; that no unassimilable alien elements be allowed to settle within the country; and that proper measures be taken to eliminate scientifically the weaker part of the racial stock.

Galton's is only one theory of scientific elimination; students of penology and charity also offer suggestions in respect to the treatment and segregation of the worst of our criminal, defective, and pauperistic population,

and legislators already have placed on statute books prohibitions of marriage for defective or diseased persons. Economists emphasize, as a powerful factor in elimination, a higher standard of living for the lower economic classes, arguing that thereby families of improvident size would cease, and that parents would lay greater stress on efficient education and better environment.

Furthermore, on the assumption that the celibacy of the best racial stock is detrimental to social interests, society hereafter should discountenance systems of occupation that necessitate celibacy or late marriage, such, for example, as long enlistments in the army or navy, a celibate class of women teachers, and celibacy among the clergy and members of religious orders. Society also should see to it that economic and cultural conditions be so readjusted that the higher social classes would tend to increase the number of their offspring. Such a policy is theoretically possible, but demands more scientific foresight than can ordinarily be found in our legislative halls. When science has learned how to fortify the body against disease, how to modify the evil effects of adverse climatic conditions, and how to build up economic and intellectual capacity, an attainment already in sight, it will seem but a step to the formulation of a policy aiming to build up the human race as a whole by emphasis on those factors in heredity and environment favorable to the multiplication of the stronger and better elements.

Eudemics.²—Social students are quite fully convinced that the surest methods of national upbuilding are through a eudemic policy based on euthenics and eugenics. Nothing good can be said of a system that encourages an unskilled laborer to marry at twenty, but that,

² See article referred to on page 372.

on the other hand, compels its socially better classes to postpone marriage until middle life or to remain celibate. The mathematical outcome of any such system plainly is the elimination of the higher in favor of the lower. Even if one grants that the masses inherently are as good as the classes, why favor the Sisyphean task of perpetually raising the lower to the higher, only to have the task renewed by the elimination of the higher through race suicide? If society, therefore, ever hopes to carry forward a telic policy, it must begin by safeguarding those who have best developed their brain capacity, and must also seek to eliminate those classes that represent the weaker elements of society. Such a policy, though difficult of attainment, is not chimerical. Once society clearly sees what it desires, and perceives the means at hand for the accomplishment of its desire, time and social education would do the rest.

Euthenics.⁴—From the euthenic standpoint probably most of our advanced nations could free themselves from the incubus of a deadening environment within a very few generations, if they felt so inclined. They have already wealth and economic achievement enough to dispense with the handicap of an ignorant, unskilled proletariat, if proper adjustments were made. This class is the real drag to eudemic prosperity. Because of its misery, not because of its innate depravity, it supplies the larger part of our vice, pauperism, and crime, with the consequent expense of charity, jails, correctional schools, hospitals, police force, and other disciplinary agencies, to say nothing of the energy wasted by these theoretically useless institutions and the social loss due to undeveloped capacity in the proletariat. This waste is a heavy tax on

⁴See Mrs. Richard's *Euthenics* in bibliography.

social efficiency and, as it naturally tends to increase by mere imitation and propagation, it can drag down a nation from the foremost place and make of it a decadent Rome.

The possibilities of social improvement are endless and too numerous for enumeration. But in illustration one might suggest that inventions should be stimulated, so as to multiply machinery to perform the work now done by unskilled labor; food supplies could be cheapened by greater attention to intensive and scientific farming and the telic multiplication of fish and flesh supplies of food; the housing condition of the poor could be vastly improved by wiser legislation, encouraging building associations through the stimulus of safeguarded loans like those advanced on farm properties; economic profits could be more fairly distributed between capital and labor and through a system of taxation for public purposes derived largely from incomes, inheritances, franchises, and corporations. The effective regulation of corporations would also be essential, encouraging those that recognize their social responsibilities, and checks should be placed on exploiting corporations with monopolistic tendencies. Industrial and cultural education should be vigorously encouraged and given in its best forms to the poorest classes, so as to stimulate them to enter skilled occupations and to take up the intensive cultivation of the land. Finally, society should endeavor to distribute its population by the use of clearing houses of information in respect to economic opportunities. A policy aiming gradually to remove the necessity of unskilled labor would tend to purify social life, to free an immense amount of energy and capital now wasted, to multiply achievements by enlarging the achieving classes, and by bringing the extremes of society nearer, to allow a real democracy. It hardly

seems possible that the expense of any such policy would begin to equal the present annual cost of vice, crime, and pauperism. Not that these would be entirely eliminated; such problems will undoubtedly last for centuries; but the backbone, so to speak, of the whole problem would be broken by the uplift of the depressed third of advanced civilization. If one were to take into account the increase of national happiness and capacity as the result of such a policy, a clear conviction would surely arise that the trial would be worth while.

CHAPTER XXVIII

ECONOMIC FACTORS IN SOCIAL PROGRESS

References have already been made to the theory that physical and economic conditions largely determine social development. This theory of economic interpretation or determinism plays so important a part in social discussions that further consideration must be given it. Attention will, therefore, be called first to the effect of natural physical conditions in the environment, and then to the effect of artificial modifications of these resulting in economic achievements.

Influence of Physical Environment.—It seems clear that if man had made few or no achievements, and was consequently in the earliest stage of his existence, he would be, to all intents and purposes, determined by his physical environment. Depending, as he would, on what nature spontaneously supplied it would be of vital importance to his welfare that he be under kindly skies and on fertile soil, abundantly watered and teeming with vegetal and animal life suitable for foods. Under such conditions he would grow physically strong and develop energy in abundance. If, however, physical conditions were inimical, so that there was an excess of heat or cold, or a lack of sufficient nutriment, the development of his mind and body would be dwarfed in consequence. He would be either enervated or stunted by the extremes of temperature, or blunted by hardships. In the same way

he would be deeply affected by the kind of food, whether flesh or vegetal, that regularly made up his diet,¹ by the relative density and humidity of the air he breathed, and by the seasonal variations in the temperature of his habitat. In other words, man under such conditions is determined by his physical environment; his range is limited, he must stay where food can best be secured, his physique and crude mentality are molded according to the quantity and quality of his food and the variations of climate, and through long selective processes he becomes adapted, like an animal, to his environment. Even yet no one is prepared to deny that soil, climate, food, and the kind of air breathed into the lungs still powerfully affect human activity. All one can say is that they are not relatively so important in advanced civilization. They influence but do not determine human development.

Man's Power Over Nature.—One reason why physical environment is relatively less influential in higher civilization is that man is no longer restricted to a single habitat and, furthermore, by his achievements he has to an extent become able to master and modify nature. If he is not satisfied with his physical environment, he may, by utilizing natural forces, be easily transferred to another climate; he may, by his inventions such as clothing, housing, and the use of fuels, modify somewhat the effects on him of the temperature, humidity, or density of his climate; he may use chemical agencies to make fertile infertile soil; he can multiply vegetal and flesh foods through agriculture, stock-raising, and the preservation of game and fish; he may level hills, fill valleys, drain marshes, build roads and canals, plant forests or cut them

¹ See R. Russell, *Strength and Diet*, a practical treatise with special regard to the life of nations,

down, and make or import stone and metal, if his home soil fails to yield these in sufficient quantities; and he saves his own muscular energy by utilizing natural power, so abundant around him. To the extent by which he transforms his physical environment he is not determined by it. Yet, after all, these modifications have not annihilated natural forces; they have simply compelled them to manifest energy in slightly different directions. Environment is still environment, though made partly artificial through human agency, and when man has done all he can, he must still adapt himself to it, not, however, in its natural form but as modified by human intellect. In other words, though civilized man can, to some extent, determine the kind of physical and economic environment in which he is to live, when the choice has been made, his physical and economic activities are powerfully influenced by his environment, though not to the same extent as those of his primitive ancestor. The real distinction lies in the fact that in place of the narrow and relatively fixed environment of savagery, he has a highly diversified, variable environment, which allows, therefore, a wide variation in adaptation.

A conclusion to be drawn from this statement is clear; if society is to keep on progressing from primitive conditions to higher civilization, either nature must itself furnish constantly bettering physical conditions, which is improbable, or man must continue to increase his power to control natural conditions. If he should ever attain such power over nature as to make possible, for all persons, a practical freedom from the strain of economic struggle, the ideal condition for cultural achievement will be reached. Under present conditions no national or racial group, as a whole, can hope to attain the fruits

of a high civilization. Those within the group who have acquired a comprehension of nature and have through patents secured a partial monopoly of the means of conquest may attain economic freedom, and those next below in the economic scale may approximate to a similar attainment, but the masses who live from hand to mouth and depend for existence on strenuous and benumbing toil are barred out of the possibility of freedom, since their lives are determined by economic conditions beyond their control. The attainment of higher civilization for the entire group lies in the possibility that it may be able to comprehend and to utilize natural law so effectively as to counteract the struggle for existence by making it comparatively easy for all the members of the group to obtain the decencies and comforts of life without undue toil. In other words, the returns from economic toil assigned to the proletariat must be vastly bettered before it will become possible for them to attain a high civilization.

Possibilities of Later Modifications.—Now the purely cosmical conditions of nature are practically beyond human control. The earth is a mere speck in the universe and in all probability man can never hope to affect its cosmic conditions. The earth's atmosphere, the sun's rays, the relative proportion of land and water, the chemical elements of matter and cosmic energy, all these and similar phenomena he may seek to understand and to utilize, but never to modify fundamentally. Whatever utilization of them he may make is, however, of the utmost importance, for through such use he passes from abject subjection to physical conditions to a stage in which he can partly understand and manipulate his environment.

For this reason the fundamental problem before society is to multiply in every possible way scientific knowledge of natural laws and the ability to apply this to the concrete conditions of life. The greatest benefactors in society are its Newtons, its Darwins, and its great inventors. We must know how to utilize the forces of nature and how to work up nature's materials into creative forms of utility. We must learn how to get more and better foods from the soil and the sea, and through science and engineering how better to make use of those parts of the world hardly yet touched, namely, the tropics, the great deserts, and marshy lands. One may look forward in imagination to the time when the great rivers of the earth will be banked in by levees, their currents used for power, the silt from the waters carefully returned to the soil, the restless sands of the deserts held in check by vegetation and supporting a dense human population, and the tropics cultivated into garden spots abounding in foods and freed from disease by scientific knowledge. Possibly through cheap power rocky soils may yet be pulverized into fertile earth, or the lands and minerals of the frigid zones be brought into use by greater knowledge of climatic and atmospheric conditions; the world's store of metals may become completely known and possibly be transfused from one to the other at will through later chemical discoveries. The flora and fauna of land and water may be made over by future Burbanks into species most useful and beautiful for mankind, and human beings themselves, freed from hunger and excessive toil, may develop a physique and a mentality suited to such lords of creation. These dreams are all scientifically possible, and the attainment of some of them need not wait for the passing of

many centuries. At any rate these for many generations to come will be the fundamental problems of society, for society as a whole must understand nature's laws, and be able to utilize its resources.

Modifications Through the State.—Evidently the problem of such development cannot be left merely to private initiative. Society itself must become telic and plan out its activity, as is even now partially the case. Many states already are beginning to foster science; they are encouraging inventions by patent laws, and scientific discoveries by honors and rewards; they are planning great engineering feats, such as transcontinental railroads, Suez and Panama Canals, and tunnels under rivers and under the English Channel. The Great War has stimulated the development of many new inventions for purposes of transportation, which are still rudimentary and will likely make rapid improvement. It is evident that the nation that adopts a policy furthering science and invention most wisely and most thoroughly is building its prosperity on sure foundations. It is real economy to spend money on scientific investigation even when there is no tangible return. The cost of a battleship, for instance, if expended on scientific investigation in respect to improvement in war material would give far greater returns in national martial ability. Science and human ingenuity, if properly stimulated, could probably develop destructive implements of such power as to banish henceforth the possibility of war, for wars will more likely cease because of their destructiveness and economic waste than because of an altruistic objection to human slaughter.

Regulation of Economic Interests.—In addition to the development of science and invention, society must

also devise wiser systems for the regulation of economic interests. This, next to national preservation, is historically the chief business of the state. The principles to be observed in social regulation have already been indicated. It is to be assumed that citizens can understand that they best serve their own truest interests while serving the interests of the state, and legislation should seek to make real this identity of interests. Wise regulation and stimulus to right action are far better than prohibitions. Laws should not be passed against capital as such, or against trusts or corporations or labor unions or strikes, or in restraint of free speech or a free press; rather the causes and conditions under which social and economic problems have come into existence must be understood, their constructive aspects should be appreciated, and their known evils eliminated.

For these evils scientific elimination and training are the proper remedies. Recalcitrant members of society might better be permanently segregated, if they cannot be trained and made responsive to the power of an intelligent public opinion. Men will always pursue their own interests and should be encouraged to do so by social stimuli. But individual interests will harmonize with social aims if society is intelligently guided, and this should be shown by wisdom in legislation and education. If individuals fight against social standards it is safer to assume that the standards are defective than to predicate the wickedness of the individual and the perfection of law. If society should adopt this point of view it would be ever seeking to improve social machinery, so as to reduce social friction and waste to a minimum. All public regulation of economic interests should be in accord with expert advice, and should aim

always to stimulate, not repress, social energy, and to guide it, if necessary, into socially useful directions.

Government as an Umpire in Disputes.—An increasingly important function of government in economic matters consists in serving as arbitrator or umpire in disputes between capital and labor. Government properly should favor neither the capitalist nor the laborer but rather the public at large, which includes these two classes. The public, as a whole, is not interested in questions of open or closed shops, or unions or no unions, or whether collective bargaining should consist of negotiations between employer and employed with or without the assistance of a union agent. It is interested in a larger production through constantly improving machinery and in a just division of the benefits arising therefrom. Increased production through machinery naturally should result in the shortening of the hours of labor without diminution of wages. Hours properly should be determined by scientific studies in respect to fatigue and efficient work. Work protracted beyond efficiency, resulting in unnecessary accidents and inefficient production should be forbidden, along with overtime work for the same reason. On the other hand, within the scientifically determined labor day and under humane conditions employees should do their best work without restriction of output. A restricted output, low speed, and excessive waste have their justification when wages are low, hours are long, and bad feeling exists between employer and employed. The Government, through arbitral courts and boards of conciliation, should, in disputes, take into account decent standards of living and the health and safety of employees, and make these fundamental in the settlement of disputes. This arbitral func-

tion wisely used should result in the gradual passing of strikes with their attendant bitterness, crimes, and economic waste through loss of production and wage, the burden of which ultimately falls on the general public, the consumer. There is no inherent reason why a permanent antagonism should exist between capital and labor. It is developed through ignorance of the other's point of view and because of a spirit of exploitation, on the one hand, and a desire to "get even" on the other. Government with the scales of justice in its hand should impartially umpire conflicting interests, should enunciate socially just principles based on scientific statistics and investigation, and then should announce a decision which would readily secure the sanction of enlightened public opinion.

Improvement in Government.—Naturally in connection with such a policy, there would be need of efficient governmental machinery. It probably makes small difference whether the form of government is monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic. As long as economic wealth and cultural education are the privileges of a small percentage of the population, these will in any case govern. As the modern movement, however, is undoubtedly toward democracy, a governmental system should be so arranged as to allow changes in that direction. Rigidity in law, constitutions, or governmental machinery is *prima facie* detrimental in dynamic civilization. Improvements in governmental methods should constantly be devised and tested by experiment. The United States of America, for example, with its forty-eight State legislatures, its national Congress, and its innumerable local lawmaking bodies, is one vast laboratory for governmental experimentation. Now and then, in the mass of useless legis-

lation, appears a law of real value, and such successful experiments should be studied and adopted generally, with suitable modifications, until a still better arises. The rise of a legislative reference bureau organized so as to furnish expert information to legislatures, or of the commission on uniform legislation, as well as the frequent use of technical commissions for the purpose of recommending legislation, are excellent illustrations of the movement toward a scientific government. The politician must give way to the statesman, who must be far wiser in general knowledge than is his forerunner of today. Lacking such changes in governmental machinery, efficient regulation of economic interests is well-nigh impossible, so that one chief advantage in democratic forms is not that they produce better government, which is hardly true at the present time, as that they make up a flexible system ready for the rapidly approaching time when there will be a demand for more wisdom in legislation, as the result of a distinct social consciousness of the necessity of telic prevision in national policy.

Economic Achievement.—If now we assume that the development of economic achievements by wise governmental regulation should be a fundamental activity of society, we must discover the best means of preserving and increasing the economic achievements of the race. In such a consideration the means employed under genetic development should briefly be indicated and then the changes involved, as telic ideas affect the situation.

The first achievements in the economic field consisted in the invention of tools and in methods of hunting and securing food. Later came knowledge of the making of ornaments, clothing, houses, and implements for cooking and other domestic economy. The natural and genetic

method of preserving the knowledge of these achievements was by practical instruction in the group, given through the elders to the younger generation. This education through social imitation, to some extent was given in play and games, which reproduced the general activities of the group,² the knowledge of the group thus readily becoming common property. An important change came through the natural differentiation of labor based on distinctions of sex, skill, and class. The vocations of men and women became distinct; certain families or groups acquired and devoted their skill in a particular direction; and the higher castes and classes entered only special occupations, leaving, as always in early civilization, manual toil, the industries, and trade to the lower classes.³ Still later, specialized industrial groups became guilds, which regulated their own membership, methods of work and output, and carefully guarded the secret processes involved in their trades. In all of this development, any given occupation safeguarded its own economic achievements, the elders or masters within it handing down instruction. The natural effect of this system is that specialized occupations tend to become monopolies, each carefully guarding its secrets by a full regulation of membership and instruction. The utility of this system for a static civilization is clear. Routine tasks are performed in accordance with immemorial custom generation after generation. Specialized occupations are dominated by the elders, who by their control of trade secrets dictate terms to the younger men, compel adherence to set standards, and forbid innovations.

² Note in Bibliography under name of Karl Groos.

³ Note R. T. Ely, *Evolution of Industrial Society*, and Karl Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*.

Changes in Economic Institutions.—As dynamic changes in economic conditions developed one by one, they necessitated telic changes in economic institutions. These were regularly initiated by individuals, who, pursuing their own interests, forced themselves into the sacred circle of specialized occupations, gradually wrested trade secrets from the guilds, secured from the government special privileges, and introduced innovations. These changes when translated into social demands become: free competition for the right to take part in any economic occupation, opposition to any form of private economic monopoly, and freedom to introduce modifications into the economic system. As these rights are won, government, the agent of society, guaranties them by law but finds it hard to fulfill its pledges, for society naturally tends to become static even in a dynamic civilization; and economic combinations tend to acquire monopolies, to standardize their industries, and to resist innovations whenever possible. The telic office of a dynamic society, therefore, is to move always in the direction of freedom of occupation and away from monopolies of any sort whatsoever. Even governmental monopolies may be dangerous, for if government itself be monopolized by a class, there may develop a system of class exploitation. Illustrations of economic changes are naturally common in these days of a transitional civilization so largely dynamic, as, for example, the movement of women into economic occupations, attempts of trade-unions to regulate instruction in their occupations and occasionally to restrict membership on lines of sex or race, and capitalistic attempts to monopolize great industries, patents, franchises, or the necessities of life or business. The discussion of these details is,

of course, the prerogative of the economist, and our attention may be concentrated on the purely educational aspects of the matter.

Illustrations of Economic Regulation.—The two chief historic functions of the state, as already explained, have been war and the regulation of economic activities, and society's best collective work has been done in these political departments. A social or a governmental policy, it will be remembered, tends to pass through three well-marked stages: prohibitive, regulative, and approbative or constructive. In Western civilization the individualistic teachings of Adam Smith and his successors removed from statute books and from custom many of the most obnoxious prohibitions on individual freedom, approving thereby a policy which allowed citizens and even aliens great freedom in the pursuit of industrial gain. As illustrations of wise economic regulation may be mentioned the patent system, and employers' liability laws stimulating employers to use safety devices and to have a definite economic interest in the reduction of accidents. The patent system of the United States in its inception was really the work of genius. Back of it there are two demands; first, that persons be induced to make material achievements by invention, and second, that they be persuaded to make their discoveries public. These objects were accomplished by making it possible for any person at small expense and loss of time to patent his invention, thereby receiving a national guaranty that he might monopolize it for purposes of manufacture and sale for a definite period of years. As patents are on record, at the expiration of the set time the invention becomes public property. This system encouraged inventiveness, discouraged the older notion of retaining

the invention as a secret, and provided that all such achievements automatically become public possessions. The results give ample testimony to the wisdom of legislation which takes into account human nature and stimulates its activity by reward.

Science Should Be Furthered.—Such an illustration of wise legislation suggests that society is becoming strongly telic and constructive in its economic sphere. Certainly the best thought and keenest energy of statesmen have been expended in that direction, and much may be expected within the next few years. As new achievements in science and invention are the essentials for wider economic success, much could probably be done by a more vigorous emphasis on scientific studies, by multiplying laboratories for research; by teaching in the schools the principles underlying invention, so as to stimulate inventive minds to activity; and by devising, if possible, a method whereby inventions might at once become public, in place of authorizing a temporary monopoly. For, at present, inventors seldom reap due rewards, their inventions are secured by keen business men with greater facilities for manufacture and sale, who by well-known devices, such as protracted litigation, manage to monopolize the essential patents of an industry, thereby exploiting the public for private gain for long periods of years. If society itself could immediately gain the benefits of an invention by bestowing directly on the inventor a suitable reward, the social benefits would be almost beyond computation. Production would be competitive rather than monopolistic and should result in vastly increased use through the absence of monopolistic prices. In science professional pride is now set against secrecy and pecuniary reward for scien-

tific discoveries, and added reputation is considered full compensation for mental toil. It may be that in economic life also, renown, and recognition by some honorable society, may later be deemed ample reward for a great invention, and that inventors will as freely give to the public their inventions as scientists now proclaim their discoveries. Meanwhile a nation may well prepare for such an age by constructively seeking to develop to the utmost the economic and inventive capacity of the people, by stimulating mental activity, and by wise education.

Education for Economic Life.—The constructive aspect of social activity, as far as it affects economic conditions, can also be seen in the social encouragement of industrial education. As long as economic knowledge is simple, and competition is chiefly domestic, a nation may with comparative safety leave instruction to private initiative, either that of the individual or of a social group. If an individual desires to enter a certain occupation he will strive to learn the business; if a group desires to attract members into its occupation it will offer instruction as an inducement. As complexity in knowledge develops, private initiative in the same way will develop schools, specialized so as to meet the demands of the economic world, and these will give instruction in the technique of the occupation in demand. In this way there arise private schools for the professions, for commerce and manufactures, and for the skilled trades.

The State's Share in This Education.—As the social importance of these becomes clearer, a demand arises that the state recognize their utility by assisting them. The state therefore begins to assume a constructive attitude toward such education. If the profits of the school

are devoted not to private gain but to educational purposes the state may grant exemption from taxation as an encouragement in social service—which is virtually a public grant for economic education. Or again, the state may contribute directly toward the expense of such education, reserving sometimes the right to supervise the management of the school. As competition becomes foreign, as well as domestic, and economic matters increasingly complex and scientific, private enterprise for lack of endowment fails to give satisfactory instruction for small tuitional fees. In consequence there comes an insistent demand that the state itself take charge of such education. If trade-unions are powerful and opposed to technical instruction by the state, the path of least resistance is for the state to assume the support of professional and highly technical schools, and of instruction in the broader economic fields not dominated by the unions, such fields, *e.g.*, as agriculture and commerce. The first stage, therefore, in this movement is the promotion of professional, commercial, engineering, and agricultural training schools. The next step is to give generalized instruction in the use of tools, and special instruction in certain aspects of the higher trades involving drawing and design,—the artistic industries. Finally, as the opposition of trade-unionism dies away, special instruction in the trades themselves may be given, first in the form of lectures to workingmen on the higher aspects of the trade, and then distinct instruction to the young in the trade itself through technical, vocational, or half-time schools. In the same manner the army and especially the navy become training schools for the skilled trades required by those branches of the service. Another

development arises when the government organizes an administrative department ⁴ especially devoted to the promotion of economic and labor interests. This may serve as a clearing house for information bearing on scientific farming and marketing, and on trade and commerce, supplying knowledge of market demands,⁵ and may act as an agent for industrial and labor interests in voicing their demands for legislation. Again, these departments, assisted by technical schools, may make scientific investigations, so as to prevent disputes and to assist economic interests by expert advice.

⁴Such as our national Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor.

⁵See, for illustrations, American consular reports, published in the daily Commerce Reports issued by the United States Department of Commerce.

CHAPTER XXIX

EDUCATIONAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL PROGRESS

The economic is an important factor in social progress, but education is its complement. At the outset it should be stated that sociology is not merely concerned with that division of social phenomena included under the term education. The science of education devotes itself mainly to the kind of education imparted by the ordinary schools of a national system of education. In these, aside from those for industrial and technical education, instruction is given in the simpler traditional knowledge of society, and chiefly for economic and civic purposes. It consists in the main of linguistics and mathematics, eked out by a slight amount of scientific and cultural information. The wisdom of present methods and courses of study is seriously questioned by many, as well as their utility for industrial life or for a cultural civilization. Unquestionably the demand for a more socialized education is voicing itself in many directions, awaiting chiefly proper text-books and methods, as well as teachers trained in the principles of sociology. The whole problem of public education, however, is outside the immediate province of sociology, except in so far as its principles may prove helpful in determining the policy of an educational system.

The Purpose of Public Education.—Since every formal system of education embodies a telic policy and

implies that society has a distinct end in mind, that end should be clear, and the means of attaining the end should be the best possible under the circumstances. In the opinion of some, public education is fundamentally intended as a basis for economic life, with such civic information as may be necessary for citizenship. By contrast education should be considered as a system for the preparation of social beings for social life, which, of course, will include the economic and the civic. School administration, however, is regularly static and innovations enter slowly, yet movements away from the old are clearly in evidence. The trend toward industrial education is obvious, and changes working towards a social and a cultural education are equally well marked. The church, for example, is losing its control over education and, having no longer compulsory authority, it must teach morals and religion to the young attractively, and without dogmatism; in the schools themselves a moral change is indicated by the fact that chastisement and unintelligent drudgery begin to yield to an emphasis on self-control and incitement of interest; sciences with their fields of concrete knowledge are replacing the former undue emphasis on linguistics and irksome disciplinary studies; and æsthetic training and stimulation of thought-processes are driving out memorization and task work. There is a movement to emphasize a knowledge of the achievements of civilization rather than a dull routine of meaningless details. Sociology naturally favors this stress on social fundamentals, representing the dynamic, progressive quality of the social mind, without which static conditions would prevail. Much of the other sort of knowledge is acquired easily under the domestic, economic, and recreational environment of early years, if

these are at all what they should be; and schools should merely supplement this natural training, adding also an increasing emphasis on scientific teachings in their simple fundamental forms and on the cultural ideals of higher civilization. No system of education is worthy of the name which fails to give its pupils an appreciation of the earth on which they live and its cosmic environment, or fails to arouse the imaginative and the ideal, and to give glimpses of the world of thought. The human mind naturally begins to reach after the cultural in the early years of adolescence, while the concrete sciences and social activities appeal throughout the entire period of growth.

Social Education.—Again, stress should be placed on the fact that the human mind grows and achieves only as it comes in contact with its social environment. A mind in contact only with the petty, the degrading, or the narrowness of a one-sided environment remains aborted throughout life. The greatest waste in society to-day is, after all, in the innumerable potentialities of human mentality that lie undeveloped through the lack of a stimulating environment. Through a system of socialized education applying the rapidly developing principles of social psychology, each generation should be taught to comprehend the unity rather than the discord of social life, it should appreciate its relations to the plant and animal world, the importance and interdependence of the social institutions that train and control its activities, and the necessity of making these its agents in policies of social improvement. The present need is not so much for an accumulation of additional information to be stored away on the shelves of our libraries, as for the wide diffusion and personal absorption of

what knowledge already exists. Creative minds, in any case, will, without prodding, add continually to the world's supply of knowledge, but if the average person through social education acquired a social attitude of mind and understood with some clearness the social panorama before him, civilization would make an immense leap forward. Social ignorance is the great handicap to social progress. The great social evils are creations of human ignorance and can be banished only as the average man sees the reasons why they exist and learns the art of modifying the conditions that make them. It is not sufficient that this knowledge be held by the few, it must become a common possession, so that public opinion, rightly informed, will spontaneously sanction the demand for their elimination. In the same manner a careful social education, made general and reiterated through the press and the platform, would enable persons constructively to devise policies of social betterment. Success in the attainment of ends would develop a belief in social telesis, so that telic policies would be supported by a public opinion constantly growing in intelligence through studies of causes and conditions.

Supposed Antagonism of Utility and Culture.—

There are many who, curiously enough, assume that there is a natural antagonism between utility and culture. Like Mr. Gradgrind,¹ who preferred facts to theories and figures to fancies, they believe that no instruction is good unless it has a market value and is presented in unattractive form and driven in by sternness and threat. But a wiser psychology insists that the mind in its development follows a natural order,

¹Dickens' *Hard Times*. "Thomas Gradgrind, sir—a man of realities, a man of facts and calculations."

and should be supplied always with a mental diet suited to its stage of life, so that the child in its growth will in a sense hunger and thirst after knowledge. With that as an ideal, in early years well-directed play, the use of tools to some extent, the simple principles of science and of human industry, training in rhythmic movements and sounds, and the beauty of color and form, might be imparted as fundamentals, leaving as incidental the knowledge of written language and arithmetic, until the mind demanded them for use and acquired them with ease. Under such a training there would be no necessary opposition between the useful and the attractive. The youth who passed into the industries would carry with them an idea of beauty and knowledge that would be felt in their work, and those passing on to higher education would have as a basis a knowledge of tools and industry that would help to bridge the chasm between the economic and the cultural worlds. Certainly nothing can be more disheartening than the dull apathy of those legions of citizens who have been "educated" under the present system, but who never caught the gleam of inspiration, nor thought of school or college except as a place of punishment and detention. Like Bunyan's atheist, they traveled the road that leads to paradise, but after reaching the gates of it they turned back and reported its non-existence. It is useless to disguise the many failures of education by charging them to the stupidity of pupils. Pupils are often stupid because of physical defect or malnutrition,² but failure is too often due to a defective course of study and to the incompetency of poorly paid and wretchedly trained

² For a careful study on this topic, see A. W. Smyth, *Physical Deterioration*.

teachers, who yet are struggling forward towards the time when teaching will be, as Plato argued, the profession most deserving of honor in the state.

Rise of Cultural Ideals.—Although sociology is deeply interested in the results obtained from industrial and public education, there is another field of knowledge, which has vital importance to social progress. It will be remembered that the rise of a leisure class was noted as one of the most important achievements of early civilization. In its beginnings it was made up of forceful, brainy men, who for selfish purposes exploited their fellows in war or slavery, thereby growing wealthy through injustice. Of course, as individuals they deserve simply condemnation by modern standards, but, out of the system thus established, grew a class of persons who, freed from economic strain, devoted themselves to thought, outside of the field of war and industrial toil.^a Out of their speculations on the mysteries in nature and in the human mind and on the bases for moral and social systems, there slowly developed empirical sciences and philosophies, ideals of goodness, beauty and truth, and laws that seemed to them eternal.

The Errors of Past Civilization.—One should hesitate to censure unduly the blunders of a genetic development. In such an age men are prone to assume that the knowledge they have is absolute, lacking as they

^aHistorically such classes would best be illustrated by the priesthood, such as the hierarchy of ancient Egypt, for example, or by the Greek philosophers. In more modern times our scientists, thinkers, artists, and moral and religious leaders are seldom engaged in industrial occupations. They receive support from some university or ecclesiastical organization in order that they may devote themselves to cultural achievement. The leading thinkers in great universities are, for example, seldom expected to teach more than six hours per week. Their real work is in the study or the laboratory.

do historical perspective and facility in prevision. Because of that fact, however, it was natural that the teachings of great thinkers in static civilization should have developed into settled dogmas, against which no one must raise his voice. Yet in every dynamic age, aroused by the clash of changing conditions, new thinkers with true insight and daring promulgated wiser teachings, even though, like Socrates, they were considered "impious and perverters of the youth." Through such persons dogma was broken down, and newer truths passed into social consciousness.⁴ As in all such genetic movements, progress was slow. The influence of the innovator was weak in comparison with the power of static thought, which retarded advancement many centuries by repression and persecution. Fortunately for progressive civilization, the invention of printing broke the power of dogmatism, and after a struggle of five hundred years the printed page and the voice have become free, never again to be suppressed wherever civilization is advancing. While, therefore, those who believe that truth has been finally ascertained, whether in science or theology, may, like the decrepit giant of Bunyan, mumble at passers-by, they can no longer bar the way of travelers to a larger knowledge of life. This development probably marks the beginning of the end of genetic thought as characteristic of society. We are passing into an age when society, becoming self-conscious of its destiny, is aiming to enlarge its mental activity in accord with well-planned ends.

Social Value of the Ideas of Culture.—In order to do so, however, it must "take account of stock." Now

⁴ As illustrations of this may be noted Edward Clodd, *Pioneers of Evolution from Thales to Huxley*, and Andrew D. White's *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom*.

the most valuable possession society has is its mass of cultural ideas. Its greatest men are those who think out new thoughts and add to the sum total of human achievement. Sociology's chief interest in education is to see to it that these great ideas be enlarged, unified, taught, and utilized for social progress. It is interested in the rise of men who will add to these ideas, it desires the broadening of scientific knowledge, and the multiplication of inventions for lifting from human shoulders the necessity of wearisome, physical toil, so that the people as a whole may enjoy leisure. In its philosophic aspect it anticipates the time when the great truths of ethics, religion, and philosophy⁶ may be presented so clearly and so generally to the human mind that men may emancipate themselves from bondage to ignorance, and become free in will and mind. The education, therefore, in which sociology is directly interested is not that taught in the schools, fundamental though it is, but rather the teaching of those ideas that arouse men, as Kant put it, "from dogmatic slumber," and inspire in them a desire to engage in the never-ending search for the holy grail of science and philosophy.

Agencies for Education.—This education is not necessarily imparted merely in schools and colleges, where instruction is so largely traditional, but is carried on also in laboratory and factory, in libraries, art centers, in private study, and in great correspondence schools. It comes through the printing press and in the various kinds of æsthetic enjoyment—in the rhythm of motion and in the joyous appreciation of form, color, and sound,

⁶ Note as attempts in this direction the several works by John Beattie Crozier, *e.g.*, *Civilization and Progress*, and *History of Intellectual Development on the Lines of Modern Evolution*, vol. I.

or even in the games that develop moral qualities, as well as on the platform where great issues are discussed. Our present dynamic civilization is animated through and through by a desire for knowledge, and along with much that is useless and even injurious, it is seeking to develop its knowledge of the effects of social achievement. Great economic changes involve the readjustment of state, church, family, and school. As these readjust themselves, so as to harmonize with better economic conditions, movements to moralize and beautify life should arise in natural order, and finally should come great philosophies to explain and unify past achievements. First, the inventor and the scientist, as sappers and engineers to prepare the way, then reorganized institutions to retain what has been gained, and finally, a philosophy to unify the work and to forecast the forward movement.

Scientific Knowledge.—This order of development, it may be seen, is implied in the serial order of the sciences. If we look at these once more the interdependence of all knowledge is evident. Before society can make a great advance in economic and cultural achievement, it must broaden its scientific knowledge. Geological study will give more complete information about the earth's strata and the wealth of minerals buried in them; physics must discover yet more in regard to cosmic energy and how it may be comprehended and forced to serve human ends, as light, heat, and power; chemistry must show the new possibilities for manufacturing and invention; biological science must add to our knowledge of the laws of plant and animal life, in order that we may eradicate the diseases of organic structures and constructively develop through the use of natural energy a more abundant food supply and a

better racial stock; while psychology must discover how mankind may treble or quadruple its capacity for thought. Only as these sciences add achievement to achievement can economic and political institutions coöperate to build up a favorable basis for the development of a vigorous racial stock, whose every impulse will tend toward activity, so as to overcome the inertia of centuries of static civilization. Needless to say that under such conditions, properly guided for common enjoyment, there could not help but come a great outburst of cultural civilization. Scientific knowledge is a great moralizer, and while simple morals are best taught through social imitation, ethical standards are far better promulgated through science. It needs no prophet to foretell that if a vigorous race, morally and mentally capable, surrounded by our modern wealth of learning, saw itself in the midst of a progressive age, its bounding energy would add achievement after achievement in the arts, in religion, and in philosophy. It is not the Ghetto or the slum that produces our best thought, but the ease of leisure, the environment of culture, and a deathless ambition to make human life worth the living. Happiness, not misery, is the spur to higher achievement.

Telic Multiplication of Achievement.—With respect to the achievemental ideas of society, it is needless to expect anything but the slow and tortuous movement of genetic development, unless society definitely undertakes to see to it that its great truths are developed and taught. The time must come when the broadening of knowledge may be definitely undertaken by the state itself, but as long as its interests are chiefly warlike and economic, it can give small attention to matters fundamentally more important. As war dies out and economic

development becomes more scientifically organized, the state will turn more and more to the moralizing and beautifying⁶ of the conditions of life. Meanwhile, as always in history, that stage must be preceded by the movement of individuals and voluntary groups, each furthering a special improvement. But these numerous agencies in time are unified, and great provincial, national, and even international organizations develop, to systematize telic activity. Our age will soon be in the midst of this period, and higher cultural achievements will multiply by leaps and bounds. Such achievements as these may be made by individuals, and by social groups, as well as by society as a whole. The number of persons devoted to the possibility of some achievement is relatively small. There always will be multitudes to "hold the fort," but not many willing to join the "forlorn hope." Still, the test of civilization, as well as of bravery, is willingness to expend energy and one's self in the attempt to push forward the van of progress. For this reason the enlightened fraction of the world's population has always held as its real heroes those who in study or laboratory have painfully worked out the great discoveries in science, art, invention, and philosophy, that collectively make men but "little lower than the angels." A civilization is sound as long as it is rearing men and women who neglect bodily ease to search out the possibilities in radium or electricity, the significance of the microbe in disease, or who plan a national banking system, or an improvement in law; or discover scientific methods for the reduction of the death rate; or who enrich life by achievements in the fine arts. Immediate

⁶ See, for example, Charles Mulford Robinson, *Modern Civic Art*.

results matter little; if only civilization has such workers its progress is sure. The contrary is true when men become self-satisfied and devote themselves to the classification of the knowledge of their fathers. A man in love with his pedigree may feel sure that the best part of him is buried with his ancestry. When civilization turns its face toward the past, it is a sure indication that the times are decadent and that persons prefer the ease of atrophy to nobler ambitions.

Group Achievement.—It is a hopeful sign of the times that individual energy is being powerfully stimulated and supplemented by group activity. Throughout higher civilization there are numerous institutions for scientific investigation, for the impartation of systematic information in respect to achievement, and for the stimulation of others to aid directly or indirectly in the forward work of civilization. In the laboratories of the great universities and foundations for scientific research, in experimental departments of manufactories, in libraries, and in art centers men are supported by group funds to work out the problems of civilization.

Achievement Through the State.—A similar work, though more restricted, is being done by States, which through national universities, scientific bureaus, and commissions for research are adding to the common stock of achievement. Unquestionably the State will in the future take an increasingly larger part in this, but should never be allowed to monopolize it lest it tend to develop fixed standards. The very fact that it represents the nation as a whole tends to make it somewhat conservative and less prone to experiment with the new. Freedom of thought and activity are essential to high attainment, and for some generations at least the initiative

of individuals and voluntary groups will prove more trustworthy than a well-intentioned government handicapped by general inertia and the opposition of affected interests. If the time should ever come when state, college, and church shall have freed themselves from the notion that there are some laws, institutions, and dogmas "too sacred to be discussed," and shall have adopted the scientific idea that teachings are always to be held open for more light and knowledge, then it may be possible to work entirely through these for achievement. As Sir Thomas More, however, once wrote, "There are many things . . . that I rather wish than hope to see followed in our governments."⁷ As long as a curriculum is a time-honored institution, or a government perfect in its own eyes, or a religion so true that its dogmas are taught to unthinking children, it may be necessary at times for individuals and groups to nail their protest to the door, and to proclaim a newer teaching which, like Virgil's *fama*, will gain strength by discussion.⁸

Class or General Education.—Should higher education be imparted to all the members of a social group or to a class only?⁹ The answer of genetic civilization is very clear; industrial and economic training should be given to the masses, cultural training to the few. If society rested satisfied with this reply, it would at once proceed to divide its educational system into two parts: instruction in the trades for the many, and a "classical course" for the children of leisure, who should be kept from the defilement of industrial pursuits. Indeed, educational systems readily and naturally incline in that

⁷ *Utopia*, at the end.

⁸ Book IV, l, 175; *virisque adquirit eundo*.

⁹ On this point see Mackenzie's *Social Philosophy*, Chap. VI, Part III.

direction. To think otherwise in fact really requires an effort of the social will and a clear perception of an ideal to be attained. This ideal in opposition to genetic civilization is supplied by the democratic humanitarian movement of recent centuries, which exalts as an ideal an appropriate opportunity for all, irrespective of social station. Obviously this ideal is as yet impracticable in complete application, but in education an approximation to it is possible through free public schools and the ease with which, in some countries at least, persons of small means may obtain education in college or university.

Social Importance of the Democratic Ideal.—Since the ideal of democracy is from the sociological standpoint a matter of fundamental importance, it makes great difference whether cultural knowledge is open to the many or the few. The reason has already been partially explained. Great achievements are not made by humdrum minds but by mean of genius. Talent is not confined to the descendants of the members of the leisure class only, but is displayed by the sons of the poor, who in their bitter experience often develop a type of mentality potent with genius. Yet if class lines are sharply drawn and cultural opportunities are scantily offered to the poor, hard toil and the lack of a stimulating environment depress natural capacity. In consequence, a powerful brain, able to make great achievement under proper conditions, becomes warped; and, blindly fretting with discontent, turns against existing institutions, and may become rabidly hostile to society. The social loss is not simply, therefore, in achievements not made, but in avoidable friction and turbulence. From either standpoint the waste is unnecessary. If, as a matter of telic policy, a distinct attempt were made to impart to all

members of society, rich and poor, male and female, an opportunity in their youth to come into contact with a stimulating cultural environment through wiser and larger educational facilities; and if the brightest were carefully trained to see the boundless opportunities lying before them in the economic and cultural worlds, certain effects would inevitably follow. There would be a greater refinement and morality among the people as a whole; many would become far more capable workers, parents and citizens; and still others would carry out ambitions and desires, leading toward social achievement. Occasionally from the ranks would rise a poet or an inventor, a statesman or a philosopher, who would leave an immortal name. If a nation did nothing more than to give systematic and scientific training in the industries, labor-saving devices would probably multiply in great number, for many workingmen have natural ingenuity and see possible improvements in the machinery they handle, but lack the knowledge necessary to bring their ideas to fruition. When the unskilled become skilled and the skilled become scientific, the worst part of the social problem will be solved. When all citizens through social and civic agencies are brought into contact with the best in civilization, democracy will prove its utility and justify the visions of men like Jefferson and Lincoln, who trusted even the people of their time.

CHAPTER XXX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Beginnings of Sociology.—In the previous chapters an attempt has been made to call attention to the many-sided aspects of sociology, to show its simple beginnings in ancient social speculation and, as modern sciences developed, to indicate how a demand arose for a synthesizing, anthropocentric interpretation of social phenomena, which in due time called itself a science and assumed the name of sociology. The new science, as systematized by Comte, received in England an economic impress from John Stuart Mill and met a rival in Spencer's system of sociology, based on his theory of evolution and influenced by the biological Darwinian age of natural selection. In both Comte's and Spencer's systems of sociology stress was placed on a classification of sciences, emphasizing the unity of all knowledge, a point of view continued by Lester F. Ward in his system of sociology. Through Spencer also came a definite classification and study of social institutions and this precedent was followed later by other sociologists, classifying social phenomena, institutions, forces, and interests. The last third of the Nineteenth Century brought emphasis on organic analogies, varying from the biological extremes of Spencer and Schäffle on the one hand, to the psychic organizations described by Giddings and by Mackenzie.¹

¹ In his *Introduction to Social Philosophy*, Chap. III.

Later Developments.—Meanwhile a psychological influence began to make itself felt, first through Lester F. Ward's efforts to show the psychological foundations for sociology and the necessity for education as a basis for social progress, and then secondly, through Tarde's study of the laws of imitation, which exerted so powerful an influence in the development of social psychology. About the same time Gumpłowicz advanced his teachings respecting social groups and the struggles of races as an explanation of social evolution. In the last decade of the Nineteenth Century was issued Gidding's *Principles of Sociology*, with its theory of the consciousness of kind and his splendid study of the historical evolution of society; and in the same year (1896) came Patten's *Theory of Social Forces* based on a pain and pleasure economy. These works, along with many others referred to in other places, unitedly gave form, content, a point of view, and an aim for the new science, which was strengthened from an ethical viewpoint by Stuckenberg² and Small, the latter also stressing vigorously the methodology of the science and, along with Ratzenhofer, the interpretation of the social processes from the standpoint of interests.

During the entire sociological period many other influences brought in their several points of view, such as the English coöperative movement of Robert Owen and Holyoake; Marxian socialism with its discussions of class struggle and economic determinism; social interpretations of humanitarianism, religion, and philanthropy; anthropological studies of all sorts, throwing light on early civilization; and the slow transformation of English individualism into studies of the *socius*, the group, and

² *Sociology*, vol. ii.

social ascendancy or control of society over its individual members.

Theories of Superiority.—Meanwhile, Darwinian hypotheses had given rise to a many sided stress on the “surviving fit.” Nietzschean philosophy, for example, stressed the superman; Gumpłowicz, the superior race; Veblen, the Leisure Class; and Galton made a careful study of “Hereditary Genius.” Owing to these influences came discussions of leadership through individual, class, or race and their place in furthering or hindering social progress. In *Applied Sociology* (Part II) Lester F. Ward made a careful study of the literature of genius, and contrasted the respective merits of “nature and nurture,” arguing in behalf of potential genius and its need of a befitting environment.

Instruction in Sociology.—In the United States within the last twenty years, chiefly through the influence of graduate schools of sociology, there has come a rapid multiplication of departments of sociology in our colleges and universities, so that through these an educated public opinion is passing into public and professional life.^{*} This is supplemented by the popularizing of social teachings through the novel, the magazine, and the “featuring” of newspapers. Numerous reform and philanthropic organizations of all sorts are also spreading broadcast information about their special movements. All this results in a general public opinion favorable to

^{*}In the *American Journal of Sociology*, note, for example, the following articles: F. L. Tolman, *The Study of Sociology in Institutions of Learning in the United States*, May, July, September, 1902. January, 1903. L. L. Bernard, *The Teaching of Sociology in the United States*, September, 1909. Also *The Teaching of Sociology in Southern Colleges and Universities*, January, 1918. F. R. Clow, *Sociology in Normal Schools*, September, 1910, and March, 1920.

social reforms and social movements, and to sociological interpretations of current happenings and past history. This movement towards a socialization of the popular point of view is merely in its beginnings. The great need for another generation at least will be a continued emphasis on a social attitude of mind through the many aspects of social study in all the grades of our public educational system and in the numerous professional schools of the land. The lawyer, the physician, the clergyman, and especially the teacher should have impressed on them social interpretations of their future vocations, so that they may view themselves, not as competing individuals struggling competitively for survival, but as members of integral groups unitedly forming a social unity, and stressing the principles of social coöperation, social obligation, and a common interest in telic progress.

There is no inherent necessity for the existence of exploitation, ignorance, and vicious excesses in social life. Yet our numerous social evils will remain permanently with us unless society socializes human desires and interests. Modern psychology makes clear the possibility of educating and directing these towards social rather than anti-social purposes. The psychology of the Freudian school frowns on the suppression of desires and aims to show how the evil in man may be sublimated into useful directions. Behaviorism seeks to ascertain the objective conditions and psychic desires that lie back of social activities, and social psychology shows how group control may mold and fashion each newer generation, through the pressure of the myriad forms of public opinion.

Social Progress Not Inevitable.—Yet the inevitability of social progress should never be assumed, least

of all for any given national group or type of civilization. Development is genetic rather than telic, and genetic development is slow and erratic, destroying almost as rapidly as it builds. Nations characterized by natural, spontaneous, genetic movement are more likely to "decline and fall," than to "rise." Progress, to be consistently so, must be telic, previsional, with well-defined aim and the bases that make progress possible must be understood. These have for the most part been mentioned or discussed in previous pages and will now briefly be enumerated so as to summarize the conditions for progress. ✓

Importance of Physical Environment.—In the first place, in a eudemic study stress must be placed on the importance of the physical aspects of nature; climatic conditions, whether humid or dry, hot or cold, uniform or varied; geologic wealth in the form of mines, oils, fuels, and building stone; the topography of the land, including its plains and mountains, its seacoast, lakes, and streams; fertile soils, the flora and fauna of the land, the fisheries of the sea and the forests with their wealth of timber. These and other gifts from nature are the chief source of national welfare for they are the bases of life and should be utilized wisely, with an eye to the future, conserved whenever possible, and developed through science into permanent sources of wealth. History is full of illustrations of nations that wasted their natural resources prodigally and then declined in power and numbers through the exhaustion of the soil and the desiccation of streams, brought about by the wanton destruction of forests and neglect of water supplies.⁴ The policy of the Netherlands in reclaiming lands from

⁴ See Huntington's *Pulse of Asia* for illustrations.

the sea and protecting them through dykes and canals, shows how nations should study their natural resources and see the possibilities of conservation and improvement, thus safeguarding and strengthening national life. In the United States, for example, one should expect from national forethought, the careful husbanding of the natural wealth under the soil; the preservation of our forests by scientific cutting and replanting; the canalization or embankment of streams, with suitable reservoirs and dams, so as to save the soil from erosion and to furnish waters for irrigation or power; the construction of artificial harbors when necessary, and a network of roads, tunnels, and canals, so as to make easy transportation and intercommunication throughout the entire national area.

Necessity of Food Supplies.—Secondly, attention must be given to the production of foods as the prime necessity for a large population. Food supplies should always be abundant in proportion to population, even if prohibitions on the exportation of foods become temporarily necessary. Far greater attention should be given to the building up of a food-raising population, avoiding as far as possible, for safety's sake, a system whereby the mass of foods must be imported. Nor is it enough to lay stress on production only, attention should be given to the multiplication and regulation of the markets and to efficient transportation from food centers to the markets. If transportation and marketing are efficient, production will take care of itself under the law of supply and demand. At the same time governmental agricultural schools can do much to aid production through a study of soils and experimentation in respect to best crops, and through the importation of

blooded stock for breeding purposes and new varieties of vegetal foods and fruits suited to national soil and climate. Tropical productions to be sure, such as coffee and fruit, may have to be imported, but the bulk of staple foods should be produced on national soil, unless other conditions necessitate a different policy.

Need of Racial Vigor.—Thirdly, too much attention can hardly be given to questions of racial vigor and the health of the population. Society must be made up in the main of vigorous racial stocks, freed from the fear of starvation and from a dreary routine of endless toil. Healthy bodies, sound minds, and leisure are the social essentials for cultural achievement and civilization. This standard is by no means so impossible of attainment as it may seem. The laws of physical development are so well understood to-day that, other things being equal, there is no reason why society should not definitely proceed to build up racial physique, aided by the youthful science of eugenics. Pure-food laws; the study of household economics, including dietetics; gymnasia of all sorts; out-of-door recreations and games; parks and summer vacations for purposes of rest; all these modern movements aim to build up a national physique. The real difficulty is that a large part of the racial stock, because of its low economic status, is debarred from these benefits. Sickness, disease, and industrial accidents are severe handicaps involving enormous waste and are largely unnecessary. Efficient health departments, well financed, and regulations, enforced by an intelligent public opinion might almost bring about a condition like that in Butler's *Erewon*, where those afflicted with sickness were treated as criminals, because through their carelessness others were exposed to danger.

Mentality of the Race.—Fourthly, racial vigor should not be considered as merely physical. A good average mentality with a fair percentage of talent and genius is necessarily important for social progress. Negative eugenics may in process of time banish from society its mental weaklings through selective and segregational processes, but the real problem is increasingly to utilize the present waste of potential mental energy, now so largely repressed or else expressed in non-useful or harmful directions. Real national progress will never come until the nation grasps the thought that there are enormous possibilities of national achievement lying dormant in the minds of its unskilled, illiterate, or poorly trained citizens, awaiting only the stimulus of education and environment to call it forth. The undeveloped natural resources of a nation are as nothing compared to the mental resources hidden away and awaiting development. Nothing is so deadening to national enterprise as the incurious stupidity of neglected minds atrophied from disuse. By contrast, a nation that developed general intelligence through education and a stimulating social environment among its citizens and directed their energies towards socially advantageous achievements would easily become a center of high civilization. What progress has come heretofore, has come in the main from the intelligence of the higher classes; when the masses also have suitable opportunities to develop and use their brain capacity, civilization should advance by leaps and bounds.

Social Institutions Should Be Flexible.—Fifthly, our chief social institutions, such as the economic, the familial, the political, the religious, and the educational should adopt dynamic, telic points of view. Admittedly they are conserving institutions and, sometimes with dis-

treasuring tenacity, they hold too long to obsolete rules and systems of organization and to customary, sanctioned methods of functioning. If these institutions were developed, as they were, by comparatively unintelligent generations of former human beings, does it not seem possible that more intelligent later generations may be able to effect improvements? Every institution, voiced by its leaders, should keep an open mind, should be prepared to make modifications in method and organization for the sake of greater efficiency, and should aim to slough off the crude and the outgrown through the process of readaptation to changing conditions. Institutions in any case do change in genetic fashion, but elimination and improvement can become telic even in institutions, if only leaders with vision can interpret the trend of the times and advocate policies of amendment and revision. When institutions not only conserve but also promote social progress, radicalism will cease to inveigh against the "bulwarks of civilization," since these also will have become, like the British Grand Fleet during the war, sentinels apparently at rest, but with power under control ready to advance on summons.

Spiritual Aspect of National Life.—Sixthly, a nation should realize that national life is not merely a matter of eating, sleeping, working, and marrying, but that there is an idealizing, spiritualizing, æsthetic aspect of life even more important than the economic and humdrum routine of daily existence. Daily routine to be sure is basal, but the real joy of life comes when ideals of goodness, beauty, and truth grip the heart and inspire it to live in an inner world in which happiness comes, not from the full stomach or the bank account, but from

the joy of achievement in the fields of the moral, the æsthetic, and the intellectual.

From the time when primitive man in fleeting moments of leisure began to raise interrogations in respect to the uncomprehended about him, the progress of society has become more and more "spiritual" or cultural in kind, absorbing the energy and devotion of its most capable members. Hence the importance of leisure for a progressive society. Increasingly society must become able through economic achievement to supply leisure to its more capable members, through scholarships and fellowships, through guidance and instruction, and through fair financial returns for achievements in science and in art. A salaried clergy furnishes the possibility of moral and religious achievement, and generous prices paid for works of art give leisure and encouragement to those blessed with a creative artistic imagination.

It is, therefore, clearly worth while for society through its institutions to be ever searching among the younger generation for promising youth, touched with the fires of genius, who by right stimulation and training, by contact with brilliant minds and racial achievements, may be spurred on to emulate their predecessors and teachers, so as to make their contribution to social progress. Progress comes by the multiplication of achievement, not material only, but the achievements of moral standards, spiritual intuitions, and artistic creations in architecture, music, sculpture, and painting. For this reason democracy will always need its élite, its leaders in public welfare, so as to keep open the doors of opportunity for all those who can rise above the mediocre.

The Religious Institution.—Thus, society is learning to plan for the sake of a coming world-wide civiliza-

tion. Because of this implicit idealism sociology has sometimes been considered a sort of religion. Comte, the "father of sociology," even worked out a religion of humanity which yet has its votaries in the so-called Positivist Church. Spencer also, in his synthetic philosophy,⁵ could not keep from enunciating a sort of cosmic theology, and his statements about "The Unknowable" used to be widely quoted in theological circles. But sociology proper is not a religion, and in its teachings is plainly inimical to many of the accretions that to-day pass as religion. To the sociologist as such, religion is one of the aspects of social life, and should be studied dispassionately and without prejudice. Religion has its great social institution in the church; it has its law, its customs, its teachings, and its emotions. It has a history of achievement both good and bad, its leisure class and its masses, its slavery and its freedom. It is subject to the law of change, with resultant degeneration and elimination on one hand, and survival through adaptation on the other. Unquestionably the influence of comparative science and philosophy will slowly modify its organization and teachings, just as the rise of the state modified its functions. Yet experience shows that humanity preserves its great historic institutions. After countless generations shall have come and gone, society will still probably have its religion and its church, even though they will widely differ in detail from those now existent.

A Religious Element in Sociology.—Yet, while sociology is not a religion, concerned as it is with humanity and its improvement, it finds much in common with the ethical aspirations of the church, so that

⁵ See his *First Principles*.

the two will inevitably unite in ethical policy in coming years. The ethical generalizations of the great religions are broadening out into a common teaching, and their ethical applications in details are more and more compatible with scientific conclusions. The ethical aims of all religions and sociological teachings will increasingly harmonize, just as the theology of religion and the best teachings of science and philosophy tend to conform. If this be true, there is a sense in which sociology may be looked on as kindred in spirit to ethical religion, since it has implicit in its teachings the future social teachings of the church.

The ultimate harmony of religion and sociology in ethical policy is curiously foreshadowed by a resemblance in their fundamental teachings. Religious teaching, for instance, in general argues that the natural condition of man demands that he repent of past sins, become newly born, as it were, live henceforth a righteous life, and so escape the pain of hell and gain the joy of heaven, thereby winning an eternity for development as against the petty duration of human life.

Sociological Idealism.—The sociological counterpart of this has repeatedly been emphasized in the previous pages. Man is born under natural law, he lives in a pain economy, his environment wars against him, and dooms him to destruction; disease, misery, and vices shorten his days. But there is a call to salvation. In the pulsing brains of the surviving "fit" is born the thought that henceforth man must no longer cringe like a slave at nature's manifestations of power but must comprehend nature and demonstrate his sonship through his creative achievements. By means of his intellect he learns to comprehend nature's laws, utilizes its energy,

and thereby builds up a higher and happier life. He gradually learns to conquer disease and to sublimate vice, and by setting his face toward new ideals he seeks to build up a higher nature that may feel itself to be in harmony with the universe. In so doing man passes from death to life, from a pain economy to a pleasure economy, from genetic to telic development. He no longer fears the hell of nature's eliminating processes, but passes by development into the heaven of achievement. His delight is in overcoming the evil in life, in casting out, as it were, social devils by healing the sick, freeing intellects from captivity, and giving food to hungry minds. Through achievement he adds attainment to attainment, and develops a firmer idealism as he strengthens his mind by social contact and quiet meditation.

He learns also to recognize the fact that humanity should be a unit, and that salvation is not the privilege of the west only, but is for the north and south and east. He sees that mankind is neither black nor white nor yellow nor brown, that it should recognize no distinctions based on sex or race, but that all unitedly may form a common brotherhood who should share their social heritage, changing the selfish exploitation of early years to altruism and social service. Finally he looks forward to the time when man will come into his kingdom; when misery, vice, and human discord shall have been outgrown, and peace, good will, and joyous emulation in achievement will prevail among men. In anticipation he feels himself to be part of this glorified humanity, since he also does his share in the world's work, and builds up, be it by ever so little, the achievement and happiness of mankind. This joy in companionship with men, past, living, or future, is to him immortality, and when death

comes, since he also is a true son of man, and like Moses has caught glimpses of the promised land, he goes gladly, trusting that he may be enrolled in the fellowship of Abou Ben Adhem.*

When sociology lends itself so readily to a sort of religious interpretation of social movements, it is not strange that many persons find in it a kind of inspiration for life. Back of statistics, and the cold logic of science is a belief in the perfectibility of mankind. The perfection of humanity on earth, however, lies far in the future, and it may be that many thousands of years will be needed before its possibilities become real. Yet the human mind is so constituted that it will continue to dream of the good time coming, and, as it frees itself from error and illusion, its utopianism will gradually merge into a science of prevision, and social energy will strive methodically to bring about a social reconstruction, founded on reason, and inspired by the hope of final achievement.

* See Leigh Hunt's poem:

“ . . . I pray thee then,
Write me as one that loves his fellow-men.”

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